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A

SPITAL SERMON,

PREACHED AT

CHRIST CHURCH,

UPON EASTER TUESDAY, APRIL 15, 1800;

TO WHICH ARE ADDED

NOTES,

BY SAMUEL PARR, L.L.D.

Quantùm possumus, boni ac benefici esse meditemur; si quid nobis opum, si quid suppetit copiarum, id non voluptati unius, sed multorum saluti impartiatur. Voluptas enim tam mortalis est, quàm corpus, cui exhibet ministerium. Justitia vero et beneficentia tam immortales, quàm mens et anima, quæ bonis operibus similitudinem Dei assequitur.

LACTANTIUS de Ira Dei. Vol. ii. page 179. Edit. Paris, 1748.

Συμφωνεῖν τοῖς λόγοις (τοῖς περὶ θεωρίας) ἐοίκασιν αἱ τῶν σοφῶν δόξαι. πίστιν μὲν ἔν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχει τινά. τὸ δ' ἀληθὲς ἐν τοῖς πρακτοῖς ἐκ τῶν ἔργων καὶ τῷ ζῆν κρίνεται. ἐν τέτοις γὰρ τὸ κύριον.

ARISTOTLE de Moribus, lib. x. cap. ix. Edit. Duval.

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1801.

5.2.27
26/12/01

TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE

HARVEY CHRISTIAN COMBE, ESQ. M. P.

Lord Mayor of London,

AND TO

THE GOVERNORS OF THE ROYAL HOSPITAL,

WHO ATTENDED HIM AT CHRIST-CHURCH,

ON EASTER TUESDAY LAST,

THE FOLLOWING DISCOURSE,

PUBLISHED AT THEIR REQUEST,

IS RESPECTFULLY DEDICATED,

BY THEIR OBEDIENT SERVANT,

SAMUEL PARR.

Lan St. Frede, Monmouthſhire,
Auguſt 16, 1800.

A

SERMON, &c.

GAL. vi. 10.

"AS WE HAVE, THEREFORE, OPPORTUNITY, LET US DO GOOD UNTO ALL MEN, ESPECIALLY UNTO THEM WHO ARE OF THE HOUSEHOLD OF FAITH."

ENOUGH there is, and more than enough, to humble our pride, and to awaken our caution, when we reflect upon the errors of ingenious men, in their attempts to unfold the moſt familiar operations of the human mind. The eager deſire of paradox; the ambition of aſſigning new terms, or new arrangements, to facts already known; the habit of contemplating a favourite topic in one diſtinct and vivid point of view, while it is diſregarded under all others; a fondneſs for ſimplicity on ſubjects too complicated in their inward ſtructure, or their external relations, to be reduced to any ſingle and uniform principle, have given riſe to numberleſs diſputes in moral, as well as natural philoſophy. But upon no occaſion, perhaps, have the talents of men been more ſtrangely miſemployed, than in tracing the motives by which we are impelled to do good to our fellow-creatures, and adjuſting the extent to which we are capable of doing it.

The Epicureans of old contended that all our views are ſelfiſh, and that to procure for ourſelves pleaſure, or to avert pain from ourſelves, was the ultimate deſign of every action. An opinion not very diſſimilar prevailed among the ſchool-men of the middle age, who repreſented a direct regard to our own happineſs, as the ſole motive by which our wills are determined, and who incautiouſly, but not irreverently, ſpoke even of virtue itſelf, as deſirable chiefly on account of the rewards annexed to it. Theſe theories, the one denying a future ſtate, the other admitting it, yet agreeing ſo far as to reſolve all our agency into the unmixed and unceaſing operations of ſelfiſhneſs, ſlumbered for ſome time in the Chriſtian world. But in the ſeventeenth century they were revived with new modifications, and gradually aſſumed a more formidable aſpect.

"Common reaſon and humanity," ſays Butler, "will have ſome influence upon "mankind, whatever becomes of ſpeculations." Hence, that we never feel the diſintereſted deſire of doing good to any man, is a tenet, which, though profeſſed now and then by the fantaſtic humouriſt, though favoured by the churliſh miſanthrope, though defended by the logical gladiator, and employed, it may be, as an occaſional inſtrument of irritation or impoſture by the wily politician, did not work any important change in

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the ſentiments or habits of a people. But, as opinions of this kind always gain a temporary popularity from their novelty, or even their extravagance, and always produce, too, a partial effect upon conduct, they ought to be refuted. Accordingly, to the credit of our own country, the ſelfiſh ſyſtem was ſucceſsfully combated by men of high reputation for the ſoundneſs of their judgments, and the preciſion of their reaſoning; and, it may be worth while to remark, that in vindicating thoſe moral ſentiments, which are beautifully ſaid to form "the party of mankind againſt vice and "diſorder it's common enemy;" equal abilities were exerted with equal zeal, by writers, whoſe ſentiments upon the abſtruſer points of theology, as connected with metaphyſics, were wholly diſcordant. "That we are made as much for ſociety, and "to do good to our fellow-creatures, as to take care of our own health: that ſelfiſh-"neſs is not to be confounded with ſelf-love: that ſelf-love may mingle and even "co-operate with benevolence: that our ſympathy with others ariſes from the very "conſtitution of our nature, and not from any views of perſonal advantage: that we "feel a pleaſure in doing good to others, becauſe we love them, but do not love them for the ſake of that pleaſure:" theſe are truths, not very ſoon to be diſturbed by the reſtleſſneſs of innovation, or undermined by the craftineſs of ſcepticiſm. The danger, *we* have to apprehend, proceeds from *another* quarter.

In a country not very diſtant, theories of more or leſs value, and with greater or leſs ingenuity, were ſome time ago conſtructed for the improvement of ſociety: and, in the progreſs of ſpeculations, carried on with a glowing and impetuous ſpirit of enthuſiaſm, certain romantic and even pernicious notions were ſtarted, upon the powers with which we are furniſhed, and the obligations by which we are bounden to promote, by *direct* aims, the univerſal good of the ſpecies. How far the advocates for theſe opinions, may have been ſincere and conſiſtent in making them the rule of *public* meaſures, is a point quite foreign to the buſineſs of this day, and, I muſt add, to the *duties of this hallowed place*. It rather becomes us to remember, that the new doctrine of univerſal philanthropy has found its way to our own country, and that whatever changes may have been wrought upon it's ſurface, by the officiouſneſs of admirers, or the dexterity of copyiſts, it ſtill retains ſo much of it's original features, as to remind us whence it came, and to give us an intereſt in conſidering, whither, for a ſeaſon at leaſt, it may ſpread.

If the peculiar circumſtances of the times ſhould induce you to compare the ſelfiſh with the philanthropic ſyſtem, as the latter has been recently taught, you will find that the one never occaſioned ſo much miſchief as it ſeemed to threaten, and that the other will be productive of leſs good than it promiſes, accompanied by a long and portentous train of evils, which had been negligently overlooked, or inſidiouſly diſguiſed by it's panegyriſts. The ſelfiſh, indeed, on it's firſt approach, repels and ſcares us with the ſternneſs of it's appearance; it gives an inſtantaneous alarm to all the centinels, which ſelf-reſpect, as the ally of virtue, has placed around the heart; it ſullies the

the general dignity of our nature, and even ſelfiſhneſs, ſtanding aghaſt at the ſuppoſed extent of her own domain, would, for the moment, be content to hold a divided empire with her more amiable rival. But the philanthropic wears a more engaging form: it announces it's pretenſions in a milder tone: by a thouſand ſecret ſpells, it wins over to it's purpoſes our vanity and our credulity, and from the ſervice in which our affections are uſually engaged, it would decoy them away, by opening to us the proſpect of far mightier atchievements, to be followed by a richer harveſt of glory to ourſelves, and a fuller tide of happineſs diffuſed among our fellow-creatures.

From many of the baneful effects which the ſelfiſh might produce, the authority of public law protects the public welfare; and the crimes to which it might incite us, fall within the reach of definitions and rules. But, in the motives by which the philanthropiſt is impelled, the kind affections may be ſo writhed around the unſocial: in the character of his actions, the freaks of abſurdity may be ſo blended with the outrages of wickedneſs: in their conſequences, evil may have ſuch an alloy from concomitant good, that, if our common ſenſe did not revolt from the incongruous maſs, ſcarcely any judicial or even intellectual proceſs could ſeparate affectation from hypocriſy, deluſion from malignity, that which deſerves only contempt or pity from that which calls aloud for reprobation.

Do you aſk what has led me into this train of reflection? I anſwer, the words of the text, in which we are commanded to "do good unto *all* men, and *eſpecially* unto them "who are of the houſehold of faith:" for, the ſpirit of the firſt propoſition has been violated by thoſe who inſiſt moſt ſtrenuouſly on the letter; and the juſtneſs of the ſecond has been obliquely controverted, or obſcurely and reluctantly admitted. That text, however, like many other paſſages in Scripture, has the ſubſtance, without the form, of genuine philoſophy. In language that is obvious to every underſtanding, it exhibits the reſult of the moſt minute analyſis that can be given of our faculties and duties, as ſocial beings. It contains all that is practicable in the doctrine of general benevolence, and all that is required of us indiſpenſably in the exerciſe of that which is particular. But you will permit me to obſerve, that the words "let us do good" will not convey to you entirely what the Apoſtle meant. The original expreſſion implies not merely "let us *do* good," but, "let us work and labour in doing it," ἐργαζώμεθα τὸ ἀγαθὸν; and to the uſe of that expreſſion St. Paul may have been led by the preceding imagery, where he had ſaid that "what a man ſoweth, that ſhall he reap;" that "he who ſoweth unto the Spirit, ſhall of the Spirit reap life everlaſting;" that "in due ſeaſon we ſhall reap, if we faint not." The metaphors, you ſee, have a ſtrong reſemblance, and are drawn from a common ſource. As to the import of the text, nothing can be more juſt than the condition laid down by the Apoſtle: "let us la-"bour in doing good, *as* we have opportunity:"—nothing more comprehenſive than the precept, let the good be done "unto all men:"—nothing more proper than the preference which is eſpecially given to "them, who are of the houſehold of faith."

In the further profecution of the fubjects which the text has fuggefted to us, I fhall firft examine how far, by the conftitution of human nature, and the circumftances of human life, the principles of particular and univerfal benevolence are compatible; and, fecondly, I fhall make fome obfervations upon the charitable inftitution over which you prefide.

Againft the union of our fpecies into one community, where the action of every part would vifibly and immediately affect the whole, innumerable barriers are placed by mountains, deferts, or feas: by differences in climate, foil and fpeech: in phyfical wants; in traditional cuftoms, civil inftitutions, religious opinions, intellectual purfuits, manual employments, and all the various and prominent circumftances which diftinguifh one nation from another. The inconveniencies arifing from this diverfity may be diminifhed, and the benefits (for benefits there are) may be multiplied by mutual, but limited intercourfe; and it deferves to be remarked that the ambition of conquerors and the wifdom of legiflators have ufually paid fome regard to thefe local diftinctions, whether natural or moral. When, therefore, we fpeak about the community of mankind, we ufe the language rather of rhetorical ornament, than of philofophical precifion; and were fuch a community recommended on the plea of giving a wider fcope to the exercife of our benevolent affections, and a more abundant fupply to the happinefs of our fellow-creatures, I fhould adopt the reafoning, which a great writer of antiquity employed againft an imaginary republic, where all children were to be confidered as equally related to all citizens. "In fuch a ftate," he argues, "the principle of affection would be diluted, and, as it were, watery, where the father "could not fay, *my* child, nor the child, my father: for as a little fweet mingled with "much water makes the whole mixture taftelefs, fo would the relation arifing from "the indifcriminate ufe of thefe names, become weak and imperceptible." What filial or parental affection would have been in the commonwealth of Plato, that would our benevolent affections be, diffufed equally to all, if "all people, nations and lan-"guages" were gathered together with the name of one fociety, and under the regulations neceffary to keep it one.

But the moral obligations of men cannot be ftretched beyond their phyfical powers. Here then a queftion arifes, whether according to the prefent conftitution of things, we can be, in any fenfe of the words, required to "do good unto all men." Probable it is that, by the laws of aflociation, the elements of thofe affections, which impel us to "weep with them who weep," and to "rejoice with them who rejoice," were brought into action by events that immediately intereited ourfelves—that produced our own pleafure, or removed our own pain. It muft, however, be allowed that thefe affections, mingled as they may have been originally with other confufed fenfations, gradually put on a more definite form, and become diftinct, entire, ultimate perceptions, without reference, not indeed in their duties, but in their eflence and energies, to any other. When they have been repeatedly exercifed by correfpondent and appropriate objects, reflection arifes, and is followed by a *calm defire* of univerfal good, according

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to the ſame order in which ſelf-love, or the calm deſire of our own good, ſucceeds thoſe gratifications of particular appetites and affections, which are the means of ſatisfaction to ourſelves. Every man, in all probability, has felt ſome degree of univerſal benevolence thus underſtood. Do we not admire the exploits which ſpread happineſs among our fellow-creatures in the ages that are paſt? Do we not love the exalted wiſdom and heroic virtue of thoſe who atchieved them? Do we not approve, and, in ſome meaſure, even partake the gratitude of thoſe who ſhared in their auſpicious effects? When we read of laws and inſtitutions ſucceſsfully eſtabliſhed for the public good, in any foreign kingdom, do we never experience more than the cold aſſent of our judgment? During the "ideal preſence" of the objects, do we not form good wiſhes towards them? Do we not, at the moment, covet a ſort of fellowſhip with them? Do not our boſoms throb with indignation againſt the ferocious oppreſſor or the ſanguinary invader, who would diſturb their peace? In conformity, then, to this part of our nature, which takes an occaſional intereſt in the felicity of ſtrangers, we are commanded by St. Paul to "do good unto all men," and, by a greater than St. Paul, to "love our neighbour "as ourſelves;" and though, in the eſtimation of ſome men, who, according to the language of a Father of the Chriſtian church, "are neither altogether aſleep in folly, "nor ſufficiently awake in the true light of the underſtanding," the precept of our Lord ſhould be defective in what they call philoſophical accuracy, ſufficient it is for every practical purpoſe, and often does it carry the *direct* and *plenary* force of obligation, for the benefit of the very perſons recommended to us in ſyſtems of univerſal philanthropy. It *ſo* far includes all men, that, by implication, *no* man is excluded. For, "who is my neighbour?" Every man, be he countryman or ſtranger, in ſome circumſtances. What is the ground of this neighbourhood? The participation of a common nature, capable of pain and pleaſure.

Conſider the caſe of him who had "fallen among thieves." He was not born in the ſame country with the Samaritan. He did not altogether profeſs the ſame religion. His perſonal merit, his kindred, and his employment were unknown. Yet, when he was in diſtreſs, the Samaritan haſtened to his ſuccour, and the bleſſed Author of Chriſtianity has juſtified the deed. Had he been born in any other country, or profeſſed any other religion, ſtill, by the unalterable laws of nature, his claim to relief was founded on his ſufferings; and by the gracious proviſion of the ſame nature, compaſſion would have led a virtuous ſpectator to relieve him. The *feeling* that prompted the relief is inſeparable from the mind of man. The *obligation* requiring it aroſe in ſtrict conformity with the text, "as we have opportunity, let us do good unto all men."

Again, in the Sermon on the Mount it is ſaid, "Be ye perfect, even as your Father "which is in heaven is perfect." But in what does this perfection conſiſt? To the Creator of the univerſe alone, muſt belong the love of the univerſe, becauſe to the care of the univerſe his omnipotence only is equal. We muſt look, then, for ſome other ſignification of the words, and the context will ſupply it. Our benevolence muſt be promiſcuous.

promiſcuous. It muſt extend to the bad as well as the good, like the benevolence of that Being "who cauſeth the ſun to ſhine, and the rain to deſcend "on the juſt," and "on the unjuſt," To all men we muſt *do* juſtly. We muſt, alſo, *love* mercy, and of mercy it is the peculiar attribute to benefit thoſe who may not deſerve our moral approbation. We muſt love not only "thoſe who love us," for this, the perſons to whom our Lord upon another occaſion addreſſed himſelf, admitted; but thoſe "who hate us," and this they denied or at leaſt doubted; and, what we are thus directed to do as our duty, we are qualified to do by our affections—by the pity which precedes forgiveneſs, and by the good-will which generally follows it. But *thus* to do good, requires the ſtrongeſt exertions. We muſt grapple with our reſentment, ere we *can* do good to thoſe who injure us; and the good to done is conſidered by all moraliſts, as the ſureſt indication of a virtuous diſpoſition, and as the beſt ſecurity for that extenſive benevolence which forwards, as occaſion may require, the intereſts of all mankind. The precepts of Chriſtianity, then, have a marked ſuperiority over the tedious and intricate rules of modern theories. They teach what *is* intelligible,—they enjoin what is practicable,—they do not make the moral worth of the ſufferer the ſole, nor in all caſes, even the chief meaſure of his right to ſuccour. They do not ſtrain or relax the ſprings of our particular affections, but direct them in their proper tone towards their proper objects. They do not bewilder and annoy our minds by throwing compaſſion, or gratitude, or clemency into an hypothetical ſtate of variance with juſtice. They admit the principle of loving thoſe by whom we *are* loved, and they enforce the diſtinct, and certainly not inferior, principle of extending a portion of that love to thoſe, by whom we are "deſpitefully vexed and perſecuted."

Now whether we conſider univerſal benevolence as a quality of nature, or a principle of action, it is highly expedient for us not to miſunderſtand it's properties or it's office. I admit, and I approve of it, as an *emotion* of which general happineſs is the cauſe, but not as a paſſion, of which, according to the uſual order of human affairs, it could often be the object. I approve of it as a diſpoſition to wiſh, and, as opportunity may occur, to deſire and do good, rather than harm, to thoſe with whom we are quite unconnected. I approve of it as a capacity ſometimes to receive uneaſineſs from their pains, and ſatisfaction from their joys; but an uneaſineſs and a ſatisfaction far *leſs* frequent, leſs intenſe, leſs permanent than the uneaſineſs and ſatisfaction which we feel for thoſe around us, and by which we are ſtimulated to act, as we feel, in their behalf.

"A man," ſays the Author of Eccleſiaſtes, "cannot find what is done under the "ſun, though he labour to ſeek it out; yea, though a wiſe man think to know it, yet "he ſhall not be able to find it." Nature therefore preſerved her uſual economy and uſual kindneſs, when ſhe did not ſubject us to any exquiſite or habitual anxiety for an object ſo indiſtinct, ſo huge, ſo far ſurpaſſing our powers of exertion and even apprehenſion as univerſal good. As an aggregate of bleſſings it is indeed ſecured by the aggregate efforts of individuals; juſt as, in the artificial diviſion of labour, through a large

large and complicated ſyſtem, he that attentively performs the taſk allotted to himſelf takes the ſureſt method of contributing moſt amply to the ſucceſs of the whole. But, if this be the caſe, why ſhould we ſhrink from acknowledging that our affections are generally enfeebled by expanſion, and invigorated by compreſſion! The final cauſe of this difference is apparent, for the conſequences of our actions, ſo far as the knowledge of them may be neceſſary to direct the judgment or excite the will, ordinarily lie within a narrow compaſs, and in ſuch actions we are ordinarily engaged.

Experience has taught us to look, ſometimes with jealouſy, and ſometimes with contempt, upon the projects of men whoſe minds have not been matured by long practice or deep wiſdom, for advancing the welfare even of a nation; and ſhould any adventurer ſeriouſly propoſe by his own ſolitary endeavours, to render any *immediate* ſervice to the whole ſpecies, the glaring extravagance of his attempt would hardly be expiated by the poſſible purity of his motives. We ſhould condemn him for folly; we ſhould ſuſpect him of vanity; we ſhould adviſe him to diſtinguiſh between the vigour of enterprize and the hardineſs of infatuation; we ſhould entreat him to exchange ſingularity for common ſenſe; we ſhould think it better for him to "wrap even ten "talents in a napkin," than to laviſh only one without the ſmalleſt chance of advantage.

To me it appears that the modern advocates for univerſal philanthropy have fallen into the error charged upon thoſe who are faſcinated by a violent and extraordinary fondneſs for what a celebrated Author calls "ſome moral ſpecies." Some men, it has been remarked, are hurried into romantic adventures by their exceſſive admiration of fortitude. Others are actuated by a headſtrong zeal for diſſeminating the true religion. Hence, while the only properties, for which fortitude or zeal can be eſteemed, are ſcarcely diſcernible, from the enormous bulkineſs to which they are ſwollen, the ends, to which alone they can be directed uſefully, are overlooked or defeated. The public good is impaired rather than encreaſed, and the claims that other virtues equally obligatory have to our notice, are totally diſregarded. Thus, too, when any dazzling phantoms of univerſal philanthropy have ſeized our attention, the objects that formerly engaged it, ſhrink and fade. All conſiderations of kindred, friends and countrymen, drop from the mind, during the ſtruggles it makes to graſp the collective intereſts of the ſpecies; and when the aſſociation that attached us to them has been diſſolved, the notions we have formed of their comparative inſignificance will prevent them from recovering, I do not ſay any hold whatſoever, but that *ſtrong* and *laſting* hold they once had, upon our conviction and our feelings. Univerſal benevolence, ſhould it, from any ſtrange combination of circumſtances, ever become paſſionate, will, like every other paſſion, "juſtify itſelf:" and the importunity of its demands to obtain a hearing, will be proportionate to the weakneſs of it's cauſe. But what are the conſequences? A perpetual wreſtling for victory between the refinements of ſophiſtry, and the remonſtrances of indignant nature—the agitations of ſecret diſtruſt in opinions, which gain few or no proſelytes, and feelings which excite little or no ſympathy—the neglect of all

the uſual duties by which ſocial life is preſerved or adorned ; and in the purſuit of other duties which are unuſual and indeed imaginary, a ſucceſſion of airy projects, eager hopes, tumultuous efforts and galling diſappointments, ſuch, in truth, as every wiſe man foreſaw, and a good man would rarely commiſerate.

Is it my intention, then to depreciate the propenſity to " do good unto all men," in defiance of the text which commands us to labour in doing it ? No. I mean only to ſtate what, as an incentive to action, it ought to be, and what, as a part of our nature, it really is : and happy were it for thoſe, who ſeem to be the loudeſt in its praiſe, if they practically fulfilled the purpoſes which it unqueſtionably is qualified to anſwer. As a *calm* deſire of general happineſs, it puts us on our guard againſt the ſilent encroachments of ſelf-love, or the calm deſire of our own happineſs—it aſſiſts us in quelling the fury of our malignant paſſions—it raiſes us above the narrow and ſordid aims of our ſelfiſh affections—it impels us to attend to the dictates of our reaſon, when employed in conſidering by what means the welfare of our fellow-creatures may be moſt effectually ſecured—it attaches us to thoſe means, when they are diſcovered, for the ſake of the end—it facilitates and regulates the operations of every amiable, but more confined affection, which may be ſuited to particular caſes, and which produces a greater or leſs quantity of good, and diffuſes it among more or fewer perſons, according to the ſtation in which we are placed, and the powers with which we are endowed—it diſſipates thoſe gloomy views of human follies and human vices, which, by frequent meditation upon them, contract the heart, and infuſe lurking and venomous ſentiments of general ill-will towards our ſpecies—it incites us to take a higher pleaſure, in contemplating the brighter ſide of every man's character—his talents, his attainments, and his virtues—it prepares us for " doing good unto all men, as we have opportunity," without impeding us in our attempts to do it unto " them who are of the houſehold of faith." Inſtead of ſeparating us from thoſe who are nearer, and therefore dearer to us, it eventually forms a cloſer union between them and ourſelves, by repreſenting them to us as parts of a great whole eſtabliſhed and regulated by a common Creator, for the common purpoſe of happineſs to all : and, whether we deliberate before we act, or reflect after we have acted, it gives us a firmer confidence in the utility, a ſtronger love for the moral beauty of thoſe particular affections, which, under the guidance of conſcience, urge us to promote the welfare of their peculiar objects. If the modern philanthropiſts mean thus much only, their words are at a diſtance from their opinions; if they mean more, their opinions are at variance with facts : and I leave them to make their own choice, between ambiguity and errour.

From the view that we have hitherto taken of the ſubject, it appears that God has indeed " made us lower than the angels." But, at the ſame time, and from the ſame proofs, it farther appears, that, if we act up to the purpoſes for which we are made—if " we labour in doing good :"—if we do it, " as we have opportunity," both unto ſtrangers, and " unto them who are of the houſehold of faith ;" it is the intention of the

the ſame God to "crown us with glory and worſhip." Such are the dictates of unperverted reaſon, and ſuch the precepts of pure religion.

The intereſts of kindred, of friends, of benefactors, of countrymen, may, I grant, be inſufficient to fill the capacious mind of a modern ſage, who is accuſtomed to be rapt in beatific viſions of univerſal benevolence, to gaze upon ſome ideal archetype of moral perfection, as men of old ſet before themſelves the image of conſummate eloquence, and to pant, reſtleſs and unſatisfied, till he hath reached the "fulneſs of the "ſtature" of the man of *reaſon*. But to inferior beings, ſuch as we are, a more confined ſphere of agency may not ſeem inconſiderable; and to do good in it, "as we "have opportunity," may require inceſſant labour in the acquiſition of uſeful knowledge—in the cultivation of a ſound judgment—in watchfulneſs over ſelf-love—in reſiſtance to paſſion—and in the habitual exerciſe of prudence, fortitude, juſtice, liberality and mercy. He that "giveth all diligence" to attain even this pittance of imperfect virtue, may have little to dread from contraſt with the panegyriſts of univerſal philanthropy; and he will be content, too, with the imperfect reward of endearing regards from thoſe whom he loves—of unfeigned gratitude from thoſe whom he has endeavoured to ſerve—of eſteem from the wiſe and good, and of approbation from his own heart. At all events, he, in my eſtimation, is a better citizen than they, who brood over the inconveniencies, while they ſlight, and teach others to ſlight, the *numerous* and *ſolid* bleſſings of ſocial life. He is a better religioniſt than they, who place the merit of faith in a vehement, obſtinate, and oſtentatious predilection for unprofitable and unintelligible jargon, or who find no criterion of piety ſo unequivocal, as the rigid obſervance of trifling, irkſome, and debaſing mummeries. He is a better moraliſt than they, who would turn aſide the ſtream of our benevolent affections from it's wonted courſe—ſcatter it abroad over a wide and trackleſs expanſe of ſurface, where it never could nouriſh, nor even penetrate the ſoil—or force it up into thin and fleeting vapours of refinement, from which it ſeldom would deſcend in ſoft and gentle dews of beneficence to refreſh the weary—

"If nature, exclaims the immortal Hooker, ſhould intermit her courſes, and leave, "though it were for a while, the obſervation of her own laws—if the cœleſtial ſphere "ſhould forget it's wonted motions—if the prince of the light of heaven, which now "rejoiceth as a giant to run it's unwearied courſe, ſhould, as it were, through a lan"guid faintneſs, begin to ſtand and to reſt himſelf—if the moon ſhould wander from "her beaten way, the clouds yield no rain, the earth be defeated of every heavenly in"fluence, and the fruits thereof pine away—what would become of man himſelf, "whom theſe things do now ſerve?"

And thus we may aſk, if the elements which give life and vigour to the moral world ſhould be diſſolved—if the mother could forget the child that "hanged from her "breaſts"—if the friend, "with whom we took ſweet counſel together," ſhould forſake us, when we are compelled to beg our daily bread—if they, to whoſe ſuccour we

ran on the firſt ſight of their diſtreſs, and poured " wine and oil into their bleeding " wounds," ſhould ponder, ere they ſtretch forth their hands to reſcue us from wretchedneſs, and pauſe, leſt peradventure ſome other human being might be found a little more virtuous, and a little more miſerable than ourſelves—if the tears of the widow and the cries of the orphan ſhould be diſregarded, till their conduct had paſſed the ordeal of ſome rigid principle, or it *may* be too, of ſome untoward prejudice, in thoſe before whom they lie proſtrate—if they who have trodden the ſame ſoil with ourſelves, ſpoken the ſame language, followed the ſame cuſtoms, enjoyed the ſame rights, obeyed the ſame laws, bowed before the ſame altar, ſhould be no more endeared to us than other men, whoſe kindneſs we have *never* experienced, whoſe faces we have never ſeen, whoſe voices we have never heard—if all theſe things were done under the pretence of ſome obligation, which ſtern, inflexible juſtice lays upon us, to be extreme in marking what is done amiſs, and to weigh every action of man, every motive to act, every conſequence of acting, in the balance which every individual may ſet up within his own boſom for adjuſting in every caſe the direct and moſt efficacious means to promote the general good—what would become of ſociety, which parental affection, which friendſhip, which gratitude, which compaſſion, which patriotiſm do now uphold? how changed would be the ſcenes around us? how blunted the edge of all our finer affections? how ſcanty the ſum of our happineſs? how multiplied and embittered the ſources of our woe?

But between ſuch a ſtate as philoſophy recommends, and that in which the will of the Almighty has placed us, there is fixed a gulph, which neither our ſocial feelings, nor our ſober reaſon will ſuffer us to paſs " into regions of ſorrow and doleful ſhades," where love and mutual confidence can never dwell.

The ſtoics, it has been ſaid, were more ſucceſsful in weakening the tender affections, than in animating men to the ſtronger virtues of fortitude and ſelf-command; and poſſible it is, that the influence of our modern reformers may be greater, in furniſhing their diſciples with pleas for the neglect of their ordinary duties, than in ſtimulating their endeavours for the performance of thoſe which are extraordinary, and perhaps ideal. If indeed the repreſentations we have lately heard of univerſal philanthropy ſerved only to amuſe the fancy of thoſe who approve of them, and to communicate that pleaſure which ariſes from contemplating the magnitude and grandeur of a favorite ſubject, we might be tempted to ſmile at them as groundleſs and harmleſs. But they tend to debaſe the dignity, and to weaken the efficacy of thoſe particular affections, for which we have daily and hourly occaſion in the events of real life. They tempt us to ſubſtitute the eaſe of ſpeculation and the pride of dogmatiſm for the toil of practice. To a claſs of artificial and oſtentatious ſentiments, they give the moſt dangerous triumph over the genuine and ſalutary dictates of nature. They delude and inflame our minds with phariſaical notions of ſuperiour wiſdom and ſuperiour virtue; and what is the worſt of all, they may be uſed as " a cloke to us" for inſenſibility

where

where other men feel, and for negligence where other men act with *viſible* and *uſeful*, though *limited*, effect.

Whether we are induced by an exceſſive zeal for religion, or by a ſuppoſed proficiency in philoſophy, " to think more highly of ourſelves than we ought to think," and " to ſeek the praiſe of men," by affecting to be righteous over much, the haughtineſs of our pretenſions will awaken ſuſpicion in thoſe obſervers who have ſounded moſt ſkilfully the depths of the human heart. No, ſays a celebrated writer of our own country, " I will not be a citizen of the world, I reject with ſcorn that proud " title under which philoſophers conceal an equal indifference to the whole human " race." Beware, ſays a foreign writer, whoſe original and ſublime genius entitles him to a hearing, " beware of thoſe coſmopolites, who deduce from books the far-" fetched obligations of univerſal benevolence, while they neglect their actual duties " to thoſe who are around them." If, to the deciſion of theſe enlightened men, be oppoſed the example of Socrates, who called himſelf " a citizen of the world," the objection is eaſily ſurmounted. The expreſſion, we muſt obſerve, is quoted by other writers, *not* to ſlaken our activity in the ordinary duties of life, but to ſhew that unmerited exile is not intolerable to a virtuous man. Socrates himſelf did not laviſh his time in viſionary ſchemes for the *immediate* good of that large commonwealth, of which he incidentally and rhetorically called himſelf a member. He did not miſemploy his talents in wily inſinuations, or declamatory harangues, to the diſcredit of gratitude or patriotiſm. He obeyed the laws of his country, and even fought in its defence. He did not cheriſh the unbounded love of his ſpecies ſo far, as to experience any torpor in the feelings, any reluctance towards the exertions, any diſtruſt in the principles, which belong to our particular affections. In domeſtic life, he was at leaſt irreproachable, and in the ſentiments of good-will and the interchange of good offices which characterize friendſhip, he was amiable and exemplary.

What Socrates practically was, and even more, we as Chriſtians are bounden to be. We are bounden to " love our neighbour as ourſelves," and to conſider not only relations, friends, and countrymen, but ſtrangers and enemies as inveſted, more or leſs, with the rights of men. We are bounden not merely to wiſh, but to labour, " *as we* " *have opportunity*," for the good of all men. *So* we are bounden to do by the moſt plain and expreſs law; and if the *power* of doing ſo were not given us, the infliction of any penalty for the violation of that law implies ſuch injuſtice, as cannot, without the moſt ſhocking impiety, be aſcribed to the moral Governor of the world.

From the foregoing conſiderations you may perceive what general benevolence, or the calm deſire of " doing good to all men" really is, and how far it coincides, and may even co-operate with our particular affections. It is, however, proper for me to obſerve that the ſame principles, upon which the influence of any of thoſe affections may be defended in any of our ſocial relations, extend their authority in favour of them who are literally " of the houſehold of faith." They to whom the precept was in the

text originally addreſſed, were perſons of obſcure ſtations, and ſcanty fortunes. Spurned by the Gentiles and abhorred by the Jews, they had no refuge but in the pity, no reſources but in the contributions of their Chriſtian Brethren, who were themſelves poor, and therefore could not, without effort, adminiſter relief. But while the minds of all were fraught with a warm and grateful ſenſe of their recent eſcape from the errours of polytheiſm, and of their admiſſion to the knowledge of the pureſt and moſt encouraging truths, no topic, ſurely, could be more *ſeaſonable* than the connection in which they ſtood with their Brethren of the Chriſtian houſehold, and with Chriſt their common head. The obligations which then lay on the poor to aſſiſt the neceſſitous, cannot be weakened by the greater wealth of thoſe among whom Chriſtianity is now profeſſed: and, therefore, without violating the benevolent feelings which intereſt you for other moral relations, we may inſiſt upon the peculiar attention that is due to men, as heirs of the ſame religious promiſes, and even members of the ſame national church.

That our religion, as well as our country, ſhould ſometimes be a ground for preference, will not be diſputed by the philoſophers who contend that "in the partiality "we feel for our remoter kindred and our acquaintance, there is always implied a re- "lation of ſentiment—that we enter eaſily and familiarly into their conceptions, and, "that our imagination paſſing from ſelf, which is ever intimately preſent with us, runs "ſmoothly along the connection, and conceives with full ſympathy the perſon who is "nearly related to ſelf."

Now, in the propenſity of men to form themſelves into religious claſſes—in their eagerneſs about proſelytes, and their hatred of apoſtates—in their willingneſs to ſurrender nearly any rights, and to renounce nearly any opinions, ſooner than thoſe which are connected with their religion—in the fury of the perſecutor, and the patience of the martyr, the ſtrength of the religious ſpirit is equally conſpicuous. However we may try to conceal the fact from others, or even from ourſelves, that ſpirit enters, more or leſs, into almoſt all our attachments and averſions—it mingles not merely with the prejudices of early education, but the habits of maturer age—it influences, in ſome degree, our opinions, upon ſubjects of public as well as private life: and though reflection does correct, and ought to correct it's exceſs, yet, an acute obſerver will generally find ſome laudable and uſeful qualities in thoſe attachments, and a faithful monitor will be unwilling to diſturb them. Surpriſed, indeed, ſhould I be, not at the parſimony, but the inconſiſtency of nature, if ſympathy, which acts ſo powerfully upon other and ſlighter occaſions, ſhould, in points relating to religion, be quite benumbed. Inexplicable to me would be the ſtructure of our minds, if we could forget, or, if without any *ſtrong* feeling of tenderneſs we could remember, that he, who now calls upon us for ſuccour, hath met us again and again in the ſame ſanctuary—hath ſhared with us in the performance of the ſame ſolemn and moſt pleaſing duties—hath joined us in the ſame language, and at the ſame moment, in penitential confeſſion, in humble adoration, in fervent thankſgiving—hath at the ſame altar commemorated the ſuffer-

ings

ings of a dying Redeemer, and implored in the ſame holy name, conſolation, ſupport, and pardon, from the ſame merciful God. Be it, however, remembered—and, a leſſon it is, which at this eventful criſis cannot be inculcated too earneſtly, that the very ſame circumſtance which gives a quicker and fuller effect to our benevolence when it is guided by an *enlightened* conſcience, may produce the moſt fatal miſchiefs, if our minds be inflamed with zeal, deluded by fanaticiſm, or hardened by ſuperſtition. On the other hand, the ſame juſt balance of the ſocial affections which throws the greater part of their force towards them who are more immediately "of the houſehold of faith," will alſo incline us to cheriſh ſentiments of good will towards others who belong to it more remotely.

Conſider—yes, I beſeech you as Proteſtants to conſider very ſeriouſly, and very thankfully, the wide difference between your ſituation, and that of the firſt converts to Chriſtianity. They lived among an ignorant and ſuperſtitious populace, who "had "changed the incorruptible God into an image" made like to corruptible man—among learned ſcoffers who denied the eternal power of the Godhead, or who knowing God to *be*, "glorified him not *as* God"—among whole nations "given up to vile af-"fections;" to all "filthineſs and ſuperfluity of naughtineſs;" to that "reprobate mind," which not only was eager in doing evil, but "had pleaſure in them that did it." *Yet*, the Apoſtle commands the Galatians to do good even to ſuch ſinners.

More than this, He that had created ſuch ſinners, ſpared them; for "thine they "were, O Lord!" thou Judge and "Lover of Souls."

But in that happy ſtate of improved religion and extended civilization, the bleſſings of which you ſhare, many, who may not be *wholly* with you, are not, therefore, fiercely and corruptly againſt you. They inveſtigate, they believe, they may ſometimes doubt after inveſtigation, as we ourſelves may ſometimes believe without it. But they do not, in *this* country at leaſt, inſult our underſtandings and our feelings with the effrontery of the libertine, the arrogance of the ſcoffer, or the fell impiety of the blaſphemer. Diffident they are and humble, where the knight-errant of atheiſm rejects indiſcriminately and undauntedly. They are ſilent where he clamours rudely. They bluſh when he dogmatizes, and they ſhudder when he reviles. By ſuch enquirers then no ſnares will be laid for credulity; no encouragement holden out to raſhneſs; no palliatives ſpread over the foulneſs and deformity of vice; no objections puſhed forward that can affront the authority, or even wound the delicacy of real virtue. As to diſputed points in religion, Chriſtianity itſelf, we muſt be aware, is no longer taught by inſpired Apoſtles; it is no longer confirmed by ſigns from heaven; it is ſubjected, like every other queſtion concerning the moral government of God, to the examination of unprejudiced reaſon; it contains much to employ our ſagacity, our induſtry, our caution, and our candour; and from oppoſition it has ultimately nothing to fear, becauſe "*it is founded on a rock.*" But, if upon topics moſt intereſting to them as rational creatures, men ſhould aſſert peaceably and exerciſe honeſtly the right of uſing their

their reaſon to explore what *is* truth, ſhall it be ſaid that as ſenſitive or ſocial creatures they forfeit every other right—that when hungry, they ſhould not be fed—that when naked, they ſhould not be clothed—that in adverſity, they ſhould not be relieved; or that in affliction, they ſhould not be comforted? We who "*ſearch* the "Scriptures," as well as profeſs our faith in them, "have not ſo learned Chriſt," neither ſhall we throw ſuch a "ſtumbling-block" in the way of our brethren. No affiance, we hold, in the diligence or impartiality of our own enquiries—no conviction as to the truth or importance of our own opinions—no conſciouſneſs of ſuperior erudition or ſuperior acuteneſs can authorize us to ceaſe from looking upon them as admitted, together with ourſelves, into the great houſehold of ſociety—can juſtify us in doing them the ſmalleſt *harm* on account of their attachment to this church, or that ſect—can abſolve us for one moment from the obligation to do them *good*, "as we have oppor-"tunities for doing it." After patient, diſpaſſionate, and above all, *ſerious* reſearch, whatſoever difficulties they may be leſs able to ſolve than others have been, in the doctrines, or perhaps the evidences of revelation, ſtill, in the ſacred and fundamental article of all religion—in the belief of an almighty and omniſcient Creator—in the adoration of his attributes—in reverence for the precepts and example of his Son—in ſolicitude to diſcover, and promptneſs to obey his will—in a ſenſe of gratitude for his favour, and dependence upon his providential care—in the hope of final retribution from his juſtice, and forgiveneſs from his mercy, they *do*—and it is at the peril of our own ſalvation that we treat them as if they do *not*, belong to the houſehold of God.

I proceed, in the laſt place, to make ſome obſervations upon the Inſtitutions over which you preſide.

We live at a period, when, amidſt the din of ſuperficial cavillers, and the vanity of preſumptuous empirics, there are men, who, with the very pureſt intentions, would enquire, not only into the proofs of ſpeculative opinions, but the practical tendency of public inſtitutions, ſuch as thoſe you now commemorate. Senſible you muſt be, that objections ſanctioned by the authority of a great name, will be echoed and re-echoed by ſciotiſts, too indolent for detail, or too precipitate for diſcrimination. Sorry you would be, that the good you intend ſhould be "evil ſpoken of," and therefore, it may be worth while to examine how far the credit of theſe Charities may be affected by the ſtrictures of a late celebrated Foreigner, who had deeply explored the true ſcience of politics, and was ſincerely attached to the beſt intereſts of humanity. I mean Mr. Turgot, Miniſter to Louis XVI.

The firſt circumſtance I would offer to your notice is, that theſe Hoſpitals were erected ſoon after the reform of that religion which, till very lately, prevailed among Mr. Turgot's countrymen, and from the abuſes of which aroſe the greater part of the evils that ſeem to have ſtruck more forcibly his penetrating and benevolent mind.

After the ſubverſion of popery, the poor, who had been accuſtomed to receive an extenſive, and, in ſome reſpects, I grant, an exceſſive protection from the religious houſes,

houſes, were ſuddenly deprived of all ſuccour from them: and to provide ſome effectual alleviation of their ſufferings was the chief purpoſe of theſe foundations. Had it been Mr. Turgot's good fortune to witneſs in his own country ſuch a temperate reform in eccleſiaſtical eſtabliſhments as our forefathers effected, ſo many happy conſequences flowing from it as we ourſelves have experienced, ſo many reſtraints thrown upon the fury, and ſo many correctives applied to the rapacity of the Prince who favoured it, ſo much lenity mingled with juſtice, ſo much juſtice admitted into policy, ſo much policy employed in the cauſe of literature and piety, ſo much regard to lenity, juſtice, policy, literature, and piety preſerved in the perilous convulſions of change, he might have felt that conviction to his wiſdom, and that gratification to his humanity, which we ought to feel to our own.

Be this as it may, I muſt refuſe my aſſent to this great writer, when he aſſerts that, "there is not one which would ſtand the teſt of enlightened policy," and when the avowed purpoſe of this aſſertion is, "not only to excite an averſion to new foundations, "but to deſtroy the remains of what he thinks our ſuperſtitious reſpect for the old." Fixing then upon the very ſpecific points which he has himſelf enumerated, we aſk, can it be ſaid of any *one* among theſe numerous Inſtitutions that it "virtually offers a "prize for idleneſs, and the diſorders reſulting from it?" That it "diminiſhes labour "and the productions of the earth?" That it "makes a void in the wealth of a "ſtate, and throws additional burdens upon the induſtrious?" I affirm peremptorily, that no ſuch tendency, either direct or indirect, can be imputed to any of theſe Hoſpitals—that there is no one circumſtance, either in their original plan, or their viſible adminiſtration, againſt which ſuch a charge can be alledged with the fainteſt colouring of probability. How far what he calls "a frivolous vanity" may have actuated the founders, is a queſtion upon which it were impoſſible to decide, without a deeper inſight than he had, or we have, into the heart of man. We, indeed, are concerned with *actions* rather than with *motives*. Yet the probable intentions of thoſe founders, if we chuſe to examine them, may be gathered from facts: from the ſituation in which they were placed, from the meaſures which they took, and from the correſpondence of thoſe meaſures with their own deliberate and repeated profeſſions; and when you conſider the wretched ſtate of the poor, who had been recently deprived of their former reſources, you will admit that ſound wiſdom concurred with Chriſtian compaſſion in ſuggeſting the proviſions that were made for their benefit.

No, ſays our writer: for, "in all foundations, there is one irremediable defect; the "impoſſibility of ſecuring their execution." How ſo? "Zeal," it ſeems, does not "communicate itſelf from age to age, and there is no community that does not, in the "end, loſe the ſpirit it ſet out with." Granted. But may not reflection perpetuate what zeal began? May it not guide us ſafely, where zeal has erred? May not a more enlightened age, acting up to the ſpirit, rather than the letter, preſerve and even multiply the benefits, which owed their riſe to views leſs exact and leſs enlarged? Are

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men become quite callous to the dictates of benevolence? Are they utterly inattentive to the warnings of experience? And has experience pointed out any eventual, but unforeſeen inconvenience from theſe Inſtitutions, which they who preſide over them have wanted either the good ſenſe to diſcover, or the honeſty to remove? But "there "is no ſentiment," we hear farther, "that is not blunted by cuſtom, and familiarity "with the objects which excite it." Be it ſo. Can a philoſopher, however, be ignorant, that in the wonderful texture of the human mind, the ends of virtue are ſecured by another and moſt uſeful property of our nature? Has not Butler, with his uſual acuteneſs, informed us, that "practical habits are ſtrengthened, but paſſive habits "weakened by repetition?" That "active principles, at the very time they are leſs "lively in perception, are wrought more thoroughly into the temper and character, "and become more effectual in influencing our practice, and, therefore, that benevo-"lence, conſidered as a practical principle, will ſtrengthen, and acquire a greater ap-"titude to aſſiſt men, even while we are leſs affected by the miſeries of life?" Is not the truth of theſe obſervations exemplified in your Hoſpitals, where a very acute ſenſe of pity would often defeat the ſkill of thoſe perſons who are moſt beneficially and meritoriouſly employed in the art of healing?

But "enthuſiaſm," ſays our objector, "cannot be kept alive." I am not ſure that enthuſiaſm had any ſhare in producing theſe foundations. If the writer of whom I am ſpeaking had peruſed, as I have, your indentures and your rules, he would have found in them ſerioufneſs without auſterity, earneſtneſs without extravagance, good ſenſe without the trickeries of art, good language without the trappings of rhetoric, and the firmneſs of conſcious worth, rather than the prancings of giddy oſtentation.

We are aſked, "Can the ſervants of a foundation, without enthuſiaſm, always exe-"cute it with the ſame exactneſs?" I have no reaſon to believe that enthuſiaſm ever acted upon the ſervants of theſe Hoſpitals, or that the influence of it would ever have been deſirable. Fidelity and diligence in their office, are the moſt proper qualifications of ſervants; and for them we have a better ſecurity in common ſenſe, which underſtands and obeys fixed rules, than in enthuſiaſm, which might violate them with good intentions, and very bad effects. But "inſpectors, we find, are ſelfiſh or indolent." For the imputation of ſelfiſhneſs there is no room whatſoever among the inſpectors of theſe Hoſpitals; and whether or no, they be chargeable with indolence, is a point, upon which they and their predeceſſors may, I believe, challenge the ſevereſt ſcrutiny.

Well: but "ſociety," we are told, "has not always the ſame wants. From dif-"ference of occupations, cuſtoms and employments, new wants ſpring up, the old "ones are no longer felt, and thus the utility of foundations deſtined to ſupply them "diſappears or diminiſhes."

Admitting, in part, the truth of this paſſage, as a general obſervation, I contend, that to your particular Inſtitutions it is wholly inapplicable.

The complete abolition of vaſſalage, the improved ſtate of agriculture, the multi-

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plied articles of commerce, the more regular diviſion of labour, and, above all, the general civilization of ſociety, which, in ſome reſpects, is the cauſe, and in others, the effect of the foregoing circumſtances, have doubtleſs mitigated many of the harſher inconveniences, which more or leſs, are inſeparable from the condition of the poor. Yet the lower and more laborious claſſes of the community will always be expoſed, in ſeaſons of ſickneſs, to improper diet, unwholeſome air, ſcanty attendance, and injudicious treatment, within their own houſes—to caſualties, by which their limbs or their lives are endangered—to ſtrange, complex, ſtubborn forms of diſeaſe, which may baffle the endeavours, becauſe they rarely fall within the notice of common practitioners. For theſe evils, to which the poor are and ever will be peculiarly liable, your Hoſpitals have provided remedies; and it muſt ſurely facilitate the progreſs of the ſcience of medicine, that after obſerving the treatment of the numerous and various caſes, which the Hoſpitals of a large town only can preſent to his view, the ſtudent may advance from literary and hiſtorical to experimental knowledge.

The mind, too, that part of man, where he is more eminently formed in the image of his Maker, will always be expoſed to the fixed gloom of melancholy, or the wild paroxyſms of phrenſy, in madneſs; and, be it obſerved, that the ſuccour you grant to perſons afflicted with this moſt dreadful of all maladies, is ſyſtematically confined to ſuch as have not the pecuniary means of procuring relief for themſelves; and that from the opportunities your Hoſpitals afford for ſurveying inſanity in all it's ſtages, and all it's variations, the beſt rules are formed for the treatment of other unhappy beings in other places, labouring under the ſame tremendous viſitation of God.

Pardon me, my hearers, if ſpeaking upon this ſubject, I give vent to my feelings, and pay a juſt tribute of praiſe to the learning, wiſdom, integrity and humanity of that excellent perſon, who once was my ſcholar, and is now the phyſician of your Hoſpital for the inſane.

But further; in the capital of a great kingdom, there will always be offenders whom policy as well as compaſſion, would lead us to *employ*, rather than puniſh. In the encreaſed civilization of the country, there will always be an increaſed neceſſity for extending the encreaſed advantages of education to young men, whoſe parents are unable to procure for them the advantages which this Hoſpital ſupplies; and when I reflect upon the comprehenſive plan which has been adopted for them, on the ſpot where we now are, upon the ſalutary diſcipline that is eſtabliſhed among them, upon the various kinds of knowledge in which they are inſtructed, upon the many excellent teachers that have been ſet over them, upon the many induſtrious and proſperous tradeſmen, the many courageous defenders of their country, the many luminaries of learning and religion that have come forth from this Seminary, I am perſuaded that it will be found to have fewer defects, and perhaps more direct tendencies to public good, than the magnificent Inſtitutions of a late northern Potentate; and that no ſchool or college in this kingdom is entitled to higher praiſe, on the ground of accommodation to the real intereſts of ſociety.

Not yet have we reached the golden age of political or moral regeneration, in which children can be left to the judgment or the exertions of their parents *indiſcriminately:* and the ſureſt way to reach, or I ſhould rather ſay, to *eſcape* and to excel it, as we have lately ſeen it deſcribed, is to preſerve a race of men *early* impreſſed with a ſenſe of decorum, morality and piety; early qualified for the part they have to ſuſtain in a free, civilized, Chriſtian country; ſuch men, I mean, as this Seminary has often produced, to the immortal honour of its Founders, Governors and Teachers; to the peculiar advantage of the capital, and even the advancement of our national proſperity.

Such are the wants of men, ſuch your method of ſupplying them, and wholly diſtinct they both are from the cauſes which have been aſſigned for the diminiſhed uſefulneſs of foundations.

It has, I know, been propoſed, to throw the poor upon the ſpontaneous bounty of the rich. But, much as I exult in that noble ſpirit of benevolence which actuates, or, as I ought rather to ſay, diſtinguiſhes the inhabitants of this country, I believe that no diſcreet man would be in haſte to make the experiment. The influence of vanity, the decay of zeal, and a variety of other trite and invidious ſuggeſtions, may be applied to Hoſpitals ſupported by voluntary contributions, juſt as obviouſly, and juſt as undeſervedly, as to your own: and whatever ſuperiority they may ſeem to have in the regularity of their adminiſtration, in the activity of their patrons, and in their capacity of being regulated by new meaſures, adapted to new exigencies, yet we muſt not condemn Inſtitutions that have flouriſhed for centuries, on the evidence of theoretic poſſibilities, or for the ſake of contingent advantages.

Between thoſe Hoſpitals and your own, there is no claſhing of intereſts, no contrariety of deſign, no criminal rivalry in your claims to public approbation: and as your plans muſt have ſuggeſted many uſeful hints to your fellow-labourers in theſe goodly deeds of charity; ſo it is probable, that, in matters of internal regulation, you "provoke "each other to good works." They ſupply what your Inſtitutions want, and they imitate what you practiſe. In the former caſe, they prove that your revenues, though inſufficient to provide aſſiſtance for every ſpecies of diſtreſs, are faithfully applied to the purpoſes for which they were originally intended, and in the latter, they evince the efficacy of wholeſome example.

As to the Founders of your Hoſpitals, they, in all probability, had more directly in view the relief of diſtreſſed individuals. But the utility of their Inſtitutions is not to be eſtimated only by their immediate and more obvious conſequences. By the long, the inviſible, but firm concatenation of cauſes and effects, which bind together the intereſts of man with the actions of man, the members who return into the boſom of ſociety with health re-eſtabliſhed, with the uſe of limbs reſtored, with morals corrected, muſt contribute by their honeſt labour not only to the ſupport of their families, but to the convenience or profit of their fellow-creatures in many diſtant places, and to the *aggregate* ſtock of public happineſs.

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From the peculiar circumſtances of their own age, when a reformation in religion had been recently effected, the ſame Founders, I can readily ſuppoſe, had a more eſpecial regard to them "who were of the houſehold of faith." But the doors of your Hoſpitals, I imagine, are not thrown open or ſhut, according to any narrow rules of religious diſtinction.

From the confluence of all ranks in this capital, and it's extenſive intercourſe with other countries, likely it is that you have afforded ſuccour to thoſe who diſſent from our religious eſtabliſhment, as well as thoſe who belong to it;—to the members of the Greek and the Latin, as well as the Engliſh Church—to the natives of Aſia, Africa and America, as well as of Europe—to *any* unhappy ſufferer from *any* ſhore, who, pining with want, or fainting with ſickneſs, or writhing with pain, and ſevered from the gladdening preſence of kindred and friends, could not have found, but in theſe houſes of refuge, where to recline his drooping head.

What then, let me aſk, are the objects of your Charities? The ingenuouſneſs of youth, the imbecillity of old age, the helpleſſneſs of penury, the ſharp anguiſh of wounds and fractures, the latent and inexpreſſible anxieties of complicated diſeaſes, the awful and incalculable ſufferings of inſanity, the capacity of uſefulneſs to mankind, and of repentance before God in thoſe who "*have* ſtolen," and are deſirous to "ſteal "no more."

To whom is the care of theſe Charities committed? To men independent in their fortunes, reſpectable in their ſtations, enlightened by long experience, and diſtinguiſhed by profeſſional ſkill. But no ſtatement however accurate, no encomiums however elaborate, can ſo clearly exhibit the merit of your Inſtitutions, as the unadorned, but grave and energetic language of "the humble ſuit" made to Edward your Founder and his Council.

In the enumeration of the perſons for which it provides, it begins with "the poor "child, that he might be harboured, clothed, fed, taught, and virtuouſly trained up." The bleſſing of God hath reſted, and may it for ever reſt, upon this part of your Inſtitutions.

Afterwards the indenture profeſſes to "take out of the ſtreets, the miſerable aged, "ſore and ſick perſons, and by phyſic and ſurgery to cure and make them whole." Having previouſly ſtated that "the cauſe of all miſery and beggary was idleneſs; that "the greateſt numbers of beggars by lewd and evil ſervices, and other cauſes, have ſo "utterly loſt their credit, that though they would ſhew themſelves willing to labour, "yet they are ſo ſuſpected and feared, that few or none dare or will receive them to "work;" the authours of it propoſed, in the third place, that "a houſe of occupations "be erected, where children unapt to learning, where they who have been ſuffered to "wander as vagabonds in the commonwealth, and where priſoners who are quit at the "ſeſſions, ſhould be ſet to labour." Wiſely they think that "becauſe the number "of ſuch perſons is great, the place where they were to be exercited ſhould alſo be

" great;" and this they emphatically deſcribe as " the perfection of all their former " travail."

My brethren! when the indenture for purpoſes ſo judicious, ſo humane, ſo holy, had been preſented to the King, ratified by him, and endowed with a ſum moſt worthy of royal bounty, do you wonder, that, recovering for a while, from the languor of a lingering diſeaſe, and having before him the proſpect of impending diſſolution, he ſhould exclaim, " LORD I YIELD THEE MOST HEARTY THANKS, THAT THOU HAST " GIVEN ME LIFE THUS LONG, TO FINISH THIS WORK TO THE GLORY OF THY NAME?"

Within a few days, mute was the tongue that uttered theſe celeſtial ſounds, and the hand which ſigned your indenture lay cold and motionleſs in the dark and dreary chambers of death. But to the fervid ejaculation of a Sovereign thus breathing, near his laſt moments, " good-will towards men," and triumphantly anticipating the effects of Inſtitutions that were to comfort and enlighten ſo many future generations, would you prefer the dying words recorded of any hero who periſhed in the arms of victory?

Does not the " laſt end" of ſuch a righteous man, appear to your minds more deſirable than that EUTHANASIA, for which a Roman Emperor is ſaid to have prayed, as the choiceſt gift of heaven?

Would not the work, in which your Founder was thus engaged, be degraded by compariſon with thoſe bequeſts, which *ſometimes* were dictated by the tranſports of vanity, the terrours of ſuperſtition, or the agonies of remorſe; and which too often ſerved no other purpoſe, than to ſhelter the lazy recluſe, or to pamper a luxurious and rapacious prieſthood?

Surely, the pageantries of wealth hide their diminiſhed glory, the ſplendour of military proweſs fades away, the moſt gorgeous diſplays of imperial grandeur are quite eclipſed, upon the firſt dawn of ſuch benevolence, riſing, as the Prophet deſcribes " the ſun of righteouſneſs, with healing in it's wings."

Forgive me, my brethren, if under the impreſſions of ſerioufneſs and tenderneſs, which the remembrance of your Founder thus dying, has made upon my mind, I point your attention towards one claſs of ſufferers, who more particularly attracted the notice of your predeceſſors, and their royal coadjutor.

In that aſſemblage of glories which forms the conſtellation of benevolence, mercy ſhines as a ſtar, if not of ſuperiour magnitude, yet of purer luſtre; and how can it's light be more auſpiciouſly directed, than in guiding the ſteps of an unfortunate creature, juſt delivered from chains, and dungeons, and the darkneſs of death? The world is his enemy; the world's law is not his friend; and hope, which cometh to other men, amidſt all their faults, and in all their tribulations, cometh not unto him. The robuſtneſs of his conſtitution, the agility of his limbs, the acuteneſs he may poſſeſs from nature, the dexterity he may have acquired from practice, are bereaved of their wonted effects, and crippled in every effort he would make, even for ſelf-preſervation. " The " wrath of God," he has been told, " is but for the twinkling of an eye," and, " though

" heavineſs

" heavineſs may endure for a night," yet, to the contrite heart, " joy ariſeth in the " morning." But, when he looketh towards the earth, he findeth in it, " a time for " hatred, but not for love ;" he ſeeth before himſelf only " the bread of adverſity and " the water of affliction ;" and though " he mourn like a dove, and his eyes be weary " with looking upward," who is there among his fellow-creatures and fellow-ſinners, to wipe away his tears? The diſcreet ſhun him—the auſtere frown upon him—the inhuman ſcoff at him—and, perhaps, the virtuous, after heaving a ſigh, are content to " paſs by on the other ſide." To his wants the fertile village affords no more ſupply than the ſolitary waſte, and to his imagination, even the crowded city muſt reſemble a dark and ſavage wilderneſs, in which he is himſelf doomed to roam, hunt down his prey, and periſh.

To the thoughtleſs, the luxurious, the proud—men " who wear purple and fine linen " and fare ſumptuouſly every day," eaſy it is to deign ſcarcely a glance towards that wretchedneſs which they never felt, and to hurl accuſations againſt thoſe crimes, which they never were tempted to commit. But the pleas of timorous indolence, or of fluttering vanity, or of bloated and faſtidious ſenſuality, for cruſhing every offender, who, goaded by inevitable and intolerable wants, would ſeize a ſmall portion of their ſuperfluities, are not *ſo eaſily* accepted before God, nor even by conſiderate and virtuous men. While " the viol and the harp, the tabret and pipe, and wine are in their feaſts," the voluptuary may feel no check from compaſſion, no ſmart from remorſe, no warnings from the inſtability of all human affairs, when urged by his pride or by his rage, " to break the bruiſed " reed." But they whom reflection hath raiſed above the prejudices of the ſordid, and the paſſions of the vindictive, they who remember how precious *muſt be the life of man* in the ſight of that Being, before whom " not a ſparrow falleth to the ground" unnoticed, they who conſider puniſhment as an accumulation of evil upon the evil of crime, and as ceaſing to be defenſible, at the very point where it ceaſes, in kind, or in degree, to be manifeſtly and indiſpenſably neceſſary, theſe men *will* ſometimes venture to heſitate, ere they aſſent to the juſtice of inflicting the laſt dreadful ſeverities of law upon ſuch an unfortunate perſon as I have been deſcribing. He ſtill carries about him, they muſt recollect, the appetites and affections of our common nature. He *cannot* by an act of volition ſtifle the cravings of hunger. He *muſt* ſhudder when expoſed to " the pelting ſtorm." Gladly would he recline, not indeed on that ſoft and downy pillow, where the rich and the powerful are ſunk in deep ſlumber, but on a pallet, ſomewhat better than the rugged flint, or the dank and unwholeſome clod. In the freſhneſs perhaps of youth, or the vigour of manhood, with compunction for having ſtolen *already*, with anxiety to ſteal *no* more, he feels himſelf deſtined to rove, day after day, and year after year, an outcaſt in his native country, and a vagabond in the land of his fathers. He knows that his ſighs are unheard—that his profeſſions are diſbelieved —that his good intentions are diſregarded : and can you be ſurpriſed then, if, " in

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" the anguiſh of his ſoul" he ſhould cry out * " O Death! acceptable is thy ſentence " to the needy—to him that is vexed with all things, and to him that deſpaireth and " hath loſt patience ?" Have you a right to be incenſed, if under the preſſure of ſuch unſought, unmerited, and unpitied woes, he ſhould ruſh where the company even of the wicked may afford ſome little relief from the drearineſs of ſolitude—where intemperance may for a while aſſuage the corroſions of ſorrow; and where example muſt incite him to the perpetration of freſh outrages, forbidden under penalties, which *he* has ceaſed to dread, becauſe, to *his* view, exiſtence is ſtript bare of all it's enjoyments, and the grave is to be welcomed as a ſure and ſpeedy refuge from chilling neglect, from hiſſing ſcorn, and from unrelenting perſecution ?

Believe me, my hearers! I ſhould diſdain to plead the cauſe of ſuch a wretched being, before captious and dictatorial ſophiſts, who ſee very dimly into the emotions of the heart, and are quite unfit to decide upon the affairs of human life, But with confidence ſhould I appeal to the ſuffrage of the true philoſopher, who knows by how many ſecret and indiſſoluble ties of ſympathy, we are bound to the love of virtue and the hatred of vice! How ſalutary is the diſcipline of ſhame and remorſe upon the human heart! How wiſely the Author of our nature has erected in every man's boſom a tribunal, which anticipates, and, as it were, repreſents his own for judging the conduct of his fellow-creatures! How intolerable, even to the ſtouteſt ſpirit, muſt be an irreverſible ſentence of condemnation from all mankind!

When your forefathers remarked " it has been a ſpeech uſed of all men, to ſay " unto the idle, work, work"—when they repreſent " idleneſs as itſelf the enemy " of all virtue, and good exerciſe as the conqueror of all vice"—when for the ſuppreſſion of idleneſs, and the nouriſhment of good exerciſe, they cauſed this houſe of occupation to be erected, and ſaid that " becauſe the number of offenders was great, " ſo ſhould the houſe itſelf be great;" they ſpoke the language of ſound policy as well as genuine humanity. You muſt have obſerved how often they recur to this ſubject, —how long they expatiate upon it—how much they inſiſt upon it—and, ſurely, if they had foreſeen the encreaſed wants of ſociety, the encreaſed population of the capital, the encreaſed provocatives to vice, the encreaſed opportunities for thieving, and, let me add, with deep concern, the encreaſed rigours of penal law, they would have made yet ampler proviſion that this moſt favoured part of their Inſtitutions, ſhould have brought forth " it's worthy fruit" with unfailing and even encreaſed abundance.

You, my brethren! who now hear me, I believe to be as you are deſcribed in your rules, " wiſe and good men." I perſuade myſelf that, as you have been clearly directed—as you have been earneſtly entreated—nay, as you have been moſt ſolemnly charged by your predeceſſors, you have never ceaſed to travail " diligently for good

* Eccleſ. chap. xli. ver. 2.

" order's

" order's ſake, in furtheting this acceptable work of God." I rejoice that a portion of what *cannot* be done by yourſelves, *is* done judiciouſly and ſucceſsfully by the voluntary patrons of a ſimilar Inſtitution, the uſefulneſs of which is moſt indiſputable, and has been very extenſive. Amidſt the multiplied incentives to wickedneſs, and the multiplied ſufferings of the wretched who fall into it, and are ſolicitous to fall no more, I ſhould be happy if the authority of the legiſlature were exerciſed in giving fuller effect to the regulations of your Founders, and the endeavours of intelligent and generous individuals.

Unqueſtionably the police which *cannot* embrace ſuch numerous and important objects, is radically defective in wiſdom: and the police which can, but *does not* regard them, lies open to weightier accuſations. It fails alike in the duties it owes to the community, and to the offender. It remedies imperfectly the public miſchief which it ſhould try to prevent by inceſſant care; by well regulated expence; by the offer of employment to the friendleſs; by the inſtitution of rewards for the penitent, and by the uſe, if need there be, of well-timed and well-meaſured correction, to the ſlothful and the hardened. But as matters have too long ſtood, and in the eſtimation of calm and diſcerning obſervers, even now ſtand, we *virtually*, I do not ſay intentionally, compel to the crime, and then puniſh the criminal—we diſhearten, where we ſhould have encouraged—we deſert, where we ſhould have protected—we deſtroy, where, as men, as citizens, and as Chriſtians, we ought, if it were poſſible, to have reformed.

To conclude. To him who remembereth the " TWO GREAT COMMANDMENTS, " on which hang the law, the prophets," and the plaineſt, the moſt frequent, and indiſpenſable precepts of the goſpel itſelf—to him, who " loveth the Lord God with all " his ſoul, and his neighbour as himſelf," conſiderations never can be wanting to direct his judgment, and animate his activity in this " labour of love."

The example of your predeceſſors, and your royal Founder, a lively and generous ſenſe of your own duty, the peace of your capital, the credit of your country, the honour of your religion, the preſervation of the ſick, the relief of the needy, the intellectual and moral improvement of the young, the growing amendment of the penitent, and the occaſional correction of the profligate, all conſpire in ſummoning the whole force of your minds, and the whole weight of your authority, to the momentous taſk.

" The fees and profits ye ſhall have," ſaid your predeceſſors, and their words deſerve to be pronounced even in this ſanctuary, " are ſuch as Almighty God hath " promiſed to them that travail in relieving the needy members, *and no other*."

But, as dependent beings, you cannot be debaſed by reflecting, that " he who giveth " to the poor, lendeth unto the Lord."

As moral agents, you ſupport the proper dignity of your nature, by aſpiring to future ſociety with " the ſpirits of juſt men made perfect."

As

As Chriſtians, you will not ſlight the proffered favour of that gracious Maſter, "who went about doing good, and who hath brought life and immortality to light" by his goſpel.

If, therefore, in obedience to his commands, and conformity to his example, ye invite "ſinners to repentance"—if ye "train up the child in the way in which he ſhould walk," —if ye "heal the broken in heart, and bind up their wounds,"—if ye viſit in ſweet pity the weeping and forlorn priſoner—whatſoever ye THUS do unto the leaſt of "them "who are of the houſehold of faith," will be recompenſed at the laſt day, as if it were done, immediately and deliberately, for the ſake of your Redeemer, and the glory of your God.

END OF THE SERMON.

THE foregoing Sermon has been detained from the preſs longer than I expected, in conſequence of buſineſs, illneſs, and the relaxation that was neceſſary for the recovery of my health; but chiefly for the want of an amanuenſis. In thoſe parts of it that were preached, I have introduced only a few verbal alterations, and of thoſe which are now printed, but were not delivered from the pulpit, due notice will be taken. I have ventured to make the Notes very copious, becauſe I wiſhed to ſave my reader the trouble of conſulting books, and becauſe I was anxious to place diſtinctly in his view, the opinions of many eminent writers on the intereſting ſubject of Benevolence. I was neceſſarily led to touch upon many great queſtions connected with that ſubject, and I hope not to be blamed for having given my own obſervations every advantage they might derive from the authority, the reaſoning, and even the words of the moſt celebrated authors. The reader, I truſt, will pardon me for having purſued now and then ſome topics which occurred to me while I was writing the Notes, and which I conceived to be important, though not immediately relating to the matter contained in the Sermon.

As to my own opinions, they have no pretenſions whatſoever to the praiſe of originality. Some, perhaps, were the reſult of my own reflections; but moſt of them may be found in writings, from which no man of letters would be aſhamed of receiving inſtruction, and they are laid before the judgment and candour of the public, for reaſons, which, as a well-wiſher to the honour of our holy Religion, and to the happineſs of mankind, I ſhall ever be ready to avow.

NOTES.

On the word *Terms*, *page* 1, *line* 4, of the Sermon.

"AMONG the badges of ſuſpected and falſified ſcience," Bacon, in his work on the Advancement of Learning, places "the novelty and ſtrangeneſs of terms." See p. 428, vol. 2d. of Bacon's Works.

Again, in his third Eſſay, he ſays, "Men create oppoſitions which are not, and put them "into new terms ſo fixed, as whereas the meaning ought to govern the term, the term in "effect governeth the meaning." Vol. iii. p. 304.

On Simplicity, *page* 1, *line* 7.

It may be worth while to ſhew ſome inſtances of the refinements of philoſophers, in their attempts to give new names to virtue—Μενεδημος μεν ὁ ἐξ Ἐρέτριας ἀνηρει των ἀρετων και το πληθος και τας διαφορας, ὡς μιας ὑσης, και χρωμενης πολλοις ὀνομασι· το γαρ αὐτο σωφροσυνην και ἀνδρειαν και δικαιοσυνην λεγεσθαι, καθαπερ βροτον και ἀνθρωπον. Ariſto and Zeno multiplied diſtinctions unneceſſarily, and at the ſame time affixed new generic terms to virtue.—Αριστων δε ὁ Χιος τη μεν ὑσια μιαν και αὐτος ἀρετην ἐποιει, και ὑγειαν ὠνομαζε· τῳ δε προς τι πως διαφορας και πλειονας, ὡς ἐι τις ἐθελοι την ὁρασιν ἡμων, λευκων μεν ἀντιλαμβανομενην, λευκοθεαν καλειν, μελανων δε, μελανθεαν, ἡ τι τοιουτον ἑτερον. και γαρ ἡ ἀρετη ποικιλεα μεν ἐπισκοπουσα, και μη ποικιλεα, κεκλησαι φρονησις. ἐπιθυμιαν δε κοσμουσα, και το μετριον, και το ἐυκαιρον ἐν ἡδοναις ὁριζουσα, σωφροσυνη. κοινωνημασι δε και συμβολαιοις ὁμιλουσα τοις προς ἑτερας, δικαιοσυνη. καθαπερ το μαχαιριον ἐν μεν ἐστιν, ἀλλοτε δε ἀλλο διαιρει· και το πυρ ἐνεργει περι ὑλας διαφορας μιαν φυσει χρωμενον· ἐοικε δε και Ζηνων ἐις τελος των ὑποφερεσθαι ὁ Κιτιευς, ὁριζομενος την φρονησιν, ἐν μεν ἀπονεμητεοις, δικαιοσυνην, ἐν δε διαιρετεοις σωφροσυνην, ἐν δε ὑπομενετεοις, ἀνδρειαν. Plutarch, Edit. Xyland. vol. ii. p. 440

In the Meno of Plato, Socrates employs a long proceſs of reaſoning, to ſhew that all virtue may be reſolved into prudence. Soc. ἐκαν συλληβδην παντα τα της ψυχης ἐπιχειρηματα, και καλλερηματα, ἡγεμενης μεν φρονησεως, ἐις ἐυδαιμονιαν τελευτα, ἀφροσυνης δε ἐις τἀναντιον; Me. ἐοικεν. Soc. ἐι ἀρα ἀρετη των ἐν τη ψυχη τι ἐστι, και ἀναγκαιον αὐτῳ ὠφελιμῳ ἐιναι, φρονησιν αὐτο δει ἐιναι. Vid. Plat. Oper. Edit. Serran. vol. ii. p. 88.

The obſervation which Ariſtotle makes upon this opinion of Socrates is very judicious—ἐπι τα ἠθικα δυο ἐστιν ἐιδη—το μεν ἀρετη φυσικη, το δε ἡ κυρια. και τελων, ἡ κυρια ἐ γινεται ἀνευ φρονησεως. διοπερ φασι παντας τας ἀρετας φρονησεις ἐιναι. ὁ δε Σωκρατης, τη μεν, ὀρθως ἐζητει· τη δε ἡμαρτανεν. ὁτι μεν γαρ φρονησεις ὠτο ἐιναι παντας τας ἀρετας, ἡμαρτανεν· ὁτι δ' ἐκ ἀνευ φρονησεως, καλως ἐλεγε. Ariſtot. Mor. Nicom. Lib. v. cap. xiii. p 277. Wilkinſon's Edition. Oxford, 1716.

They who wiſh to enter more largely into the ſubject of prudence, may conſult Gaſſendi in libro ſecundo De Virtutibus, cap. i & ii. pag. 730, tom. ii. and Vaſquez's Commentaries

in primam ſecundæ ſancti Thomæ in Diſput. 88. I will quote two paſſages from chap. 4, of Vaſquez, as they may throw light upon this logomachy about prudence. Primum quidem dicendum eſt, ſi ſermo ſit de *connexione* virtutum eſſentiali, unam virtutem non pendere, neque connexam eſſe cum alia ſecundum *rationem habitus*, aut ſecundum rationem *Virtutis*, ut optime docuit Durand in 3d. 36. q. 1, quia una virtus non habet ſpeciem ſuam, et eſſentiam ex ordine ad *aliam* virtutem, ſed ſolum ex ordine ad *objectum* per prudentiam propoſitum. Vaſquez, vol. iii. p. 604.

Omnes virtutes connexas eſſe *participatione* quadam dixit Hieronymus (ſtatim allegandus,) intelligens per participationem *ſimilitudinem quandam virtutis ſecundum generales quaſdam rationes*. Etenim in quolibet actu cujuſque virtutis tria ſunt, quæ aſſimilantur actibus trium virtutum, ita ut hac ratione *idem* actus videatur *participare* rationem trium virtutum ſub quibus reliquæ continentur. Nam in quovis virtutis actu eſt firmitas animi in operando, in qua *aſſimilatur* fortitudini, eſt etiam rectitudo operationis, et æqualitas cum regula, in qua *aſſimilatur* juſtitiæ : eſt denique moderatio, in qua aſſimilatur temperantiæ. Vaſquez, vol. iii. page 605.

As a writer of great celebrity and uncommon acuteneſs has lately reſolved gratitude, and indeed, all our ſocial virtues into juſtice, I ſhall endeavour to ſhew, from ancient and modern writers, that this extenſive ſenſe of the word for which he contends, has no claim to novelty.

Ἐστι δε διτλον το δικαιον, ὡν το μεν καθ᾽ νομον ἐστι. δικαια γαρ φασιν ειναι, ἁ ὁ νομος πρατ̃ει. ὁ δε νομος κελευει τὰνδρεια πρατ̃ειν και τα σωφρονα, και ἁπλως ἁπανθ᾽ ὁσα καθ᾽ τας ἀρετ̃ας λεγεται· διο και (φασι) δοκει ἡ δικαιοσυνη τελεια τις ἀρετ̃η ειναι * * * * ἀλλα μην ὁδε τδ̃ο το δικαιον, ὁδε την πρι ταυτ̃α δικαιοσυνην ζητ̃ουμεν (καθ᾽ μεν γαρ ταυτ̃α τα δικαια ἐστι, καθ᾽ ἑαυτ̃ου ὁλα δικαιον ειναι, ὁ γαρ σωφρων, και ἀνδρειος, και ἐγκρατ̃ης και ὁλος καθ᾽ ὁλου ἐστι τοιος̃) ἀλλα το δικαιον το ἐις ἑτερον, ἀλλο τι ἐιρημενον καθ᾽ νομον δικαιον ἐστι. Ariſtot. Magn. Moral. Lib. cap. xxxiv. page 164. Edit. Duval. vol. ii.

Again, he aſſigns another reaſon for calling juſtice a perfect virtue—ὁλη μεν ἐν ἡ δικαιοσυνη, ἀρετ̃η μεν ἐστι τελεια, ἀλλ᾽ ὐχ ἁπλως, ἀλλα προς ἑτερον, και δια τδ̃το πολλακις κρατ̃ιστη των ἀρετ̃ων ειναι δοκει ἡ δικαιοσυνη· και ὐθ᾽ ἑσπερος, ὐθ᾽ ἑως, ἐτω Θαυμαστος. και παροιμιαζομενοι φαμεν,

Ἐν δε δικαιοσυνη συλληβδην πασ᾽ἀρετ̃ης.

Και τελεια μαλιστα ἀρετ̃η, ὁτι της τελειας ἀρετ̃ης χρηστις ἐστι. τελεια δ᾽ἐστιν, ὁτι ὁ ἐχων ὁλην, και προς ἑτερον δυναται τη ἀρετ̃η χρησθαι, ἀλλ᾽ ὁ μονον καθ᾽ ὁλον. Ariſtot. Ethic. Nicom. Edit. Duval. Lib. v. cap. iii. page 59. tom. ii.

The ſame matter and nearly the ſame words occur in the firſt chapter and fourth book of the Eudem. See alſo the Paraphraſis of Andronicus Rhodius, page 260, Edit Heins.

Juſtice has ſometimes been ſo defined as to include the duty we owe to God, as well as Man. Thus in a work de Virtutibus et Vitiis, improperly aſcribed to Ariſtotle, we read δικαιοσυνης δε ἐστι, το διανεμητικον ειναι τ̃ις κατ᾽ἀξιαν, και σωζειν τα πατ̃ρια ἠθη, και τα νομιμα· και το σωζειν τ̃ης γεγραμμενης νομος, και το ἀληθευειν ἐν τ̃ῳ διαιρουντι, και το διαφυλατ̃τειν τας ὁμολογιας. ἐστι δε πρωτη των δικαιοσυνων προς τ̃ης Θεος, ἐιτα προς δαιμονας, ἐιτα προς πατ̃ριδα και γονεις, ἐιτα προς τ̃ης καθοικουμενες· ἐν ὁις ἐστιν ἡ ὐσεβεια, ἠτοι μερος ὐτα δικαιοσυνης, ἡ παρακολουθουσα. ἀκολουθει δε τη δικαιοσυνη και ὁσιοτης και ἀληθεια και ἡ πιστις και ἡ μισοπονηρια. Vid. Ariſt. Edit. Duval. tom. i. page 293.

There

There is a paſſage reſembling this in the Oratoriæ Partitiones of Cicero. *In communione quæ poſita pars eſt, juſtitia dicitur, eaque erga Deos, religio, erga parentes, pietas, vulgo etiam bonitas: creditis in rebus fides, in moderatione animadvertendi lenitas, amicitia in benevolentia nominatur.* Edit. Gruter, tom. i. p. 179. On Juſtice as including our duty to God, ſee Lactantius in Epitom. Divin. Inſtitut. cap. 15, and 56.

How far juſtice may be ſaid to *comprehend* all our ſocial virtues, Cicero, I think, explains more intelligibly, and more inſtructively, than any other ancient writer. *In omni autem honeſto de quo loquimur, nihil eſt tam inluſtre, nec quod latius pateat, quam conjunctio inter homines hominum, et quaſi quædam ſocietas et communicatio utilitatum, et ipſa caritas generis humani: quæ nata a primo fatu, quo a procreatoribus nati diliguntur, et tota domus conjugio et ſtirpe conjungitur, ſerpit ſenſim foras; cognationibus primum, tum adfinitatibus, deinde amicitiis, poſt vicinitatibus, tum civibus, et iis qui publice ſocii acque amici ſunt, deinde totius complexu gentis humanæ. Quæ animi adfectio ſuum cuique tribuens, atque hanc, quam dico, ſocietatem conjunctionis humanæ munifice et æque tuens, juſtitia dicitur: cui ſunt adjunctæ pietas, bonitas, liberalitas, benignitas, comitas, quæque ſunt generis ejuſdem. Atque hæc ita juſtitiæ propria ſunt, ut ſint virtutum reliquarum communia. Nam cum ſic hominis natura generata ſit ut habeat quiddam innatum quaſi civile atque populare, quod Græci πολιτικὸν vocant; quicquid aget quæque virtus, id a communitate et ea quam expoſui caritate atque ſocietate humana non abhorrebit. Viciſſimque juſtitia, ut ipſa ſe fundet uſu in ceteras virtutes, ſic illas expetet: ſervari enim juſtitia, niſi a forti viro, niſi a ſapiente non poteſt.* ' Qualis eſt igitur omnis hæc, quam dico, conſpiratio conſenſuſque virtutum, tale eſt illud ipſum honeſtum: quandoquidem honeſtum, aut ipſa virtus eſt, aut res geſta virtute. Quibus in rebus vita conſentiens, virtutibuſque reſpondens, recta et honeſta et conſtans et naturæ congruens exiſtimari poteſt. Atque hæc conjunctio confuſioque virtutum, tamen a philoſophis ratione quadam diſtinguitur. Nam cum ita* copulatæ connexæque ſint, (ut omnes omnium participes ſint), nec alia ab alia poſſit ſeparari; tamen proprium ſuum cujuſque munus eſt: ut fortitudo in laboribus periculiſque cernatur, temperantia in prætermittendis voluptatibus, prudentia in delectu bonorum et malorum, juſtitia in ſuo cuique tribuendo. De Fin. Lib. v Par. xxiii. page 411. Edit. Davis.

The extended ſenſe of the word juſtice has not been unnoticed by modern writers. After ſtating the generic and ſpecific ſenſe of the word as it is employed by Ariſtotle, Gaſſendi thus proceeds:—

Cum ſoleat vero juſtitia hæc laxius, ſtrictiuſque uſurpari; et laxius quidem prout comprehendit genera omnium officiorum; quo pacto etiam Religio, Pietas, obſervantia, amicitia, Liberalitas, *Gratitudo ſpecies quædam* juſtitiæ ſunt; ſtrictius vero, quatenus ea ſolum officia complectitur, quæ aut obligationi exæquantur, quo pacto excluduntur, v. c. Religio, atque Pietas; aut niſi impleantur, ad multam, pœnamve nullam obligant; quo pacto excluduntur amicitia, Liberalitas, cœteræ: Ideo ſunt, qui ut rem componant, dicunt has virtutes, puta Religionem, Pietatem, et alias, eſſe *partes* juſtitiæ, non ſubjectas, ſed *potentiales*; aut *ſpecies* quidem, ſed adnexas ſolum. Verum ne hæreamus in controverſia quæ videatur de *nomine*, ſufficiat videri officium, munuſve eſſe juſtitiæ, quoties id cuipiam tribuitur, quod aliquo ipſi titulo debetur, ac poteſt ideo comprehendi definitione celebri, qua apud Juriſconſultos "Juſtitia eſſe dicitur conſtans et perpetua voluntas ſuum cuique tribuendi." Gaſſendi de Virtutibus, lib. ii. cap. v. vol. ii. page 784.

* Davis would read illæ for ita, and upon the authority of a Paris Manuſcript, he would omit the five words which I have included in a parenthesis.

"The

" The word," says Adam Smith, " which expresses justice in the Greek language has se-
" veral meanings, and as a correspondent word in all other languages, so far as I know, has
" the same, there must be some natural *affinity* among those various significations." " The word
" (in one sense) coincides with what Aristotle and the Schoolmen call commutative justice, and
" Grotius the justitia expletrix, which consists in abstaining from what is another's, and in
" doing voluntarily whatever we can with propriety be forced to do. The second sense of the
" word coincides with what some have called distributive justice, and with the justitia attribu-
" trix of Grotius, which consists in proper beneficence, in the becoming use of what is our
" own, and in the applying it to those purposes, either of charity or generosity, to which it is
" most suitable in our situations that it should be applied. In this sense justice comprehends *all*
" *the social* virtues. In another sense, what is called justice means the same thing with exact
" and perfect propriety of conduct and behaviour, and comprehends in it not only the offices
" of both commutative and distributive justice, but of every other virtue, of prudence, of for-
" titude, of temperance." See Smith's Moral Sentiments, vol. ii. page 210.

" As justice," says Tucker, " consists in a hearty desire of doing right to every one against
" the solicitations of other desires urging another way, and as among contending impulses
" the most vigorous will always prevail, therefore justice, though distinct from temperance
" and fortitude, cannot well subsist without them, because it is their office to reduce our de-
" sires within a manageable compass." See Light of Nature, vol. ii. p. 308.

" There is a beauty," says Edwards, " in the virtue called Justice, which consists in the
" agreement of different things which have relation to one another in nature, manner, and
" measure. There is an harmonious corresponding of one thing to another, that he who from
" his will does evil to others should receive evil from the will of others, and that he should
" suffer evil in proportion to the evil of his doings."

" Things are in natural regularity and mutual agreement, when he whose heart opposes
" the general system should have the hearts of that system, or the heart and the head of the
" Ruler of the system against him, and that in consequence he should receive evil in propor-
" tion to the evil tendency of the opposition of his heart."

" So there is a like agreement in nature and measure, when he that loves has the proper
" returns of love, when he that from his heart promotes the good of another has his good
" promoted by the other, as there is a kind of justice in a becoming *gratitude*."

" Indeed most of the duties incumbent on us, if well considered, will be found to partake
" of the nature of justice. There is some natural agreement of one thing to another, some
" adaptedness of the agent to the object, some answerableness of the act to the occasion, some
" equality and proportion in things of a similar nature, and of direct relation of one to ano-
" ther. So it is in relative duties, duties of children to parents, and of parents to children,
" duties of husbands and wives, duties of friendship, and good neighbourhood, duties of rulers
" and subjects, and all duties that we owe to *God* our creator, preserver and benefactor, and
" all duties whatsoever considered, as *required* by God, and also considered as what are to be
" performed with regard to Christ." Edwards's Nature of True Virtue, p. 152.

From many of the foregoing passages, it appears that the resemblance of justice to other virtues, or its connection with them, gave rise to the large signification in which the word is sometimes used. Be it observed, however, that justice is by none of the antient writers set in *opposition* to any other social virtue, such as gratitude, liberality, or parental affection, that they did not erect systems upon the basis of justice, nor employ the colossal weight of the

term

term in cruſhing other moral excellencies, which, *together with* juſtice, were conſidered as pillars in the temple of virtue.

Biſhop Butler, in the preface to his admirable ſermons, expreſſes a wiſh "That it had been "a cuſtom to lay before people nothing in matters of argument but premiſes, and leave them "to draw concluſions themſelves." I have in the ſame manner thrown before my reader ſuch premiſes as may enable him to form a judgment of the uſe which a celebrated modern writer has made of the word juſtice. If thoſe paſſages be well conſidered, they will preſerve him from any evil conſequences to which he may be expoſed from any equivocal uſe of the term. They will relieve him from the ſurpriſe he may have felt at the ſuppoſed novelty of its ſignification in the book to which I allude, and perhaps they may induce him to ſuſpect that no important end, either of ſpeculative or practical juſtice, will be promoted by deviation from the ordinary and eſtabliſhed language of ethics.

Note upon Epicureans, *page* 1, *line* 14.

"There is a ſtrange affectation in many people of explaining away all particular affec-"tions, and repreſenting the whole of life as one continued exerciſe of ſelf-love. Hence "ariſes that ſurpriſing confuſion and perplexity in the Epicureans of old."—Butler's Preface to his Sermons.

"One need only look into Torquatus's account of the Epicurean Syſtem in Cicero's Firſt "Book de Finibus, to ſee in what a ſurpriſing manner this was done by them. Thus the "deſire of praiſe and of being beloved, he explains to be no other than deſire of ſafety: regard "to our country even in the moſt virtuous character, to be nothing but regard to ourſelves."—Butler's Preface to his Sermons, p. 23, note on Epicureans.

"The diviſion of our deſires (into public and benevolent) has been diſputed ſince Epi-"curus; who, with his old followers, and ſome of late, who deteſt other parts of his ſcheme, "maintain that all our deſires are *ſelfiſh*, or that what every one intends or deſigns ulti-"mately, in each action, is the obtaining pleaſure to himſelf, or the avoiding his own *pri-vate pain*."——See Hutcheſon on the Paſſions, p. 13.

Gaſſendi, in the firſt Book of his Ethics (de Felicitate) and particularly in chapters 4 and 5, has endeavoured, but I think unſucceſsfully, to vindicate Epicurus himſelf from moſt of the charges brought againſt him by the Academics and Stoics.* Probably there *was* much exaggeration in thoſe charges. But after repeated peruſal of the ratæ ſententiæ and of Gaſſendi's explanation, I believe that the language of Epicurus induced many of his followers to contend for the tenets which Cicero and Plutarch oppoſed.

"Juxta naturam ſuam, ſays Gaſſendi, quicquid homo agit, *quodam* cum reſpectu ad ſeipſum "agit."—See Gaſſendi Opera, tom. ii. p. 710. True—but the ſelfiſh ſyſtem gains nothing by the conceſſion. "Every particular affection, ſays Butler, even the love of our neighbour "is as really our own affection as ſelf-love, and the pleaſure ariſing from its gratification is "as much my *own* pleaſure as the pleaſure ſelf-love would have from knowing that I my-"ſelf ſhould be happy ſome time hence would be my own pleaſure. Butler's Sermons, p. 207. "Whether the principles of our actions be ſelf-love or the hatred or the love of another, "they would agree in this, that the actions proceeding from them are done to gratify an "inclination in a man's ſelf."——Butler's Sermons, p. 209.

* Vid. Brucker's Hiſt. Critic. Philoſoph. Vol. i. Part ii. Liber 2. Cap. 13. Parag. 4, 5, 14, 18.

Great

Great ambiguity has arisen from the use of the word self-interest, advantage, &c. But I have found no term so clear and so correct as *satisfaction*,* and I grant with Tucker that "every man's satisfaction is the spring that actuates all his motions." Vol. V. Light of Nature by Search, p. 353, or if we examine more strictly, "It is not very satisfaction, but "the prospect or idea of it." Vol. i. p. 105.

Tucker most admirably guards the term satisfaction from abuse. "For it may be urged "that if satisfaction, a man's own satisfaction, be the ground-work of all our motives; if "reason can furnish no ends of her own, but serves only to discover methods of accomplish-"ing those assigned her by sense; if she recommends virtue and benevolence, solely as con-"taining the most copious sources of gratification; then are virtue and benevolence no more "than means, and deserve our regard no longer than while they conduce towards their end. "So that upon an opportunity offering, wherein a man may gain some pleasure or advantage "slily, and safely, without danger of after damage to himself, though with infinite detriment "to all the world beside, and in breach of every moral obligation, he will act wisely to em-"brace it."

"I cannot deny that the consequence follows in *speculation* upon the case above supposed; "but I conceive such case can never happen, in fact, so long as a man has any prospect of "good and evil to come. For we must take into account not *only* the advantage accruing "from an action, but likewise the benefits or mischiefs of the *disposition* of mind giving birth "to it: and if this will lead us into evils *overbalancing* the present profit of the action, we "cannot be said to do it without danger of after damage to ourselves. The virtues belong to "the heart rather than the head, or to speak in our own stile, their residence lies in the "imagination, not the understanding; and to be compleat, must direct our inadvertent mo-"tions as well as our deliberate; that is, must become appetites impelling to action without "standing to consider their expedience. Now, whoever resists that impulse soberly, and pre-"meditately, upon consideration of their being inconvenient to his private purposes, will "thereby make such a *breach* upon their authority, and give such a *crooked* turn to his mind, "as must unavoidably draw him into evils *greater* than any immediate advantage he may "gain. All vice, says Juvenal, stands upon a precipice, and if we once step over the brink, "nobody can tell how far we shall go down: one of these two things must necessarily fol-"low: either we shall continue sliding till we fall into destruction, or must put ourselves to "infinite trouble in climbing the precipice, a trouble far exceeding the pleasure we may have "felt at first in the case of a down-hill motion. He that cheats when he can do it safely, will "want to cheat at other times, and consequently must suffer either by a self-denial, or the "mischiefs of an indulgence, so that it had been more for his benefit to have adhered invio-"lably to his rule of honesty. The ultimate end we have assigned for a reasonable creature "to act upon was not present pleasure or profit, but the *aggregate* of enjoyments; and we "have laboured, I hope, not unsuccessfully, to prove, from a survey of human nature, that "nothing adds so largely to that aggregate as a right disposition of mind. Search, vol. ii. p. 364.

Butler says "it may be allowed, without any prejudice to the cause of virtue and religion, "that our ideas of happiness are most important to us, and that though virtue or moral recti-"tude does indeed consist in affection to, and pursuit of what is right and good, as such, yet,

* Hence, according to the opinion of Metaphysicians, Omnis sive de ultimo fine, sive de mediis, deliberatio, ad *unum* quendam proximum grati et molesti, tandem referenda est. Hutcheson's Synops. Metaphysic. Page 61.

"that

" that when we ſit down in a cool hour, we can neither juſtify to ourſelves this or any other " purſuit, till we are convinced that it will be for our happineſs, or at leaſt not contrary to " it." Butler's Sermons p. 229.

Note on Virtue itſelf, *page* 1, *line* 19.

This certainly was the opinion of the Epicureans. " Virtue," ſays Adam Smith, according to Epicurus, " did not deſerve to be purſued for its own ſake, nor was of itſelf one of " the ultimate objects of natural appetite, but was eligible only on account of its tendency to " prevent pain, and to procure eaſe and pleaſure." See Smith's Theory of Morals, vol. ii. page 283. See alſo page 274.

Gaſſendi qualifies the propoſition: Ut, quod caput eſt, de ipſo honeſto ad voluptatem relato dicatur, obſervandum eſt hanc ad voluptatem relationem nihil videri obſtare quo minus honeſtum dicatur quodam ſenſu per ſe, ſive *propter* ſe expeti. Gaſſendi Oper. tom. ii. p. 705.

I allow, with Reid, that " all the ancient ſects, except the Epicureans, diſtinguiſhed the " *honeſtum* from the *utile*, as we diſtinguiſh what is a man's duty from what is his intereſt."—Reid on the Active Powers, page 234. As to the Schoolmen of the middle ages, take the following paſſage from Reid:

" Some well-meaning perſons have maintained, that all regard to ourſelves, and to our own " happineſs, ought to be extinguiſhed; that we ſhould love virtue for its own ſake only, even " though it were to be accompanied with eternal miſery. This ſeems to have been the ex- " travagance of ſome myſtics, which, perhaps, they were led into, in oppoſition to a contrary " extreme of the Schoolmen of the middle ages, who made the deſire of good to ourſelves to " be the ſole motive to action, and virtue to be approveable only on account of its preſent or " future reward." See Reid on the Active Powers, page 263.

Perhaps, ſome of the expreſſions which gave riſe to the obſervation of Dr. Reid, aroſe from the ambiguity of the word *utile*, by which the Schoolmen following Ariſtotle, meant not good or advantage, as an end, but the *mean* of procuring it. δοξειε δ' ἂν χρησιμον εἶναι, δι' ὃ γινεῖαι αγαθον τι ἡ ἡδονη. Ariſtot. Ethic. Nicom. Edit. Wilkinſon, 1716, page 341. Retaining this ſenſe of utile, ſome of the Schoolmen contend for honeſtum as Dr. Reid or I ſhould underſtand it. Ex ſententia ſancti Thomæ quod bonum *relate*, nempe quod alteri bonum ſeu conveniens eſt, triplex eſt: aliud eſt bonum *honeſtum*, *nempe virtutis*: aliud bonum delectabile, quod Anſelmus *commodum* appellavit: aliud autem eſt bonum utile. Duo priora conſtituunt rationem *finis*, (ut diſputatione 4 capite 2 oſtendimus) quia gratia ſui appetuntur, utile autem ſolum eſt bonum, quod in *mediis* reperitur: dicitur enim bonum utile, quod eſt bonum et conveniens, non gratia ſui, ſed gratia *alterius*, honeſti, aut delectabilis: *eo quod conducit* ad conſequendum id, quod honeſtum, aut delectabile ſeu commodum eſt. Vaſquez in S. Thomam, tom. iii. page 7. Diſput. i. cap. ii. But let us hear him farther: Quod vero attinet ad mores, utile, ut utile, non tribuit bonitatem moralem actioni, niſi *ratione finis*. Porro finis aut eſt honeſtum aut delectabile bonum quod Anſelmus, (ut ibidem vidimus) vocavit commodum. Vel ergo voluntas fertur in objectum honeſtum, quatenus delectabile et commodum eſt, et hoc modo *non* poteſt eſſe voluntas honeſta. Vel, voluntas fertur in objectum honeſtum *allecta ab ipſa honeſtate, et ita operatur honeſtum propter ipſum*. Ac proinde habemus id quod contendimus, nempe *nunquam* eſſe voluntatem bonam moraliter et ſtudioſam, *niſi* feratur in rem honeſtam propter ipſam honeſtatem. Id quod non obſcure docuit ſanctus

Thomas in queſtione 19, ubi aſſerit in hæc verba. (Sed ad hoc, quod ſit voluntas bona, requiritur *quod ſit boni ſub ratione boni*). Id eſt quod velit bonum et propter bonum. Per bonum autem intelligit honeſtum. Diſput. lxxiii. cap. vii. page 498. tom. iii.

Page 1, *line* 22.

Seventeenth Century, Mr. Hobbes—he was followed by Rochefoucault and Mandeville, and afterwards, by Rouſſeau and Helvetius.

Page 1, *line* 24.

Butler. See Sermon xi. page 229.

Diſintereſtedneſs, *page* 1, *line* 25.

I had great pleaſure in reading the following obſervations upon Diſintereſtedneſs: "The "hypotheſis of diſintereſtedneſs would never have had ſo many adverſaries, if the complexity "of human motives had been ſufficiently conſidered. To illuſtrate this, let it be recollected "that every voluntary action has in it a mixture of involuntary."

"We are capable of ſelf-oblivion, as well as of ſacrifice. All that is ſtrictly voluntary, in "the beneficence of a man habitually generous and kind, commences from this point: if "other conſiderations intervene in the ſequel, they are indebted for their intervention to "the diſintereſted motive. But, at the ſame time that this truth is clearly eſtabliſhed, it is "not leſs true—firſt, that the indirect and original motive, that which laid the foundation of "all our habits, is the love of agreeable ſenſation—Secondly, it is alſo to be admitted, that "there is probably ſomething perſonal, directly and perceptibly mixing itſelf with ſuch of our "beneficial actions as are of a ſenſible duration. Polit. Juſtice, vol. i. p. 430, 1, 3d. edit.

Our own Country, *page* 2, *line* 4.

I am glad to find that the author of Political Juſtice thinks with me in this point. "Among "the French, not a ſingle writer upon the nature of the human mind is to be found, who "does not, more or leſs, explicitly declare for the hypotheſis of ſelf-love. Among ourſelves, "ſeveral authors of eminence have undertaken to ſupport the practicability of diſintereſted "action." Vol. i. 3d. edition, page 422.

Party of Mankind, *page* 2, *line* 8.

See Hume's Eſſays, vol. 2. page 349, edit. 1767.

By Writers, *page* 2, *line* 9.

Lord Shaftſbury, Biſhop Butler, Mr. Hutcheſon, Mr. Hume, Adam Smith, and Lord Kaimes in his Hiſtory of Man.

Our own Health, *page* 2, *line* 11.

See Butler, Sermon i. page 6, and Hume's Eſſays, vol. ii. page 239.

Confounded with Self-love, *page* 2, *line* 12.

See Butler, Sermon xi. particularly where he explains, in page 214, the word ſelfiſh. See alſo his Preface, page 24.

Co-operate with Benevolence, *page* 2, *line* 13.

"Though benevolence and ſelf-love are different, yet they are ſo perfectly conſiſtent, that "the greateſt ſatisfactions to ourſelves depend upon our having benevolence in a due degree, "and

" and that ſelf-love is one chief ſecurity of our right behaviour towards ſociety. It may " be added, that their mutual coinciding, ſo that we can ſcarce promote one without the " other, is equally a proof that we were made for both." See Butler's Sermons, page 9. See alſo Kaimes's Hiſtory of Man, vol. ii. ſect. 3, book 3.

" It muſt be here obſerved, that as all men have ſelf-love as well as benevolence, theſe two " principles may jointly excite a man to the ſame action, and then they are to be conſidered " as two forces impelling the ſame body to motion." See Hutcheſon's Inquiry, page 136.

Conſtitution of our Nature, page 2, *line* 14.

" That this ſympathy with others is the effect of the conſtitution of our nature, and not " brought upon ourſelves by any choice with view to any ſelfiſh advantage, they muſt own: " whatever advantage there may be in ſympathy with the fortunate, none can be alledged in " ſympathy with the diſtreſſed: and every one feels that this public ſenſe will not leave " his heart, upon a change of the fortunes of his child or friend; nor does it depend upon a " man's choice, whether he will be affected with their fortunes or not." See Hutcheſon on the Paſſions, page 14.

Feel a Pleaſure, page 2, *line* 15.

" I feel a pleaſure in doing good to my friend, becauſe I love him, but do not love him for the ſake of that pleaſure." Hume's Eſſay, eleventh, on the Dignity of Human Nature, page 95, edit. 1767.

What Mr. Hume expreſſes ſo cloſely and ſo clearly, is ſtated at greater length, but with equal preciſion, by another writer.

" If what they mean, who ſay that all love comes from ſelf-love, be not, that our loving " ſuch and ſuch particular perſons and things, ariſes from our love to happineſs in general, " but from a love to our own happineſs, which conſiſts in theſe objects; ſo, the reaſon why " we love benevolence to our friends or neighbours, is, becauſe we love our happineſs con- " ſiſting in their happineſs, which we take pleaſure in: ſtill the notion is abſurd; for here " the *effect* is made the *cauſe* of that of which it is the effect, our happineſs, conſiſting in the " happineſs of the perſon beloved, is made the cauſe of our love to that perſon. Whereas " the truth plainly is, that *our love to the perſon* is the cauſe of our delighting, or being happy " in his happineſs. How comes our happineſs to conſiſt in the happineſs of ſuch as we love, " but by our hearts being firſt united to them in affection, ſo that we, as it were, look on them " as ourſelves, and ſo on their happineſs as our own?" Edwards on True Virtue, p. 158.

Theories, page 2, *line* 19.

I allude to the French œconomiſts under the late monarchy, and to their ſucceſſors, Mr. Condorcet, &c.

Ἐργαζωμεθα, page 3, line 31. Εργα is applied by the Greek writers ſpecifically to works of agriculture. Thus in Callimachus—

—συες ἐργα, συες φυλα λυμαινονται. Callim. Hym. in Dian, v. 156.

So in Ovid, Non hominum video, non ego facta boum, which Geſner well interprets, agros cultos, opera hominum et boum. See Epiſt. of Ariadne to Theſeus, line 60.

As the Apoſtle in the text evidently alludes to thoſe works, I think it right to diſcuſs the queſtion fully—Ἐργον propriè eſt agricultura, opus quo terra exercetur et ſubigitur, nam

eſt ab ἡ ἐρα. Hinc. ὁ ἀνἐργος eſt ὁ την ἰδιαν ἐργαζομενος γην. Eurip. Oreſt. 918, non vero forenſis homo—deinde, eſt in genere, Opus, labor, et ſi epitheton nullum in contrarium additur, ſemper notat honeſtum in ſe opus et utile. Denique notat et *difficultatem* aliquam ; ſed *primario* notat την γεωργιαν. Damm's Lexicon Homeric.

Ἐργαζομαι often ſignifies what is done with great effort. Magnam verbi Ἐργαζεσθαι vim laborem ſtrenuum indicandi eſſe aliquot Heſiodi exemplis probatum dedit celeberrimus Jo. Henr. à Seelen, in Bibliotheca Lubecenſi, vol. vii. p. 459. See Wolfius in Epheſ. cap. iv. ver. 28. I have not Mr. à Seelen's work ; but the following paſſage is an inſtance—

Ἀλλα συ γ' ἠμελερης μεμνημενος αἰεν ἐφελμης
Ἐργαζευ. Heſiod Opera et Dies, verſ. 298.

Ἐργαζομαι in the Sacred Writings, ſays Schleuſner, vol. i. p. 823, ſignifies ſtudioſus ſum circa aliquid, operor, occupatus ſum in aliqua re, facio, exerceo. Matth. c. vii. ver. 23. Thus, Pſalm xv. ver. 2.

Ἐργαζομενοι την ἀνομιαν improbitatis *ſtudioſi*. Sirac, c. xxiv. v. 35, οἱ ἐργαζομενοι ἐν ἐμοι qui mihi operam dant, ibid. c. xxx. v. 13. ἐργασαι ἐν αὐλῳ, operam da ei inſtituendo et educando.

Ἐργαζομαι implies great labour in Homer, Iliad xxiv. v. 733.

Ὁισιν τε χρυσον ἐιργαζεῖο, et quibuſcunque aurum laborando ſubigebat. See alſo Heſiod, Opera et Dies, v. 151. χαλκῳ δ' ἐργαζοιῖο.

The reader will probably admit, that I was not miſtaken in referring the imagery of St. Paul to *agriculture*, and that by εργαζωμεθα we muſt underſtand *intenſe* labour. The duty is well explained by Barrow. " He muſt labour in effectual performance of all good offices, and " in catching all occaſions of doing good ; he muſt exert that κοπον ἀγαπης, that labour of " love." See Barrow's Sermon, 18th upon Induſtry, vol. iii. p. 213.

It may not be improper to obſerve, that in Epheſians, c. iv. v. 28, a *ſimilar expreſſion* occurs, but with a very *different* ſenſe, ἐργαζομενος το ἀγαθον ταις χερσιν.

Ἐργαζισθαι here ſignifies labore comparare, lucrari, acquirere, and in John, c. vi. v. 27. Ἐργαζεσθε μη την βρωσιν την ἀπολλυμενην non tam cibum periturum vobis comparate. Heſych. et Phavorin. ἐιργασαῖο, ἐποιησεν, ἐπραξαῖο. See Schleuſner in voce. Dreſigius in p. 282, of his Commentary de Verbis Mediis N. T. after ſtating the verſions of John, c. vi. v. 27, by the Vulgate, Eraſmus, and Beza, obſerves, nullus verum verbi medii uſum eſt aſſecutus, quum ſit interpretandum operamini vel comparate *vobis*. Our Engliſh verſion ſays, " labour not for the meat," which though preferable to the verſion of Eraſmus and the Vulgate, is defective. But in the Epheſians it is far more defective " working with his " hands the thing which is good."

With all the deference which every man of letters owes to the ſagacity of Biſhop Sherlock, I will ſtate my reaſons for diſſenting from his Lordſhip, in the interpretation of a text which relates to the duty of benevolence, and juſt now occurs to my memory. In the third volume of his admirable Sermons, p. 148, he tranſlates ἀγαπη ἐκτενης an *uninterrupted* love. The Engliſh verſion calls it *fervent* charity. In my opinion the word ſignifies *intenſe*, which is *nearer* to fervent in the Engliſh verſion, than " uninterrupted." In favour of the Biſhop's opinion it muſt be obſerved, that Oecumenius interprets ἐκτενη, διαρκη, ἐπι πολυ διαλειπουσαν, dilectionem continuam, conſtantem, *diu* durantem. To theſe words of Oecumenius, quoted by

by Suicer, I will add from Hefychius, ἐκλενιαν (which Scaliger reads ἐκλενιᾶν, Kuſter interprets καὶ ἐκλενιαν, and Pricæus corrects into ἐκλεινειν) συνεχως ποιειν το αὐλο. But we alſo read in Hefychius, ἐκλενει, ἐπιμελει, and ἐκλενες, διαλελαμενον, and ἐκλενως, προθυμως, ἢ διαλελαμενως. Suidas explains the ſame word ὁλοψυχως και προθυμως. Phavorinus, ἐκλενως, συλλογως, ἐπιμονως, ἢ ὁλοψυχως, και προθυμως και φιλανθρωπως. St. Luke uſes ἐκλενης twice. It occurs in Acts, c. xii. v. 5. προσευχη δε ἦν ἐκλενης.

The Engliſh tranſlation interprets *without ceaſing*, the word which, with equal probability, may be rendered, according to Schleuſner, *ardentiſſimæ*, *enixæ* preces fiebant. St. Luke, c. xxii. v. 44, uſes ἐκλενεστερον προσηυχετο. Hic *intenſius*, ſays Suicer, *fervidius* reddunt eruditi. Gloſſa, ἐκλενεστερον enixius. Vetus, prolixius. Chryſoſtomus, την ἐυχην μετ' ἐκλενειας ἀναφερειν, The Engliſh tranſlation is "he prayed more earneſtly." I therefore approve of the Engliſh verſion of St. Peter, as expreſſing degree, rather than duration. The word occurs four times in the Septuagint, and is explained by Biel extenſe, vehementer. But further, I obſerve that in Polybius ἐκλενης and ἐκλενως are applied to *degree* rather than duration, γεγονασι πασων ἐκλενεσταται των ἐπι της Ασιας αὐλονομενων omnium civitatum liberarum, quæ in Aſia ſunt, *ſummo ſtudio* amicitiam hos coluiſſe (i. e. Romanorum). Polyb. lib. xxii. cap. 5.

Ἐτι δε συγκαταλλος τω ναυκληρῳ και τοις ἐπιβαλλαις ἐκλενως, quum etiam nauclero et vectoribus eos *ſtudio magno* commendaſſet. Polyb. lib. xxxi. cap. 22.

Πασων αὐλον των καθ' την Ἑλλαδα πολεων ἐκλενως και μεγαλοψυχως ἀποδεξαμενων καθ' την ὁδοδον. Omnibus Græciæ civitatibus per quas iter faciebat *ſummo ſtudio* et magnificentia cum excipientibus. Polyb. lib. xxxiii. cap. 4.

In each of the foregoing inſtances the *degree* of kindneſs and good will is ſignified by ἐκλενης and ἐκλενως. In Appian it means degree, not duration. και την αλλην Ιταλιαν και Ρωμην ἐπ' αὐτῃ Συλλαν ἐκλενως κεχειρωσθαι et omnem reliquam Italiam cum urbe Roma in Syllæ poteſtate jam *penitus* eſſe. Appian de Bell. Civil. lib. i. p. 131. vol. 2. edit. Schweighæuſer.

One Community, page 6, line 4.

When Biſhop Butler argues upon any *ſuppoſed* caſe, he ſhews ſo much *caution*, as well as ſagacity, as muſt guard his readers from applying the ſuppoſition to any bad purpoſe. In his chapter upon the Moral Government of God, p. 93, in order to ſhew the happy tendency of virtue, he ſuppoſes a "kingdom or ſociety of men upon earth perfectly virtuous for a "ſucceſſion of many ages, to which may be given a ſituation advantageous for univerſal "monarchy." But after deſcribing this kingdom, he takes care to add, that "our know-"ledge of human nature, and the whole hiſtory of mankind, ſhew the impoſſibility, without "ſome miraculous interpoſition, that a number of men here on earth ſhould unite in one ſo-"ciety of government, in the fear of God and univerſal practice of virtue." See Butler's Analogy, p. 95.

Great Writer of Antiquity, page 4, line 20.

Theſe are the words of Ariſtotle—ἐν δε τη πολει την φιλιαν ἀναγκαιον ὑπαρχειν γινεσθαι δια την κοινωνιαν την τοιαυτην, και ἡκιστα λεγειν τον ἐμον ἢ υἱον παλερα, ἢ παλερα υἱον. ὡσπερ γαρ μικρον γλυκυ εἰς πολυ ὑδωρ μιχθεν, ἀνιαθηλον ποιει την κρασιν, ὡτω συμβαινει και την οἰκειοτητα

την

τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν ὀνομάτων τούτων, διαφορλιζειν ἡκιστα ἀναγκαιον ὀν ἐν τῇ πολιτικῇ τοιαυτῃ, ἡ πατὴρ ὡς υἱων, ἡ υἱον ὡς πατρος, ἡ ὡς ἀδελφους ἀλλήλων. Aristot. Politic. edit. Heins. lib. ii. cap. ii. p. 112. "No man," says Johnson, "forgets his original trade: "the rights of nations and of kings, sink into questions of grammar, if grammarians discuss "them." I will confirm, by a fresh instance, the justness of Johnson's observation; for while writing notes upon the subject of benevolence, I shall stop to remark that ὑδαρης, which occurs in the sentence just now quoted from Aristotle's Politics, is also to be found in the last chapter of the Poetics.—ἀκολουθουσι τῳ τε μηκει μυθου φαινεσθαι ὑδαρη. Fabulam apparere dilutam et languidam. See Mr. Tyrrwhit's excellent note.

Upon limited Intercourse, page 4, *line* 13.

"We find the creation, so far as our intercourse reaches, divided into distinct species and "limited societies, the effects of whose actions extend no further than a certain number of "those with whom they have intercourse Nor can we presume otherwise of those unseen "consequences depending upon the secret concatenation of causes, which, however, they "may in part extend to innumerable multitudes, are likely to affect some particular class of "beings principally with whom we stand nearest concerned." Search, vol. v. p. 371.

I hear with concern, that the works of this admirable writer are very scarce, and therefore I shall not apologize for ample and frequent quotation.

My Child. page 4, *line* 23.

I have often been struck at the use which is made of this word expressing relation, by the advocates both of the selfish and the benevolent systems. "What say you of natural affection," says Hume, "is that also a species of love? Yes, always self-love. My children are loved "only because they are mine. My friend, for a like reason. My country engages me only "so far as it has a connection with myself. Were the idea of self removed, nothing would "affect me." Hume, Essay 11th, p. 94. The sense allows me to substitute *my* for *your*.

The proposition may be true, if rescued from ambiguity in the *terms*, and yet no consequences would flow from it in favour of the selfish system. Now let us see how little stress is laid upon the particle of relation to self, by an advocate of the benevolent system. A case is stated, where it may be in a man's power to save the life of Fenelon, or of a valet who was his own brother, father, or benefactor. "Justice, it is said, would have taught him to save the "life of Fenelon, because it was more valuable, at the expence of the valet's life. What "*magic*, it is added, is there in the pronoun "*my*," that should justify us in overturning the "decisions of impartial truth? My brother or my father may be a fool, or a profligate, "malicious, lying, or dishoneſt. If they be, of what consequence is it that they are mine." See Political Justice, vol. i. p. 128.

Probably, if the appeal were made to the common sense and common experience of mankind, the circumstance, that they are mine, would, even in the case supposed by our philosopher, be of great consequence. But, what if a father were neither a fool nor a profligate, would it *then* be of consequence that he was mine? Would the remembrance of his relation to me be no cause of endearment, no incitement to acts of beneficence towards him? I believe that Aristotle would have laid much greater stress upon the pronoun "my," δυο γαρ ἐστινα μαλιστα ποιει κηδεσθαι τους ἀνθρωπους και φιλειν, το τε ἰδιον και το ἀγαπητον. See Aristot. Politic. Edit. Heins. p. 112.

I suspect

I ſuſpect that ἀγαπῆλον, here means *more* than carum, it may be rendered unicum, atque adeo carum. Ariſtotle, in lib. i. cap. 7, Rhetor. ſays of the eye, deſtroyed in him who had only one, ἀγαπῆλον ἀφῃρῆσθαι. See Hen. Stephens's Theſaurus; but I ſhould obſerve, that in the margin of Ariſt. και μονον are added, *perhaps*, as explanatory. Upon the word ἀγαπῆλον in SS. for μονογενη, ſee Suidas and Heſychius in U, and the notes.

Would our modern philoſophers, who exclude ſelf from the duty of what they call juſtice, deny the influence of ſelf upon many other occaſions? They who adopt, as I do, Mr. Hume's opinion about "the double relation of impreſſions and ideas," which he illuſtrates in the caſe of pride (See Diſſertation on the Paſſions, vol. ii. p. 198, 9), will readily admit the eaſineſs of tranſition from one to the other, in caſes of benevolence where the object is related to ſelf. In page 207, Mr. Hume ſtates, that a relation to ourſelf excites affection towards any perſon; but he ſeems to limit the operation of the principle, to relations who are leſs near than parents or children; and to conſider the affection between *them* as founded upon "an original inſtinct." Granting, however, that parental affection originates in ſuch an inſtinct, yet I ſuſpect that the continuance of it muſt in part be aſcribed to other cauſes. "Parental fondneſs," ſays Tucker, "riſes from the conſideration of being our own blood, "the habit of attending to the cares of nature and education, the hope of ſeeing the good "fruits of our endeavours, the ſolace and ſupport expected from returns of duty." Tucker upon Charity, vol. vi. page 354.

The remainder of former affections, and the acceſſion of new ones, which make the ſum total of parental love, and the various ſources of filial affection, are explained by Hartley, ſect. iv. upon the Pleaſures and Pains of Sympathy.

The pronoun my, I believe, will always be found to have great weight, both in the ſentiments and the duties of mankind.

Calm deſire of Univerſal Good, page 4, laſt line.

"Our calm affections, private or public, are perfectly diſtinct from our particular affec-"tions. Calm ſelf-love is quite diſtinct from hunger, thirſt, ambition, &c. So calm good-will "towards others is different from pity, parental affection, or the paſſion of particular friends. "Now every kind paſſion, which is not pernicious to others is virtuous and lovely, and yet a "calm good-will towards the ſame perſons appears more lovely. So good-will towards a "ſmall ſyſtem is more lovely and preferable to more paſſionate attachments, and yet a more "extenſive calm benevolence is ſtill more beautiful and virtuous, and the higheſt perfec-"tion of virtue is an univerſal calm good-will towards all ſenſitive natures." Hutcheſon's Enquiry, page 182. See alſo Hutcheſon on the Paſſions, ſect. ii. art. 2. and 3.

Love the Exalted Wiſdom, page 5, line 5.

"The actions we approve in others are generally imagined to tend to the natural good "of mankind, or ſome parts of it. But whence this ſecret chain between each perſon and "mankind. How is my intereſt connected with the moſt diſtant parts of it, and yet I muſt "admire actions which ſhew good will towards them, and admire the author."

"As ſoon as any action is repreſented to us as flowing from love, humanity, gratitude, "compaſſion, a ſtudy of the good of others, and an ultimate deſire of their happineſs, al-"though it were in a more diſtant part of the world, or in ſome paſt age, we feel joy within "us, admire the lovely action, and praiſe its author." Hutcheſon's Inquiry, page 114.

"We

" We frequently beſtow praiſe on virtuous actions performed in diſtant ages and remote " countries, where the utmoſt ſubtlety of imagination would not diſcover any appearance " of ſelf-intereſt, or find any connection of our preſent happineſs and ſecurity with events " ſo widely ſeparated from us." Hume's Eſſays, vol. ii. page 284.

Inſtitutions, page 5, *line* 8.

" Let a man of a compoſed temper, out of the hurry of his private affairs, only read of the " conſtitution of a foreign country, even in the moſt diſtant parts of the earth, and obſerve art, " deſign, and a ſtudy of public good in the laws of this aſſociation ; and he ſhall find his mind " moved in their favour ; he ſhall be contriving rectifications and amendments in their con- " ſtitution, and regret any unlucky part of it which may be pernicious to their intereſt ; " he ſhall bewail any diſaſter which befalls them, and accompany all their fortunes with the " affections of a friend." Hutcheſon's Inquiry, p. 162.

Upon Ideal Preſence, page 5, *line* 10.

For this expreſſion I am indebted to Lord Kaims. See his Elements of Criticiſm, page 82. vol. i. edit. 3.

Covet, page 5, *line* 11.

" Civil ſociety doth more content the nature of man than any private kind of ſolitary liv- " ing, becauſe, in ſociety, this good of mutual participation is ſo much larger than other- " wiſe. Herewith, notwithſtanding we are not ſatisfied, but we covet, if it might be, to have " a kind of ſociety and fellowſhip even with all mankind. Which thing Socrates intending " to ſignify, profeſſed himſelf a citizen, not of this or that common wealth, but of the world. " An effect of that very natural deſire in us, a manifeſt token that we *wiſh after* a ſort of an " univerſal fellowſhip with all men, appeareth by the wonderful delight men have, ſome to " viſit foreign countries, ſome to diſcover nations not heard of in former ages: we all deſire " to know the affairs and dealings of other men, yea, to be in league of amity with them. " And this not only for traffic's ſake, or to the end that when many are confederated, each " may make others more ſtrong, but for ſuch cauſe alſo as moved the queen of Sheba to viſit " Solomon, and, in a word, becauſe nature doth preſume that how many men there are in the " world, ſo many gods, as it were, there are, or, at leaſtwiſe, that they ſhould be towards " men." Hooker, page 89.

The moſt eloquent deſcription I have ever read of univerſal benevolence, and, perhaps, the moſt correct ſtatement of its reſtriction according to our particular relations in ſociety, are in Biſhop Taylor's diſcourſe on the nature and meaſures of friendſhip. I cannot reſiſt the ſtrong impulſe I feel to quote a part of it. " Perfect friendſhip, by the principles of Chriſtianity, is " warranted to extend to all mankind, and the more we love the better we are. It is not ill " that you entertain brave friendſhips, and worthy ſocieties; it were well if you could love, " and if you could benefit all mankind." " I confeſs this is not to be expected of us in this " world. But as all our graces here are but imperfect ; at beſt they are but tendencies to glory, " ſo our friendſhips are imperfect too, and but the beginnings of a celeſtial friendſhip, by which " we ſhall love every one as much as they can be loved. Then ſo we muſt here *in our proportion*, " and, indeed, that it is that can make the difference. We muſt be friends to all, that is, *apt to* " *do good*, loving them really, and doing to them all the benefits which we can, and that they are " capable

" capable of. The friendſhip is equal to all the world, and of itſelf hath no difference, but is " *differenced* only by accidents, and by the capacity or incapacity of them that receive it. Na- " ture and religion are the bonds of friendſhip; excellency and youthfulneſs are its great " endowments; ſociety and *neighbourhood*, that is, the *poſſibilities and circumſtances* of converſe " are the *determination and actualities* of it." Taylor's Collection of Moral and Polemical Diſcourſes, page 643.

Father *of the* Chriſtian Church, *page* 5, *line* 17.

The paſſage is in St. Auſtin. De civitate Dei, lib. x. cap i. I found it in Hooker's Eccleſiaſtical Polity, p. 83.

Defective in Philoſophical Accuracy, *page* 5, *line* 19.

" This maxim, though poſſeſſing conſiderable merit as a popular principle, is not modelled " with the ſtrictneſs of philoſophical accuracy." See Political Juſtice, vol. i. page 126.

To this opinion I ſhall oppoſe the authority of Butler, in his twelfth Sermon, where, with his uſual ſagacity, he ſo explains the precept, as to leave, with few of his readers, the ſmalleſt doubt of its *preciſion*. " The ſcripture not being a book of theory and ſpeculation, but a plain " rule of life for mankind, has, with the utmoſt poſſible propriety, put the principle of virtue " upon the love of our neighbour; which is, that part of the univerſe, that part of mankind, " that part of our country, which comes under our immediate notice, acquaintance, and in- " fluence, and with which we have to do." See Butler's Sermons, page 235.

Ariſtotle examines how far preciſion is to be expected in moral diſcuſſions, and ſays, ἀγαπητὸν ἂν τις περὶ τοιούτων καὶ ἐκ τοιούτων λεγομένων, τραχυλως καὶ τυπῳ τἀληθες ἐνδεικνυσθαι. Ariſtot. de Mor. lib. i. cap. i. He often takes occaſion to *repeat* the ſame obſervation, as in cap. vii, the ſame book, in lib. vii. cap. vii, de republica, and in the laſt chapter of the ſecond book of Metaphyſics. According to *his* rules and to his practice, the maxim of our Lord will be found *ſufficiently* accurate even for a philoſopher, and when connected with the explanation of the maxim by the caſe of the Samaritan, our Lord's inſtruction may be thought entitled to praiſe, according to another remark of Ariſtotle—ἐν τοις περι τας πραξεις λογοις, οἱ μεν καθολικ κενοτεροι εἰσιν, οἱ δε ἐπι μερους ἀληθινωτεροι περι γαρ τα καθ' ἑκαστα αἱ πραξεις. Edit. Wilkinſon, Ethic. Nicom. cap. vii. p. 74.

But that the precept is comprehenſive, ſeems granted in page 422 of Political Juſtice, vol. 1ſt; where we read, that " the active and ardent ſpirit of the founders of religion has, " perhaps, always carried them into the liberal ſyſtem." See Matt. ch. xxii. ver. 37. 41.

Yet theſe conceſſions fall very ſhort of the commendation due to Chriſtianity. Let us hear what is ſaid of it by men whoſe views, to ſay the leaſt, were *equally comprehenſive and equally accurate* with thoſe of the writer to whom I allude. " It may be truly affirmed, (ſays Bacon), " that there never was any philoſophy, religion, or other diſcipline, which did ſo plainly and " highly exalt the good which is communicative, and depreſs the good which is private and " particular, as the holy faith." Bacon's Advan. Learning, p. 508.

Again. " Theſe be heathen and profane paſſages, having but a ſhadow of that divine ſtate " of mind, which religion and the holy faith doth conduct men unto, by imprinting upon " their ſouls charity, which is excellently called the bond of perfection, becauſe it compre- " hendeth and faſteneth all virtues together. And as it is elegantly ſaid by Menander of vain

" love,

" love, which is but a falſe imitation of divine love, Amor melior ſophiſta laevo ad huma-
" nam vitam, that love teacheth a man to carry himſelf better than the Sophiſt, or Preceptor,
" which he calleth left-handed; becauſe, with all his rules and perceptions he cannot form
" a man, ſo dexterouſly, nor with that facility to prize himſelf, and govern himſelf, as love
" can do; ſo certainly, if a man's mind be truly inflamed with charity, it doth work him
" ſuddenly into greater perfection than all the doctrine of morality can do, which is but a
" ſophiſt in compariſon of the other." Bacon's Advancement of Learning, p. 520.

" Chriſtian charity is friendſhip to all the world; and when friendſhips were the nobleſt
" things in the world, charity was little like the *ſun drawn* in at a chinke, or his beams
" drawn into the centre of a burning glaſs; but Chriſtian charity is friendſhip expanded
" like the face of the ſun when it *mounts above the eaſtern hills.* Nature hath made friend-
" ſhips and ſocieties relations and endearments; and by ſomething or other we relate to all
" the world; there is enough in every man that is willing, to make him become our friend;
" but when men contract friendſhips, they incloſe the commons; and what nature intended
" ſhould be every man's, we make proper to two or three. Friendſhip is like rivers and the
" ſtrand of ſeas, and the air, common to all the world; but tyrants and evil cuſtoms, wars
" and want of love, have made them proper and peculiar. But when Chriſtianity came to
" renew our nature, and to reſtore our laws, and to increaſe her privileges, and to make her
" aptneſs become religion, then it was declared that our friendſhips were to be as univerſal
" as our converſation; that is, actual to all with whom we converſe, and potentially ex-
" tended unto thoſe with whom we did not." Taylor's Polemical Diſcourſes, p. 642.

Who is my neighbour, *page* 5, *line* 23.

We may ſay of the word neighbour, (Ariſt. Mor. lib. v. cap. ii. edit. Duval, p. 58), what Ariſtotle ſays of juſtice ἐοικε πλεοναχως λεγεσθαι, and therefore δια το συνεγγυς ἐινα τηκ ὁμωνυμιαν αὐτῆ λανθανει.

Now it is plain, that the lawyer who wiſhed to juſtify himſelf, uſed the word neighbour in a very reſtrained ſenſe. It is equally plain from our Lord's anſwer, that the word was capable of a more *extended* ſignification; and upon a term which is ſo important in itſelf, and which occurs ſo frequently, it cannot be improper to beſtow ſome remarks.

Vorſtius, in the third chapter of his book, de Hebraiſmis N. Teſt. has very judiciouſly and very copiouſly explained the words brother and neighbour, as uſed either in the Old or New Teſtament. In the New Teſtament, ἀδελφος, ſays he, ſignifies quemvis alium, which the Greeks vulgo exprimunt by ὁ πλησιον and ὁ ἑτερος. Thus πας ὁ ὀργιζομενος τῳ ἀδελφῳ αὐτῆ ἐικῃ quicunque temere iraſcitur alteri, Matt. chap. v. ver. 22. So Matt. cap. vii. ver. 3. Matt. cap. xviii. ver. 15, cap. xxi. ver. 35. Luke, cap. iv. ver. 41, 42, 43. Romans, c. iv. v. 10, &c. Ceterum uſurpata ſic eſt vox Græca ἀδελφος ad exemplum Hebræ אח Hebræi cum ſignificare volunt quemvis alium uti ſolent iſta vocula. He refers to Levit. c. xix. v. 17. Pſalm l. v. 20. Gen. c. xxvi. v. 3. It is even uſed for alius alium, alter alterum of things inanimate, as in Exodus, c. xxvi. v. 5, in the feminine; and in Exodus, c. xxv. v. 20, of the cherubim in the maſculine; ſo the word רע. Kings, lib. i. cap. xx. v. 40. Græci interpretes verterunt καθεφιλησεν ἑκαστος τον πλησιον, και ἐκλαυσεν ἑκαστος ἐν τῳ πλησιον. He further ſays, that ὁ πελας and ὁ πλησιον mean not only vicinum, ſocium, propinquum.

propinquum generally, but quemvis alium. He then quotes from Thucydides and Polybius—νομιζειν τας διανοιας των πελας παραπλησιας ειναι. Thucyd. lib. i.—putare, ſententias aliorum ſimiles eſſe noſtris—ἡ των πελας ἀπειρια, μεγιστον ἐφοδιον γιγνεται τοις ἐμπειροις προς καλοροθωσιν. Polyb. lib. ix.

Raphelius, in his notes upon Matthew, cap. v. ver. 43, illuſtrates ὁ πλησιον by four paſſages from Polybius, of which it will be ſufficient to produce two—πικρος γαρ γεγονως και ἀπαραιτητος ἐπιλημητης των πελας, εικοτως ἀν και ὑπο των πλησιον ἀυτος απαραιτητε τυγχανοι καλητοριας. Nam cum alios ipſe acerbe atque inclementer obſurgare ſoleat, jure merito ab alius pari inclementia tractabitur. Polyb. edit. Caſaub. p. 1396. παντα γαρ ἐπιδεχεσθαι μοι δοκει τα πικροτατα το γενος, ὁις ἐκεινος κεχρητται κατα των πλησιον. Nullum eſt tam acerbum genus convicii, quo ille adverſus alios utitur, quod huic illius facto non arbitror convenire. Ibid. p. 1401.

Biel, in his Lexicon for the Septuagint, interprets ὁ πελας not only qui prope eſt, but alius, and inſtances in Prov. chap. xxvii. ver. 2. Again, under ὁ πλησιον he produces inſtances where it correſponds to pater, frater, ſocius, and even hoſtis. Though, in this inſtance, ſome read רע for עך.

As to the Hebrew terms in the Old Teſtament, we find great variety in their ſignifications. Thus אח is by Parkhurſt explained, a brother by nature. Gen. cap. iv. ver. 2. One conſociated by ſimilarity of condition or manners, Ezek. cap. xviii. v. 10. A countryman, Levit. cap. xxv. ver. 46. One connected with us by partaking of the ſame nature, Levit. cap. xix. ver. 17, and here Parkhurſt refers to Luke, cap. x. ver. 29, et ſeq. where the Engliſh tranſlation gives neighbour. Theſe inſtances ſhew the great latitude of the word.

רע as we have ſeen above, has various ſenſes. Vid. Taylor's Concordance. By Parkhurſt it is explained, an intimate or ſpecial friend and companion, as Deuter. cap. xiii. ver. 6. Prov. cap. xxviii. ver. 7, &c. &c.; but moſt commonly it is uſed for a companion or neighbour in general. Gen. cap. xi. ver. 3. Exod. cap. xx. ver. 16. Levit. cap. xix. ver. 18.

Even עמית Parkhurſt explains, a member of the ſame ſociety. Levit. cap. vi. ver. 2. cap. xviii. ver. 20. But in Taylor's Concordance it is explained, one another, or a man's neighbour. Levit. xxv. 17, and one to another, or a man to his neighbour. Lev. xix. 11.

The foregoing citations and references plainly ſhew, that *conſiſtently* with the genius of the Hebrew language, our Lord gave a very wide ſignification to the word neighbour. If the reader ſhould be wearied with quotations from verbal critics and lexicographers, perhaps he will be refreſhed a little by the charming language of Jeremy Taylor. "The Scripture, "ſays he, which often deſcribes the duty of parents and children, never deſcribes the *duty* of "brothers, except, where by *brethren* are meant *all* that part of mankind, who are tied to us "by *any* vicinity of religion or country, of profeſſion and family, of contract or ſociety, "of love and the nobleſt friendſhips." Page 455 of Taylor's Polem. Diſcourſes.

Again—"The New Teſtament ſpeaks of friends often, but by friends are meant our "acquaintance, or our kindred, the relatives of our family, or our fortune, or our ſect; "*ſomething of ſociety*, or ſomething of kindneſs in it; *a tenderneſs of appellation* and civility, "a relation made by gifts, or by duty, by ſervices and ſubjection; and I think I have rea- "ſon to be confident, that the word friend (ſpeaking of humane intercourſe), is no other- "ways uſed in the Goſpels or Epiſtles, or Acts of the Apoſtles: and the reaſon of it is, the

 "word

" word friend is of a *large* ſignification, and means *all* relations, and ſocieties, and whatſo-
" ever is not an enemy." Ibid. p. 641.

The objection to the Goſpel for omitting to give any precepts about friendſhip, is well anſwered by Search, in his Light of Nature, Part II. vol. iii. p. 417.

But of the term neighbour, uſed by our Lord, he ſays, in p. 418, " it was the propereſt " to diſtinguiſh the object of our good offices, becauſe it ariſes from ſituation, and not from " perſonal character."

Ground of this Neighbourhood, *page* 5, *line* 24.

" It is not man's being a ſocial creature, much leſs his being a moral agent from whence " alone our obligations of good-will towards them ariſe. There is an obligation to it prior " to either of theſe ariſing from his being a *ſenſible* creature, capable of happineſs or miſery." Butler's Sermons, page 166.

Samaritan, *page* 5, *line* 29.

I have no where ſeen the caſe of the Samaritan argued ſo ably as by Sherlock in the eleventh diſcourſe of his fifth volume.—" When the relief had been given, the queſtion was " who had been neighbour to the unfortunate man in the ſenſe of the law. As the caſe was " ſtated there was no room to inſiſt on the near relation, which the Levite bore to the " wounded man. The nearer their relation the worſe neighbours they were for neglecting " him ; no room to object againſt the Samaritan, his want of relation, or his difference of " religion. The leſs and the fewer his obligations were, the more diſintereſted was his " obedience to the law, and the better neighbour was he." See page 273.

Compaſſion, *page* 5, *line* 31.

The illuſtrious prelate whom I mentioned in the former note, was certainly no advocate for the ſelfiſh ſyſtem. But a paſſage *once* dropped from his pen, which they who are advocates for it might pervert to very evil purpoſes. " To adminiſter relief to the extreme ne-
" ceſſities and ſufferings of our fellow creatures, is, in ſome degree, to comply with the " cravings of nature in ourſelves, and to provide for our own eaſe and enjoyment: for the " pity and compaſſion, which miſerable objects raiſe in us, are attended with a pain and " uneaſineſs to ourſelves, no otherwiſe to be allayed but by relieving the miſery that cauſed " them." See Sherlock, Diſcourſe II. vol. v. page 34.

Now Hartley has traced up compaſſion " to the appearance and ideas of any kind of miſery " which children have experienced, and to the ſigns of diſtreſs which they underſtand, to the " connection between the adjuncts of pain and the actual infliction of it. When theſe and " ſuch like circumſtances have raiſed their deſires and endeavours to remove the cauſes of " their own uneaſy feelings, or the miſeries of others, in all which they are much influ-
" enced by their diſpoſition to *imitate*, and when a *variety* of internal feelings and deſires of " this kind are ſo blended that no part can be ſeparated from the reſt, a child has compaſ-
" ſion. An attentive perſon," he adds, " may diſcern the conſtituent parts of his compaſ-
" ſion while they are yet the internal and ſelfiſh feelings, and before they have put on the " nature of compaſſion by coaleſcence with the reſt." See Hartley, page 474, edit. 1749. True; and the uneaſineſs, it is granted, remains when compaſſion is formed. Yet Hutcheſon is perfectly right, when he ſays " that we are not *immediately* excited by compaſſion

" to

" to deſire the removal of our *own* pain. We think it juſt to be ſo affected upon the occa-
" ſion, and diſlike thoſe who are not ſo; but we are excited directly to deſire the relief of
" *another*, without any imagination that this relief is a private good to ourſelves." See Hutcheſon, page 240 of the Enquiry. See alſo page 146 of do. and page 522 of the Nature and Conduct of the Paſſions. " Our intention, as Hutcheſon well obſerves, page 195 of the
" Enquiry, is not to free ourſelves from the uneaſineſs of the paſſion, but to alter the ſtate
" of the object."

When I thus notice what ſeems to me a paſſage not *ſufficiently* qualified in Biſhop Sherlock, I would not be underſtood to deny that he deſerves the reputation which he has generally acquired for depth of thought, acuteneſs of reaſoning, and preciſion of ſtyle. ἀγαμαι μὲν ἀυτῳ σκαιος, μηδ' ἀναισθητος ἐγω γενοιμην, ὡσθε ταυτην την δοξην περι ἀνδρος τηλικουδε λαβειν· ἐπει πολλα και περι πολλων οἰδα μεγαλα και θαυμαστα, και ἀπο της ἀκρας δυναμεως ἐξενηνεγμενα ὑπ' ἀυτου. So ſaid a critic of antiquity, when he cenſured parts in Plato, and ſo ſay I, by way of apology for myſelf, when I have expreſſed diſſent from Biſhop Sherlock. Vid. Dion. Helicarn. Tractatus de Antiquis Scriptoribus. Page 176. Edit. Holwell, 1766.

In the Eſſay on the Sublime and Beautiful, ſection xiv. Mr. Burke remarks, that " we
" have no ſmall degree of *delight* in the real misfortunes and pains of others, that the Creator
" deſigning us to be united by a bond of ſympathy, has ſtrengthened that bond by a propor-
" tionable delight, and *there* moſt, where our ſympathy is *moſt wanted*, in the diſtreſſes of
" others, that this delight hinders us from ſpurning ſcenes of miſery, that the pain we feel
" prompts us to relieve ourſelves in relieving thoſe who ſuffer, and all this antecedent to any
" reaſonings by an inſtinct that works as to its own purpoſe without our concurrence." I admit the exiſtence both of pain and pleaſure in compaſſion. The final cauſe of *both* is to quicken our exertions for the benefit of others. But yet I maintain that the agent intends directly neither to obtain that pleaſure, nor to remove that pain, but to ſuccour the diſtreſſed object. Akenſide, in the ſecond book of the Pleaſures of Imagination, has moſt beautifully deſcribed the pain and the pleaſure which accompany compaſſion—

O deemeſt thou indeed,
No kind endearment here by nature given
To mutual terror and compaſſion ſteers?
No ſweetly melting ſoftneſs which attracts,
O'er all that edge of pain, the ſocial powers
To this their proper action and their end.

Obligation, *page* 5, *line* 34.

I do not ſpeak *only* of the obligation " which conſcience, approving of any action, impoſes
" upon us to obey the law of our nature, which, doubtleſs, in ſuch a caſe would urge us to re-
" lieve." See Butler's Sermons, page 50. I have *alſo* in view the expreſs or implied obligations of religious command. " When any ſanctions co-operate with our moral ſenſe, in
" exciting us to actions which we count morally good, we ſay we are obliged." Hutcheſon's Inquiry, page 277.

Univerſal benevolence as a feeling I have endeavoured to explain; but as an active duty, I grant, it cannot be practiſed, nor, as ſuch, is it inculcated, without reſtrictions ariſing from opportunity,

portunity, &c. " Our active duties," says Lord Kaimes, " regard particular persons as our " relations, our friends, our benefactors, our masters, our servants. Even distress," he observes, " though it has a tendency to convert benevolence into a duty, is not sufficient " without other concurring circumstances; for to relieve every person in distress is be- " yond the power of any human being. Our relations in distress claim that duty from " us, and even our neighbours; but distant distress, without any particular connections, " scarce causes our sympathy, and never is an object of duty." See Book I. sect. 3, 4. vol. ii. of Sketches of History of Man.

Universe, *page* 5, *line* 38.

See Butler's twelfth Sermon, page 234.

Sermon, *page* 6.

For " person" in page 6, line 5, read " persons," and for " he" in line 7, read " they." I allude to the conversation of our Lord with his disciples, as related in Luke, chap. vi. from ver. 32 to 36. When writing the Sermon I fell into a μιμονικον ἁμαρτημα, which upon reading it in print, I afterwards discovered, and have corrected.

Indication, *page* 6, *line* 12.

" Benevolence towards the worst characters, or the study of their good, may be as amiable " as any whatsoever: yea, often more so than that towards the good, since it argues such a " strong degree of benevolence as can surmount the greatest obstacle, the moral evil in the " object. Hence the love of unjust enemies is counted amongst the highest virtues." Hutcheson's Inquiry, page 179.

Intricate, *page* 6, *line* 14.

Some rules which have been laid down about justice, gratitude, &c. remind me of what Bishop Taylor says in the preface to his Ductor Dubitantium. " There is a wood before " your doors, and a labyrinth within the wood, and locks and bars to every door within that " labyrinth, and after all we are like to meet with unskilful guides, and yet of all things in " the world, in these things an error is the most intolerable." Preface, page 7. " Unhappy " would it be for mankind if a sense of virtue was of as narrow an extent, as a capacity for " *such* metaphysics." Hutcheson's Inquiry, page 119.

Moral Worth, *page* 6, *line* 16.

In one of the senses ascribed to justice, in a former note, it implies a due degree of esteem for any object; so I find it used by Hierax, in his work upon justice, quoted by Stobæus, Serm. ix. πως δε εκ ἀδικος, ει ὁμοιως τιμησει τον τε σωφρονα και τον ακολαστον, και τον ἀφρονα, και τον φρονιμον. No man ever meant to deny that our affections will carry us forward more eagerly to assist a good than a bad man, i. e. " when good appears attainable by a person of " moral dignity, our desire of his happiness, founded upon esteem or approbation, is much " stronger than that supposed in a former class of persons by whose happiness or misery our " public passions are moved abstractedly from their moral qualities, or that the misfor- " tune of such a person raises stronger sorrow, pity or regret." See Hutcheson on the Passions, page 73. But the social relations in which we stand even to the bad, and the excess

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of their misery, and various other circumstances, may justify us in granting to them the assistance, which we at the same time do not grant to better men. "Every kind and every "degree of misery, says Sherlock, is an object of mercy, and whether men are exposed to "calamity by the necessity of their condition, and the over-ruling providence of God, or "whether they bring them upon themselves by sin and wickedness, or by folly and indiscretion, yet, considered as miserable, they are objects of pity." See Sherlock's Sermons, vol. v. page 275.

It is impossible to lay down rules that should be adapted to all cases. However, the reader may peruse with advantage Hutcheson's Canons, sect. iii. art. xi. and his Corollaries, sect. vii. art. ix. of his Inquiry, and the general law, according to which our desires arise in sect. ii. art. iv. of the Nature and Conduct of the Passions.

At variance with Justice, *page* 6, *line* 20.

The reader will not be displeased with the following quotation from Gregory de Valentia's Commentaries, vol. ii. page 995. "Comparatio virtutum moralium quoad perfectionem, "non tam mihi utilis et scitu digna, quam *obscura et difficilis* cognitu videtur. Nam quælibet virtus absolute est satis præstans, et *quoad aliquid* etiam censeri potest reliquis *præstantior*.

"Cum autem alia virtus in alio aliis excellat, simpliciter quidem illa erit censenda reliquis præstantior quæ *consideratis* omnibus habeat dignitatem majore dignam æstimatione, "sive quia in pluribus attributis excellat, sive quia in aliquo sive aliquibus, quæ præponderent. Quod certe dignoscere *difficillima et perobscura res est*."

It is the usual practice of the best writers of morality, both ancient and modern, rather to distinguish virtue into genera et species, and to mark the connections and resemblances between one virtue and another, than to perplex the mind by contrasting the degree of their obligation. However it must be owned Aristotle sometimes engages in useless speculations; and he did so, probably, because such questions were started in his own times.

In the seventh book Eudemorum, chapter eleventh, he discusses the question, whether we are to do good to a *friend*, or to *a good man*, and leaves the difficulty, I think, nearly where he found it—ἀν μεν γαρ φιλος και σπουδαιος. ἰσως ὲ λιαν χαλεπον, ἀν μητις το μεν αὐξησῃ, το δε ταπεινωσῃ, φιλον μεν σφοδρα ποιων, ἐπιεικη δε ἠρεμα. ἐι δε μη, πολλα προβλημαθ' γινεται· διον ἐι ὁμεν ἡν, ἀκ ἐσαι δε· ὁ δε ἐσαι, ὑυπω δε, ἡ ὁ μεν ἐγγενέλο, ἐστι δι ὰ. διο ἐστιν, ἀκ ἠν δε, ἀδε ἐσαι. Another solution is, ἰσως ἐστιν ἁ δει τῳ χρησιμῳ, ἀλλα δε τῳ ἀγαθῳ. Edit. Duval, vol. ii. p. 283.

To the general question, I could not obtain from Aristotle such a general answer as amounts to a principle, and his distinctions are perhaps so numerous as to exclude the possibility of a general rule. But I observe that he does not make the degree of moral merit the *sole* standard for regulating our actions. In chapter 2d of the Mor. book 9, we have some other curious questions—ἀποριαν δ' ἐχει και τα τοιαδε, οἱον, πολερα δει παῖα τῳ παῖρι ἀπονεμειν, και πειθεσθαι· ἡ καμνουλα μεν ἰαῖρῳ πειτεον· στραῖηγον δε, χειροτονῆτεον τον πολεμικον· ὁμοιως δε φιλῳ, μαλλον ἡ σπουδαιῳ ὑπερβῆλεον· και ευεργεῖη ἀνταποδοτεον χαριν μαλλον, ἡ ἑταιρῳ δοτεον, ἐαν ἀμφοιν μη ἐνδεχῆαι. ἀρ ἀν παντα τα τοιαυῖα ἀκριβως μεν διορισαι, ὲ ῥαδιον, πολλας γαρ και παῖοιας ἐχει διαφορας, και μεγεθει, και μικροῖῆι, και τῳ καλῳ και ἀναγκαιῳ. Edit. Duval, p. 117.

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The following obſervation is replete with good ſenſe—ὁπερ ἐν πολλακις ἐιρηται, ὁι περι τα παθη και τας πραξεις λογοι ὁμοιως ἐχουσι το ὡρισμενον τοις περι ἁ ἐισιν. ὁτι μεν ὐν ὐτ' ἀυτα πασιν ἀποδοτεον, ἀδε τῳ παιρι πανια, καθαπερ ἀδε τῳ Διι Δυεται, ὐκ ἀδηλον. ἐπει δ' ἑτερα γονευσι, και ἀδελφοις και ἑταιροις, και ἐυεργεται, ἑκασοις τα ὀικεια και τα ἁρμοττοντα ἀπονεμητεον—ἐτω δε και ποιειν φαινονται. Ariſtot. Edit. Duval, tom. ii. p. 118.

I have ſeldom ſeen either any momentous truth illuſtrated, or any important duty facilitated by the ſtatement of rare and extreme caſes. Even in the moment when we are diſcuſſing them, they amuſe the imagination without ſtirring up the affections. They ſupply matter to the ſubtle diſputant, more than guidance to the virtuous agent. When they happen, they are accompanied by *peculiar and prominent* circumſtances, which are at once perceived by the underſtanding, and felt by the heart. But they ſuggeſt only remote and *dubious analogies* for ordinary caſes. On the contrary, the diſcipline of the mind, by a right conduct in ordinary caſes, is the beſt ſecurity againſt error and defect in thoſe, which are extraordinary.

Emotion, *page* 6, *line* 26.

I borrow this term from Lord Kaimes. "An internal motion or agitation of the mind, "when it paſſes away without deſire, is denominated emotion: when deſire follows the mo- "tion or agitation, is denominated a paſſion." Elements of Criticiſm, vol. page 39.

The ſame writer diſtinguiſhes, as I do between, a wiſh, and a deſire. "Deſire in its "*proper* ſenſe is that internal act, which by influencing the will makes us to *proceed to action*. "Deſire in a *lax* ſenſe reſpects alſo actions and events that depend not on us, as when I de- "ſire that my friend may have a ſon to repreſent him, or that my country may flouriſh "in arts and ſciences. But ſuch internal act is properly termed a *wiſh*, than a deſire." From the ſame writer alſo I draw the diſtinction between a cauſe and an object. "Paſ- "ſions being accompanied with deſire, have a tendency to action; but every paſſion muſt "have an object, namely that being or thing to which it is directed, and with a view to "which, every action prompted by it is performed: and to what being or thing is a paſſion "directed? Plainly to the ſame being or thing that occaſioned it. The cauſe of a paſſion, "therefore, and its objects, are the ſame in different reſpects: an emotion, on the other "hand, being in its nature quieſcent, and merely a paſſive feeling, muſt have a cauſe; but "cannot be ſaid, properly ſpeaking, to have an object." See Elements of Criticiſm, vol. i. page 41.

Mr. Hume, I am aware, uſes the word emotion in a larger ſenſe, and diſtinguiſhes, though not preciſely in the ſame terms, between an object and a cauſe. "The object of love and "hatred is ſome other perſon; the cauſes are either excellencies or faults; the cauſes are "what excite the emotion, the object is what the mind directs its view to, when the emo- "tion is excited." Diſſertation on the Paſſions, vol. ii. of Eſſays, page 192.

Uſual œconomy, *and uſual* kindneſs, *page* 6, *line* 37.

As upon *this* ſubject there may be ſome difficulty in ſatisfying a virtuous mind concerning the wiſdom or the benevolence of our Creator, I will lay before my reader the opinions of ſeveral great writers:—

"While every man conſults the good of his own community, we are ſenſible that the "general

" general intereſt of mankind is better promoted than by any *looſe indeterminate views to the* " *good of a* ſpecies, whence *no beneficial action could ever reſult for want of a duly limited object* " *on which they can exert themſelves.*" Hume's Eſſays, vol. ii, p. 294.

" 'Tis wiſely ordained by nature, that private connexions ſhould commonly prevail over " univerſal views and conſiderations; otherwiſe our affections and actions would be diſſi- " pated and loſt, for want of a *proper limited* object. Thus a ſmall benefit done to ourſelves, " or our near friends, excites more lively ſentiments of love and approbation, than a great " benefit done to a diſtant commonwealth. But ſtill we know here, as in all the ſenſes, to " correct theſe inequalities by reflection, and retain a general ſtandard of vice and virtue, " founded chiefly on general uſefulneſs." See Hume's note in p. 299 of his Eſſays, vol. ii.

" All men, even thoſe at the greateſt diſtance, are no doubt intitled to our *good wiſhes*, " and our good wiſhes we naturally give them. But if, notwithſtanding, they ſhould be " unfortunate, to give ourſelves any anxiety upon that account, ſeems to be no part of our " *duty*. That we ſhould be but little intereſted therefore, in the fortune of thoſe whom we " can neither ſerve, nor hurt, and who are in every reſpect ſo very remote from us, ſeems " wiſely ordered by nature; and if it were poſſible to alter in this reſpect the original con- " ſtitution of our frame, we could yet gain nothing by the change." Smith's Moral Sentiments, vol. i. p. 343.

" As one great purpoſe of ſociety is to furniſh opportunities of natural aid and ſupport; " nature ſeconding that purpoſe, hath provided the principle of benevolence, which excites " us to be kindly, beneficent, and generous. Nor ought it to eſcape obſervation, that the " author of nature, attentive to our wants, and to our well-being, hath endued us with a " liberal portion of that principle. It excites us to be kind, not only to thoſe we are con- " nected with, but to our neighbours, and even to thoſe we are barely acquainted with. " Providence is peculiarly attentive to objects in diſtreſs, who require immediate aid and " relief. To the principle of benevolence, it hath ſuperadded the paſſion of pity, which in " every feeling heart is irreſiſtible. To make benevolence *more* extenſive would be fruit- " leſs; becauſe here are objects in plenty to fill the moſt capacious mind. It would not be " fruitleſs only, but *hurtful* to ſociety: I ſay hurtful; becauſe frequent diſappointments in " attempting to gratify our benevolence, would render it a troubleſome gueſt, and make us " cling rather to ſelfiſhneſs, which we can always gratify." See Kaimes's Hiſtory of Man, vol. ii. p. 292; ſee alſo p. 311.

" Becauſe of the great numbers of mankind, their diſtant habitations, and the incapacity " of any one to be remarkably uſeful to great multitudes; that our benevolence might not " be quite diſtracted with a multiplicity of objects, whoſe equal virtues would equally re- " commend them to our regard; or become uſeleſs, by being equally extended to multi- " tudes at vaſt diſtances, whoſe intereſts we could not underſtand, nor be capable of pro- " moting, having no intercourſe of offices with them; nature has ſo well ordered it, that " as our attention is more raiſed by thoſe good offices, which are done to ourſelves or our " friends, ſo they cauſe a ſtronger ſenſe of approbation in us, and produce a ſtronger bene- " volence towards the authors of them. See Hutcheſon's Inquiry, p. 220.

When Ariſtotle diſcuſſes the queſtion, whether we ſhould have many or few friends, and determines that it is beſt to have neither many nor few, he aſſigns a reaſon which may be applied to univerſal benevolence—πολλων μεν' ὀντων, ἐργον ἐφ' ἑκαστον μερισαι το φιλειν. ἐφ' ἁπαν-

ἐπαινῶν γαρ και των ἀλλων ἐξαδυναῖει ἡμων ἡ φυσις ἀσθενης ἐσα, προς το ἐπι πολυ ἀφικνεισθαι. Ariſtot. Magn. Moral. lib. ii. cap. xvi.

The ſame philoſopher obſerves, that upon objects placed beyond our reach, we do not employ even conſultation. περι ὡν δ' ἐνδεχεῖαι μη μονον το ἐιναι και μη, αλλα και το βελευσασθαι τοις ανθρωποις· ταυῖα δ' ἐσιν ὁσα ἐφ' ἡμιν ἐσι πραξαι ἡ μη πραξαι. διο ἐ βελευομεθα περι των ἐν Ινδοις, ἐδε πως ἐι ὁ κυκλος τετραγωνιζεος. τα μεν γαρ ἐκ ἐφ' ἡμιν. το δ' ὁλως ὐ πρακῖον. Eudem, lib. iii. edit. Duval, p. 214.

In the 18th chapter of the firſt book of Mag. Mor. he ſays, that we have alſo no προαιρεσις upon objects that are remote πολλακις διανοεμεθα ὑπερ των εν Ινδοις. αλλ' ὐ και προαιρεμεθα. The readers of Ariſtotle know well the diſtinction he makes between will and election. ὐθεις γαρ τελος ὐδεν προαιρεῖαι, αλλα τα προς το τελος.—βελεῖαι δε γε μαλιſα το τελος. See cap. x. lib. ii. Eudem. βελησις, indeed, is applied to voluntary actions, as, in the caſe of the ἀκρασης, ἡ ὀρα βελησις ἑκουσιον. Mag. Mor. lib. i. cap. xiv. and to circumſtances in which we do not act, as βουλησι ἐσι και, των ἀδυναῖων· ὁιον, βελομεθα μεν ἀθαναῖοι ἐιναι, προαιρεμεθα δε ἐ. Mag. Mor. lib. i. cap. xviii. See alſo, lib. ii. Eudem. cap. x.

I ſuppoſe, that in the language of Ariſtotle, the word, will, uſed in a very low ſenſe, and implying merely a wiſh, might be uſed of the good of all mankind. This however is not ſuch a wiſh as would amount to deſire, in the modern philoſophical ſenſe of the word—ſuch, I mean, as is accompanied with the view of an end, and rouſes us to action. "Into "actions done with a view to an end," ſays Lord Kaimes, "deſire and will enter: deſire "to accompliſh the end goes firſt; the will to act, in order to accompliſh the end is next; "and the external act follows." Hiſtory of Man, vol. ii. p. 219; and Bentham, ſect. viii. upon Intentionality, and 10th upon Motives. My purpoſe in this note is to ſhew, that univerſal happineſs cannot be propoſed to our minds as an end—that as an object it does not excite our deſires; that the attempt to promote it directly forms no part of our duty—and, that theſe limitations of the principle and feeling of univerſal benevolence, being adapted to our limited powers, are proofs of the wiſdom of the Deity.

Effects of the whole, page 7, line 2.

"Our powers being ſmall, the effects of them would be utterly loſt, like a handful of "ſalt thrown into a pond, if diffuſed among too many; whereas, by ſeverally confining our "ſervice within a compaſs where they may be felt, they will prove of real value, and the "good of the whole will be beſt promoted." Light of Nature, vol. iii. part 2d of the Poſthumous Works, page 361.

Invigorated, page 7, line 4.

"But our underſtanding and power are limited, ſo that we cannot know many other na"tures, nor is our utmoſt power capable of promoting the happineſs of many: our actions "are influenced by ſome ſtronger affections than this general benevolence. There are "certain qualities found in ſome beings more than in others, which excite ſtronger degrees "of good will, and determine our attention to their intereſts, while that of others is ne"glected. The ties of blood, benefits conferred upon us, and the obſervation of virtue in "others, raiſe much more vigorous affections than that general benevolence, which we may "have towards all." Hutcheſon on the Paſſions, p. 309.

Immediate

Immediate ſervice to the whole ſpecies, page 7, *line* 11.

I am perſuaded with Hutcheſon, that " any univerſal increaſe, whether of the ſocial or " the benevolent affections would in the whole be of little advantage, and that the medium " of the public is a ſufficient counterbalance to the medium of the ſelfiſh. If the public " were raiſed, the hero of Cervantes would be no rare character. If the ſelfiſh, the world " would be filled with univerſal rapine and war." Hutcheſon on the Paſſions, p. 203.

But ſurely the adventurer whom I deſcribe would be chargeable with Quixotiſm.

Moral Species, page 7, *line* 20.

See Hutcheſon, p. 99, upon the Paſſions.

Enormous bulkineſs, page 7, *line* 24.

" 'Twere infinite to compute in how many inſtances want of due order, meaſure, and " manner, do ſpoil and incommodate action. 'Tis wiſdom that applies remedy to theſe miſ- " chiefs. Things muſt be compared to, and arbitrated by, her ſtandard, or elſe they will " contain ſomething of monſtrous enormity; either ſtrutting in unwieldy bulk, or ſinking " in defective ſcantineſs." See Barrow's Works, vol. i. p. 8.

Juſtify itſelf, page 7, *line* 36.

See Malebranch, as quoted by Adam Smith in his Theory of Moral Sentiments, p. 220. London edition of 1767, and by Hutcheſon in his Enquiry, p. 139.

Reaſon, page 8, *line* 13.

" When benevolence is ſaid to be the ſum of virtue, it is not ſpoken of as a *blind* propen- " ſion, but as a principle in reaſonable creatures, and ſo to be directed by their reaſon: for " reaſon and reflection comes into our notion of a moral agent. And that will lead us " to conſider diſtant conſequences, as well as the immediate tendency of an action: it " will teach us that the care of ſome perſons, ſuppoſe children and families, is particularly " committed to our charge by nature and Providence; as alſo that there are other circum- " ſtances, ſuppoſe friendſhip or former obligations, which require that we do good to ſome, " preferably to others." Butler's Sermons, p. 153.

Without impeding us, page 8, *line* 25.

" Univerſal charity is not incompatible with private prudence, nor particular affection, " ſo far from it, that it encourages and furniſhes us with rational inducements to cultivate " them." See Search, vol. iii, part 2d of his poſtumous works, p. 360.

Nearer, and therefore dearer, page 8, *line* 26.

" So eaſy is it for every man to err, and ſo hard to wreſt from any man's mouth the plain " acknowledgment of error, that what hath been once inconſiderably defended, the ſame is " commonly perſiſted in as long as wit, by whetting itſelf, is able to find out any ſhift, be " it never ſo ſlight, whereby to eſcape out of the hands of preſent contradiction." See Hooker's Eccl. Polity, book iii. p. 133.

The ſagacity and candour of the author of Political Juſtice have led him to diſplay a moſt honourable exception to the foregoing remark of Hooker. "Some readers of my graver "productions will perhaps, in peruſing theſe volumes, accuſe me of inconſiſtency; the "affections and charities of private life being every where in this publication a topic of the "warmeſt eulogium, while in the enquiry concerning Political Juſtice, they ſeem to be "treated with no indulgence and favour. In anſwer to this objection, all I think it neceſ- "ſary to ſay on the preſent occaſion is, that for more than four years I have been anxious "for opportunity and leiſure to modify ſome of the earlier chapters of that work, in con- "formity to the ſentiments inculcated in this—not that I ſee cauſe to make any change re- "ſpecting the principle of juſtice, or any thing elſe fundamental to the ſyſtem there deli- "vered; but, that I apprehend domeſtic and private affections inſeparable from the nature "of man, and from what may be ſtyled the culture of the heart, and am fully perſuaded "that they are not incompatible with a profound and active ſenſe of juſtice in the mind of "him who cheriſhes them." "The way in which theſe ſeemingly jarring principles may be "reconciled, is in part pointed out in a little book, which I gave to the public in the year "1798, and which I will therefore take the liberty to quote."

"A ſound morality requires that nothing human ſhould be regarded by us as indifferent; "but it is impoſſible that we ſhould not feel the ſtrongeſt inſtinct for thoſe perſons whom "we know moſt intimately, and whoſe welfare and ſympathies are united to our own.— "True wiſdom will recommend to us individual attachments; for with them our minds are "more thoroughly maintained in activity and life, than they can be under the privation of "them; and it is better that man ſhould be a living being than a ſtock or ſtone. True virtue "will ſanction this recommendation, ſince it is the object of virtue to produce happineſs, "and ſince the man who lives in the midſt of domeſtic relations, will have many opportu- "nities of conferring pleaſure, minute in the detail, yet not trivial in the amount, without "interfering with the purpoſes of general benevolence. Nay, by kindling his ſenſibility "and harmonizing his ſoul, they may be expected, if he is endowed with a liberal and "manly ſpirit, to render him more prompt in the ſervice of ſtrangers and the public."— Memoirs of the Author of a Vindication of the Rights of Women, cap. vi. p. 90, ſecond edition.

I will not inſult the foregoing obſervations with the name of conceſſions. I am more diſpoſed to conſider them as modifications ſuggeſted by maturer reflection, and expreſſed with ſome degree of contrition, that they had neither occurred to the writer, nor had been conveyed to the reader, before. For the purpoſe of doing them complete juſtice, I have quoted them literally and entirely; and I think that they cannot be too attentively peruſed, nor too widely circulated.

In regard to "the principle of juſtice, and other things fundamental to the ſyſtem" which our writer yet retains, I ſuppoſe that in Ethics, as well as Theology, men will differ about fundamentals. I have heard it, however, remarked by perſons well ſkilled in the tactics of controverſy, that, after the ſurrender of ſo many outworks, the citadel itſelf is ſcarcely tenable.

While the principle of juſtice was ſo explained as to degrade the virtues of domeſtic life, and other individual attachments between friends, benefactors, and the perſons whom they ſerve, I conceived it to be indefenſible. How far the culture of the heart may be compatible with the profound and active ſenſe of juſtice which is ſtill pronounced fundamental, is a point

a point upon which I ſhall myſelf decline entering into any direct altercation; and my reaſon ſhall be given in the words of an antient writer—προς γαρ τον παντως πειρωμενον φαινεσθαι διαφευγειν δικαιον μεν παντως πειραθαι συλλογισασθαι, ουκ ευσχημον δε. διοπερ ει δει συνεσλαναι ευχερως προς τους τυχοντας. ανανκη γαρ πονηρολογιαν συμβαινειν. Ariſtot. Top. lib. viii. cap. xiv. tom. i. p. 281.

If it were neceſſary to deviate from the eſtabliſhed forms of language, I would rather ſay with Mr. Bentham, that "the dictates of juſtice are nothing more than a part of the "dictates of benevolence, which on certain occaſions are applied to certain ſubjects, to wit, "to certain actions." See Introduction to the Principles of the Morals of Legiſlation, page 123.

Mr. Bentham, it is to be obſerved, meaſures benevolence by utility. Hutchinſon refers all virtues to benevolence, as acting by what he calls, the moral ſenſe. Butler, when he ſtates, that "in a higher and more general way of conſideration, benevolence ſeems in the "ſtricteſt ſenſe to include in it all that is good and worthy," adds that, "in ſo doing, we leave "out the particular nature of creatures, and the particular circumſtances in which they are "placed." P. 258. He traces up "the common virtues and the common vices of mankind "to benevolence, or the want of it, ſo as to juſtify the Apoſtle's aſſertion, that all other com-"mandments are comprehended in the love of our neighbour." But he does not paſs over "the cautions and reſtrictions which further require to be conſidered in the virtue of a being, "who has ſuch a nature, and is placed in ſuch circumſtances as man." His note in p. 257 of the Sermon, is full of the beſt ſenſe, and the impartial philoſopher will do well to compare it with p. 462 of the Diſſertation upon the Nature of Virtue, ſubjoined to the Analogy. I muſt again obſerve, that Butler does not ſet one virtue at variance with another. He marks their reſemblances as well as their differences, and he ſhews their happy tendency from the conſtitution of our nature to the ſame end. "Temperance, ſobriety, and moderation in "ſenſual pleaſures, have an influence upon the happineſs of others, and therefore they may "be produced by the love of others." The effect of the oppoſite vices, as inconſiſtent with benevolence, are moſt impreſſively ſtated by Hutchinſon: ſee page 172, on the Nature and Conduct of the Paſſions.

A great whole, page 8, *line* 28.

"By wiſdom we underſtand we are parts and members of the great body, the univerſe, "and are therefore concerned in the good management of it, and are thereby obliged to pro-"cure its order and peace, and by no irregular undertaking to diſturb or diſcompoſe it; "which makes us honeſt and peaceable men: that we proceed from the ſame primitive "ſtock, are children of the ſame father, and partake of the ſame blood with all men; are "endued with the like faculties of mind, paſſions of ſoul, ſhape of body, and ſenſe of things: "that we have equally implanted in our original conſtitution inclinations to love, pity, gra-"titude, ſociableneſs, quiet, joy, reputation: that we have an indiſpenſible need and impa-"tient deſire of company, aſſiſtance, comfort and relief: that therefore it is according to the "deſign of nature, and agreeable to reaſon, that to thoſe, to whom our natural condition by "ſo many bonds of cognation, ſimilitude, and mutual neceſſitude, hath knit and conjoined "us, we ſhould bear a kind reſpect and tender affection, ſhould chearfully concur in under-

"going

" going the common burthens, ſhould heartily wiſh and induſtriouſly promote their good, " aſſiſt them in accompliſhing their reaſonable deſires, thankfully requite the courteſies re- " ceived from them, congratulate and rejoice with them in their proſperity, comfort them " in their diſtreſſes, and as far as we are able, relieve them ; however, tenderly compaſſionate " their diſappointments, miſeries, and ſorrows." See Barrow's Works, vol. i. page 9.

Utility, page 8, *line* 30.

" Reaſon, when fully aſſiſted and improved, is ſufficient to inſtruct us in the pernicious " or uſeful tendencies of qualities or actions: it is not alone ſufficient to produce any moral " blame or approbation. Utility is only a tendency to a certain end ; and were the end to- " tally indifferent to us, we ſhould feel the ſame indifference towards the means. " 'Tis re- " quiſite a *ſentiment* ſhould here diſplay itſelf, in order to give a preference to the uſeful above " the pernicious tendencies. This ſentiment can be no other than a feeling for the happi- " neſs of mankind, and a reſentment of their miſery ; ſince theſe are the different ends, which " virtue and vice have a tendency to promote. Here therefore *reaſon* inſtructs us in the ſeve- " ral tendencies of actions, and *humanity* makes a diſtinction in favour of thoſe, which are " uſeful and beneficial." See Hume, appendix 1, concerning moral ſentiments, page 360, edit of his Eſſays, 1767.

Having quoted from Mr. Hume a paſſage in which he uſes the word, reaſon, I ought to ſtate, that I do not always confine the uſe of the word in moral deliberations, as he does, merely to " that power by which we become acquainted (ſee page 364) with objects, their " relations and circumſtances, and then experience approbation and blame, which is the " work of the heart only, and not of the judgment." On the contrary, I with Reid, underſtood reaſon ſometimes to mean " that moral power by which actions ought to be regulated, " and which ſuggeſts to us what are called rational principles of action." See p. 471 and 212 of Reid on the Active Powers of Man. I agree alſo with Dr. Reid in his explanation of the word ſentiment, " as implying not *mere* feeling, but *judgment accompanied* with feel- " ing." See p. 479.

Particular affections, page 8, *line* 31.

" In the benevolent affections, the happineſs of any one perſon is an ultimate end, deſired " with no further view, and yet the obſerving its inconſiſtency with the happineſs of another " more beloved, or with the happineſs of many, though each one of them were but equally " beloved, may overcome the former deſire: yet this will not prove, that in each kind action " men form the abſtract conception of all mankind, or the ſyſtem of rationals. Such con- " ceptions are indeed uſeful, that ſo we may gratify either our ſelf-love, or kind affections in " the fulleſt manner, as far as our power extends, and may not content ourſelves with ſmaller " degrees either of private or public good, while greater are in our power. But when we " have formed theſe conceptions, we do not ſerve the individual only from love to the ſpecies." See Hutcheſon on the Paſſions, p. 222.

On the other hand, the particular affections indirectly re-act on the general, or, as Hutcheſon ſays, " a powerful determination even to a limited benevolence is obſerved to give a " ſtrong bias to our minds towards a univerſal goodneſs, tenderneſs, humanity, generoſity, " and contempt of private good in our whole conduct." See Inquiry, p. 258.

Conſcience,

Conſcience, page 8, *line* 32.

Upon conſcience, as connected with benevolence, Butler's firſt and ſecond Sermon cannot be read too often, nor too attentively. I have been alſo much inſtructed on the ſubject of conſcience by Dr. Reid, in the 6th, 7th, and 8th chapters, in his third Eſſay on the Active Powers of Man. The energy of it in quickening the operations of benevolence, is moſt eloquently deſcribed by Adam Smith's, p. 336, vol. i. of Moral Sentiments.

There is ſome unſteadineſs among philoſophers in their uſe of the word. Butler warily, (p. 13 of his Sermons), calls it "the principle in man by which he approves or diſapproves "his heart, temper, or actions." This he calls "the ſtrict uſe of the word, but allows it to "be ſometimes ſo uſed as to take in more." Dr. Reid, p. 243, calls it "an original power of "the mind, or moral faculty, by which we have the conceptions of right and wrong in "human conduct, and the dictates of which form the firſt principles of morals."

On the contrary, according to Adam Smith, "conſcience does not immediately denote "any moral faculty by which we approve or diſapprove. It ſuppoſes, indeed, the exiſtence "of ſome ſuch faculty, and properly ſignifies our conſciouſneſs of having acted agreeably or "contrary to its direction." See Smith's Moral Sentiments, vol. ii. p. 355.

"Thoſe who write of conſcience," ſays Sir Matthew Hale, "tell us it hath three offices "or acts, Synteresis, Syneideſis, and Epicriſis; ſo thoſe principles are lodged in that cheſt "of the conſcience, called Synteresis." See Sir M. Hale, on the Primitive Origination of Mankind, p. 64.

It may be worth while to ſtate the account which a learned ſchoolman gives of Synteresis, and which, in part, correſponds with the opinion of Adam Smith—"Synderesis item non eſt "aliqua potentia, ſed habitus potius naturalis, quo intellectus cognoſcit prima principia "practica, ſicut habitus naturalis quo intellectus cognoſcit prima principia ſpeculativa, ſo-"let vocari intellectus principiorum. Quod facile oſtendit D. Thom. artic. 12, et patet "ex eo, quod potentiæ rationales habent ſe ad oppoſita, ut docet Ariſtoteles. 1. Metaphyſ. "text 3. Synderesis autem tantummodo eſt de bono—Conſcientia denique, nihilo magis "*aliqua peculiaris potentia* eſt ab intellectu diſtincta, ſed eſt proprie applicatio quædam ſcientiæ "univerſalis practicæ ad particulare aliquod objectum, ſive (quod idem eſt) uſus quidam "ſcientiæ circa objectum particulare. Itaque eſt indicium, quo vel cognoſcimus quidpiam "nos feciſſe, aut non feciſſe, quo pacto conſcientia dicitur teſtificari; vel quid ſit nobis "faciendum vel non faciendum, quo pacto conſcientia dicitur ligare aut ſolvere; vel bene "aut male factum eſſe quod fecimus, quo pacto conſcientia dicitur excuſare vel accuſare, et "remordere, ut optime explicat D. Thom. hic artic. 13. Ubi et recte addit, aliquando "etiam habitum ſynderesis vel ſcientiæ ex quo ejuſmodi judicia proficiſcuntur, ſolere con-"ſcientiam nominari. Ut cum Origines, lib. ii. in Epiſt. ad Roman. dicit conſcientiam "eſſe pædagogum animæ ſociatum. Et Baſilius in libro proverb. initio eſſe naturale Judica-"torium, et Damaſcenus libro 2d, de fide Orthodoxa, cap. xii. eſſe lucem intellectus noſ-"tri. Et D. Hieronymus cum in caput 1ſt Ezech. dicit ſcintillam conſcientiæ quam, in-"quit, συνείδησιν Græci vocant in Cain quoque poſtquam ejectus eſt ex Paradiſo, non fuiſſe "extinctam." Greg. de Valentia Comment. in D. Thom. vol. i. Diſput. 6. Quæſt. 5, ſub fin. page 1288.

Tha-

The ſchoolmen, I have obſerved, uſually write the word Syndereſis. Perhaps they adopted this pronunciation from modern Greek, in which ν before τ is pronounced δ, as ἀντρον, ἀνδρον. See Ducange's Gram. p. 21.

Words, page 8, *line* 33.

I ſuſpect that what Hume ſays upon another occaſion, may be applied to ſome modern writers about univerſal benevolence. "There is much of a diſpute of words in all this "controverſy." When they reject gratitude, as the advocates of the ſelfiſh ſyſtem "rejected all private friendſhip, if no intereſt or ſelf-love intermixed itſelf, I am confident "that they abuſe terms, and confound the ideas of things." Vid. Eſſay xi. vol. i. p. 94.

I am aware, with Mr. Bentham, that in moral diſcuſſions, "the imperfections of language "are ſometimes great: that a man, confining himſelf to the terms moſt in uſe, can ſcarcely "avoid running, in appearance, into perpetual contradictions—that his propoſitions will "appear ſometimes repugnant to truth, and ſometimes adverſe to utility; and that, to obviate this inconvenience, he muſt have recourſe to the unpleaſant remedy of laying aſide "the old phraſeology, and inventing a new one." Page 101. In the very difficult ſubject which Mr. Bentham undertook to diſcuſs, and the very new points of view, in which he exhibits many parts of it, Mr. B. by ſuch obſervations, made a proper, and I think, a ſatisfactory apology for himſelf. But they cannot be applied to the modern teachers of univerſal philanthropy, nor do they juſtify another claſs of writers, whom Mr. B., in appearance at leaſt, has attempted to vindicate, not perhaps in their ſyſtems, but their phraſeology.—Speaking of "the clamours raiſed againſt thoſe ingenious moraliſts, who, travelling out of "the beaten track of ſpeculation, have found more or leſs difficulty in diſentangling themſelves from the ſhackles of ordinary language—he names Rochefoucault, Mandeville, "and Helvetius," the well known patrons of the ſyſtem of ſelfiſhneſs. He adds, that "to "the unſoundneſs of their opinions, and, with ſtill greater injuſtice, to the corruption of "their hearts, was often imputed, what was moſt commonly owing either to a want of ſkill "in matters of language on the part of the author, or a want of diſcernment: poſſibly now "and then, in ſome inſtances, a want of probity on the part of the commentator." I could wiſh that Mr. Bentham had *ſpecified* the inſtances in which the opponents of theſe writers have ſhewn their "want of diſcernment, or their want of probity." Butler, in page 206 and 214, has explained the words ſelf-love, ſelfiſhneſs, &c. In page 82, 3, 4, 5, he examines Hobbs's account of pity. He ſhews "what it *really is*, becauſe there is raiſed upon it a "general ſcheme which undermines the whole foundation of common honeſty and humanity." Theſe, I think, are the ſevereſt terms that he employs, and he employs them juſtly. In p. 24, of the Preface, too, he explains the words ſelfiſh and intereſted; but I ſee no one expreſſion in which he charges his opponents with corruption of heart. Dr. Adam Smith, in chap. iv. ſect. vii. part 2d. examines the licentious ſyſtem, in which he includes that of Mandeville. He mentions it, "as the great fallacy of Mandeville's book, to repreſent every paſſion as "wholly vicious which is ſo in any degree or in any direction." He ſpeaks of Mandeville's "eloquence as coarſe and ruſtic, but lively, luminous, and calculated to throw upon his "doctrines an air of probability, which is very apt to impoſe upon the unſkilful." He allows, however, that "in human nature there are ſome appearances which, when viewed in a certain manner, favour the notions of this writer. Moſt of them, he thinks, in almoſt every

"reſpect

" reſpect erroneous; but ſome he grants to be juſt," and he aſſigns very judicious reaſons " why even ſome of thoſe which are moſt overcharged, muſt have had ſome foundation." But when does he attack directly or indirectly the moral character of Mandeville? No man felt a nobler love of virtue, or a deeper indignation againſt vice than Mr. Hutcheſon. But does he indulge himſelf in wanton invective or ſly inſinuations? Does he not tell me, " that Lu- " cretius and Hobbes ſhew themſelves in innumerable inſtances ſtruck with ſome moral ſpe- " cies; they are full of expreſſions of admiration, gratitude, praiſe, deſire of doing good; " and of cenſure, diſapprobation, averſion to ſome forms of vice."

I am not ſure that, in oppoſing the ſelfiſh ſyſtem, even Biſhop Butler felt much more ſolicitude, or diſplayed much more ability than Mr. Hume; and I ſometimes obſerve a very ſtriking *reſemblance* between the reaſoning and the terms of the prelate and the philoſopher. See page 239 of Hume's Eſſays.

Yet Mr. Hume tells us, page 234, " that, whoever concludes, from the ſeeming ten- " dency of the ſelfiſh ſyſtem, that the advocates of it cannot poſſibly feel the true ſentiments " of benevolence, or have any regard for genuine virtue, will often find himſelf in practice " very much miſtaken." He aſcribes " probity and honour to Epicurus and his ſect, a ge- " nerous and friendly diſpoſition to Atticus and Horace, moſt irreproachable lives to Hobbes " and Locke, who maintained the ſelfiſh ſyſtem of morals." In page 383, Mr. Hume, ſpeaking of the ambiguity of the word pride, ſays, " the French expreſs this ſentiment by " the term amour propre; but as they alſo expreſs ſelf-love, as well as vanity, by the ſame " term, there ariſes a great confuſion in Rochefoucault, and many of their moral writers." Is there any attentive reader of Rochefoucault, who has not experienced frequent embarraſſment from the equivocal ſenſe of theſe words?

Ariſtotle ſeems to have been aware that the Greek term for ſelf-love was open to miſapplication, and therefore, he found it neceſſary to fix it by definition, and to guard it from abuſe: ἐστι δε φιλαυτος, ὁ αὐτου ἑνεκεν παντα πρατ̃ων, ἐν τοις καλα το λυσιτελες. ὁ μεν ουν φαυλος, φιλαυτος ἐσαι, αὐτος αὐτ̃ω γαρ ἑνεκεν παντα πρατ̃ει· αλλ' ουχ ὁ οπουδαιος. δια τουτο γαρ ἐστι οπουδαιος, ὁτι ἀλλω ἑνεκεν τ̃ου πρατ̃ει· διο ουκ ἐστι φιλαυτος.

Towards the goods of pleaſure or advantage, a virtuous man, according to Ariſtotle, is not φιλαυτος; though, in a more looſe way, he may be ſaid to be ſo—καλα το καλον. " τουτου " γαρ μονε ἀλλῳ ουκ αν ἐκσαιη. τα δε συμφερουτα και ἡδεα ἐκσησεῖαι. την μεν ουν καλα το καλον " ἀιρεσιν, φιλωυτος ἐσαι. την δε καλα το συμφερον, και καθ' ἡδονην λεγομενην, ουκ ἐσαι ὁ οπου- " δαιος, ἀλλο ὁ φαυλος." Ariſt. Mag. Mor. lib. ii. cap. xiii. ver. ii. page 192. Whatever might be the ſubtleties of diſputants in the ſchools of Greece, I believe that in Greek books, we do not find φιλαυτος applied in a good ſenſe, without ſome obvious circumſtances in the ſituation of the agent, or ſome concomitant explanation on the part of the writer, to qualify what was the rare uſe of the word.

But, to return to Mr. Hume, in page 284, vol. 2d. he acknowledges the " deduction of " morals from ſelf-love, to be a very obvious thought, and not ariſing wholly from the " wanton ſallies of the ſceptics." He mentions Polybius, " one of the graveſt, moſt judi- " cious, and moral writers of antiquity, as aſſigning this origin to all our ſentiments of " Virtue." But in page 236, he aſcribes this uſe of the word ſelf-love " to that love of " ſimplicity, which has been the ſource of much falſe reaſoning on philoſophy." In

page 241, he, alſo, calls " ſuch philoſophy more like a ſatire than a true delineation of hu- " man virtue ;" and in page 345, he again notices the " ſpirit of ſatire which ſome advocates " of the ſelfiſh ſyſtem have indulged." But where does he accuſe their hearts of corruption ?

I know not whether any profeſſed anſwer to Helvetius has been publiſhed. Doubtleſs, his perſpicuity, his vivacity, his facility in gliding through the mazes of metaphyſics, and his unrelenting hoſtility againſt the uſurpations, of what he calls, " prejudice," will always ſecure to him a numerous claſs of readers. By his ſingular uſe of terms I have not myſelf been much embarraſſed, becauſe he has defined them more clearly, and adhered to them more ſteadily, than any other advocate of the ſelfiſh ſyſtem. The chief faults which I obſerved in his writings as compoſitions are, a looſeneſs of arrangement which ſometimes ſlackens the attention, and ſometimes bewilders the judgment, of his readers—a fondneſs for multiplying narratives, which frequently interrupt the continuity of his reaſoning, and a wantonneſs in ſcattering witticiſms, which are often not well-ſuited to the importance of his ſubjects. In his work upon education, however, he has compleatly refuted the captivating, but moſt pernicious, paradoxes of Rouſſeau ; and to his Eſſay on the Mind, though deeply tinged with hatred of the prieſthood, and laviſhly decked with the trappings of infidelity, I cannot refuſe the praiſe of brilliant genius, and of benevolence, which, however romantic and ill-directed, I dare not pronounce inſincere. Yet, his Code of Ethics ſeems to be imperfect, becauſe it does not conſider the Nature of Man, as it has been juſtly viewed by Butler, and other philoſophers, in the light of a " ſyſtem or conſtitution, of which the ſeveral parts are united, " not by a phyſical principle of individuation, but by the reſpect they have to each other, " their reſtraints upon each other, and their proportion to each other, under the abſolute " and entire direction of conſcience." Sermon 3d. I find no warrant in experience for his ſcheme—" De fonder la probité, non ſur des principes auſſi reſpectables que ceux de la reli- " gion, mais ſur des principes dont il ſoit moins facile d'abuſer, tels que ſont les motifs d'in- " térêt perſonnel," or as he had before ſaid, " d'intérêt temporel, maniés avec adreſſe par " un legiſlateur habile." (Chap. xxiv. Diſcours II). In common with other reformers of the modern ſchool, he opens the wideſt range for thoſe ſenſual appetites, the reſtraint of which is indiſpenſably neceſſary to the well-being of ſociety. He plucks up the wheat with the tares in matters of opinion ; and by attempting, as he thought, to reſcue virtue from the ſhackles of religion, he would rend aſunder what, in the original frame, and the unalterable condition of man, the Deity has joined together.

Mr. Bentham may ſmile at my " want of diſcernment," but he will not impute to me " want of probity."

When examining the opinions of ſuch an able writer as Mr. Bentham, I thought it neceſſary to go into detail, and no place ſurely can be *more* proper for the vindication of thoſe who have defended the benevolent ſyſtem, than notes upon a ſermon which is intended to explain and enforce benevolence. " Nature, I agree with Mr. Hume, page 50, vol. i. will " always maintain her rights," and therefore, I am convinced, that many of the writers, who ſeem to contend for univerſal philanthropy, ſo as to lower the dignity and weaken the efficacy of our particular affections, would in their own practice, be grateful to benefactors, and tender to relatives. But their writings ought to be oppoſed, and their improper uſe of terms ſhould be pointed out—for they produce great inquietude in virtuous minds: they perplex the judgments of young men in their endeavours to underſtand the principles of Morality,

rality, and they furniſh bad men with ſpecious apologies for their omiſſions in the neceſſary and amiable duties of private life.

Countrymen, page 9, line 3.

Few men, I believe, are endowed with ſuch ſtrength of mind, that their political tenets ſhould never have any influence over their ſpeculations. I have not, therefore, been ſurprized at a kind of faſhion, which prevails among ſome writers, to depreciate the love of our country, to repreſent it as interfering with the principles of general benevolence, and to reſolve it into prejudice, vanity, jealouſy, or weak and inglorious ſelfiſhneſs. Can it be unreaſonable, then, to remind a reader of the ſources from which it proceeds? "Whatever "place we have lived in for any conſiderable time, there we have moſt diſtinctly remarked "the *various affections of human nature*; we have known many *lovely characters*; we remem- "ber the *aſſociations, friendſhips, families, natural affections*, and other *human ſentiments*: our "*moral ſenſe* determines us to approve thoſe *lovely diſpoſitions* where we have moſt diſtinctly "obſerved them; and our *benevolence* concerns us in the intereſts of thoſe perſons poſſeſſed of "them." Hutcheſon's Enquiry, page 163, 4.

Will my readers excuſe me for producing ſome obſervations which I once had occaſion to make, in a Sermon of my own, "upon thoſe who endeavour to draw down patriotiſm itſelf "from that high ſeat of honour, which it has long been allowed to fill near the throne of vir- "tue. There is, I grant, a ſpurious, and there is alſo a genuine patriotiſm; juſt as there "is a philoſophy which corrupts our minds, as well as there is a philoſophy which improves "them. But *true* philoſophy has ever borne teſtimony in favour of *true* patriotiſm, becauſe "it conſiders the good of our country as forming a part, and in reſpect to our own agency, "our own duty, and our own welfare, a very conſiderable part, of general happineſs. Theſe "conſiderations, no doubt, when preſented to the mind of a virtuous ſtateſman, will inſpire "him with additional joy; and when they become, as they always may, additional motives, "will enhance the merit of his meaſures. The object which rouſes all his deſires, and "nerves all his ſtrength, is the well-being of his country: and as to the dangers he has to "encounter, or the toils he has to endure, they are abundantly compenſated by the magni- "tude of the ſervices performed; by the quantity of good immediately produced; by the "multitudes to whom it is diffuſed in various degrees, and in various directions; and by the "long ſeries of years through which it is likely to continue. But in regard to the greater "part of mankind—to men, who neither pant for extenſive power, nor ſhine in public opi- "nion, the love of our country may be traced up, not to the blind prejudices of education, "not to the ſordid deſire of gain, not to the inſatiable thirſt of glory, not to a ſavage appe- "tite for devaſtation, but to other and better motives:—to the remembrance of ſcenes, "where we have paſſed the delightful ſeaſons of boyhood and of youth:—to ſympathy with "the complicated intereſts of parents, children and kindred:—to joy for the ſafety, or for "the proſperity of thoſe who have lightened our own ſorrows, or promoted our own ſucceſs: "—to the pleaſing recollection of the hours we have ſpent in learned or in chearful ſociety: "—to reſpect for the laws by which our liberty, our property, and our lives have been pro- "tected:—to reverence for that mode of religion which we believe to be moſt warranted by "the law of God: to the rapid communication* of paſſion over related objects brought into "a group:—to the mechanical and potent influence of numbers upon our imaginations; and

* Elements of Criticiſm, lib. 1. cap. 2, ſect. 4.

" to the facility with which they pafs from ourfelves and our countrymen, to a near and even " a remote poſterity."

God forbid that I ſhould ever preſume to palliate the guilt of men, who, at any time, or in any country, may have perverted this generous paſſion to the purpoſes of their own wayward and inordinate ambition. For I allow, with the wiſe and benevolent Hutcheſon, " that " *tyranny*, that *faction*, that a *neglect of juſtice*, a *corruption of manners*, and any thing which " occaſions the miſery of the ſubjects, may deſtroy," or, as I would rather ſay, *weaken*, " this national love." But let not every kind of it be repreſented as a weakneſs, nor every degree of it as a crime. Let not the abuſe of it be confounded with that uſe, which nature often ſuggeſts, which experience warrants, and which Chriſtianity does not forbid. Let it not be ſevered entirely from benevolence, of which it forms a ſound, a large, and a conſpicuous part; nor rudely thruſt out from the duties of ſociety, which, in its abſence, could neither flouriſh, nor perhaps exiſt. The ſophiſtry which has been employed to degrade it, will in part be defeated, not, perhaps, by my wiſhes, or by my reaſoning, but by the authority of a much greater writer, whoſe judgment and even eloquence will be readily admitted by any attentive reader of the following obſervations: " The faculty we have of uniting num- " berleſs individuals into one complex object, enlarges greatly the ſphere of benevolence. " By that faculty, our country, our government, our religion, become objects of public " ſpirit, and of a lively affection. The individuals that compoſe the group, conſidered apart, " may be too minute, or too diſtant for our benevolence; but when united into one whole, " accumulation makes them *great*, greatneſs makes them conſpicuous; and affection, pre- " ſerved entire and undivided, is beſtowed upon an abſtract object, as upon one that is ſingle " and viſible; but with energy proportioned to its greater dignity and importance. Thus " the principle of benevolence is not too ſparingly ſcattered among men." Kaimes's Hiſtory of Man, vol. ii. page 292.

Image of Conſummate Eloquence, page 9, line 6.

" Ego ſic ſtatuo, nihil eſſe in ullo genere tam pulchrum, quo non pulchrius id ſit, unde " illud, ut ex ore aliquo, quaſi imago, exprimatur, quod neque oculis, neque auribus, ne- " que ullo ſenſu percipi poteſt. Cogitatione tantum, et mente complectimur, &c " Cicer. Orator. edit. Gruter. vol. i. page 156; and Quintilian, lib. i. Proem. p. 5, Rollin's edit.

Moral Perfection, page 9, line 6.

In an age when ſo much has been ſaid to ſo little purpoſe about perfectibility, it may not be amiſs to conſider the ſober and judicious language of a real philoſopher. " The wiſe and " virtuous man directs his principal attention to the idea of exact propriety and perfection. " There exiſts in the mind of every man an idea of this kind, gradually formed from his ob- " ſervations upon the character and conduct both of himſelf and of other people. It is the " ſlow, gradual, and progreſſive work of the great demi-god within the breaſt, the great " judge and arbiter of conduct. This idea is in every man more or leſs accurately drawn, " its colouring is more or leſs juſt, its outlines are more or leſs exactly deſigned, according " to the delicacy and acuteneſs of that ſenſibility, with which thoſe obſervations were made, " and according to the care and attention employed in making them. In the wiſe and vir- " tuous man they have been made with the moſt acute and delicate ſenſibility, and the utmoſt " care

" care and attention have been employed in making them. Every day ſome feature is im-
" proved; every day ſome blemiſh is corrected. He has ſtudied this idea more than other
" people, he comprehends it more diſtinctly, he has formed a much more correct image of
" it, and is much more deeply enamoured of its exquiſite and divine beauty. He endea-
" vours, as well as he can, to aſſimilate his own character to this archetype of perfection.
" But he imitates the work of a divine artiſt, which can never be equalled. He feels the im-
" perfect ſucceſs of all his beſt endeavours, and ſees, with grief and affliction, in how many
" different features the mortal copy falls ſhort of the immortal original. He remembers
" with concern and humiliation, how often, from want of attention, from want of judg-
" ment, from want of temper, he has, both in words and actions, both in conduct and con-
" verſation, violated the exact rules of perfect propriety; and has ſo far departed from that
" model, according to which he wiſhed to faſhion his own character and conduct." Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments, vol ii. p. 147-9, 7th edit.

The foregoing ſtatement is perfectly free from the confuſion and obſcurity which pervade our modern writers upon perfectibility, and it has no tendency to excite thoſe viſionary expectations which amuſe the fancy, without improving the heart.

Pittance of imperfect Virtue, page 9, *line* 13.

" The moſt plauſible exception lying againſt the expediency of labouring for the general
" good, ariſes from our inability to contribute ſo much towards it, as to make our ſhare
" worth the conſideration.

" But let us conſider that, if this doctrine were to prevail, moſt of the bleſſings of nature,
" the benefits of ſociety, and conveniencies of life would be loſt; the moſt valuable of
" which are procured by the operation of feeble and inconſiderable agents.

" We need not undervalue our particular ſervices, becauſe they yield but little profit; for
" though the performance of them cannot do much good, yet it may prevent great miſchiefs
" which might have enſued upon the omiſſion."

" What though our perſons be ſingle and our efforts ſmall; nobody can ſay what multitudes
" they may not affect, nor what tides of induſtry they may not excite. 'Tis notorious of
" how ſpreading a nature both the virtues and the vices are; for example and ſympathy dif-
" fuſe the ſtream to all quarters from a ſingle fountain; and a man may ſometimes find that
" in his power wherein all mankind ſhall have concern in the conſequences. The founders
" of religions and ſects in philoſophy, inventors of arts and ſciences, though imparting their
" thoughts to a few, have thereby opened channels which overflowed whole nations and
" countries."

" It may be ſaid, this might happen, perhaps, to extraordinary perſons, once in an age;
" but a private man never ſtands in a ſituation to work conſequences that can poſſibly extend
" beyond the narrow circle of his own acquaintance. But I would aſk him how he knows
" that, for we have ſhewn, in our chapter on Providence, that the affairs of the world are
" all complicated and interwoven into one tiſſue. There is no ſuch thing as triſle in nature,
" every little incident and ſudden fancy, being provided for by perfect wiſdom, with regard
" to the whole; for how narrow ſoever the views of creatures may be, God beholds the
" univerſe, and directs every little ſtroke, in his all comprehenſive plan, ſo as to contribute
" its ſhare, towards the greateſt good. Or if there be ſuch things as triſles, they are ſo in-

" terminglcd

" termingled among the imperceptible ſprings of important events, that the moſt prying eye " cannot diſtinguiſh them apart. Therefore we ought always to ſtand upon our guard, " and ſhape our minute motions, by ſuch diſcretion and regard to rectitude, as is *proper upon* " *the occaſion*, for the chance of effecting what unſeen good, or eſcaping what unthought of " evil may poſſibly depend upon them. But it would be in vain for a man to take his mea- " ſures upon conſequences that human ſagacity cannot inveſtigate ; therefore he has nothing " to do with them, or with any thing elſe, beſides the rules of prudence, charity, propriety, " and innocence, ſo far as in the preſent circumſtances of the caſe he can diſcern them."— Tucker's Chapter upon General Good, vol. v. of the Light of Nature.

Philoſophy, in the paſſages juſt now quoted, is brought within the reach of common ſenſe, and is more ſkillfully applied to the duties of common life, than by any of the writers on Univerſal Benevolence, with whom it has been my fortune to meet.

Solid Bleſſings of Social Life, page 9, *line* 20.

I have always been charmed, and, in the preſent ſtate of the world, my mind is deeply intereſted by the manner, in which Hume has deſcribed ſome of thoſe bleſſings. " In an- " tiquity, the heroes of philoſophy, as well as thoſe of war and patriotiſm, have a grandeur " and force of ſentiment, which aſtoniſhes our narrow ſouls, and is raſhly rejected as extra- " vagant and ſupernatural. *They, in their turn, I allow, would have had equal reaſon to conſider* " *as romantic and incredible, the degree of humanity, clemency, order, tranquillity, and other ſocial* " *virtues, to which, in the adminiſtration of government, we have attained in modern times, had any* " *one been then able to have made a fair repreſentation of them.*" Hume, vol. ii. ſect. vii. page 328.

A better Religioniſt, page 9, *line* 20.

I truſt, that in what is here delivered, my opinions agree *entirely* with thoſe of Barrow.— " The principal advantage of wiſdom is, its acquainting us with the nature and reaſon of " true religion, and affording convictive arguments to perſuade men to the practice of it ; " which is accompanied with the pureſt delight, and attended with the moſt ſolid content " imaginable. I ſay, the nature of religion, wherein it conſiſts, and what it requires ; the " miſtake of which produceth daily ſo many miſchiefs and inconveniences in the world, and " expoſes ſo good a name to ſo much reproach. It ſheweth it conſiſteth not in fair profeſ- " ſions, and glorious pretences, but in real practice ; not in a pertinacious adherence to any " ſect or party, but in a ſincere love of goodneſs, and diſlike of naughtineſs, wherever diſ- " covering itſelf ; not in vain oſtentations and flouriſhes of outward performance ; but in an " inward good complexion of mind, exerting itſelf in works of true devotion and charity ; " not in a nice orthodoxy, or politick ſubjection of our judgments to the peremptory dic- " tates of men, but in a ſincere love of truth, in a hearty approbation of and compliance " with the doctrines fundamentally good, and neceſſary to be believed ; not in harſh cenſur- " ing and virulent inveighing againſt others, but in carefully amending our own ways ; not in " a peeviſh croſſneſs and obſtinate repugnancy to received laws and cuſtoms, but in a quiet " and peaceable ſubmiſſion to the expreſs laws of God, and lawful commands of man ; not " in furious zeal for or againſt trivial circumſtances, but in a conſcionable practiſing the " ſubſtantial parts of religion ; not in a frequent talking or contentious diſputing about it,

" but

" but in a ready obſervance of the unqueſtionable rules and preſcripts of it." (Barrow, vol. i. Serm. I. page 10.)

Immortal Hooker,

The names which learned men bear, for any length of time, are uſually well founded. If Duns Scotus was juſtly called the moſt ſubtle Doctor, Roger Bacon the wonderful, Bonaventure the ſeraphic, Aquinas the univerſal and evangelical, ſurely Hooker has, with equal, if not ſuperiour juſtice, obtained the name of the judicious. Biſhop Lowth, in the Preface to his Engliſh Grammar, has beſtowed the higheſt praiſe upon the purity of Hooker's ſtyle. Biſhop Warburton, in his book on the Alliance between Church and State, often quotes from him, and calls him " the excellent, the admirable, the beſt good man of our order." I have ventured to call him the immortal, but if the word judicious had occurred to me, I ſhould have preferred it. Mr. Hall, of Cambridge, in one of the notes to his late *moſt* excellent Sermon, (ſee page 62), had ſtiled him the great and judicious Hooker: and it is with concern that I find him cenſured for doing ſo, by ſome of his contemporaries. Their unmerited ſeverity reminds me of an obſervation which I once read in the Biſhop of Limerick's Life of Biſhop Bramhall, and which they, who reverence Mr. Hall, as I do, will peruſe with great pleaſure. " At this time alſo, the learned, the meek, and the judicious Hooker " opened that fountain of reaſon that ſhall ſerve as an inexhauſtible ſpring for this uſe, " whoſe only fault is, that his reſearches are ſo deep, that thoſe with whom he deals, having " nothing to draw, are not ſo much inſtructed as they might be by more ſlight diſcourſes, " becauſe more ſuited to their models and capacities." Biſhop Bramhall's Life prefixed to his Works, page 2.

In common with all men of letters, I read with exquiſite delight Mr. Hall's Sermon lately publiſhed. As compoſitions, his former Works are replete with excellence; but his laſt approaches to perfection, μέλα τε σεμνε την χαριν ἐχει. He apologizes for its length, but the apology was unneceſſary: for every man of taſte and virtue, will apply to this publication, what Photius ſaid upon the λειμωναριον of Joannes Moſchus, ἐξ ἁπαντων το χρησιμον ὁ συνελος και ὁ θεοφιλης ἀνηρ δρεπομενος, ουκ ἀν των συνειλεγμενων κακον καλαγοιτη. Bacon tells us that " the contemplative Atheiſt is rare, and that Atheiſm did never perturb States, be- " cauſe it makes men weary of themſelves as looking no farther." But I agree with Mr. Hall, that " the preſent times furniſh a melancholy exception to this general obſervation;" and Mr. Hall probably will agree with Bacon, that " ſuperſtition alſo has been the confuſion " of many States, and bringeth in a new primum mobile, that raviſheth all the ſpheres of " government." (Bacon's 17th and 18th Eſſays). The livelineſs of Mr. Hall's imagination, and the ſtrength of his feelings, may now and then have led him to ſpeak rather too ſtrongly in each of his late publications. In the former, I thought that he aſcribed too much to the effects of Popery under the French monarchy, and in the latter, too much to the effects of philoſophy in the French Revolution. But, in both works, he has made many wiſe and intereſting obſervations; in both he has preſerved a moſt beautiful and animated ſtile; through both he has been actuated, I believe, by the pureſt motives; and by the laſt more eſpecially, he has deſerved well from every friend to civilized ſociety and pure religion. I am not ſure that Mr. Hall ſtands in need of any vindication upon the ſcore of inconſiſtency; but I am ſure that he is moſt able to vindicate himſelf againſt accuſations really ſtrong, if ſuch there

there be, and I am equally ſure that he has too much candour and too much magnanimity to perſiſt in any errour, which his own ſagacity may diſcover, or the objections of his antagoniſts ſhall clearly prove.

Having ſtated my wiſhes, that in a few, I mean a very few inſtances, Mr. Hall had been a little more wary in puſhing his principles to conſequences, which they may not quite warrant, I will give my general opinion of him in the words that were employed to deſcribe a prelate, whoſe writings, I believe, are familiar to him, and whom he ſtrongly reſembles, not perhaps in variety of learning, but in fertility of imagination, in vigour of thinking, in rectitude of intention, and holineſs of life. Yes, Mr. Hall, like Biſhop Taylor, "has "the eloquence of an orator, the fancy of a poet, the acuteneſs of a ſchoolman, the pro- "foundneſs of a philoſopher, and the piety of a ſaint." See the Funeral Sermon upon Jerem. Taylor, by Dr. Ruſh, Biſhop of Dromore.

Sincere as my attachment is to Proteſtantiſm, I confeſs that I have been pained by ſome outrageous invectives that have been lately thrown out againſt the Church of Rome; and at the preſent criſis, I muſt further confeſs, that they appear to me not only unjuſt, but indiſcreet and even inhuman. Let me remind the accuſers of Mr. Hall, that, in the eſtimation of Lord Bacon, "diviſions in religion, if they be many, introduce Atheiſm"—"that there "is a ſuperſtition in avoiding ſuperſtition, when men think they do beſt by going fartheſt "from what they think the ſuperſtition formerly received, and therefore, care ſhould be had "that the good be not taken away with the bad, which commonly is done when the people is "the reformer." Among thoſe who cenſure Mr. Hall, there may be thoughtleſs and injudicious perſons, who often repeat the witty and deciſive anſwer of Sir Henry Wooton to the prieſt, who aſked, "where was your religion to be found before Luther?" Let me then recall to their memory the advice which Sir Henry gave to one, whoſe earneſtneſs exceeded his knowledge, and who was perpetually railing againſt the Papiſts: "Pray, Sir, forbear, 'till "you have ſtudied the points better; for the wiſe Italians have this proverb—*he that under-* "*ſtandeth amiſs concludes worſe*; and take heed of thinking, the farther you go from the "Church of Rome, the nearer you are to God." To men of ſounder judgment and more candid diſpoſitions, I would recommend the ſerious peruſal of "Caſſandri Conſultatio," of Grotius's notes upon it, and his three replies to Rivetus. When they read "the Syllabus "Librorum et Epiſtolarum doctorum aliquot et priorum virorum," in the third volume of Grotius's Works, they may ceaſe to think Mr. Hall ſingular, when he remarks in his Preface, "how trivial, for the moſt part, are the controverſies of Chriſtians with each other!" They may be diſpoſed to join him in his prayer, that "Ephraim may no longer vex Juda, "nor Juda Ephraim;" and they may be converted to the wiſe and ſalutary opinion of Grotius, "quam non ſit difficilio in Religione Conciliatio, ſi controvertendi ſtudium vitetur!"

Prince of the Light of Heaven, page 9, *line* 31.

For part of this beautiful imagery, Hooker is indebted to the Pſalmiſt. I remember in the book De Mundo, aſcribed to Ariſtotle, a very fine paſſage upon the ſame ſubject. The imagery is different from that of Taylor, but it is ſo charming, that no learned Chriſtian will, I think, blame me, for enabling him to compare it with the quotation from Hooker. Καθαπερ δε ἐν χορω, κορυφαιε καλαρξαιλος, συνεπηχει πας ὁ χορος ἀνδρων, ἐθ ὁτε και γυναικων ἐν Διαφοροις φωναις ὀξυλεραις και βαρυλεραις μιαν ἁρμονιαν ἐμμελη κεραννυλαι, ὁτως ἐχει και ἐπι

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τε το συμπαν διεπονλος θεα. καλα γαρ το ἀνωθεν ἐνδοσιμον ὑπο τε φερωνυμως ἀν κορυφαιε προσαγορευθενλος, κινειλαι μεν τα ἀστρα ἀει, και ὁ συμπας ὀρανος. πορευελαι δε διτλας πορειας ὁ παμφανης ἡλιος. τη μεν, ἡμεραν και νυκλα διοριζων, ἀναλολη και δυσει· τη δε, τας τετσαρας ὡρας, ἀγων τε ἐτους, προσω τε βορειος, και ὀπισω νοτλιος διερξερπων. (Ariſtotle, edit. Duval. vol. i. page 612.

In a tone more peremptory than uſual, Fabricius pronounces the book De Mundo to be the work of Ariſtotle; but Harles and his learned coadjutor, have given what I think weighty reaſons, for conſidering it as ſpurious; and I confeſs, that ſo far as any internal proofs can be found in the ſtyle or the matter, they are in favour of Harles's deciſion. See Frabic. Bibliothec. Græc. by Harles, vol. iii. p. 234.

I muſt inform the reader, that from the paragraph in page 9, beginning, "If nature," to the paragraph in page 11, ending with "Governor of the world," no part was preached.

The Mother, forget the Child, page 9, *line* 38.

Shall philoſophy be permitted to trifle with the affection, to which religion itſelf has, by ſilence, paid the moſt marked reſpect? "In the Decalogue," ſays Adam Smith, "we are "commanded to honour our father and mother. No mention is made of the love of our "children; nature had ſufficiently prepared us for the performance of the latter duty." Vol. i. p. 348.

Their Conduct, page 10, *line* 5.

In reſpect to every ſocial duty, we may grant, nihil per ſe quemquam decere—referre, quid, cui, quando, quare, ubi, et cetera, ſine quibus facile ratio non conſtiterit. Seneca de beneficiis, liber 2d. Other circumſtances being equal, the moſt virtuous perſon is to be preferred. But how is this ſufficiently to be aſcertained? How can the comparative worth of men (which, from the imperfection of human nature, it is *granted* that we cannot often ſettle, ſee Political Juſtice, vol. i. p. 130), be laid down as a *rule* for the degree in which we are to ſuccour diſtreſs? Is it not farther granted, (page 133), that when a perſon in diſtreſs applies to us for relief, it is our duty to beſtow it, and that we commit a breach of duty in refuſing it? But upon what is the duty really founded? Surely upon the *diſtreſſes* of others, and upon our *power* to relieve them; not upon *their merit*, and *our power to meaſure it*. "We "are directed to take the pattern of our charity from our ſelf-love, and taught to love our "neighbour, not as we do our child, our brother, or our friend, but as we do *ourſelves*: "now we do *not* love ourſelves for being handſome, *wiſe*, or witty, or good tempered, or ac-"compliſhed, or *virtuous*, or born in ſuch a place or family, nor for any adjunct or cir-"cumſtance obſerved in us, but *for being ourſelves*. If we be diſtempered, deformed, wretch-"ed, and involved in crimes, this does not abate our fondneſs, which reſts directly upon "the perſon: and from hence we may learn to bear a like perſonal regard for others, how-"ever circumſtanced." Tucker upon Charity. Vol. iii. part ii. Poſt. Works, p. 359.

But, may not the principle of relieving diſtreſs, be limited by the conſideration that relief may, in ſome inſtances, "inflict an injury of ſuperior magnitude upon *myſelf* or *ſociety*?"

There is an ambiguity in the word *injury*—Let us, however, ſuppoſe it to mean *phyſical harm*. If the harm, after a balance of circumſtances, appears greater to ſociety than the good we do to an individual; then, neither the circumſtance of his diſtreſs, nor any other

 circumſtance,

circumſtance, either of his being a child, a parent, a benefactor, or a friend, can warrant the greater harm; for the greater phyſical harm, in ſuch a caſe, becomes a moral injury. Yet this, ſurely, has been long known, and perhaps was never diſputed by any man of ſenſe.

But, do the occurrences of common life often require ſuch nice and accurate compariſons? Do not the circumſtances which conſtitute material differences, preſent themſelves, and without any deliberate effort of our own, excite a correſpondent degree of right affection, and determine us ultimately to a right choice? Is the practice of "weighing grains and "ſcruples" likely to produce more good than evil, where the intereſts of many relations or benefactors are concerned; and would our ſocial affections be more amiable or more uſeful, from the officious intruſions of reaſon? My own fixed opinion perfectly agrees with that of Plutarch—His words are remarkable, and contain all the great principles, by which the diſpute ought to be decided—τους μεν αλλοτρους (ως ελεγε Θεοφραστος) ε φιλουντα δει κρινειν, αλλα κρινοντα φιλειν—ὁπου δε ἡ φυσις ἡγεμονιαν τη κρισει προς ευνοιαν, ου διδωσιν, ουδε αναμενει τον θρυλλουμενον των αλων μεδιμνον, αλλα συγγεγεννηκε την αρχην της φιλιας, ενταυθα δει μη πικρους ειναι, μηδε ακριβεις των αμαρτηματων εξεταστας. Plutarch de Fraterno Amore, 482. But, I fear, that under the pretence of regard to the general good, ſome motive *leſs honourable* would lead us to theſe inquiſitorial proceedings, when we were conſidering, whether conſiſtently with that good we were to grant, or refuſe, ſuccour to a friend with many faults; or whether, in conſequence of thoſe faults we ſhould give the preference to a ſtranger whom we eſteemed more virtuous—A ſmall ſhare of ingenuity would ſuggeſt difficulties, which, like the *ignavæ rationes* of the ſceptics, would ſuſpend all action; or, like the more pernicious ſubtleties of the caſuiſts, would furniſh us with palliatives for acting according to the ſecret dictates of ſelfiſhneſs, or vanity, or prejudice.

Again, if the harm done to ourſelves, be greater than the good done to another, numberleſs circumſtances muſt be taken into the account, before we can be juſtified in granting, or refuſing. But, to grant, where the greater harm is done to ourſelves, is, in many *circumſtances*, a *duty*; and the performance of that duty ſhews the predominance of the ſocial affections over the ſelfiſh. "Charity ſeeketh not its own." It will ſometimes relinquiſh the greater good to itſelf, that it may procure the leſs for another man; and ſometimes it will incur the greater evil, in order to avert from another man the leſs.

In the page of Political Juſtice, where it is repreſented as our duty to relieve a perſon in diſtreſs, the ground of the duty *ſeems* to be, for a moment, even in the writer's own mind, *the diſtreſs* itſelf: and, in truth, we, in moſt caſes, act virtuouſly, when we follow the impulſes of compaſſion, excited by the *view* of diſtreſs. But, if the moral worth of man be made the *only* ſtandard, by which our relief is to be meaſured, let it be remembered that we are continually expoſed to errour; that our prejudices and our paſſions often prevent us from ſeeing the truth; and that our bad diſpoſitions and bad habits, would ſometimes make us diſregard it, even when we *do* ſee it. The diſtreſs of men excites our pity: the moral worth of men excites our eſteem. We are often influenced by *both*, in doing good to our fellow-creatures; and we may be influenced ſo to do by either, in the abſence of the other. But in the conflict between eſteem for one man, and compaſſion for another, various circumſtances, diſtinct from the comparative moral worth of the claimants, and perhaps more eaſy to be aſcertained, may concur, to juſtify us in acting from compaſſion, rather than eſteem; and the general

general good of ſociety, as included in the good of the individual, would *thus* be moſt effectually promoted.

Butler has told us all that we need know for the general regulation of our conduct. "It "may perhaps be expected, that notice ſhould be taken of occaſions, circumſtances, and "characters, which ſeem to call forth affections of various ſorts. Thus vice may be thought "the object of pity and indignation, folly of pity and laughter. How far this is ſtrictly "true, I ſhall not enquire. But only obſerve upon the appearance, how much more humane it is to yield and give ſcope to affections, which are more directly in favour of, and "friendly to our fellow-creatures; and that there is plainly much leſs danger of being led "wrong by theſe than by the other." Serm. VI. p. 110.

If the appeal in any doubtful caſe lay between the opinion of Biſhop Butler and that of any modern theoriſt whatſoever, I ſhould have no heſitation about the anſwer which it becomes me to give, as an agent who is reſponſible both to God and Man.

Muſt I not "do the utmoſt in my power to diſcover the truth?" perhaps ſo, if the good cannot be done without diſcovering it. But the queſtion is, *what* are the truths which in any given circumſtances I am moſt required to inveſtigate? What, I am moſt able to diſcover? What, I am chiefly obliged to take into the account, when they *are* diſcovered? There are many other truths *beſides* the poſitive or comparative worth of a fellow-creature which lie within my reach; truths, of which the knowledge is neceſſary to regulate my conduct towards him; truths, which in the moment of action may render it proper for me no *farther* to regard his moral defects, than to avoid both the appearance and the reality of giving them encouragement. The domeſtic, and other ſocial relations in which he ſtands to me, are truths—the benefits which he has conferred on me, are truths—the immediate degree, and the future conſequences of his miſery, are truths—the chances which he has, or has not, of receiving adequate ſuccour from any other perſon than myſelf, are truths. Some of them may be known with certainty, others may be calculated with probability; but the knowledge of the one, and the calculation of the other, will not be facilitated by the rules of ſome modern ſyſtems of philoſophy; and as to the utility of thoſe rules in producing a right conduct, I confeſs myſelf utterly at a loſs to find in what it conſiſts. The rules of juſtice, as the word is commonly underſtood, are, indeed, fixed, and ſo far as they have the force of general rules applicable to any caſe under *all* its circumſtances, they muſt not be violated, either from any ſtrong impulſe of our affections, or from any notions which individuals may have formed of general good. Gratitude itſelf, as we may hereafter ſee, is a virtue which, according to the general apprehenſions of mankind, approaches more nearly than almoſt any other ſocial virtue to juſtice. Yet a very ſagacious writer has ſhewn us that, "however we may approve of a ſentiment which prompts the receiver of a benefit to reward "his benefactor, it is impoſſible to adjuſt by rules the degree of that reward." "The general rules," ſays he, "of almoſt all the virtues, the general rules which determine what "are the offices of prudence, of charity, of generoſity, of gratitude, of friendſhip, are in "many reſpects looſe and inaccurate, admit of ſo many exceptions, and require ſo many "modifications, that it is ſcarce poſſible to regulate our conduct entirely by a regard to "*them*. The *common proverbial maxims of prudence* being founded in univerſal experience, "are, perhaps, the beſt general rules which can be given about it. To affect, however, a

" very *ſtrict* and literal adherence to them, would evidently be the moſt abſurd and ridicul-
" ous pedantry. Of all the virtues I have juſt now mentioned, *gratitude* is that, perhaps, of
" which the rules are the *moſt* preciſe, and admit of the feweſt exceptions. That as ſoon as
" we can, we ſhould make a return of equal, and if poſſible of ſuperior value to the ſervices
" we have received, would *ſeem* to be a pretty plain rule, and which admitted of ſcarce any
" exceptions. Upon the moſt ſuperficial examination, however, *this* rule will appear to be
" in the higheſt degree *looſe* and inaccurate, and to admit of ten thouſand exceptions. If
" your benefactor attended you in your ſickneſs, ought you to attend him in his? or, can
" you fulfil the obligation of gratitude by making a return of a different kind? If you ought
" to attend him, how long ought you to attend him? the ſame time which he attended you,
" or longer? and how much longer? If your friend lent you money in your diſtreſs, ought
" you to lend him money in his? How much ought you to lend him? When ought you to
" lend him? Now, or to-morrow, or next month? And for how long a time? It is evident
" that no general rule can be laid down, by which a preciſe anſwer can, in all caſes, be
" given to any of theſe queſtions. The difference between his character and your's, between
" his circumſtances and your's, may be ſuch, that you may be perfectly grateful, and juſtly
" refuſe to lend him a halfpenny; and on the contrary, you may be willing to lend, or even
" to give him ten times the ſum which he lent you, and yet be juſtly accuſed of the blackeſt
" ingratitude, and of not having fulfilled the hundredth part of the obligation you lie under."
Smith's Moral Sentiments, vol. i. p. 437.

The ſame obſervations may be applied to the ſentiment of ingratitude, and to the actions flowing from it. " Examine," ſays Mr. Hume, " the crime of ingratitude, which has
" place wherever we obſerve good will, expreſſed and known, together with good offices
" performed, on the one ſide, and a return of ill-will or indifference, with ill offices or ne-
" glect on the other. Anatomize all theſe circumſtances, and examine by your reaſon
" alone in what conſiſts the demerit or blame; you never will come to any iſſue or con-
" cluſion."

" Reaſon judges of matter of fact and relations." " There is no matter of fact which can
" be called crime; the ill-will or the indifference reſide in the perſons who are ungrateful;
" they are not always crimes, but become ſo when directed towards perſons who have be-
" fore diſplayed good-will towards us." As to the relation to be conſidered here, " it conſiſts
" in the relation of contrariety, between good will and good offices in one, and ill will and ill
" offices in another; but the relation of *contrariety* does not prove the crime; for if a perſon
" has ill will and ill offices towards me, and if I have indifference towards him and do him
" good offices, he has the *ſame* relation of contrariety towards me, yet my conduct is often
" highly laudable. Therefore we never can reſt immorality on relations, but muſt have re-
" courſe to ſentiment." Upon the whole he ſtates, that " the crime of ingratitude is not
" any particular individual fact, but ariſes from a *complication* of circumſtances, which being
" preſented to the ſpectator, excites the ſentiment of *blame* by the particular *ſtructure* and
" *fabric* of his mind." Vol. ii. p. 361.

This account of ingratitude, I allow with Dr. Reid, to be " true and intelligible;" but with him I underſtand the word ſentiment to imply a judgment accompanied with feeling, not a *mere* feeling *without* judgement. Reid's Eſſays, p. 484.

Now *that* reaſon which has been employed to invent rules for gratitude, implies judgment without

without feeling; and if it be unable to analyze the *ſentiment* of ingratitude itſelf, it muſt be equally unable to furniſh rules for meaſuring the degrees of ungrateful *actions*.

If, then, general rules about gratitude are confeſſedly ſo looſe, muſt we conclude, that men know not how to be grateful? Experience proves the contrary. Where the affection is ſtrong, where the intentions of him that feels it are ſincere, where his exertions are active, and his general diſpoſition is benevolent, ſmall is the danger of errour, in defect, or in exceſs.

In regard to the principles that have been laid down for determining whether we are to aſſiſt a virtuous man, or a benefactor leſs virtuous, I would ſay of them as Adam Smith ſays of the works of the Caſuiſts, "That they attempt to direct by preciſe *rules*, what it gene-" rally belongs only to feeling and ſentiment to judge of. They could be of little uſe to " one who ſhould conſult them upon occaſion, even *ſuppoſing* their deciſions to be juſt, be-" cauſe, notwithanding the multitude of caſes collected in them, yet upon account of the " ſtill greater variety of poſſible circumſtances, it is a chance if among all thoſe caſes there " be found one *exactly* parallel to that under conſideration. *None of them tend to animate us " to what is generous and noble—none of them tend to ſoften us to what is gentle and humane—many " of them, on the contrary, tend rather to teach us to chicane with our own conſciences; and by " their vain ſubtilties, ſerve to authorize innumerable evaſive refinements with regard to the moſt " eſſential articles of our duty.*" Vol. ii. p. 393.

Should it, however, be aſked, whether the general character of a benefactor, or his motives upon any particular occaſion to confer a benefit, are to be totally diſregarded? my anſwer is, that they are not. But, without giving any countenance to the rules which have ſometimes been laid down for our behaviour, I will ſtate clearly from Adam Smith, ſome conſiderations which have been confuſedly and darkly inſiſted upon by other authors.

"What gratitude chiefly deſires, is not only to make the benefactor feel pleaſure in his " turn, but to make him conſcious that he meets with this reward in conſequence of his paſt " conduct, to make him pleaſed with that conduct, and to ſatisfy him that the perſon upon " whom he beſtowed his good offices, was not unworthy of them. What moſt of all charms " us in our benefactor, is the concord between his ſentiments and our own, with regard to " what intereſts us ſo nearly as the worth of our own character, and the eſteem that is due " to us. We are delighted to find a perſon who values us as we value ourſelves, and diſtin-" guiſhes us from the reſt of mankind, with an attention not unlike that with which we " diſtinguiſh ourſelves. To maintain in him theſe agreeable and flattering ſentiments, is " one of the chief ends propoſed by the returns we are diſpoſed to make to him. A gener-" ous mind often diſdains the intereſted thought of extorting new favours from its benefactor, " by what may be called the importunities of its gratitude. But to preſerve, and to increaſe " his eſteem, is an intereſt which the greateſt mind does not think unworthy of its atten-" tion. And this is the foundation of what I formerly obſerved, that when we cannot enter " into the motives of our benefactor, when his conduct and character appear unworthy of " our approbation, let his ſervices have been ever ſo great, our gratitude is always ſenſibly " diminiſhed." Vol. i. p. 238.

Here we have a ſtatement of *facts*, not a code of *rules*. Conſidered *as* a ſtatement, it is very intelligible, it is very juſt too, and it is, moreover, ſo very obvious from every man's experience, that no man needs to be reminded of it for the purpoſe of *reſtraining* his gratitude.

His

His ſentiments will ſuggeſt the whole, without any aſſiſtance from the ſevere and minute operations of his reaſon, as the word is underſtood by ſome writers.

Eſteem for virtue, and indignation againſt vice, are *natural* affections, and they are ſo conducive both to general and particular good, that we muſt often wiſh the profeſſion of them more ſincere, the feeling of them more intenſe, and the effects of them more frequent, than they generally are. But gratitude, and filial, or parental love, are affections *equally* natural, and when they operate only in a juſt *proportion* to other affections, requiring other duties, they, alſo contribute both directly to particular, and indirectly to general good. The preſence of them is *one* of the virtues which attract our eſteem, and the abſence of them, *one* of the vices which provoke our indignation. I contend, therefore, that being ſometimes parts of virtue, and often the inſtruments of happineſs, they ought not to be excluded from any ſyſtem which profeſſes to inſtruct us in virtue, or to guide us to happineſs. I farther contend, that they would be leſs meritorious, and leſs ſalutary, if they were permitted to influence our behaviour *ſolely* by the meaſure of moral merit or demerit in their objects. Nay, I contend ſtill farther, that virtue may exiſt under circumſtances where the *quantity* of moral worth in a fellow-creature is not regarded, as, for inſtance, in the feeling of compaſſion, and in the acts to which compaſſion prompts us, towards diſtreſs conſidered merely as diſtreſs. And it may exiſt *alſo* under circumſtances where the *want* of moral worth is not conſidered, as in forgiveneſs, and in the acts to which forgiveneſs incites us, towards an envious rival, or a malicious enemy.

In regard to friends, children, or benefactors, the direct cauſes which call our affections into action, *are* the relative ſituation, or the *relative deſerts* of our fellow-creatures. But the indirect cauſes of reſtraining thoſe affections are accidental—they may vary indefinitely—they cannot be illuſtrated by *extreme* caſes, nor do they admit any rules clear, preciſe, and comprehenſive. The former cauſes can be aſcertained more eaſily and more frequently than the latter; and in practical caſes, (for of ſpeculative and hypothetical ones, there is no end, and indeed no uſe), the latter can rarely have ſuch force as to ſuperſede *entirely* the moral obligations which reſult from the former.

General benevolence requires, doubtleſs, that we ſhould conſider the virtue of another man, as *one* of the cauſes for which he may become an object of kind affection and kind offices; but not to the excluſion of *other* cauſes. "Our underſtanding and power," ſays Hutcheſon, "are limited, ſo that we cannot know many other natures, nor is our utmoſt "power capable of promoting the happineſs of many: our actions are therefore influenced "by ſome ſtronger affections than this general benevolence. There are certain qualities "found in ſome beings more than in others, which excite ſtronger degrees of good-will, and "determine our attention to their intereſts, while that of others is neglected. The ties of "blood, benefits conferred upon us, and the obſervation of virtue in others, raiſe much more "vigorous affections, than that general benevolence which we may have toward all. Theſe "qualities or relations we may call the cauſes of love." Hutcheſon on the Paſſions, page 309.

More than once I have had occaſion to remark, that the doctrines of the new philoſophy are founded upon partial and confuſed views of real facts, and become erroneous and miſchievous by the exceſs to which they are indiſcriminately puſhed. "Among the irregularities of our natural ſentiments," Smith ſays, "That our love and admiration for ſome virtues

" tues is such, that we would wish to bestow upon them all sorts of honours and rewards, " even those which we must acknowledge to be the proper recompences of some other qua- " lities with which those virtues are not always accompanied. But nature bestows upon " every virtue and every vice, that precise reward or punishment which is best fitted to en- " courage the one, or to restrain the other. She is directed by this sole consideration, and " pays little regard to the different degrees of merit and demerit which they may seem to " possess in the sentiments and passions of man." i. 420. Now, supposing our modern philanthropists to be actuated, not by an undue love of paradox, but by a sincere regard for virtue, still I must contend that they are mistaken, when they would transfer to the virtuous man those rewards which are due to the benefactor. The same voice of nature, which prompts us to reward the one, prompts us, also, to reward the other; and the same course of moral causes and effects, which procures a reward for the one, procures it, also, for the other. The proper reward of a benefit conferred is the return of benefit. " The proper " rewards of truth, justice, and humanity," says Smith, " are the confidence, the esteem, " and love of those we live with. Humanity does not desire to be great, but to be beloved. " It is not in being rich that truth and justice would rejoice, but in being *trusted and believed*, " recompences which those virtues must always acquire." p. 416. But when we take upon ourselves to neglect the benefactor, and to prefer as the object of benefits from ourselves, the more virtuous man, we not only withdraw from that benefactor the recompence due to his acts of kindness towards ourselves, but virtually inflict a kind of punishment upon him for the want of equal worth. We give to the virtuous man a reward which he did not seek directly or indirectly, and we refuse to the benefactor a reward to which by the common sentiments and the common practice of mankind he is evidently entitled. But if the person thus preferred were in reality a virtuous man, he might not be in haste to *accept* the kindness that was offered him upon *such* conditions—he might feel the dignity of conscious worth insulted by the mockery of such homage—he might disdain to take any share in the unhallowed spoils holden out to him by ingratitude.

If it were my misfortune to meet with any human being who should maintain, that the moral deserts of his fellow-creatures are the *only* measure for his kindness towards them, and that by disregarding *all other* measures he would himself act most conformably to the principles of virtue, and most effectually for the happiness of his species, I should, for the refutation of his error, fix upon the claims of a benefactor to whom he objects some faults, and I should expostulate with the objector in these serious terms——

Who art thou that judgest another? Who hath laid open to thee every thought of thy benefactor's heart, or made to thee every effect, and every tendency of his actions, known? Who hath revealed to thee every extenuating circumstance of his misconduct, or every secret, minute, and exquisitely delicate motive, which in the sight of heaven may have enhanced the merit of his better deeds? Who has thrown open to thy view the register in which are recorded all that he hath done well, and all that he hath done amiss, " from his youth up- " ward even until now?" If the tree which is *very* good can easily be discerned from the tree which is *very* corrupt, yet in *most* of the objects that are placed before thee, canst thou determine how many blossoms of virtue have [illegible]

[illegible]ly

away from want of nouriſhment, from opportunity, or encouragement, or example? How many have reached their full maturity, unobſerved by thee? How many roots of good intention may yet be exempt from decay, and in due ſeaſon bring forth fruit, ſome ten, and ſome, an hundred fold?

And, beſides all this—In ſearching for the mote that is in thy brother's eye, art thou quite ſure that the beam is caſt out from *thine own?* Art thou ſuperiour to the wayward prejudices of education?—to the mechanical force of cuſtom—to the blind impetuoſity of appetite—to the ſudden and irregular ſallies of imagination—to the falſe colourings in which paſſion is wont to decorate or to blacken the objects of deſire or of averſion? And while thou art ſubject to all, or to any, of theſe imperfections, is it not probable that to *ſome* virtues thou mayeſt be more partial, and more indulgent to ſome vices, than "the wiſdom "which is from above" may warrant? Conſcious thou mayeſt be of errours, of infirmities, of evil diſpoſitions, or of evil habits; and while the ſtings of affliction, or the ſhafts of adverſity pierce thy ſoul, if they with whom thou haſt wept, when they wept, and rejoiced, when they rejoiced, ſhould make thee no return of ſympathy and ſuccour,—if under pretences of a regard to truth, they ſhould add inſult to neglect—if from pleas of conformity to juſtice, they ſhould recount thy *faults*, inſtead of aſſuaging thy *ſorrows*—is it poſſible that thou ſhouldeſt conſider them as doing to another man, what another man, even in *their* eſtimation, ought to do unto them? As a comforter, who is called upon to adminiſter comfort, thou canſt not err—but as a *ſelf-appointed* judge, thou mayeſt err, and injure by errour. *Unknown* thou muſt be in part to thyſelf, and thy benefactor, in the *whole extent of his agency*, is yet *more* unknown. But his good will and good ſervices to thee *are known*, and known to thee would be thy duty, alſo, if the voice of nature within thee were heard. Turn away then from the refinements of vain philoſophy, and aſk thy own heart, for "it will tell "thee more than ſeven watchmen who ſit on a high tower." Eccleſ. xxxvii. 14.

Inflexible Juſtice, page 10, *line* 12.

The conſequences "of the radical poſition that we are bound in juſtice to do all the good "we can, and that all moral duty is compriſed in juſtice," are ſtated with great clearneſs by Mr. Green. "Allow the firſt poſition," ſays he, "and all the inferences follow ſo clearly, "and irreſiſtibly, that it ſeems impoſſible to elude their force, however ſubverſive they may "be of the principles which have hitherto governed the conduct of mankind.

"If we are bound in juſtice to do all the good in our power, to produce the greateſt ſum "of happineſs in ſentient nature, which it is within the compaſs of our faculties to effect, "then, doubtleſs, juſtice being altogether an inflexible duty, admitting no diſpenſation, no "remiſſion, no, not for a moment, our whole mind muſt be ſolely directed to this ſingle "purpoſe; and the deſire to effect it, muſt conſtitute the only legitimate motive of human action.

" action. Then, whatever leads us to act upon any other incitement, or with any other " view, muſt be extirpated or ſubdued, as revolting againſt the rules of juſtice. Then, " every paſſion and emotion of the human heart muſt be extinguiſhed as abhorrent to our " duty: it being in the eſſence of all affections of this kind, to prompt us to act upon par- " ticular motives, ſometimes not apparently conducive to the general good, and never cer- " tainly grounded upon it. Then patriotiſm, friendſhip, gratitude, affection, pity, all the " public and private virtues, all the ſocial and domeſtic charities, which have hitherto been " conſidered as the beſt bleſſings and ſureſt hope, as well as the grace and ornament of our " nature, muſt be effectually rooted from our feelings, as creating an *unjuſt* preference in " favour of certain individuals, or deſcriptions of individuals, independently of their diſpoſi- " tion and their power to co-operate with us in promoting the general good. Then, what- " ever obſtructs us in the purſuit of this good, is an abateable nuiſance. All determinate " rules are blind reſtrictions. All legal property is inveterate injuſtice: I have a right to as " much as I conceive will beſt enable me to accompliſh my grand project: and nobody has " a right to any other portion upon any other title. All law is uſurpation upon reaſon: all " judicial proceſs, fetters and oppreſſion: prevailing ſentiments and manners, antiquated " prejudice. If we accept the principle, we muſt take the conſequences—they are poten- " tially included." See page 15th of Mr. Green's examination of the leading principles of the new Syſtem of Morals.

I perfectly agree with Mr. Green that, " what gives force to the whole body of the new " ſyſtem of morals, is the opinion which has lately prevailed, that virtue conſiſts *altogether* " in utility—that it is the beneficial or pernicious tendency of any action, which *alone* con- " ſtitutes it virtuous or vicious." See page 16th of the abovementioned Work. Mr. Hume is the avowed, and, perhaps, the moſt able advocate for that opinion: yet, he allows to our affections that force which his followers deny. " The ſocial virtues of humanity and bene- " volence, exert their influence immediately, by a direct tendency or inſtinct, which keeps " chiefly in view the ſimple object, moving the affections, and comprehends not any ſcheme " or ſyſtem, nor the conſequence reſulting from the concurrence, imitation, or example of " others. A parent flies to the relief of his child; tranſported by that natural ſympathy, which " actuates him, and which affords us leiſure to reflect on the ſentiments or conduct of the " reſt of mankind in like circumſtances. A generous man embraces cheerfully an oppor- " tunity of ſerving his friend; becauſe he then feels himſelf under the dominion of the be- " neficent affections, nor is he concerned whether any other perſon, in the univerſe, was " ever before actuated by ſuch noble motives, or will ever afterwards prove their influence. " In all theſe caſes, the ſocial paſſions have in view a ſingle individual object, and purſue " alone the ſafety and happineſs of the perſon loved and eſteemed. With this they are ſatis- " fied; in this they acquieſce. And as the good reſulting from their benign influence is in " itſelf compleat and entire, it alſo excites the moral ſentiment of approbation, without any " reflection upon farther conſequences, and without the more enlarged views of the con- " currence or imitation of the other members of ſociety." Eſſays, vol. ii. p. 371, 2.

If the juſtice, upon which ſome late philoſophers have expatiated, and which tends to deſtroy all rights to property, and all inequalities of poſſeſſion, were realized; it would ſuperſede the neceſſity of juſtice, as the word is ordinarily underſtood. " The rules of " equity or juſtice depend entirely upon the particular ſtate and condition, in which men are " placed, and owe their origin and exiſtence to *utility*, which reſults to the public from their

" ſtrict and regular obſervance. Reverſe, in any conſiderable circumſtance, the condition of " men; produce extreme abundance, or extreme neceſſity: implant in the human breaſt " perfect moderation and humanity, or perfect rapacioufneſs and malice: by rendering juſ- " tice totally *uſeleſs*, you thereby totally deſtroy its eſſence, and ſuſpend its obligation upon " mankind." Eſſays, vol. ii. p. 254.

A man of plain common ſenſe, would be ſurpriſed to hear, that a term, which according to the received opinion of mankind, pre-ſuppoſes the exiſtence of property and unequal poſſeſſion, ſhould be adopted in a ſyſtem which tends to deſtroy property and equalize poſſeſſion —that a common name is given to ſubjects ſo widely different as juſtice, in the language of the old philoſophy, and juſtice according to the doctrines of the new—that the virtue, which according to the old, derives its origin from utility, ſhould be quite incompatible with the virtue, which according to the new, is founded upon the ſame general principal of utility, and deſcribed by the ſame appellation of juſtice. " Non noſtrum eſt tantas componere lites."

General Good, page 10, *line* 16.

Mr. Green properly denies that, becauſe " the end of virtue is the general good, it is the " tendency of it to this end, which determines us to diſtinguiſh it as virtue; and becauſe the " final cauſe of moral diſtinction is *utility*, therefore that *utility* muſt be its proximate cauſe " alſo." Page 22. Nay, he affirms " that there is no ſingle inſtance in the whole moral " œconomy of man, in which the end to be attained is, the motive appointed to attain it. " Thus the end of parental affection is the preſervation of helpleſs infancy. But do we love " our children on that account? The ultimate end here too is the general good; but does it " form any part of the incitement?" Page 23. " So far (ſays he), are we from eſtimating " virtue on this principle, that if a man could bring himſelf, by any effort, to perform any " one of the virtues with this view, to diſcharge, for example, very punctually, all the duties " of gratitude and humanity, without any of the ordinary motives to ſuch actions, without " any kind of grateful emotion, or fellow-feeling, but purely from a conviction of the ulti- " mate tendency of ſuch conduct, to promote the general good, he would be an object to us " rather of diſguſt and averſion." Page 27.

Which Gratitude, page 10, *line* 17.

We are told, " that if by gratitude we underſtand a ſentiment of preference which I en- " tertain towards another upon the ground of my having been the ſubject of his benefits, it is " no part either of juſtice or virtue:" and in a note ſubjoined to this ſentence we are farther told, that " this argument is ſtated with great clearneſs in an Eſſay on the Nature of True " Virtue, by Jonathan Edwards, Author of a celebrated work on the Freedom of the Will." Political Juſtice, vol. i. page 129.

The principle contained in the poſition about gratitude, and the fact contained in the note about Mr. Edwards, ſhall be conſidered ſeparately.

As every enquiry concerning the merit of gratitude is of the higheſt importance, it becomes us to remember carefully what the queſtion before us is not, as well as what it is.

The queſtion is not, whether any ſocial affection, e. g. the gratitude we feel to our benefactors, (or we may add by way of illuſtration only) the love we have for our parents, or the regard we bear to our country, may not ſometimes be carried to ſuch an exceſs as to be criminal.

No man will deny that Bloſſius *would* have been criminal, if he had ſet fire to the capitol; of

of Rome, in conſequence of his perſonal attachment, and probably, perſonal obligations to Tiberius Gracchus. Cicero de Amicitia, vol. ii. page 545.

No man will deny that Ageſilaus *would* have been criminal if, in obedience to his father, he had paſſed a ſentence of which his conſcience did not approve. Plutarch, vol. ii. page 534. Edit. Xylandri.

No man will deny that Themiſtocles *was* criminal when, for the advantage of the Athenians, he made a propoſal which the Athenians had the magnanimity to reject, for burning the ſhips of the Greek ſtates which had ſought ſhelter in the harbour of Athens. Plutarch, vol. i. page 122.

Again, the queſtion is not whether any oblique views of ſelfiſhneſs in a benefactor, or any general defects in his moral character, may not *weaken* the feeling of gratitude, and ſlacken the obligation to a grateful return—I ſay *weaken*, but not, extinguiſh; ſlacken, but not, ſuperſede.

The queſtion *is*, whether *ſimply*, *univerſally*, in the preſence, or in the abſence of any collateral conſiderations whatſoever, the "ſentiment of preference which I entertain towards "another upon the ground of my having been the ſubject of his benefits, *be*, or be *not*, a part "either of juſtice or virtue."

Seneca, I remember, where he is enquiring "a quibus accipiendum eſſet beneficium," and where he anſwers, "ab his quibus dediſſe vellemus," makes a diſtinction in the high language of the ſtoical ſchool. "Non loqui ſe de ſapientibus, quos, quidquid oportet, & juuat, "qui animum in poteſtate habent, & *legem ſibi quam* volunt, dicunt, & quam dixerunt, *ſervant*: "ſed de *imperfectis hominibus*, *honeſta ſequi volentibus*, quorum affectus ſæpe contumaciter pa-"rent." Lib. ii. de Benefic.

In diſcuſſing, therefore, this queſtion about gratitude, I profeſs not to inſtruct thoſe modern ſages, if ſuch there be, who revering the omnipotence of truth, the immutability of juſtice, and the infallibility of reaſon, have reached the ſame empyreum of virtue to which the wiſe man of the ſtoics aſpired. I would be underſtood to ſpeak only de imperfectis hominibus, honeſtatem ſequi volentibus, and they, I ſuppoſe, compriſe all the known natives of Aſia, Africa, and America, and all the inhabitants of Europe, except the choſen few who may have entered into the ſchool of our new philoſophy, as Cato frequented that of the ſtoics, non ſolum diſputandi cauſa, ſed ita vivendi. Vide Cicero's Orat. pro Muræna.

"The ſentiment (ſays Smith), which moſt immediately and directly prompts us to reward "is gratitude; to us, therefore, that action muſt appear to deſerve reward, which appears to "be the proper and approved object of gratitude. To reward is to recompenſe, to remu-"nerate, to return good for good received." Vol. i. page 162.

"A ſyſtem of natural philoſophy (ſays Smith), may appear very plauſible, and be for a long "time generally received by the world, and yet have no foundation in nature. But in moral "philoſophy, he who pretends to account for the origin of our moral ſentiments, cannot de-"ceive us ſo groſsly; a departure ſo very far from all reſemblance to truth. If he deceives "us at all, he is like a perſon that would inform us of what paſſes in our neighbourhood, "and the falſehoods he impoſes upon us muſt have ſome reſemblance to truth, and even a con-"ſiderable mixture of truth in them." Vol. ii. page 321.

Now, is there any feeling, upon which men are more "in their own neighbourhood," than in the feeling of gratitude? Is there any ſubject upon which they can with more confidence apply the obſervation of Hooker, that "the moſt certain token of evident goodneſs is,

" if the general perſuaſion of all men do ſo account it!" Eccleſiaſt. Polit. page 80. Will they not tell you that, " of all the duties of beneficence, thoſe which gratitude recommends " to us, approach neareſt to what is called a perfect and complete obligation? That " what " friendſhip, what generoſity, what charity, would prompt us to do with univerſal approba- " tion, is ſtill more free, and can ſtill leſs be extorted by force than the duties of gratitude? " That we talk of the *debt* of gratitude, not of charity, or generoſity, nor even of friend- " ſhip, when friendſhip is mere eſteem, and has not been enhanced and complicated with " gratitude for good offices?" Moral Sentiments, vol. i. page 195. Will they not aſſent to the maxim of Chryſippus—" Qui gratus futurus ſit, illum velut in certamen curſus compo- " ſitum, et carceribus incluſum, opperiri debere ſuum tempus, ad quod, velut dato ſigno, " proſiliat?" Seneca de Benef. lib. ii. Will they not ſay, that mythology was never applied more laudably to the illuſtration of morality, than by the people who χαρίτων ἱερον ἐμποδων ἐκκοπτουσιν, ἵνα ἀνταποδοσις ἐιη. Ariſt. Ethic. lib. v. cap. v. edit. Wilkinſon. Will they not tell you, that the gratitude of man reſembles, *with reverence be it ſpoken*, the juſtice of God—" the " juſtice of one, that requiteth nothing mincingly, but all with preſſed, and heaped, and " even overenlarged meaſure." See Hooker, page 93.

As to ingratitude, without maintaining it to be a vice, " ſine quo vix ullum magnum " facinus accreverit," do they not feel " eſſe iſtud grave vitium, eſſe intolerabile, et quod " diſſociet homines, et concordiam, quâ *imbecillitas noſtra fulcitur*, ſcindat ac diſſipet?" Vide Sen. de Benef. lib. i. & lib. vii.

Amidſt all the imperfections of human language, the principles of gratitude have fixed and intelligible terms. I have, indeed, read of one exception, in the ſtorehouſe of ſtoical retire- ments, and of the method, too, in which the exception is to be ſolved, " A conſuetudine " quædam quæ dicimus abhorrent; deinde, *alia via* ad conſuetudinem redeunt. Dicimus " eum qui beneficium bono animo accepit gratiam *retuliſſe*, nihilominus illum in ære alieno " relinquimus, gratiam relaturum etiam cum *reddiderit*. *Exhortatio* eſt illa, *non inficiatio* be- " neficii." Sen. de Benef. lib. xi. p. 28. But, when " gratitude, as a ſentiment of pre- " ference, upon the ground of our having been the ſubject of benefits" from another man, is ſaid to be " *no* part of juſtice or virtue," " a conſuetudine quæ *ita* dicta ſunt, abhorrent, " *neque ulla via* in conſuetudinem redeunt."

About eighteen years ago I read Mr. Edwards's Enquiry into the modern prevailing no- tions of the Freedom of the Will, &c.; and I afterwards lent it to a learned friend, whom it compleatly detached from the common opinions, or, perhaps, I ſhould rather ſay, from the *popular language* of men, upon a ſubject over which the ſerra λογομαχίας, has been, and hereafter will be drawn, again andagain. Charmed as I was, with the metaphyſical acuteneſs, and the fervent piety of the writer, I became very deſirous to read his Diſſertations " con- " cerning the end for which God created the World, and the Nature of true Virtue." I met with them about the year 1790; and I found in them the ſame romantic imagination, the ſame keen diſcernment, the ſame logical ſubtlety, and the ſame unextinguiſhable ardour.

Mr. Edwards is a writer who exerciſes our minds, even where he does not ſatisfy them; who intereſts us, where he does not perſuade; who inſtructs and improves us, where he does not ultimately convince; and, as I know his authority to be very great, among a numerous and pious claſs of Chriſtians, it is of ſome importance that his *real* opinions ſhould be clearly underſtood. From his own words then, I will endeavour to ſhow that, in *his* eſtimation, gratitude *is*, in many reſpects, not unconnected with juſtice; and that the virtue, from which

which he *diſtinguiſhes* it, is eſſentially *different* from the virtue, of which the author of Political Juſtice pronounces it to be *no part*.

"There is a ſecondary kind of beauty," ſays Edwards, "in the virtue called juſtice, "which conſiſts in the agreement of different things that have relation to one another in "nature, manner, and meaſure. There is this agreement, in nature and meaſure, when "he that loves has the proper returns of love; where he that from his heart promotes the "good of another, has his good promoted by the other; *as there is a kind of juſtice in a be-* "*coming gratitude*." Page 132. I have quoted theſe words already for another purpoſe.

But further, "if we ſhould allow that to be univerſal, that in gratitude there is the exer- "ciſe of ſome kind of moral ſenſe (as it is granted *there is ſomething* that may be ſo called), "all the moral ſenſe that is eſſential to that affection is a ſenſe of *deſert*, which is to be re- "ferred to that ſenſe of juſtice before ſpoken of conſiſting in an apprehenſion of that ſe- "condary kind of beauty that lies in uniformity or proportion. Other's love and kindneſs "to *us* appears to us to *deſerve* our love, or, in other words, it ſeems to us no other than "*juſt*, that *as they love us* and do us good, *we ſhould alſo love them* and do them good." Page 164. (I omit the words which relate to anger).

"That forementioned approbation of juſtice and deſert, ariſing from a ſenſe of the "beauty of natural agreement and proportion, will have a kind of reflex and indirect influ- "ence to cauſe men to approve benevolence, as men ſee that he who is benevolent and loves "others, and does them good, deſerves himſelf alſo be loved and rewarded by others, as they "ſee the natural congruity or agreement, and mutual adaptedneſs of theſe things: and hav- "ing always ſeen this, the idea of benevolence is habitually connected and aſſociated, with "the idea of being loved and rewarded by others, which is grateful to ſelf-love: and by "virtue of this aſſociation of ideas, benevolence itſelf becomes grateful, and the contrary "diſpleaſing." Page 170.

Mr. Edwards, in another part of his book, makes gratitude, as explained by himſelf, ſubject to conſcience. "The other thing," ſays he, "which belongs to the approbation of "natural conſcience, is the ſenſe of deſert which was ſpoken of before; conſiſting in a "natural *agreement* between loving and being loved, between ſhewing kindneſs and being "rewarded." Page 176.

Further ſtill, "Another reaſon why the things which have been mentioned, i. e. natural "affection, natural pity, &c. are miſtaken for virtue, is, that there is indeed a *true negative* "*moral goodneſs* in them. They have this negative moral goodneſs, becauſe a being *without* "them would be an evidence of a much greater moral evil."

From the foregoing paſſages it is plain that Mr. Edwards repreſents gratitude as a *part* of juſtice, according to his own explanation of the latter word. He does not indeed conſider gratitude as a part of what, according to his own *peculiar* ſyſtem, and his own *peculiar* language, is *true* virtue. But we ſhall now examine in *what* true virtue; according to Mr. Edwards, conſiſts; and by ſuch examination we ſhall ſee that when Mr. Edwards, and the Author of Political Juſtice denied gratitude to be a part of virtue, they apply the *ſame term* virtue to ſubjects eſſentially *different*, and conſequently that their notions of gratitude, as forming *no part* of virtue, have little or no *reſemblance*.

In page 127 Mr. Edwards ſays, "True virtue moſt eſſentially conſiſts in benevolence to "beings in general." In page 128 he explains that propoſition by ſaying, that "he does

"not

" not mean to ſay that no one act of the mind, or exerciſe of love, is of the nature of true " virtue, but what has being in general, or the great ſyſtem of univerſal exiſtence, for its *di-* " *rect and immediate* object; ſo that no exerciſe of love, or kind affection to any one particu- " lar being, that is, but a ſmall part of this whole, has *any* thing of the nature of true virtue; " *but*, that the nature of true virtue conſiſts in a *diſpoſition* to benevolence *towards being in ge-* " *neral*, though from ſuch a diſpoſition may ariſe exerciſes of love to particular beings, as ob- " jects are preſented and occaſions ariſe." In page 131, he ſays, " The firſt object of a virtuous " benevolence is being ſimply conſidered; and if being, ſimply conſidered, be its object, then " being in general is its object; and the thing it has an ultimate propenſity to, is the higheſt " good of being in general; and it will ſeek the good of every individual being, unleſs it be " conceived as not conſiſtent with the higheſt good of being in general."

Having thus ſtated the primary object of virtuous love, he, in page 132, contends " That " the ſecondary object of a virtuous propenſity of heart, is *a benevolent being!*

From theſe premiſes he concludes, in page 135, " That true virtue *muſt* conſiſt *chiefly* in " *love to God*, the Being of beings, infinitely the greateſt and beſt of beings; and this (he main- " tains), appears, whether we conſider the primary or ſecondary ground of virtuous love."

Now gratitude, in his opinion, does not form a part of *this* true and primary virtue: though we have before ſeen that he allows a place to it in the *ſecondary* claſs of virtues; and *ſuch a part*, as even connects it with juſtice.

I am not diſpoſed to rail at any man for opinions, nor to cavil with him about words. But I muſt confeſs that, in the book upon Political Juſtice, there appears to me " nec vola nec " veſtigium" of *that* virtue which Mr. Edwards calls " true and primary"—that virtue, which conſiſts in the love of being in general; that virtue, which neceſſarily has the *Deity* for its firſt and greateſt object.

Whatever virtue may be, according to the Author of Political Juſtice, evidently it is *not* the true virtue of which Mr. Edwards ſpeaks.

In the book upon Political Juſtice much is ſaid of a regard to general good, by which, I ſuppoſe, was meant the good of man; and if in the judgment of the writer, this regard was virtuous, I ſuſpect that Mr. Edwards, having in view what he calls true virtue, would have maintained *ſuch* regard *not to be* virtuous. " It is manifeſt (ſays Edwards), that no affection " limited to any private ſyſtem, not dependent on, nor ſubordinate to being in general, can " be of the nature of true virtue; and this, whatever the private ſyſtem be, let it be more or " leſs extenſive, conſiſting of a greater or ſmaller number of individuals, ſo long as it con- " tains an infinitely little part of univerſal exiſtence, and ſo bears no proportion to the great " all comprehending ſyſtem." Diſſertations, page 141.

My immediate concern is, not in the *truth* or falſehood of Mr. Edwards's ſyſtem, but in the *reſemblance* which it has, or has not, to that poſition in the work upon Political Juſtice, which pronounces gratitude, under a certain reſpect, to be no part of juſtice or virtue.

In the Preface of the Enquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue, Hutcheſon ſuppoſes that, " It would have moved the indignation of Lord Shafteſbury to find a diſ- " ſolute ſet of men ſearching into his writings for his inſinuations againſt Chriſtianity, that " they may be the leſs reſtrained from their debaucheries; when, at the ſame time they were " incapable of reliſhing thoſe noble ſentiments of virtue and honour which he has placed in ſo " lovely a light." Would not Mr. Edwards have felt equal, or even greater indignation, if he

he had found the avowed advocates of infidelity misrepresenting, or, at leaſt, misconceiving his notion of true virtue; and misapplying the arguments which he urged in defence of it, to the diſcredit of *that* gratitude which, under certain circumſtances, and with certain reſtrictions, he approved as part of juſtice itſelf? In page 56 of Mr. Hall's admirable ſermon, many judicious, and, I think, deciſive objections are brought againſt the fundamental principle of Mr. Edwards; and they who with to go more deeply into the ſubject, would do well to peruſe ſection ſixth in Mr. Hutcheſon's Illuſtration of the Moral Senſe, where he examines "how far a regard to the Deity is neceſſary to make an action virtuous." When they have read Mr. Hutcheſon, they may, with great advantage, enquire by what means the love of God, according to the laws of aſſociation, is generated, and to what extent we are capable of reaching it; and for this purpoſe, let them ſee Hartley on the Pleaſures and Pains of Theopathy. Page 289, and page 696 of the notes and additions by Pillorius.

Since my examination of Mr. Edwards's opinion may have led the mind of the reader to the love of God, as reſembling benevolence, he may not think his time miſpent in peruſing what has been ſaid upon *that* ſubject by other and more ſober writers. "Our affections to-"wards the Deity (ſays Hutcheſon), ariſe in the ſame manner as towards our fellows, and are "in proportion to our attention to the cauſes of love in him, and the goodneſs of our temper. "The reflection on his goodneſs raiſes approbation and complacence; his benefits raiſe gra-"titude, and both occaſion *good-will* or benevolence." Illuſtrations on the Moral Senſe, page 312.

"The love of God (ſays Mr. Bentham), is a kind of ſympathy or good-will, which has the "Deity for its object." Introduction upon Motives, page 108.

Barrow, after deſcribing love in general to be "an affection or inclination of the ſoul to-"wards an object, proceeding from an apprehenſion and eſteem of ſome excellency therein; "its beauty, worth, or uſefulneſs; after obſerving that "theſe and other properties well "agree with that love which we owe to God:" and after ſtating that "the faint reſem-"blances of the Creator in things created are apt to allure our affections to them," then aſks, "Why ſhould not, from a *like*, but ſo much *greater* cauſe, the like effect proceed? Whence "can it be that the apprehenſion of an object ſo infinitely lovely, ſo incomparably beneficial, "(if not paſſing curſorily through our fancy, but deeply impreſſed upon our mind) ſhould act "proportionably, affect, and incline us towards him, with all that deſire, that delight, that "*good-will*, which are proper to love?" Sermon xxiii. vol. i.

They who might impute myſticiſm to Mr. Edwards, muſt allow that Biſhop Butler poſ-ſeſſed, what Seneca calls "ſubtile acumen ingenii in imam penettans veritatem." "That, "(ſays he) which we more ſtrictly call piety, or the love of God, and which is an eſſential "part of a right temper, ſome may, perhaps, imagine no way *connected* with benevolence: "yet ſurely they muſt be connected, if there be indeed in being an object infinitely good. "Human nature is ſo conſtituted, that every good affection implies the love of itſelf; i. e. "becomes the object of a new affection in the ſame perſon. Thus, to be righteous, implies "in it the love of righteouſneſs; to be benevolent, the love of benevolence; to be good, "the love of goodneſs; whether this righteouſneſs, benevolence, or goodneſs, be viewed as in "our own mind, or in another's: and the love of God as a being perfectly good, is the love "of perfect goodneſs contemplated in a being or perſon." Sermon xii. page 259.

Butler was never ſlovenly nor laviſh in the uſe of words. I muſt, therefore, warn my reader s

readers, that when he ſpeaks of " the love of perfect goodneſs as *contemplated in a being or* " *perſon*," he ſhews, even in thoſe familiar words, his profound inſight into the conſtitution and operations of the human mind. My obſervation ſhall be ſupported by the teſtimony of no contemptible philoſopher. " In tracing our emotions and paſſions to their origin, my " firſt thought was, that qualities and actions are the primary cauſes of emotions; and that " theſe emotions are afterwards expanded upon the being to which theſe qualities and actions " belong. But I am now convinced that this opinion is erroneous: an attribute is not, even " in imagination, ſeparable from the being to which it belongs; and for that reaſon, cannot " itſelf be the cauſe of any emotion. We have, it is true, no knowledge of any being or ſub- " ſtance but by means of its attributes; and therefore no being can be agreeable to us as " otherwiſe than by their means. But ſtill, when an emotion is raiſed, it is *the being itſelf*, " as we apprehend the matter, that raiſes the emotion; and it raiſes it by means of one or " other of its attributes." Elements of Criticiſm, vol. i. page 36. note.

At the concluſion of this long note, I am refreſhed to ſee that, without any abrupt tranſition, my mind has been carried on, from the ſingular opinions of a modern writer about the gratitude which we owe to man, to the juſt and luminous repreſentations given by other writers, of the love which we owe to God.

The Stoics, page 10, *line* 25.

" The apathy the Stoics talk is accompanied with ſomewhat amiſs in the moral character, " in that which is the health of the mind. Thoſe who formerly aimed at this upon the foot " of philoſophy, appear to have had better ſucceſs, in eradicating the effects of tenderneſs " and compaſſion, than they had with the paſſions of envy, pride, and reſentment." Butler, Sermon vi. page 96.

Superior Wiſdom, page 10, *line* 39.

The cauſe of this remark, and the whole extent to which I wiſh it to be carried, will be ſeen by the learned reader in the words I am about to produce from the Epiſtles aſcribed to Plato. Ἀλλ' ἴτε ἀνθράποις ἡγᾶμαι τὴν ἐπιχείρησιν περὶ αὐτῶν λεγομένην ἀγαθὸν, εἰ μή τισιν ὀλίγοις, ὁπόσοι δυνατοὶ ἀνευρεῖν αὐτοὶ διὰ μικρᾶς ἐνδείξεως· τῶν γε δὴ ἄλλων, τὰς μὲν καταφρονήσεως οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἐμπλήσειεν ἂν οὐδαμῆ ἐμμελῶς· τὰς δὲ, ὑψήλης καὶ χαυνὴς ἐλπίδος, ὡς σέμν' ἄττα μεμαθηκότας. (Platonis Op. edit. Serran. vol. iii. page 341). A ſalutary admonition, indeed, is here conveyed both to raſh and incompetent teachers, and to their miſguided and conceited diſciples.

A celebrated Writer, page 11, *line* 2, 4, 6, 7.

See vol. i. p. 388, of the Miſcellaneous Works of Mr. Gibbon.

I cannot refuſe myſelf the gratification of ſetting before the reader, the opinion and words of Mr. Fellowes, in his inſtructive and elegant work, called, " A Picture of Chriſtian " Philoſophy." " Patriotiſm, like extenſion, muſt begin at a point; but may be encreaſed " by gradual diffuſion, till it becomes a philanthropy, that knows no other limits than the " limits of nature. But as the circulation near the heart is more warm, freſh, and vigorous, " than at the extremities, ſo, every man's affection for his native country ought to be more " fervent

" fervent and vivid, than that philanthropic heart which may intereſt him in the happineſs " of diſtant regions.

" A good Chriſtian will be a citizen of his own country, before he will claim the too " often affected appellation of a citizen of the world; a name frequently abuſed to diſguiſe " a baſe inſenſibility to the beſt affections of the human heart.

" But though a good Chriſtian will glory in a partial fondneſs for his own country, ſtill " he will feel a lively intereſt for the happineſs of other nations. He will love juſtice and " benevolence more than his country; and he will never conſent to violate theſe ſacred prin- " ciples, though, by the violation, he might encreaſe her opulence, or her grandeur."—Page 102, 3.

My own benevolence and ſenſe of duty impel me irreſiſtibly to continue this note.

Mr. Fellowes has written ſeveral books both upon political and theological ſubjects, and in my opinion, the ableſt of them is the " Picture of Chriſtian Philoſophy" above-mentioned, a third edition of which was publiſhed at the beginning of this year. He is curate of Harbury in Warwickſhire, where I have often ſeen him employed among a well-choſen collection of books, and have been much pleaſed with his converſation upon many intereſting points of ethics, literature, and divinity. Now, in conſequence of ſome reproaches that have been lately thrown upon his intellectual and moral character, I am bounden to ſay that I am acquainted with no clergyman in this or any neighbouring county, who is more reſpectable than Mr. Fellowes for diligence in his ſtudies, for acuteneſs in his underſtanding, for purity in his principles, for regularity and earneſtneſs in the diſcharge of his clerical duties, or integrity in the whole tenour of his life. He poſſeſſes only a ſcanty income, and has no proſpect, I believe, of eccleſiaſtical preferment. But he adminiſters medicine to the ſick, he gives alms to the needy, he offers inſtruction to the ignorant, he " viſits the fatherleſs and " the widow in their affliction," and keeps " himſelf," in no common degree, " unſpot- " ted from the world." What, therefore, muſt have been my ſurpriſe, and my ſorrow, when I found the author of the book on Chriſtian Philoſophy, deſcribed in one of our periodical publications as a man " preſumptuous, idolizing his own conceptions, fancying his own " reaſon infallible, withheld by no ſenſe of prudence from introducing ſpeculations not ne- " ceſſary to his ſubject, and often highly dangerous; already a Latitudinarian in the *wideſt* " ſenſe of the word, deſcending by a natural progreſs from the character of a Latudinarian, " to that of a fanciful, ſelf-willed, and merely nominal Chriſtian, *differing* very little, except " in *name*, from a Deiſt," and expoſed in the courſe of his enquiries " even to Atheiſm!" In the annals of modern polemics there never was a fouler charge againſt any book or any author. Mr. Fellowes, I know, is not unacquainted with the writings of Grotius and perhaps, when he read the critique to which I allude, it called to his mind what Grotius ſaid of Calvin, " Quâ vero humanitate ſolitus fuerit Calvinus, excipere a ſe diſſentientes, ex ſcriptis " liquet. Caſtellionem, qui illam, quam Calvinus docebat, predeſtinationem oppugnabat, " nebulonem & ſatanam vocat. Conſertium, et nebulonem et canem. Scriptorem de officio " pii viri in hoc religionis diſſidio, qui erat Caſſander, ipſi autem putabatur eſſe Balduinus, " appellat frontis ferreæ hominem, pietatis expertem, profanum, impudicum, impoſtorem, " ἄεργον, petulantiæ deditum. Ei ſcripto cum ſe oppoſuiſſet Balduinus, vocat eum homi- " nem nihili, obſcœnum canem, improbum, falſarium, multa ſcelerate ac nequiter cogitan- " tem, & conſpirantem cum improbis nebulonibus, cynicum, ſcurram, perfidum, ſatuum,

" belluina rabie, ſatanæ addictum. Quid quod Bucerum ita vexavit, ut virum mitem coegerit " hæc ſcribere longe veriſſima" "*judicas, prout amas, vel odiſti*; amas autem et odiſti, prout " libet." Votum pro Pace Eccleſiaſtica, p. 665. Grot. Op. v. iii.

But whether or no Mr. Fellowes would apply to his reviewer what Bucer ſaid of Calvin, he may with juſtice ſpeak of himſelf in the words of his favourite writer Grotius. " Pacem " amavi ſemper amoque, et ad eam labores meos dirigo: pacem autem intelligo, illæsâ eâ ve- " ritate, quam nobis ſacra ſcriptura et perpetua traditio conſignant. Hanc qui amant, fieri " non poteſt quin in odia incurrant eorum, qui diſſidiis *frui volunt*, qualium nimis ferax eſt " hæc ætas. Tales pacis hoſtes in me inſurrecturos ſatis prævidi, ac facile patior, ſolorque " me conſcientia honeſtiſſimi propoſiti." Vid. Grot. Animadver. in Animadver. Riveti, p. 649, towards the concluſion.

I have the honour to be perſonally acquainted with two reſpectable men, to whoſe counſels and exertions muſt be in a great degree aſcribed the celebrity of the publication in which I read the accumulated and unfounded invectives againſt Mr. Fellowes juſt now recited. I eſteem both of them for their literary attainments, and I applaud them for their unwearied activity in the defence of our conſtitution, eccleſiaſtical and civil. But I know Mr. Fellowes to be *as* determined an enemy to real impiety, to be as ſincere a believer in the goſpel, to be as laborious a ſtudent, as ſound a ſcholar, as maſterly a writer, and as honeſt a man, as either of thoſe gentlemen; and *this* ſurely is no ordinary praiſe. The " Picture of Chriſtian Phi- " loſophy," even according to the conceſſion of the Reviewer, contains " many paſſages fa- " vourable to virtue and religion, and much that is well conceived and well written," though, in his eſtimation, " it is one of the laſt books that ſhould be recommended to the general " reader." May I then, be permitted to aſk, whether the paſſages which received, and perhaps extorted ſo much commendation, might not have induced the critic to be more temperate in his cenſures, more candid in his ſuſpicions, and more *wary in his predictions?*

If a writer, who, according to our critic, " warmly and ſkilfully recommends benevo- " lence," ſhould admire the talents, and ſometimes even adopt the opinions of Dr. Darwin, is it neceſſary, or even a probable conſequence, that his veneration for Dr. Darwin is " next " only to that which he feels for himſelf;" that he is " an arrogant ſpeculator," and that, " without any regard to conſequences, he plunges," or would incite his readers to plunge into " wanton and haſty diſputation?" Is it a mark of the reviewer's *own* benevolence, that he repreſents Mr. Fellowes as " bending the goſpel to his own whims," as looking with " an " unfavourable eye upon the writings of the Apoſtles," as having " it in view to make the " doctrines of genuine Chriſtianity reſemble the tenets of modern philoſophy." μὴ γένοιτο. Mr. Fellowes does not handle the word of God thus ſottiſhly, nor thus deceitfully. He has not ſo learned Chriſt, as to confound the truths of the goſpel with the impious effuſions of writers, who revile the precepts of their Redeemer, or deny the exiſtence of their Maker. He has ſenſe enough to be a Chriſtian without bigotry, and virtue enough to be a philoſopher without profaneneſs. He profeſſes Chriſtianity from conviction, he explains it with perſpicuity, he defends it with ardour, and he comments upon the temper and actions of its bleſſed Author with reverence the moſt profound, and eloquence the moſt impreſſive.

After all, it muſt be confeſſed that Mr. Fellowes does not aſſent to ſome poſitions of Mr. Wilberforce about original ſin. But for the attempt to refute Mr. Wilberforce, ſome enlightened believers may applaud, and ſome orthodox churchmen, I believe, would pardon him.

him. As to the ſtate of my mind about the book which gave riſe to the Strictures of Mr. Fellowes, the deſcription of it lies in a narrow compaſs—τὰ μὲν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, οὐ μέμνημαι, τὰ δὲ μέσα, οὐ συνίημι, τὰ δὲ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν, οὐ δοκιμάζω. M. A. P. C. xvii. N. 111 C.

To the authority of a writer who conceals his name, I may, without the imputation of "fancying my own reaſon infallible," oppoſe my calm and ſerious opinion. Upon two or three points of controverſial divinity, I diſſent from Mr. Fellowes; and had I aſſumed the office of a reviewer, I ſhould have ſpecified them. But the general merits of his work are *very great* indeed; and if I am not ſtrangely miſtaken, few perſons, however extenſive may be their knowledge, however rooted their faith, however exalted their piety, have peruſed it without increaſe of that knowledge, without confirmation of that faith, or without the moſt active and delightful exerciſe of that piety. Many of the obſervations are judicious, and ſome of them profound. The ſtile is clear, animated, and elegant. The ſpirit of the writer is, as it ought to be, tolerant towards Chriſtians of every ſect, but indignant againſt thoſe wretches, who would undermine the principles of morality, or who *ſcoff* at the evidences of religion, natural and revealed. I have lately converſed with ſome intelligent perſons, whoſe ſentiments about Mr. Fellowes's book are ſimilar to mine, and in the honour of their impartial ſuffrages, as well as the conſciouſneſs of his own meritorious exertions, he will find ample compenſation for the injuſtice which has been done to him by ſome unknown accuſer.

Foreign Writer, page 11, *line* 10.

"Defiez-vous de ſes coſmopolites qui vont chercher au loin dans leurs livres des devoirs "qu'ils dédaignent de remplir autour d'eux. Tel Philoſophe aime les Tartares pour être "diſpenſé d'aimer ſes voiſins.

"L'homme naturel eſt tout pour lui; il eſt l'unite numérique, l'entier abſolu, qui n'a de "rapport qu'à lui-même ou à ſon ſemblable. L'homme civil n'eſt qu'une unite fractionnaire qui tient au dénominateur, et dont la valeur eſt dans ſon rapport avec l'entier, "qui eſt le corps ſocial." Rouſſeau, Æmilius, book i.

Citizen of the World, page 11, *line* 14.

Ὁ δὲ Σωκράτης βέλτιον, οὐκ Ἀθηναῖος, οὐδὲ Ἕλλην, ἀλλὰ Κόσμιος εἶναι φήσας. Plutarch, περὶ φυγῆς. Page 600. edit. Xylan. The title of "Citizen of the World," was aſſumed by other philoſophers, to gratify, it ſhould ſeem, their vanity or their ſpleen. Thus Diogenes ἐρωτηθεὶς πόθεν εἴη; Κοσμοπολίτης, ἔφη. (D. Laertius, vol. i. page 345. edit. of Amſterdam 1692). It is recorded of Ariſtippus, that he ſaid εἶναι πλησίον τὸν κόσμον. (Page 138).—This is not the only inſtance in which I have ſeen a reſemblance between Ariſtippus, and ſome modern writers upon ethics.

Unmerited Exile, page 11, *line* 17.

"Jam vero exſilium, ſi rei naturam, non ignominiam nominis quærimus, quantum demum "a perpetuâ peregrinatione differt? In qua ætates ſuas philoſophi nobiliſſimi conſumpſe"runt, Xenocrates, Crantor, et innumerabiles alii, qui ſemel egreſſi, nunquam domum "reverterunt."

"Socrates quidem, cum rogaretur, cujatem ſe eſſe diceret, *mundanum* inquit; totius enim "mundi ſe incolam et civem arbitrabatur." Cicer. edit. Grut. vol. ii. p 402, 3.

He obeyed the Laws of his Country, page 11, *line* 21.

See the Crito of Plato, where Socrates ſuppoſes himſelf addreſſed by the laws—"καὶ ἐν πολέμῳ καὶ ἐν δικαστηρίῳ καὶ πανταχῇ ποιητέον ἃ ἂν κελεύσῃ ἡ πόλις τε καὶ ἡ πατρίς. P. 145. of Plato's Dialogue, by Forſter.

Fought in its Defence.

Theſe are inſtances—ἐστρατεύσατο ἐς Ἀμφίπολιν, καὶ Ξενοφῶντα ἀφ' ἵππου πεσόντα ἐν τῇ κατὰ Δήλιον μάχῃ, διέσωσεν ὑπασπιζόμενος.—ἐστρατεύσατο δὲ καὶ εἰς Πολίδαιαν διὰ θαλάττης. D. Laertius, vol. i. page 93.

Bounden to be, page 11, *line* 27.

Various are the inſtruments which the Deity has employed for ſecuring the intereſts of virtue. We have reaſon, we have affections, we have, what Adam Smith calls, "a ſenſe of "propriety, a ſenſe of merit and demerit, and a ſenſe of duty," influenced by the authority of commands and prohibitions, and by the ſanctions of reward and puniſhment. *Each* of them has its *proper* office in the courſe of our agency, and all of them are ſubſervient to one common end, our improvement, and our happineſs, as moral beings. There are, indeed, philoſophers who leave us no other guides than omnipotent truth, inflexible juſtice, and reaſon, which, according to their repreſentations, will, at laſt, be placed beyond the reach of errour. Yet, "reaſon alone," as ſays Butler, "whatever any one may wiſh, is not, in reality, a "ſufficient motive of virtue, in ſuch a creature as man; but this reaſon, joined with thoſe "affections which God has impreſſed on his heart." See Butler, page 88.

But as to that conſtant and direct regard to general good, which juſtice, truth, and reaſon, are ſaid to exact from all men at all times, and under all circumſtances, the philoſophy which thus exalts them, may be found, upon a near inſpection, to incur the charge which a great writer has brought againſt the dogmas of the Stoics, and "to be ultimately only a more re-"fined ſyſtem of ſelfiſhneſs, by which we may *reaſon ourſelves out of all virtue.*" Vol. ii. page 49. On the other hand, there are well-meaning but miſtaken religioniſts, who ſeem to think that we ought not to be "grateful from gratitude, to be charitable from humanity, "to protect the helpleſſneſs of our children, and ſupport the infirmities of our parents, from "natural affection, to be generous and juſt, from the love of mankind, but to perform all "theſe different duties, ſolely becauſe God has commanded us to perform them." Smith's Moral Sentiments, vol. i. page 429.

Now, when I ſpoke of what we as Chriſtians *are bounden to be*, I grant with Adam Smith, that "there is no precept in Chriſtianity which pronounces the ſenſe of our duty to be the "*only* principle of our conduct;" but that Revelation conſpires with "philoſophy and com-"mon ſenſe, in repreſenting it as the *ruling* and the *governing* principle." "The ſecond "precept of the Goſpel is, to love our neighbour as we love ourſelves, and we love ourſelves "ſurely," as the ſame philoſopher well obſerves, "for our own ſakes, and not merely be-"cauſe we are commanded to do ſo." The ſame obſervation may be applied to all the directions of religion about prudence, temperance, and every other virtue, which moraliſts deſcribe as included in the duty we owe to ourſelves.

Thus

Thus, by the *conſtitution of* our nature, we are *capable* both of general and particular benevolence; and by the authority of religion we are commanded to exerciſe both, "in loving "our neighbour as ourſelves."

General Benevolence page 11, *line* 35.

In juſtice to Barrow, Taylor, and ſome other of the older and more celebrated divines who have adorned the Church of England, I will once for all make a remark, which may not be very congenial to the temper and prejudices of theſe times, but which long, and I hope impartial, obſervation will juſtify me in making with great affiance in the truth of it. Without any attempt to preſerve the peculiar *forms* of philoſophical inveſtigation, without any habit of employing the *technical* language of it, without any immediate conſciouſneſs of intention to exhibit their opinions in what is called a *philoſophical point* of view, their incidental repreſentations of man in all the varieties of his moral powers and his ſocial relations, have ſo much depth, ſo much preciſion, and ſo much comprehenſion, as would have procured them the name of philoſophers, if they had not borne the different and not leſs honourable name of Chriſtian teachers. In their profeſſional writings I have often ſeen the *germ* of thoughts which have been expanded into fuller luxuriance, and decked with brighter colours, in the more popular productions of later times. The paſſages quoted from their works in theſe notes, will abundantly illuſtrate my obſervation; and of eloquence combined with philoſophy, a nobler inſtance can ſcarcely be found than in the words of Barrow, where he decribes the ſpirit of benevolence, ſometimes diffuſing itſelf over the collective intereſts of man, and ſometimes emanating in the ſweet and lovely charities of private life.

"Charity (ſays he), is a right noble and worthy thing; greatly perfective of our nature; "much dignifying and beautifying our ſoul. It rendereth a man truly great, enlarging his "mind into a vaſt circumference, and to a capacity near infinite; ſo that it by a general "care doth reach all things; by an univerſal affection doth embrace and grace the world. "By it our reaſon obtaineth a field or ſcope of employment worthy of it, not confined to the "ſlender intereſts of one perſon or one place, but extending to the concerns of all men. "Charity is the imitation and copy of that immenſe love, which is the fountain of all being "and all good; which made all things, which preſerveth the world, which ſuſtaineth every "creature.

"Charity rendereth us as angels, or peers to thoſe glorious and bleſſed creatures, who with-"out receiving or expecting any requital from us, do heartily deſire and delight in our good, "are ready to promote it, do willingly ſerve and labour for it. Nothing is more amiable, "more admirable, more venerable. even in the common eye and opinion of men; it hath in "it a beauty and a majeſty apt to raviſh every heart; even a ſpark of it in generoſity of deal-"ing, breedeth admiration; a glimpſe of it in formal courteſie of behaviour procureth much "eſteem, being deemed to accompliſh and adorn a man; how lovely therefore, and truly "gallant is an entire, ſincere, conſtant, and uniform practice thereof, iſſuing from pure "good-will and affection!" Barrow's Sermons, vol. i. page 375.

They who read theſe notes will have no reaſon to ſuſpect that I am wholly inſenſible to the charms of juſt thinking and beautiful compoſition in other writers, whoſe opinions upon ſpeculative topics of religion are widely different from my own, but whoſe talents have been moſt

moſt laudably employed in ſupporting the cauſe of virtue according to the common apprehenſions, and for the common benefit of the civilized world.

One of the happieſt illuſtrations I have ever ſeen, both of the more enlarged, and the more limited benevolence, is in Hutcheſon, and it well deſerves to be quoted. "This univerſal "benevolence towards all men we may compare to that principle of gravitation, which per- "haps extends to all bodies in the univerſe; but like the love of benevolence, encreaſes as the "diſtance is diminiſhed, and is ſtrongeſt when bodies come to touch each other. Now this "increaſe of attraction, upon nearer approach, is as neceſſary to the frame of the univerſe, "as that there ſhould be any attraction at all; for a general attraction, equal in all diſtances, "would, by the contrariety of ſuch multitudes of equal forces, put an end to all its regularity "of motion, and perhaps ſtop it altogether." Enquiry, page 222. In the foregoing words there is a compleat deſcription of philanthropy, ſo far as man, by his nature, is capable of feeling, or by reaſon or religion is required to practiſe it; and there is a compleat refutation, too, of the ſtrange notions that have gone abroad, under the impoſing name of philoſophy.

In No. 45 of the Adventurer, written by Dr. Johnſon, imagery nearly the ſame as that of Hutcheſon is applied to the ſame ſubject.

"The reigning philoſophy informs us, that the vaſt bodies which conſtitute the univerſe, "are regulated in their progreſs, through the etherial ſpaces, by the perpetual agency of con- "trary forces; by one of which they are reſtrained from deſerting their orbits, and loſing "themſelves in the immenſity of Heaven; and held off by the other from ruſhing together, "and cluſtering round their center with everlaſting coheſion. The ſame contrariety of im- "pulſe, may be, perhaps, diſcovered in the motions of men; we are formed for ſociety, not "for combination; we are equally unqualified to live in a cloſe connection with our fellow- "beings, and in total ſeparation from them: we are attracted towards each other by general "ſympathy, but kept back from contact by private intereſts."

Mr. Green, whoſe penetration, whoſe taſte, whoſe large views in philoſophy, and whoſe great talents for compoſition, entitle him to my reſpect, has quoted ſome admirable lines from Pope, in order to illuſtrate the progreſs of our affections—

"God acts from whole to parts, the human ſoul
"Muſt riſe from individual to the whole.
"Self-love but ſerves the virtuous mind to wake,
"As the ſmall pebble ſtirs the peaceful lake.
"The centre mov'd, a circle ſtraight ſucceeds,
"Another ſtill, and ſtill another ſpreads.
"Friend, parent, neighbour, firſt it will embrace,
"It's country next, and next all human race."

I will give the reader an opportunity of comparing theſe lines with a paſſage which they reſemble ſtrongly, but which Mr. Pope in all probability had not ſeen—"ὅλως γὰρ ἕκαστος "ἡμῶν, ὅιον κύκλοις πολλοῖς περιγέγραπται. τοῖς μὲν, σμικροτέροις, ταῖς δὲ μείζοσι, καὶ τοῖς "μὲν περιέχεσι, τοῖς δὲ περιεχομένοις, κατὰ τὰς διαφόρους καὶ ἀνίσους πρὸς ἀλλήλους σχέσεις. "πρῶτος μὲν γὰρ ἐστὶ κύκλος καὶ προσεχέστατος, ὃν αὐτός τις καθάπερ περὶ κέντρον τὴν ἑαυτοῦ γέγρα- "πται διανοιαν, ἐν ᾧ κύκλῳ τό τε σῶμα περιέχεται, καὶ τὰ τοῦ σώματος ἕνεκα παρειλημμένα,

"σχεδὸν

" σχεδὸν γὰρ ὁ βραχύτατος καὶ μικρᾷ ὅεῖν αὐτᾷ προσαπτόμενος τᾶ κέντρα κύκλος ἔιτος. " δεύτερος δὲ ἀπὸ τέτα, καὶ πλέον μὲν ἀφεξῶς τᾶ κέντρα, περιέχων δὲ τὸν πρῶτον ἐν ᾧ τετά- " χαται γονῆις, ἄδελφοι, γυνὴ, παῖδες. ὁ δὲ ἀπὸ τέτων τρίτος, ἐν ᾧ ϑεῖοι, καὶ τιτθίδες, πάπ- "ποι τε καὶ τίτθαι, καὶ ἀδελφων παῖδες, ἔτι δὲ ἀνέψιοι· μεθ' ὃν ὁ τὺς ἄλλους περιέχων συγ- " γενῆις. τέτῳ δὲ ἀφεξῆς, ὁ τῶν δημοτῶν, καὶ μετ' αὐτὸν ὁ τῶν φυλετῶν, εἶτ ὁπλιτῶ. καὶ λοιπὸν " ἔτως ὁ μὲν ἀσυγγειτόνων. ὁ δὲ ὁμοεθνών. ὁ δὲ ἐξωτάτω καὶ μέγιςος, περιέχων τε πάντας τὺς " κύκλους, ὁ τᾶ παντὸς ἀνθρώπων γένες." Stob. Serm. 82, page 481.

By the Philoſophers, page 12, *line* 15.

See Hume on the Paſſions, page 207.

To renounce nearly any Opinions, page 12, *line* 23.

" Quid ſi vero gravior ſit error, et qui apud æquos judices facile poſſit ſacra autoritate, " aut veterum conſenſu revinci? Cogitandum hic quoque quanta ſit vis inolitæ opinionis, et " quantum libertatem judicii minuat in ſuam cujuſque ſectam ſtudium, Malum, ut Gal- " lenus ait, quavis ſcabie inſanabilius. Appoſite ad hanc rem Origenes—εὐχερέστερόν γε ἂν- " ϑρωπος τὰς περὶ ἄλλα συνηϑείας, κἂν δυσαποσπάστως ἀυτῶν ἔχῃ, καλαλείψαι ἂν, ἢ τὰς περὶ " τὰ Δόγματα." Grotius de Jure Belli et Pacis, lib. ii. cap. xx.

In his note Grotius adds, to the ſame purpoſe, the following words from Chryſoſtom—ὅταν δὲ καὶ ἐν δόγμασιν ἡ συνήϑεια ᾖ, βεβαιοτέρα γίνεται· πάλα γάρ τις ἐυκολώτερον ἀμείψειε, ἢ τὰ περὶ τὰς θρησκείας. Chryſoſtom in 1 Cor. ii.

Solemn and pleaſing Duties, page 12, *line* 38.

I have choſen to ſpeak of that ſympathy which ariſes from the participation of religious duties in the ſanctuary, rather than of that which proceeds from ſimilarity of opinion upon abſtruſe and polemical queſtions of divinity. The moral effects of the latter, I fear, are too often unfavourable to benevolence; and with the higheſt reſpect for the talents and erudition of thoſe perſons who are moſt capable of examining ſuch queſtions, I will venture to expreſs my moſt fixed and *ſolemn* judgment, that they ought to be very *rarely* introduced, and very *temperately* diſcuſſed in diſcourſes from the pulpit. ἐριδαιτέων δὲ καὶ ἐιμανιελικλέων λόγως ἀφιέσιν, ὁι αὐτάς τε κατατείνουσιν ἐν πρά γμασι γλίσχροις καὶ δυϑεωρήτοις, τάς τε παραλυγχάνυσας ἔδαμᾶ; οἰκοδομᾶσι. The foregoing paſſage is taken from Plutarch, edit. Xylan. vol. ii. page 614. and for obvious reaſons I have omitted the laſt word in Plutarch, and ſubſtituted for it the better phraſeology of an inſpired writer, who more than once has condemned διακρίσεις διαλογισμων. Rom. xiv. 1.

I know not that philoſophy either ancient or modern has ever deſcribed the beauty of true holineſs in colours ſo correct and ſo glowing, as the great apoſtle of the Gentiles in his Epiſtle to the Coloſſians. My ſoul is always enraptured when I read " ὁ λόγος τᾶ χρίςᾳ ἐνοικείτω " ἐν ὑμῖν πλησίως, ἐν πάσῃ σοφίᾳ· διδάσκοντες καὶ νεθετᾶντες ἑαυτὺς, ψαλμοῖς καὶ ὕμνοις καὶ " ᾠδαῖς πνευματικαῖς, ἐν χάριτι ᾄδοντες ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ ὑμῶν τῶ Κυρίῳ." Coloſſ. cap. iii. v. 16.

When devotion is thus made the indirect, but powerful inſtrument of inſtruction; when

prayer

prayer and thankſgiving are offered up to the throne of heaven, both " with the ſpirit and " with the *underſtanding*:" when the duties of external religion are performed with " ſingle- " neſs of heart" towards God, and with " love unfeigned" towards men, then, indeed, and then *only* may Chriſtian worſhippers be ſaid " τὰ τῆς Εἰρήνης διώκειν, καὶ τὰ τῆς οἰκοδομῆς " τῆς εἰς ἀλλήλους." Rom. cap. xiv. ver. 19.

If the opinions ſeriouſly delivered in my ſermon, and unfolded more fully in this note, ſhould unfortunately give offence to the fiery zealot or the captious bigot, be it remembered that I have the authority of a ſincere believer, and moſt profound philoſopher, in my favour. " As for the fruit towards thoſe that are within it is peace; which containeth infinite " bleſſings; it *eſtabliſheth faith*; it kindleth charity; the outward peace of the church diſ- " tilleth into peace of conſcience; and it turneth the labours of writing and reading of con- " troverſies, into treatiſes of mortification and devotion." Bacon's Works. London 1730. vol. iii. page 304.

Enlightened Conſcience, page 13, *line* 5.

The ſober and ſincere Chriſtian will find that an " enlightened conſcience," is neceſſary to produce in his actions and his opinions, too, all the ſalutary effects which Socrates aſcribes to φρόνησις. " This," ſays he, " is not the true way to virtue, if we exchange pleaſures " for pleaſures, pains for pains, fear for fear, and the greater for the leſs, like pieces of " money—ἀλλ' ἡ ἐκεῖνο μόνον τὸ νόμισμα ὀρθὸν, ἀντὶ ὃ δεῖ πάντα ταῦτα καλλαλλάττεσθαι, " φρόνησις. καὶ τότε μὲν πάντα καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο ὠνέμενά τε καὶ πιπρασκόμενα τῷ ὄντι ἦν, καὶ " ἀνδρεία καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ δικαιοσύνη. καὶ ξυλλήβδην ἀληθὴς ἀρετὴ μετὰ φρονήσεως, καὶ " περιγιγνομένων καὶ ἀπογιγνομένων καὶ ἡδονῶν καὶ φοβερῶν, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων τῶν τοιούτων· " χωριζόμενα δὲ φρονήσεως, καὶ ἀλλαττόμενα ἀντὶ ἀλλήλων, μὴ σκιαγραφία τις ἡ τοιαύτη ἀρετὴ, " καὶ τῷ ὄντι ἀνδραποδώδης τε, καὶ οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς οὐδ' ἀληθὲς ἔχῃ." Plato, Phædo. ed. Forſter, page 185, 6.

Inflamed with Zeal, page 13, *line* 6.

" The other part of ſpiritual worſhip is a fervor, and a holy zeal of God's glory, greatneſs " of deſire, and quietneſs of action. Of all this the Jews were not careful at all, excepting " the zealots among them; and they were not only fervent but inflamed: and they had the " carneſtneſs of paſſion for the holy warmth of religion; and inſtead of an carneſt charity, " they had a cruel diſcipline." Taylor's Sermons, 112.

Deluded by Fanaticiſm.

" The animoſity of hoſtile factions, whether civil or eccleſiaſtical, is often ſtill more fu- " rious than that of hoſtile nations, and their conduct towards one another is often more " atrocious."

" The real, revered, and impartial ſpectator, therefore, is upon no occaſion, at a greater " diſtance than amidſt the violence and rage of contending parties. To them it may be ſaid, " that ſuch a ſpectator ſcarce exiſts any-where in the univerſe. Even to the great Judge of " the univerſe they impute all their own prejudices, and often view that divine Being as ani- " mated by all their own vindictive and implacable paſſions. Of all the corrupters of moral

" ſentiments

" ſentiments, therefore, faction and fanaticiſm have always been by far the greateſt." A. Smith's Moral Sentiments, vol. i. page 386.

" The preceding obſervations of A. Smith are very judicious; but thoſe which follow from Mr. Hutcheſon are *far* more intereſting. Lord Shafteſbury, ſays he, in his Eſſay on Wit and Humour, obſerves, " that the various ſects, parties, factions, cabals of mankind in larger " ſocieties, are all influenced by a public ſpirit: that ſome generous notions of public good, " ſome ſtrong friendly diſpoſitions, raiſe them at firſt, and excite men of the ſame *faction* or " *cabal* to the moſt diſintereſted mutual ſuccour and aid: that all the contentions of the dif- " ferent factions, and even the fierceſt wars againſt each other, are influenced by a ſociable " public ſpirit in a limited ſyſtem." " But certain it is, that men are little obliged to thoſe, " who often artfully raiſe and foment this party ſpirit, or cantonize them into ſeveral ſects for " the defence of very trifling cauſes. When mens heads are filled with ſome trifling opinions, " when deſigning men raiſe in their minds ſome unaccountable notion of *ſanctity* and *religion*, " in tenets or practices, which neither increaſe our love to God, or our own ſpecies; when " the ſeveral factions are taught to look upon each other as *odious*, *contemptible*, *profane*, be- " cauſe of their different tenets or opinions; even when theſe tenets, whether true or falſe, " are perhaps perfectly uſeleſs to the public good; when the keeneſt paſſions are raiſed about " ſuch trifles; and men begin to hate each other for what, of itſelf, has no evil in it; and " to love the zealots of their own ſect for what is no way valuable; nay, even for their " fury, rage, and malice againſt oppoſite ſects; (which is what all parties commonly call " zeal), 'tis then no wonder if our *moral ſenſe* be much impaired, and our *natural notions* of " *good* and *evil* almoſt loſt; when our *admiration*, and *love*, or *contempt*, and *hatred*, are thus " perverted from their natural objects." Inquiry, page 209, 210.

For the wiſe and virtuous Hutcheſon I feel the ſame veneration which Dr. Reid and Dr. A. Smith have frequently expreſſed. But from my converſation with men of letters, I have reaſon to fear that his writings are too much neglected. If therefore the frequent, and, I truſt, the pertinent quotations I have made from them, ſhould be inſtrumental in bringing them back to the notice of my countrymen, I ſhall have rendered no inconſiderable ſervice to the cauſe of virtue.

Balance of the Social Affection, page 13, *line* 7.

See Hutcheſon on the Nature and Conduct of the Paſſions, page 55, 6.

To do Good even to ſuch Sinners, page 13, *line* 19.

In following the Apoſtle's injunction, we ſhould always " keep it in aim to bring our- " ſelves, by practicable gradations, to univerſal benevolence, even to the *worſt* of men, ſo as " to ſhew them all the kindneſs that may not prove an encouragement to vice, or endanger " miſchief to ourſelves: in imitation of that power who cauſeth his ſun to ſhine upon the " good and upon the evil, and ſendeth his rain upon the juſt and the unjuſt; and we truſt " will turn every evil permitted, to anſwer ſome good and holy purpoſe." Tucker upon Holineſs, vol. iii. part ii. page 173.

Lover of Souls, page 13, *line* 21.

Wiſdom of Solomon, chap. xi. ver. 26.

Not wholly with you, page 13, *line* 24.

" There are people who ſeem to have placed the corner ſtone of their faith in that text— " *He that is not with us, is againſt us* ; *and he that gathereth not with us, ſcattereth.*" " With " ſuch there is no medium to be preſerved; a favourable word ſpoken of any they do not " like, is taken for a declaration of hoſtility againſt themſelves.—They are more eager to " run down an adverſary, than to labour at their own improvement, as being the leſs trouble- " ſome taſk: and more afraid leſt another ſhould attain any good thing, than that themſelves " ſhould miſs of it. For ſeeking their credit, rather by differing from others than by their " intrinſic merit, they cannot hear with patience whatever tends to leſſen that difference, " which they ſtrive to widen as far as poſſible; ſo that he who preſumes to doubt of a ſingle " truth, muſt be a heretic, an infidel, a man of no principles; and he that believes a ſingle " point without ſufficient warrant to their liking, muſt be a bigot, an enthuſiaſt, a crafty " deſigner upon the liberties of mankind." Light of Nature, vol. iii. part ii. chap. vii. on Religion, pages 256, 7. The reader will remember, that I make frequent and large quotations from Tucker, becauſe his works are ſcarce.

The two proverbial ſayings, " He that is not with us, is againſt us, and he that is not " againſt us, is with us," are moſt judiciouſly explained by Jeremy Taylor, in the Ductor Dubitantium, p. 762.

Arrogance of the Scoffer, page 13, *line* 27.

A free thinker of this kind " hates trouble, thinks all painful inveſtigation needleſs, as " tending only to perplex, and makes his deciſions eaſily, without ſcruple or diffidence."

" His delight is wholly in oppoſition. If men believe what is taught them, it is enough, " no matter what elſe they believe. Ridicule is his truſty weapon, as doing its work much " quicker or cleverer than argument, for what cannot ſtand that touchſtone, muſt needs be " abſurd. He affects to appear mighty full of doubts, but in reality never doubted of any " thing: for what he pretends to doubt of, he is abſolutely ſure muſt be falſe, becauſe he " diſcerns the character of abſurdity in it by his moral ſenſe.

" He takes his idea of Chriſtianity, ſometimes from the extravagances of the Methodiſts, " ſometimes from the tyrannical policy of the Papiſts, and perceives no inconſiſtency in " making it either the deluſion of ſilly enthuſiaſts, or the deep-laid ſchemes of crafty de- " ceivers, to raiſe immenſe riches and power, according as ſerves his preſent purpoſe. He " runs down charity, and cries up benevolence, but groſsly miſtakes both the one and the " other: for he places charity ſolely in building churches or giving money to beggars, and " benevolence in eaſineſs of carriage and a chearful converſation, or in doing any obliging " office for a friend, or acquaintance, that may be done without much trouble to yourſelf. " He abhors perſecution as an invaſion of the rights of mankind; but he criticiſes and " and teazes, derides and runs down, with his contemptuous ſneer, whatever he does not " like, the only means of perſecution in his power; as if mankind had not a right to can- " did and equitable judgment, with reſpect to their good name, as well as to their liberties " and properties." Theſe obſervations make a part of the admirable compariſon which Tucker has drawn between a bigot and a free-thinker, and are to be found in vol. iii. part ii. pages 312, 13, of the Light of Nature.

I fear

I fear that in a neighbouring State, the cauſe of infidelity has, in far too many inſtances, been ſupported by a worſe kind of perſecution. But of my own countrymen in general, I am happy to ſay——

" The baleful dregs
" Of theſe late ages, this inglorious draught
" Of wickedneſs and folly, have not *yet*,
" Bleſt be the eternal Ruler of the world!
" Defil'd to ſuch a depth of ſordid ſhame
" The native honours of the human ſoul,
" Nor ſo effac'd the image of its Sire."

Akenſide's Pleaſures of Imagination, book ii.

Full Impiety of the Blaſphemer, page 13, *line* 27.

I have met with ſeveral perſons, who were ready enough to confeſs, and even eager to avow and defend their infidelity. I muſt, however, acknowledge, that their language, in my preſence, at leaſt, was decorous; and that their aim, as it appeared to me, was rather to vanquiſh by diſputation, than to inſult by profaneneſs. The yell of blaſphemy never aſſailed my ears from more than one human voice, and that voice has for theſe eleven years been ſilenced by death. Firmly, but not in the gall of bitterneſs, I beſtowed upon the offender the diſcipline he deſerved for a moſt unprovoked outrage, and I have often expreſſed my joy, that a table ſtood between us, for, he had the grim viſage of a ruffian, and his hands, I knew, had been imbrued in the blood of a fellow-creature—εἰδὼς αὐτῷ τὸ ὄνομα, ſays an old writer, οὐκ ἐπιμνοθήσομαι—But I am glad that he was not an Engliſhman.

Knight Errant of Atheiſm, page 13, *line* 28.

" Is the idea," exclaims the pious and eloquent Mr. Hall, " of an almighty and perfect " Ruler, unfriendly to any paſſion which is conſiſtent with innocence, or an obſtruction to " any deſign which it is not ſhameful to avow? Eternal God! on what are thine enemies " intent? What are thoſe enterpriſes of guilt and horror, that, for the ſafety of their per- " formers, require to be enveloped in a darkneſs which the eye of Heaven muſt not pierce? " —Miſerable men! proud of being the offspring of chance; in love with univerſal diſor- " der; whoſe happineſs is involved in the belief of there being no witneſs to their deſigns, " and who are at eaſe, only becauſe they ſuppoſe themſelves inhabitants of a forſaken and " fatherleſs world!" Page 71, 2.

Am I told that Mr. Hall is a profeſſed teacher of religion, and that his imagination is diſturbed by the frightful ſcenes that have been paſſing before him? Let us hear then the words of a philoſopher, calmly inveſtigating the characters of true benevolence. "Though our effec- " tual good offices can very ſeldom be extended to any wider ſociety than that of our own " country; our good will is circumſcribed by no boundary, but may embrace the immen- " ſity of the univerſe. We cannot form the idea of any innocent and ſenſible being, whoſe " happineſs we ſhould not deſire; or to whoſe miſery, when diſtinctly brought home to the " imagination, we ſhould not have ſome degree of averſion.

* * * * * * * " This univerſal benevolence, how noble and generous ſoever, can be the " ſource of no *ſolid* happineſs to any man, who is not thoroughly convinced that *all* the in-

 " habitants

" habitants of the univerſe, the meaneſt as well as the greateſt, are under the immediate " care and protection of that *great, benevolent, and all-wiſe Being*, who directs all the move- " ments of nature; and who is determined, by his own unalterable perfections, to maintain " in it, at all times, the greateſt poſſible quantity of happineſs. To this univerſal benevo- " lence, on the contrary, the very *ſuſpicion of a fatherleſs world*, muſt be, the moſt melan- " choly of all reflections; from the thought that all the unknown regions of infinite and " incomprehenſible ſpace may be filled with nothing but endleſs miſery and wretchedneſs." A. Smith's Moral Sent. vol. ii. page 113, 14.

Upon the inference which ought to be drawn from ſuperſtition, as it affects the truth of natural religion, the ſentiments of another great philoſopher, are ſo juſt, ſo important, and ſo original, that my readers will thank me for producing the whole.

" Examine," ſays Mr. Hume, " the religious principles which have prevailed in the " world—you will ſcarcely be perſuaded that they are any thing but ſick men's dreams; or " perhaps, will regard them more as the playſome whimſies of monkies in human ſhape, " than the ſerious, poſitive, dogmatical aſſeverations of a being who dignifies himſelf with " the name of rational. To oppoſe the torrent of ſcholaſtic religion by ſuch feeble maxims " as theſe, that it is impoſſible for the ſame thing to be and not to be; that the whole is " greater than a part; that two and three make five; is pretending to ſtop the ocean with a " bulruſh." " But what is the inference (ſays the ſagacious and temperate Dugald Stewart), " to which we are led by theſe obſervations? Is it (to uſe the words of this ingenious writer, i.e. " Mr. Hume) that the whole is a riddle, an ænigma, an inexplicable myſtery; and that doubt, " uncertainty, and ſuſpenſe, appear the only reſult of our moſt accurate ſcrutiny concerning this " ſubject? Or ſhould not *rather* the melancholy hiſtories which he has exhibited of the follies " and caprices of ſuperſtition, direct our attention to thoſe ſacred and indelible characters on " the human mind, which all theſe perverſions of reaſon are unable to obliterate; like that " image of himſelf which Phidias wiſhed to perpetuate, by ſtamping it ſo deeply on the " buckler of his Minerva, " ut nemo delere poſſet aut divellere, qui totam ſtatuam non im- " minuerit." In truth, the more ſtriking the contradictions, the more ludicrous the ceremo- " nies, to which the pride of human reaſon has thus been reconciled; the ſtronger is our " evidence that religion has a foundation in the nature of man. When the greateſt of mo- " dern philoſophers declares that " he would rather believe all the fables in the Legend and " the Talmud, and the Alcoran, than that this univerſal frame is without mind;" he has ex- " preſſed the ſame feeling, which in all ages and nations has led good men, unaccuſtomed " to reaſoning, to an implicit faith in the creed of their infancy; a feeling which affords " an evidence of the exiſtence of the Deity, incomparably more ſtriking, than if, unmixed " with error, and undebaſed by ſuperſtition, this moſt important of all principles had com- " manded the univerſal aſſent of mankind. Where are the *other* truths in the whole circle of " the ſciences, which are ſo eſſential to human happineſs, as to procure an eaſy acceſs, not " only for themſelves, but for whatever opinions may happen to be blended with them? " Where are the truths ſo venerable and commanding, as to impart their own ſublimity to " every trifling memorial which recals them to our remembrance; to beſtow ſolemnity and " elevation on every mode of expreſſion by which they are conveyed; and which, in what- " ever ſcene they have habitually occupied the thoughts, conſecrate every object which it " preſents to our ſenſes, and the very ground we have been accuſtomed to tread? To attempt

" to

" to weaken the authority of ſuch impreſſions, by a detail of the endleſs variety of forms, " which they derive from caſual aſſociations, is ſurely an employment unſuitable to the " dignity of philoſophy. To the vulgar it may be amuſing, in this, as in other inſtances, to " indulge their wonder at what is new or uncommon; but to the philoſopher it belongs to " perceive, under all theſe various diſguiſes, the workings of the ſame common nature; and " in the ſuperſtitions of Egypt, no leſs than in the lofty viſions of Plato, to recognize the " exiſtence of thoſe moral ties, which unite the heart of man to the author of his being." Stewart's Elements, 359. Animated with the enthuſiaſm, with which this eloquent paſſage muſt inſpire a true religioniſt, will he not inſtantly repeat Pope's Univerſal Prayer, " meekly " kneeling upon his knees?"

Upon a ſubject which the words prefixed to this note ſuggeſt to my mind, I muſt detain the reader's attention ſomewhat longer than uſual.

Lord Bacon ſays (Eſſay xvii.) that " a little philoſophy inclineth a man's mind to Atheiſm, " but that depth in philoſophy bringeth it about to religion." Sir Matthew Hale, in his admirable work De Homine, quotes theſe words with high approbation, and I think that, with the latitude which muſt always be allowed to general poſitions, Bacon is very right. He has made, alſo, another remark, the propriety of which has again and again ſtruck my mind, in the courſe of my own obſervations upon the diſpoſitions and characters of men. " Atheiſts," ſays he, " will ever be *talking* of that their opinion, as if they *fainted in it within* " *themſelves*, and would be glad to be ſtrengthened by the conſent of others: nay more, you " ſhall have Atheiſts ſtriving to *get diſciples*, as it fareth with other ſects." Eſſay 17.

" To the great Searcher of all Hearts—to him who eſpieth our thoughts afar off, and who " knoweth of what we are made," would I leave the ſacred prerogative of deciding how far the opinions of men are *neceſſarily*, or in ſome caſes, *actually* produced by vicious habits, and the propagation of them ſecretly accompanied by malignant motives. I muſt, however, take the liberty of ſaying, that one claſs of unbelievers in this country confirm, beyond all other men, to my mind the juſtneſs of Mr. Hume's remark, that, " It is almoſt impoſſible for us to ſupport " any principle or ſentiment againſt the univerſal conſent of every one with whom we have any " fellowſhip or correſpondence: that, of all our opinions, thoſe which we form in our own " favour, however lofty or preſuming, are at bottom the fraileſt, and the moſt eaſily ſhaken " by the contradiction and oppoſition of others; and that, our great concern in the caſe " makes us ſoon alarmed, and keeps our paſſions upon the watch." Eſſays, vol. ii. p. 202. More, or leſs, this remark may be applied to every man who is actuated even by the moſt honeſt love of fame. But I think it peculiarly applicable to thoſe perſons who have reached the greateſt extremes of infidelity; and in whom I have obſerved a ſtrange mixture of outward poſitiveneſs and inward diſtruſt—a *watchful*, *captious*, and *fretful* turn of mind, amidſt the ſmootheſt profeſſions of moderation and candour—an unceaſing ſolicitude to obtain, not merely triumph from the praiſe, but *ſupport* from the *aſſent* of others—a *latent* proneneſs to meaſure the probability of their own tenets, by the zeal and increaſe of their followers, *at the very moment* when they aſcribe the permanency of eſtabliſhed opinions, not to the ſolidity of the reaſonings by which they are defended, but to the influence of the numbers by whom they are profeſſed.

" Parum favet," ſays Moſheim, " Memoriæ magni Baconi Cudworthus, quem inter " occultos impietatis erga Deum Patronos numeraſſe videtur." Note on Cudworth's Works, 4to. vol. ii. page 109.

Let *me* not be ſuſpected of entertaining any ſuch unjuſt prejudice againſt Lord Bacon,

when I examine, and would *reſtrain* another propoſition of the ſame great man, which in my hearing has been ſometimes repeated with exultation, and oppoſed to the celebrated paſſage in Plutarch, where he ſays of ſuperſtition—δεῖ μὲν ἀμέλει τῆς περὶ θεῶν δόξης, ὥσπερ ὄψεως λήμην ἀφαιρεῖν τὴν δεισιδαιμονίαν· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο ἀδύνατον, μὴ συνεκκόπτειν, μήδε τυφλοῦν τὴν πίστιν ἣν οἱ πλεῖστοι περὶ θεῶν ἔχουσι. Vol. ii. p. 169.

"Atheiſm," ſays Bacon, "leaves a man to ſenſe, to philoſophy, to natural piety, to laws, "to reputation, all which may be guides to an outward morality, even though religion were "not. But, ſuperſtition diſmounteth all theſe, and erecteth an abſolute monarchy in the "minds of men. Therefore Atheiſm did never perturb States." * Eſſay 18.

Would not Bacon have qualified this propoſition, if he had lived in *our own* days? In order to determine whether atheiſtical tenets were compatible with virtuous conduct, has it not hitherto been uſual to appeal to the example of Atticus and ſome other amiable Epicureans, and to the good qualities and good habits of a few *particular* men who have lived in later ages? But it was reſerved for *theſe* times to ſurvey the practical effects of Atheiſm upon a *wider* ſcale. Bacon's obſervation may be very juſt, ſo far as it concerns a few ſolitary individuals removed from the buſtle of the world, preſerving, as it were, in the garden of Epicurus, the natural calmneſs and ſerenity of their own minds; enjoying the converſation of ſpeculative and literary friends, endowed with a conſtitutional ſuavity of temper, and furniſhed by education or example with a delicate ſenſe of honour and decorum. But will there be *no difference*, when Atheiſm paſſes from the few to the *many*—from men of leiſure and reflection, to men whoſe underſtandings are chiefly employed in the buſy ſcenes of life, whoſe purſuits are often directed to low and ſordid objects, and whoſe appetites ſeek for gratification in the fouleſt dregs of ſenſuality? From men diſciplined by erudition, and exalted by genius, to men of moderate talents and ſcanty attainments, to forward ſcioliſts, to beardleſs ſtriplings, and unlettered mechanics? Will there be no difference when, in the propagation of Atheiſm, the ſtratagems of *confederacy* lend their aid to the efforts of individuals; when many of thoſe who act, involuntary forward the purpoſes of thoſe who project; and when parts, the moſt diſcordant in their elementary principles, and the moſt deſtructive of each other by immediate colliſion, are directed by powers unreſiſted, becauſe unſeen, and become ſubſervient to a common ſyſtem, by their number, by their extent, by the regularity of their ſeparate force, and by the concentration of their ultimate tendencies? Will there be no difference, when Atheiſm mingles with the ſecular intereſts of men, both in private and in public life? will there be no difference when it is admitted as a leading principle into ſyſtems of ethics or politics? When, from external circumſtances it has an opportunity of waging undiſguiſed and unceaſing war againſt its real or imaginary foes? When, like its antagoniſt, Superſtition, it forms alliances with

* I believe that, when Bacon made this obſervation upon the pacific temper of Atheiſm, he had chiefly in view the Epicureans of antiquity, from whoſe tenets and whoſe practice we know very well, that many of them in purſuit of their favourite εὐθυμία profeſſedly ſtood at a diſtance from the buſtle of political life. Their ſucceſſors, however, in the preſent age, have not in this reſpect followed the example of their predeceſſors. Some of them remind us of Jortin's remark, "that the learned age "of Auguſtus, with all its polite advantages, was ſadly corrupted in matters of religion; that the "Epicurean doctrine had ſpread itſelf through the Roman empire, and that perſons of the brighteſt "abilities and higheſt ſtations being unhappily infected with it, were men of that First Philoſophy, "which in a Chriſtian country, and in the eighteenth century, hath been publickly recommended to "us by patriots and geniuſes, compared with whom, Epicurus was a gentleman, a philoſopher, a "reaſoner, and a ſcholar." Jortin's Diſſertation 6th, towards the concluſion.

prejudice, or pride, or fanaticiſm? When it is able either to gratify the inclinations of its votaries, or to incite the paſſions of other men, in the ſubverſion of old governments and the erection of new? When it becomes giddy and flippant, from the countenance of faſhion? When it has grown fearleſs from the authority of public favour? When it is ſeized with the ambition of diſtinguiſhing itſelf by romantic adventure? When it has ſoared to high rank, wreſted the ſceptre from kings, and wields the collective force of mighty nations? Does the philoſopher appeal to experience for the deciſion of theſe awful queſtions? To experience let us go.

Far be it from me, to plead directly or indirectly the cauſe of Superſtition—to palliate its abſurdities, errours, and extravagancies—to varniſh over the crimes with which it has ſtained the page of hiſtory, ſullied the luſtre of Chriſtianity, and debaſed the nature of man created in God's own image, by domeſtic animoſities, by ſeditious tumults, by "chains and ſtripes, "and arbitrary puniſhment" inflicted upon the weak, or the wiſe, or the virtuous, by maſſacres, by aſſaſſinations, and "by grim and piercing fires blown into ſeven-fold rage."

Theſe are the dreadful effects of Superſtition. They are ſo frequent, too, that in certain ſeaſons of public affairs, and certain diſpoſitions of the public mind, a religioniſt might venture to pauſe, ere he pronounced them *quite* incidental. But to thoſe effects, frequent as they have been, and dreadful as they were, may be oppoſed other and good effects, not, I grant, proceeding immediately from Superſtition itſelf, but from virtues which *will* grow with it—from ſentiments which it *cannot* eradicate—from kind affections and honeſt intentions, which even miſtaken piety will ſometimes foſter. Of Atheiſm itſelf, it cannot be ſaid that the *direct* tendency of it is to ſweeten natural piety, to encreaſe our reverence for laws, or to animate our love of that reputation, which is founded upon virtuous habits and virtuous propenſities. But if Atheiſm be compatible with any ſuch habits, or any ſuch propenſities, be it remembered, that Superſtition is equally compatible with them.

Charron, as I find him quoted by Bayle, tells us that, "an habitual and univerſal kind of "Atheiſm, cannot lodge but in a very ſtrong and bold ſoul——

"Illi robur et æs triplex
"Circa pectus erat,

"it muſt be furious and maniac."

At ſome diſtance from the foregoing words, Charron thus proceeds, "to get looſe from, "and caſt off the ſenſe and fear of the Deity, a thing interwoven in our nature, requires a "monſtrous and furious ſtrength of the ſoul; and ſuch is hardly to be found, although thoſe "great and notorious Atheiſts, who through an extreme and furious inſolence, had a mind "to withdraw their allegiance to the Deity, and to ſhake off a ſuperior being, *did what they* "*could to acquire it.*"

If Mr. Charron had contemplated the characters of modern Atheiſts, he would have found that the meaſures of ſome were indeed ſtrongly marked by maniacal fury; but that the number of even determined Atheiſts,* was much greater than he ſuppoſed it likely to be—that

* Falster belongs not to the class of determined Atheists. To a reader of sensibility, what can be more acceptable than this simple and impreſſive tale?

"De Deo semel in vita dubitavi, juvenis undeviginti annorum, quum institutionibus theologicis "operam darem; non diu post, Deo bene juvante, in viam reductus per Balduinum, qui ad Stellas, "divinæ Mentis Testes et Præcones, me ablegaverat hoc versu:

"Sidera qui spectat, juret is esse Deum." A quo

their unremitted endeavours to ſhake off the fear of a Deity, were not *wholly* unſucceſsful, and that their tenets may be lodged in cold and phlegmatic, as well as in fiery and intrepid ſpirits. To ſome ſecret miſgivings of ſoul, to ſome painful, though temporary, diſtruſt in the truth of thoſe doctrines which they avow with confidence, and propagate with activity, to that ſenſe of the Deity which is attended, not perhaps by a direct dread of his diſpleaſure, as a moral governour, but by a confuſed and overwhelming apprehenſion of his poſſible exiſtence and his power, almoſt all Atheiſts are, I believe, more or leſs ſubject. Neither the ſolemnity of their profeſſions, nor the levity of their raillery is a proof to the contrary. Yet, after they have declared for atheiſtical principles openly, clung to them eagerly, and argued for them ſtoutly, I ſuſpect that they are rarely brought over to a ſincere and firm conviction on the ſide of Theiſm. It is therefore extremely difficult to determine to what extent ſuch a conviction might operate in the improvement of their moral conduct. General habits, and general diſpoſitions acquired under the influence of Atheiſm, might be too ſtubborn to yield to the authority of mere opinion. There are, however, frequent inſtances of men who have been converted from lower degrees of infidelity; and if that conviction proceeded, not from the ſudden alarms of their conſcience, but the ſober exerciſe of their judgment, the ſalutary effects of it were viſible in their actions, as well as their tenets. On the other hand, we ſee in too many inſtances the tranſition of the human mind from ſuperſtitious terrours to impious defiance, where the change is wrought haſtily, where it is diſplayed oſtentatiouſly, and followed by a rapid progreſs from pitiable or ridiculous *imbecillity*, to the moſt odious and incorrigible *depravity*. The infidel transformed into the devotee, may have more weakneſſes, but he is in danger of fewer crimes, than the devotee transformed into the infidel.

Whatſoever may be the comparative merits or demerits of Superſtition, the utmoſt care, I grant, ſhould be uſed in every ſtage of education to prevent its firſt approaches, and where it has unfortunately taken poſſeſſion of the mind, great exertions accompanied with great circumſpection and tenderneſs, are neceſſary to efface its impreſſions from the imagination, and to ſlacken its hold upon the affections and paſſions. So fearfully, however, and ſo wonderfully are we made, ſo intricate are the aſſociations of our ideas, ſuch is the latent force of habit, and ſuch, too, is ſometimes the cloſe connection between our virtues and our infirmities, that by attempting to remove *all* the errours of Superſtition indiſcriminately and haſtily, we may chance to looſen from their roots the beſt principles of the heart, and to check their faireſt fruits, ere they have arrived at maturity.

But, if a contrary experiment were made to deſtroy by argument the attachment of a man to Atheiſm, and if, during the proceſs, caution were uſed, neither to ſcare his imagination with ſuperſtition, nor to agitate his ſpirits with fanaticiſm, can it be ſuppoſed that the virtues which really accompanied his former conviction, would be diminiſhed? that his good ſenſe would be crippled, that his philoſophy would be ſhackled, that "his natural piety" would be relaxed, or that the "outward morality" produced by his obedience to laws, and his regard to reputation, would be impeded?

"A quo quidem tempore, animus ita flamma cæleſti mihi ardet, ut (quod cum immortali honore "nominis divini dixerim) certus sim, ὁτε οὐτε θανατος, οὐτε ζωη, οὐτε αγγελοι, οὐτε ἀρχαι, οὐτε δυναμεις, "οὐτε ἐνεστωτα, οὐτε μελλοντα, οὐτε ὑψωμα, οὐτε βαθος, οὐτε τις κτισις ἑτερα δυνησεται με χωρισαι ἀπο της "ἀγαπης τϑ Θεϑ, της ἐν Χριστῳ Ἰησῳ τῳ Κυριῳ ἡμων." Amænitates Philologicæ, tom. i. page 46.

What,

What, I would aſk, are the general effects of Superſtition and Atheiſm upon the happineſs and the conduct of mankind? Superſtition, it is granted, has many direct ſorrows, but Atheiſm has no direct joys. Superſtition admits fear mingled with hope, but Atheiſm, while it excludes hope, affords a very imperfect ſecurity againſt fear. Superſtition is never expoſed to the dreary vacuities in the ſoul, over which Atheiſm is wont to brood in ſolitude and ſilence; but Atheiſm is ſometimes haunted by forebodings ſcarcely leſs confuſed, or leſs unquiet than thoſe by which Superſtition is annoyed. Superſtition ſtands aghaſt at the puniſhments reſerved for wicked men in another ſtate; but Atheiſm cannot diſprove the *poſſibility* of ſuch a ſtate to all men, accompanied by conſciouſneſs, and fraught with evils equally dreadful in degree, and even in duration, with thoſe puniſhments. Superſtition has often preſerved men from crimes; but Atheiſm tends to protect them from weakneſſes only. Superſtition impoſes freſh reſtraints upon the ſenſual appetites, though it may often let looſe the malignant paſſions; but Atheiſm takes away many reſtraints from thoſe appetites, without throwing equal checks upon thoſe paſſions, under many circumſtances which may excite them in the minds of its votaries. Superſtition is eager from a vicious exceſs of credulity, but Atheiſm is often obſtinate from an exceſs of incredulity, equally vicious. Superſtition is ſometimes docile from conſcious weakneſs; but Atheiſm is always haughty from real or ſuppoſed ſtrength. Superſtition errs, and perverts only in conſequence of errour; but Atheiſm rejects, and, for the moſt part, diſdains to examine after rejection. Superſtition catches at appearances, but Atheiſm ſtarts back from realities. Superſtition may, in ſome favourable moment, be awakened to the call of truth; but Atheiſm is generally deaf to the voice of that "charmer, charm ſhe ever ſo wiſely."

When I read the Ἀμαξιαῖα ῥήματα of Lucretius and other antient Atheiſts,—when I ſee them σαλακίζοντας καὶ ἀλαζονευομένους upon their ſuperiority to popular prepoſſeſſions and vulgar terrours, I am ſometimes led to *ſuſpect*, that like heroes who laugh at ſpectres by daylight, and ſhudder at them in the dark, they were ſtruggling with inquietude, which they wiſhed to *conceal* as well as to aſſuage, and endeavouring to collect that courage from the *buſtle of their words*, which they did not *habitually* feel within the receſſes of their hearts. My preſent concern, I am aware, is not with the ſpeculative proofs, but with the moral effects of Atheiſm. Yet, upon a queſtion, which, in the abſtruſer parts of it, is by a very wiſe man called "perdifficilis* et perobſcura," and to the conſideration of which, "omnes duce natura vehi-"mur," we may, without the imputation of folly, venture to aſk, whether the arguments againſt Theiſm be ſuch as uſually to produce a *ſteady* aſſent and to warrant an *unlimited* alliance. Without the imputation of perverſeneſs we may not be in haſte to apply to the judgment of every Atheiſt, what Taylor† eloquently ſays of the will, that "like the magnetic needle, it was "full of trembling and uncertainty ere it became fixed at its beloved point, wavered at firſt, "becauſe at firſt it doubted, and then was at reſt, becauſe it *could* doubt no more." After reaching that ſtate of reſt, Atheiſm indeed, may have the credit of reſcuing a man from the agitations of deluſive hopes, and the torments of groundleſs fears. But may it not deſtroy at the ſame time *other* fears which are very ſalutary in checking our fantaſtic deſires, and in calming our turbulent reſentments; and may it not extinguiſh other hopes too, which ſeem *neceſſary* to ſupport the bulk of mankind in their paſſage through this vale of tears?

* See Cicero De Natura Deum, lib. i. † See Doctor Dubitant. p. 754.

The miſchiefs of ſuperſtition ariſe from the *abuſes* of religion, which in the abſence of thoſe abuſes is indiſputably productive of good, in *addition* to all the other advantages we derive from our moral faculties. But Atheiſm, *however uſed*, cannot on the whole be *ſo* good as religion, either to individuals or to communities; and in a being, ſubject as man is, to ſo many ſtarts of fancy, ſo many caprices of humour, ſo many wrong biaſſes from opinion, and ſo many blind impulſes from paſſion, it leaves him defenceleſs againſt many evils. Compared with ſound, clear, and enlarged notions of religion, can Atheiſm be ſaid to preſent to our minds ſo many delightful and magnificent views of nature? to furniſh the poet with ſuch a profuſion of imagery, or the orator with ſo many topics of perſuaſion? to conſecrate the ſocial virtues by ſo many endearments to our affections, or to exalt our ſpirit to ſo many arduous atchievements of ſelf-denial, ſelf-command, magnanimity, and forgiveneſs? Compared even with ſuperſtition under its milder aſpects, does it ſupply ſo many incentives to virtue, ſo many reſtraints from vice, ſo many conſolations under ſorrow, or ſo many ſources of reflection to heighten the very pureſt and moſt exquiſite joys which terreſtrial objects can beſtow? The Atheiſt, indeed, may ceaſe to tremble at the idea of an inviſible, irreſiſtible, vindictive deity, in the howling ſtorm, or the convulſive earthquake, or "when the moon "in dim eclipſe, ſheds diſaſtrous twilight on half the nations." But he has, alſo, ceaſed to rely for protection upon that benevolent power, which may ſhelter him "from the arrow "that flieth by day, and from the peſtilence that walketh in darkneſs." In truth, the tranquillity of which Atheiſm boaſts ſo loudly, and ſo laviſhly, amounts only to exemption from pain, and that exemption is to be obtained by the loſs of many pleaſures.

According to the various temperament of men's minds, and the various events of their life, Atheiſm is marked by various effects. Shall *indifference* be ſtated as the reſult of it? *That* indifference, as might eaſily be ſhewn from the hints of one celebrated author, and the ſarcaſms of another, will ſometimes paſs onward from ſpeculation to action: it will looſen *principles* as well as *prejudices*, and reconcile its votaries to nameleſs impurities, from which the natural ſentiments of mankind recoil, and of which the indirect, but *invariable*, tendency is, to obſtruct the moſt uſeful duties, and to contaminate the ſweeteſt comforts, of domeſtic life. Meaſuring its own high exploits with the credulity and weakneſs of the herd, has Atheiſm produced *contempt*? Such, at leaſt, is the *preſent* conſtitution of the human mind, that we are not apt to be *very* ſcrupulouſly juſt, nor very actively benevolent, in behalf of thoſe whom we deſpiſe unfeignedly; and if the negligent or ſcornful diſpoſition by which we are governed in our private tranſactions with other men, ſhould communicate itſelf to laws, and laws in *their* turn ſhould *re-act* upon that diſpoſition, precarious indeed is the protection which they would afford to the feeble againſt the ſtrong, or to the honeſt againſt the cunning. This, however, is not the only inſtance in which Atheiſm may be unfavourable to philanthropy. *Poſſible* it is, as we know from recent facts, that Atheiſm in ſome circumſtances may generate *hatred*; and where hatred has been ſo generated, *there*, in the conflicts of opinion againſt opinion, and intereſt againſt intereſt—in competitions for power or fame—in appeals to the prepoſſeſſions, or the pride of contending parties, the conſequence of Atheiſm would be a jealous, domineering, ſavage ſpirit of intolerance. Atheiſm *thus* would end, where Superſtition has been ſaid to begin; and in the *tenets* of Atheiſm will be found not one of thoſe *correctives*, which uſually accompany the tenets of Superſtition. There is *no* eye to detect ſpecious hypocriſy—no hand to curb ſucceſsful wickedneſs—no refuge from the

the partial or erroneous deciſions of man, in the ſentence of a judge, who is diſintereſted and infallible—no tribunal, before which the weak and unoffending may hereafter be permitted to plead "trumpet-tongued," againſt the oppreſſor—no avenger of calumniated innocence, inſulted wiſdom, and perſecuted integrity.

In the ordinary courſe of human affairs, Superſtition, though it ſhould pervade the maſs of a people, has been *experimentally* found conſiſtent with a ſtate of ſociety, not quite intolerable—with a wiſe and upright adminiſtration of laws—with the gradual improvement of individuals in rational religion—and with a gentle exerciſe even of abſolute power. Where, indeed, Superſtition is not moved to and fro by the hidden ſprings of ſtate-craft: where it is not united with a ſaturnine and revengeful temper: where it is not irritated by the acrimony of diſputants: where it is not ſeduced by the inflammatory harangues of zealots nor made infuriate by the contagion of popular rage, under *ſuch* circumſtances, I ſhould grant that Plutarch's repreſentation of it is not too favourable—ἡ τῶν πολλῶν καὶ ἀμαθῶν ἐ πάνυ μοχθηρῶν διάθεσις πρὸς τὸν Θεὸν, ἔχει μὲν ἀμέλει τῷ σεβομένῳ καὶ τιμῶντι μεμιγμένον τινὰ σφυγμὸν καὶ φόβον, ἢ καὶ δεισιδαιμονία κέκληται· μυριάκις δὲ μεῖζόν ἐστι καὶ πλέον αὐτῇ τὸ ἔυελπι καὶ περιχαρὲς, καὶ πᾶσαν ευπραξίας ὄνησιν ὡς ἐκ Θεῶν ὅσαν εὐχόμενον καὶ δεχόμενοι. Vol. ii. page 1100. It ſhould be obſerved, that in the paſſage which, in page 94, is quoted from Plutarch, he profeſſedly ſpeaks of that Superſtition, which in the ſentence immediately following he deſcribes as ἐ φοβερόν τινα, ἀδὲ σκυθρωπὴν.

They who attend to the diſtinction I would make between moderate and exceſſive Superſtition, will not be long perplexed by the ſeeming contradiction between the opinions of Plutarch, as delivered in his famous Treatiſe upon Superſtition, and thoſe which occur in the paſſages I have quoted from another part of his works. In the former, Plutarch ſometimes aſſumes the ſtrong language of the Stoics about the Paſſions, and ſometimes indulges himſelf in Rhetorical exaggeration. But in the latter, he preſerves a more temperate and argumentative form of writing; and if his obſervations upon the practical effects of the Epicurean ſyſtem be juſt, they may, with greater propriety and greater force, be applied to the malignant influence of modern Atheiſm upon the morals and the welfare of mankind.

In the opening of the Treatiſe abovementioned, Plutarch ſays, ἅπασα μὲν ψευδὴς κρίσις ἀλλώς τε κἂν ἢ περὶ ταῦτα, (i. e. what relate to the Deity) μοχθηρὰν· τῇ δὲ, (i. e. a wrong judgment accompanied by Superſtition), καὶ πάθος πρόσεστι μοχθηρότατον. Page 164. Afterwards he defines Atheiſm and Superſtition according to the view which he was going to take of them reſpectively—ἡ μὲν ἀθεότης λόγος ἐστὶ διεψευσμένος, ἡ δὲ δεισιδαιμονία, πάθος ἐκ λόγε ψευδὲς ἐγγεγενημένον. Page 165. But the Superſtition,* againſt which he inveighs as more odious and more pernicious than Atheiſm, is a Superſtition, *rarely* found even in kind, and yet *more* rarely in degree, among Chriſtians: for it is a Superſtition, which ἀτιμίαις ὀνόμασι καὶ ῥήμασι βαρβαρικοῖς καταισχύνει καὶ παρανομεῖ τὸ θεῖον καὶ πάτριον ἀξίωμα τῆς εὐσεβείας, page 166; which τῇ θεᾷ ἀρχὴν ὡς τυραννίδα φοβεῖται σκυθρωπὴν καὶ ἀπαραίτητον, page 166: which ἀδὲ τολμᾷ βοηθεῖν ἀδὲ διαλύειν τὸ συμβεβηκὸς, ἀδὲ θεραπεύειν, ἀδὲ ἀντιπάττεσθαι, μὴ δέξῃ θεομαχεῖν καὶ ἀντιβλέπειν κολαζομένη· page 168; which ἐκπατεῖ καὶ συντρίβει τὸν ἄνθρωπον οἰόμενον εἶναι Θεὸν, εἶναι δὲ βλαβερὸν, λυπηρὸν, ἔμπληκτον, ἄπιστον, ἐμμετάβο-

* Plutarch in ſeveral paſſages ſeems to allude to Oriental Superſtitions, and ſometimes to Jewiſh.

λον, τιμωρητικὸν, ὠμὸν, μικρόλυπον, page 165, and 170. The Atheiſm, alſo, of which Plutarch ſpeaks as leſs degrading to the human character, and leſs deſtructive of human happineſs, than *that* Superſtition, is *not* the Atheiſm of our own days, but an Atheiſm, which is merely ψευδὴς ὑπόληψις, ἀλλ' ἕλκος ἀ ποιῆσα, ἀδὲ σφυγμὸν, ἀδὲ ὀδύνην παράτλουσαν· page 164; that which is merely ἀκίνητος πρὸς τὸ Θεῖον· page 170; that in which τέλος ἐστὶ τᾶ μὴ νομίζειν τὸν Θεὸν, τὸ μὴ φοβεῖσθαι, page 165: Adverting, probably, to *ſuch* Superſtition in its moſt hideous form, and to ſuch Atheiſm in its leaſt offenſive, Lord Bacon tells us, " It were better " to have no opinion of God at all, than ſuch an opinion as is unworthy of him; for the one is " unbelief, the other is contumely, and certainly Superſtition is a reproach of the Deity." Eſſay xiii. in which Bacon often refers to the Treatiſe of Plutarch. Yet the ſame great philoſopher informs us in Eſſay xvii, " I had rather believe all the follies in the Legends, the " Talmud, and the Alcoran, than that this univerſal frame is without a mind."

The remarks of Fabricius upon Plutarch are very judicious—Sane Atheiſmum *quemlibet* in ſe Superſtitione *quâcunque* meliòrem eſſe, nemo ſanus dixerit: neque hoc uſquam facit Plutarchus, qui *contrarium diſertis verbis docet* libro, " quod non ſuaviter poſſit vivi ſecundum " Epicurum." Page 1101, and 1104. Cum enim et Superſtitio et Atheiſmus ambo res ſint peſſimæ et turpiſſimæ, et Superſtitionis præſertim quodam modo innumerabiles ſint *gradus*, ſaltem non fert Plutarchus eos qui Atheiſmum faciunt ἀπολόγημα δεισιδαιμονίας, ut loquitur libro " de diſcrimine amici et adulatoris," page 66. Dantur etiam genera quædam Superſtitionis tam flagitioſa, ut in Deum æque injuria ſint quam Atheiſmus ipſe, et gravius bellum etiam indicant honeſtati, virtuti, et ſocietati humanæ, *non quam Atheiſmus univerſe ex principiis ſuis deduceus conſecutiones omnes, malitiamque illam exſereus*, ſed, quam Atheiſmus nonnullorum hominum in *ſola ſpeculatione* falſiſſime acquieſcentium, et naturæ bonitate non admittentium errorem hunc in *actiones ſuas* integrum influere. Vid. Bib. Græca, lib. iv. page 351, edit. Hamburg. 1708.

As to the paſſage which Fabricius has cited from Bodinus, a good man may heſitate, before he gives unqualified aſſent to the firſt poſition, Superſtitio *quantacunque* ſit, *ruovis* Atheiſmo tolerabilior eſt. Experience, however, to a very great degree, confirms the juſtneſs of the next obſervation, Nam qui Superſtitione aliquâ obligatur, hunc numinis metu in officio quodam modo, et naturæ legibus continet. Atheum vero, qui nihil niſi reſtim metuit aut judicem, ad omnia ſcelera proclivi lapſu ruere oportet. The following remark is founded upon the principles of the ſoundeſt philoſophy. At tametſi actionum humanarum præſtantiam ſapientiſſimus quiſque *non ſ.lum* finibus ipſis metitur, verumetiam omnibus partibus et cauſis, ſcilicet, efficienti, forma, ſubjecto, fine, *ſummam tamen et præcipuam cauſam omnium actionum* ipſo fine dijudicat. Bodin. Colloq. Heptaplomere MS. Libro v.

Happy were it for the advocates of modern Atheiſm, if they ſeriouſly conſidered the concluſion of that Treatiſe, which has been ſuppoſed to favour their cauſe—φευκτέον ἂν τὴν δεισιδαιμονίαν ἀσφαλῶς τε καὶ συμφερόντως, ἀχ ὥσπερ οἱ ληςῶν καὶ θηρίων ἔφοδον, ἢ πῦρ ἀπερισκέπτως καὶ ἀλογίςως περιφεύγοντες, ἐμπίπτεσιν εἰς ἀνοδίας βάραθρα καὶ κρημνὰς ἐχθάσας· ὕτως γὰρ ἔνιοι φεύγοντες τὴν δεισιδαιμονίαν ἐμπίπτεσιν εἰς ἀθεότητα τραχεῖαν καὶ ἀντίτυπον, ὑπερπηδήσαντες ἐν μέσῳ κειμένην τὴν εὐσέβειαν. Plutarch, vol. ii. page 171.

Upon the various effects of Superſtition, where it has ſpread widely, and thriven long, we can reaſon from *facts*. But in the original frame of the human mind, and in the operations

tions of all thoſe moral cauſes which regulate our conduct, or affect our happineſs. there ſeems to be a moſt active, conſtant, and invincible principle of *reſiſtance* to the encroachments of Atheiſm. "All nature cries aloud" againſt them, "through all her works," not in ſpeculation only, but in practice.

Much, I know, has been ſaid ingeniouſly by Bayle; and in oppoſition to Bayle, much has been ſaid yet more ingeniouſly by Warburton, about the comparative miſchiefs of Atheiſm and Superſtition. But I bleſs Heaven, that by the moral conſtitution of our nature, no experiments ever have been made, which may enable us to calculate preciſely the *aggregate* of evils that would ariſe from the *permanent* influence of Atheiſm. *Enough* have we ſeen of its activity, of its ſubtlety, of its malignity, as a temporary, a concurrent, perhaps, a predominant cauſe, in the crimes and miſeries of mankind; enough, I ſay, have we ſeen to ſhrink with horrour from the poſſible repetition of ſuch events; and to execrate that innovator, who, in the blindneſs of infatuation, or the hardihood of wickedneſs, ſhould exclaim of a national conſtitution, facilitated by ſuch events, "*eſto perpetua.*"

In a neighbouring country it has already ſunk into decay. *There* it wanted alike the ſimplicity of nature, and the graces of art. It was bulky without ſolidity, elaborate without ſymmetry, and lofty without magnificence. It ſeized, indeed, the attention of a ſpectator, by the vaſtneſs of its dimenſions, and the novelty of its form; and it impreſſed him with momentary awe, *becauſe it ſtood upon ruins.* But it had no foundation in the common-ſenſe of men, no ſuperſtructure from their general habits, no cement from their nobler affections, no embelliſhments from their unperverted imaginations, nor pillars from their ſocial virtues. It ſtarted up, but to vaniſh—it towered, but to fall—and it has fallen, I ſincerely hope, to riſe no more.

Atheiſm, thus brought from theory to the teſt of experiment, has expoſed to the world, the brittleneſs of its materials, and the clumſineſs of its workmanſhip. It may deface, but cannot adorn—it may mutilate, but cannot even repair—it may pluck down the labours of others, but cannot preſerve its own. Under ſuch an architect, even "the pillared firmament "would be rottenneſs, and earth's baſe built on ſtubble." Milton's Comus.

The want of durability, about which I am now ſpeaking, is, doubtleſs, a circumſtance highly favourable to the happineſs of mankind. So far, however, as we can argue to the future from the paſt, it were not difficult to conjecture *ſome* of the conſequences that would iſſue from the *very* wide diſſemination, and the *very* long continuance of Atheiſm. What then are thoſe conſequences? I anſwer, without heſitation—they are unbluſhing profligacy, unprincipled ſelfiſhneſs, and unrelenting cruelty.

Theſe are the conſequences which I ſhould forebode in private life; and in public, I ſhould look for conſpiracy without unanimity, energy without conſtancy, ſucceſs without ſecurity, and popularity without glory, to be quickly followed by irretrievable ruin and indelible diſgrace.

Are not the ſcenes in which ſuch evils have exiſted *partially*, but glaringly, intended for our admonition? Yes, ſurely. Thoſe ſcenes may teach individuals to ſuſpect the ſoundneſs, and the innocence, too, of every theory which aims at the deſtruction of all the received opinions, and all the eſtabliſhed uſages, which mankind have been accuſtomed to reſpect. They may farther animate the members of religious ſocieties, to clear away thoſe impurities

impurities which flow from Superſtition, and furniſh occaſions for cavil and miſrepreſentation to the champions of *infidelity*—to renounce, in their actions, as well as in their profeſſions, every claim of ſpiritual domination over the conſciences of men—to remove every palpable errour from their doctrines—to rectify every groſſer abuſe in their diſcipline; and thus, to exhibit religion under that pure and lovely form in which we trace at once the characters of cultivated reaſon, and of heavenly inſpiration.

In this earthly ſtate, where happineſs, as well as virtue, will always be imperfect, ſhocks will now and then be felt, by the force of which both civil and religious eſtabliſhments may be ſhaken to their centre. Amidſt the fury of thoſe ſtorms, which, in *all* ages have been permitted to diſturb the political ſky, and of which the *ultimate* effects, under the providence of God, may be as beneficial in the moral world, as thoſe of earthquakes and hurricanes are thought to be in the natural, the ſtately palace, the lofty throne, the hallowed temple itſelf, may be "laid low, even to the ground." But, though "the rains ſhould deſcend," though "the floods ſhould roll," and though "the winds ſhould blow," the word which came down from Heaven can NEVER FAIL.

When ſuch is my conviction, as to the ſecurity and final ſucceſs of Chriſtianity againſt its moſt formidable aſſailants, muſt I not feel at leaſt an equal degree of confidence for the ultimate prevalence of thoſe proofs which relate to the exiſtence of a God? Moſt aſſuredly I do.

Attempts have, indeed, been made by philoſophers to undermine thoſe proofs, by ſcoffers to debaſe them, and by political upſtarts to overthrow them. Through the artifices and violences of theſe innovators, the *law* of natural religion has been oppoſed, but not deſtroyed; and the light of it, too, has, for a ſeaſon, been darkened, but not, I truſt, extinguiſhed for ever.

Upon the philoſophical merits of thoſe opinions which have lately gone abroad to the prejudice of Theiſm, my conviction has been ſtrengthened by the obſervations of that ſound and judicious philoſopher, whoſe writings have been already mentioned in this note. "It is not "merely," ſays he, "in order to free the mind from the influence of error, that it is uſeful "to examine the foundation of eſtabliſhed opinions. It is ſuch an examination alone, that, "in an inquiſitive age like the preſent, can ſecure a philoſopher from the danger of unlimited "ſcepticiſm. To this extreme, indeed, the complexion of the times is more likely to give "him a tendency, than to implicit credulity. In the former ages of ignorance and ſuper-"ſtition, the intimate aſſociation which had been formed, in the prevailing ſyſtems of edu-"cation, between truth and errour, had given an aſcendant over the minds of men, which "it could never have acquired, if diveſted of ſuch an alliance. The caſe has of late years "been moſt remarkably reverſed: the common ſenſe of mankind, in conſequence of the "growth of a more liberal ſpirit of inquiry, has revolted againſt many of thoſe abſurdities, "which had ſo long held human reaſon in captivity; and it was, perhaps, more than could "be reaſonably expected, that in the firſt moments of their emancipation, philoſophers "ſhould have ſtopped ſhort at the preciſe boundary, which cooler reflection and more mo-"derate views would have preſcribed. The fact is, that they have paſſed far beyond it, and "that in their zeal to eradicate prejudices, they have attempted to tear up by the roots, many "of the beſt, and happieſt, and eſſential principles of our nature. Having remarked the "wonderful influence of education over the mind, they have concluded, that man is wholly "a factitious being; not recollecting, that this very ſuſceptibility of education pre-ſuppoſes "certain

" certain original principles which are common to the whole ſpecies; and that, as error can " only take a permanent hold of a candid mind by being grafted on truths, which it is un- " willing or unable to eradicate, even the influence which falſe and abſurd opinions occa- " ſionally acquire over the belief, inſtead of being an argument for univerſal ſcepticiſm, is " the moſt decilive argument againſt it; inaſmuch as it ſhews, that there are ſome truths ſo " incorporated and identified with our nature, that they can reconcile us even to the abſur- " dities and contradictions with which we ſuppoſe them to be inſeparably connected. The " ſceptical philoſophers, for example, of the preſent age, have frequently attempted to " hold up to ridicule, thoſe contemptible and puerile ſuperſtitions, which have diſgraced the " creeds of ſome of the moſt enlightened nations, and which have not only commanded the " aſſent, but the reverence of men of the moſt accompliſhed underſtandings. But theſe hiſ- " tories of human imbecility, are, in truth, the ſtrongeſt teſtimonies which can be pro- " duced, to prove, how wonderful is the influence of the fundamental principles of morality " over the belief; when they are able to ſanctify in the apprehenſions of mankind, every " extravagant opinion, and every unmeaning ceremony, which early education has taught us " to aſſociate with them "

If then the belief of a Deity be, as perhaps it is, one of thoſe κοιναὶ ἔννοιαι * which are ſaid to be engraven on the heart of man;—if, (to change the mataphor) it be a ſentiment, which though

* " I come now to conſider of thoſe rational inſtincts as I call them, the innate principles engraven in " the human ſoul; which, though they are truths acquirable and deducible by rational conſequence and " argumentation, yet they ſeem to be inſcribed in the very *cravis* and texture of the ſoul, antecedent to " any acquiſition, by the induſtry, or the exercise of the diſcurſive faculty in man; and therefore they " may be well called anticipations, pre-notions, or ſentiments characterized and engraven in the ſoul, " born with it, and growing up with it, till they receive a check by ill cuſtoms or educations, or an im- " provement and advancement by the due exercise of the faculties. I ſhall ſhew firſt what they are: " ſecondly, what moves me to think that ſuch are unnatural."

1. " Touching the former, I think thoſe implanted and unnatural anticipations are theſe; namely, " That there is a God, that he is of greateſt power, wiſdom, goodneſs, and perfection; that he is pleaſed " with good, and diſpleaſed with evil; that he is placable; that he is to be feared, honoured, loved, " worſhipped, and obeyed: that he will reward the good and punish the evil; a ſecret ſentiment of the " immortality of the ſoul, or that it ſurvives the body to be capable of rewards and punishments accord- " ing to its deportment in this life; certain common notions of moral good and evil, of *decorum* and *turpe*, " that faith and promiſes are to be kept; that a man muſt do as he would be done by; that a man muſt " be grateful for benefit received: These and ſome ſuch common notions, or intimate propenſions, " ſeem to be connaturally engraven in the ſoul, antecedently to any diſcurſive ratiocination; and though " they are not ſo diſtinct and explicit, yet they are ſecret biaſſes inclining the humane nature primarily " to what is uſeful and convenient for it, in proportion to the ſtate of an intellectual nature." Hale, De Homine, page 62.

Mr. Locke probably would have refuſed his aſſent to Lord Hale's poſition. "The name of God, ſays Mr. " L. being once mentioned in any part of the world to express a ſuperior, powerful, wiſe, invisible being, " the ſuitableneſs of ſuch a notion to the principles of common reaſon, and the intereſt men will always " have to mention it often, muſt neceſſarily ſpread it far and wide, and continue it down to all genera- " tions; though yet the general *reception of this name, and ſome imperfect and unſteady notions, conveyed* " *thereby*, to the unthinking part of mankind, *prove not the* idea *to be innate*; but only that they who " made the diſcovery, had made a right uſe of their reaſon, thought maturely of the cauſes of things,

" and

though it does not always produce a full harveſt of virtue, ſeldom fails at leaſt to check the ranker weeds of vice—if it be a ſentiment which Superſtition by its fouleſt infections cannot quite corrupt, nor infidelity by its mightieſt efforts can quite extirpate—a ſentiment which recurs to our minds upon every ſurvey we take of the operations of nature, and every reflection we employ upon the *only* cauſe which *can* ſuſtain and regulate them—a ſentiment which ruſhes upon us irreſiſtibly, when we gaze upon the goodly face of the earth, explore the depths of the ocean, and look up to the firmament of Heaven—*then*, doubtleſs, the artifices of crafty ſophiſts, the recantations of apoſtate prieſts, the rhapſodies of rhetorical babblers, and all the clamours of ruffians loaden with pillage, and recking with blood, never have been, nor ever will be of ſufficient efficacy to obliterate *ſuch* a ſentiment from the minds of a *whole* people. Diſguſted we may have been with ſo much arrogance, as we have lately witneſſed—we may have been provoked at ſo much profligacy—we may ſtand amazed and confounded at ſo much audacity, combined with ſo much ferocity. But the wiſdom of God, we ſhould remember, often finds the inſtruments of his *righteous*, though unſearchable, purpoſes, in the follies and in the crimes of man.

So imperfect is our acquaintance with the ſymbols which ſavages employ to expreſs their ideas, that, without impeaching the veracity, we may ſometimes doubt the correctneſs of travellers, whoſe wiſh, it may be, was rather to ſurprize, than to deceive their readers. Nations, however, I would grant, there may have been *a few*,* ſo immerſed in barbariſm and ignorance, as not to have invented or adopted any rites, however uncouth, for the duties of religion; or to have formed any notions, however indiſtinct, of an inviſible and moſt powerful Being, to whom adoration is to be paid.

" and traced them to their original; from whom other less considering people, having once received so " important a notion, it could not easily be lost again." See Locke upon the Understanding, book first, chap. iv. paragraph 10.

Though we should grant to Mr. Locke, " That the Deity has stamped no original characters on our " minds," and though it ought to be granted to him, " That our idea of a most perfect being is not " the sole proof of God," yet we must remember what he says in book iv. chap. 10, " It is plain to " me we have a more certain knowledge of the existence of a God, than of any thing our senses have " not immediately discovered to us. Nay, I presume I may say, that we more certainly know that " there is a God, than there is any thing else without us. When I say we *know*, I mean there is such " a knowledge within our reach, which we cannot miss, if we will but apply our minds to that, as we " do to several other enquiries."

As to Mr. Locke's opinion about the origin of our ideas, I would refer the reader to chapter the first, section the fourth, of Stewart's Elements. And in respect to the dispute about the source of our notions of a God, I am inclined to say with Mosheim, " Crediderim fere, si diligenter discutiantur omnia " quæ de notione Dei, utrum adventitia sit, an vero innata, inter viros doctos disputantur, resque po- " tius quam verba et vocabula, ponderentur, minus de hac re dissensionis fore, quam videtur multis." Mosheim's Notes upon Cudworth, vol. ii. page 137.

* See Mr. Locke's Book I. chap. iv. paragraph 9, of his Essay on the Human Understanding, where he speaks of barbarous nations that have no idea of a God. It were easy to produce instances of other nations, from later travellers, than Sir Thomas Roe. The idea of a God, of which Mr. Locke speaks, is very different from the notion of *one* God, which has been historically and philosophically investigated with great erudition and great judgment by Meiners, in his work De Vero Deo. " The Indians of the " West, says Bacon, have names for their particular Gods, but they have no name for God." Essay 17.

But

But, whereſoever a Deity has been *once* known—where his exiſtence and his attributes have been explored by philoſophical reſearches into cauſes and effects—where his will has been collected, however imperfectly, from the moral conſtitution of the world, or announced authoritatively by his ſacred word—where the worſhip of him has been recognized by traditions, cuſtoms, and laws—where his name has been pronounced with reverence—where his altars have been adorned with the free-will offerings of a grateful and an humble ſpirit—where his temples have reſounded with hymns of praiſe—where his wrath has been deprecated, his favour implored, and his agency *felt*, as it were, in proſperity, or adverſity—Among *ſuch* a people, there never *has been* a complete, univerſal, inſtantaneous bound from *habitual* belief, and habitual piety into unbelief and impiety upon *principle*; nor among ſuch a people, will there ever be an *unlimited* range of action, and a *continued* ſucceſſion of triumphs, to the dark and chilling ſubtleties of Scepticiſm, or to the wild and daring dogmas of Atheiſm. Why then ſhould we be diſmayed?

"Mighty are the waves of the ſea, and rage horribly."——But, in Heaven above, and in the earth beneath, and in the water under the earth, a voice there *is* FAR MIGHTIER.

Diſputed Points in Religion, page 13, *line* 34.

"The conſequent of this diſcourſe," ſays Jeremy Taylor, "in order to conſcience is, that "no man loſe his peace concerning the controverted articles and diſputes of Chriſtendom. "If he inquires after truth earneſtly, as after things of great concernment: if he prays to "God to aſſiſt, and uſes thoſe means which are in his hand, and are his beſt for the finding "it; if he be indifferent to any propoſition, and loves it not for any conſideration but be"cauſe he thinks it true; if he will quit any intereſt rather than loſe a truth; if he dares "own what he hath found and believed; and if he loves it ſo much the more, by how much "he believes it more conducing to piety and the honour of God: he hath done what a good "and a wiſe man ſhould do; he needs not regard what any man threatens, nor fear God's "anger, when a man of another ſect threatens him with damnation: for, he that heartily "endeavours to pleaſe God, and ſearches what his will is that he may obey it, certainly loves "God; and nothing that loves God can periſh." Ductor Dubitantium, p. 755, 4th edit.

Our Candour, page 13, *line* 38.

"Preſque partout," ſays even Mr. Helvetius, (p. 167, de l'Eſprit,) "l'Evangile, les Apô"tres et les Pères, prêchant la Douceur et la Tolérance." He then gives inſtances from St. Paul, St. Chryſoſtom, St. Baſil, and St. Auguſtin. But where ſhould we find a nobler leſſon for the candour which is truly Chriſtian, than in the language in which St. Auguſtin addreſſes the Manicheans, in whoſe errours he had himſelf been once involved! I will give the whole paſſage, as I find it quoted by Grotius de Jure Bell. et Pac. lib. ii. cap. xx. "Illi "ſæviant in vos, qui neſciunt quo cum labore verum inveniatur, et quam difficile caveantur

" tur errores. Illi in vos fæviant, qui neſciunt quam rarum et arduum ſit carnalia phantaſ-
" mata piæ mentis ſerenitate ſuperare. Illi in vos fæviant, qui neſciunt quanta difficultate
" ſanetur oculus interioris hominis, ut poſſit intueri ſolem ſuum. Illi in vos fæviant, qui
" neſciunt quantis gemitibus et ſuſpiriis fiat ut ex quantulacunque parte poſſit intelligi
" Deus. Poſtremo illi in vos fæviant qui nullo tali errore decepti ſunt, quali vos deceptos
" vident. Ego autem fævire in vos omnino non poſſum, quos ſicut me ipſum illo tempore,
" ita nunc debeo ſuſtinere, et tanta patientia vobiſcum agere, quanta mecum egerunt
" proximi mei, cum in veſtro dogmate rabioſus et cæcus errarem."

Oh! that " theſe words were written on the tablet" of every Chriſtian heart!—That " they
" were printed" in every book of religious controverſy—" that they were graven with an iron
" pen and lead in the rock for ever!" Job xix. 23, 4.

Should not be ſed, page 14, *line* 2.

" It was an old trick of the Jewiſh zeal,"

" Non monſtrare vias eadem niſi ſacra colenti,
" Quæſitum ad fontem ſolos deducere verpos." Juvenal, xiv. 104.

" They would not ſhew the way to a Samaritan, nor give a cup of cold water but to a
" circumciſed brother. *That was their zeal.*" Taylor, Sermon XIV. p. 136.

This Church, or that Sect, page 14, *line* 11.

I am now very near the concluſion of my notes upon the firſt head, and I ſhall be glad to convince the reader how much the opinions defended in it reſemble thoſe of Barrow.

" The good man doth not plant his bounty in one ſmall hole, or ſpout it on one narrow
" ſpot; but with an open hand diſſeminates it, with an impartial regard diſtills it all about.
" He ſtints it not to his own family or relations; to his neighbours, or friends, or benefactors;
" to thoſe of his own *ſect and opinion*, or of his humour and diſpoſition; to ſuch as ſerve
" him, or oblige him, or pleaſe him; whom ſome private intereſt ties, or ſome particular
" affection endears him to: but ſcatters it indifferently and continually towards *all* men that
" need it, towards mere ſtrangers; yea, towards known enemies, towards ſuch as never did
" him any good, or can be able to do him any; yea, towards thoſe who have done evil to
" him, and, may be preſumed, ready to do more; nothing in his neighbour, but abſence of
" *need*, nothing in himſelf, but defect of ability, doth exiſt or live in his obedience! In that
" προθυμία, that proclivity and promptitude of mind which St. Paul ſpeaketh of, he
" doeth good every where; wherever a man is, there is room for his *wiſhing* well, and doing
" good, if he can; he obſerves that rule of the Apoſtle, as we have opportunity, let us do
" good unto *all* men!" Vol. i. 423.

Houſhold of God, page 14, *line* 21.

In Barrow's Sermon, juſt now quoted, there is a paſſage quoted from Chryſoſtom, which is exactly to my purpoſe—ἐὰν ἴδῃς τινὰ κακῶς πάσχοντα μηδὲν περιεργάζου λοιπὸν· ἔχει τὸ δικάιωμα τῆς βοηθείας, τὸ κακῶς παθεῖν αὐτόν. ΤΟΥ ΘΕΟΥ ἐστὶ κἂν Ἕλλην, κἂν Ἰουδαῖος. Chryſoſtom in Hebrews, Orat. x.

Authority

Authority of a Great Name, page 14, *line* 28.

Ariſtotle, I remember, in his Topics, gravely recommends the argument from authority, and, in truth, there are circumſtances, in which authority muſt be allowed to ſupply the place of doubtful and imperfect reaſoning. The reader may, if he pleaſes, paſs by what Ariſtotle ſays upon ſo trite a ſubject. But, as the paſſage occurred to me, I ſhall produce it without laying any great ſtreſs upon it. "Παρασημαίνεσθαι δὲ καὶ τὰς ἐκάστων δόξας, οἷον "ὅτι Ἐμπεδοκλῆς τέτταρά φησι τῶν σωμάτων στοιχεῖα εἶναι. Θεὶς γὰρ ἄν τις τὸ ὑπό τινος εἰρημέ- "νον ἐνδόξως." Top. lib. i. p. 189.

Strictures of a late celebrated Foreigner, page 14, *line* 32.

The paſſages I have quoted from M. Turgot may be found in Article I. of the Appendix to his Life, containing a tranſlation of the article Foundation, which had been inſerted before by M. Turgot, in the French Encyclopedia. The Life was written by M. Condorcet. I have only the tranſlation of it, which was publiſhed in London in the year 1787. My opinion about M. Turgot, and his more judicious and temperate aſſociates, correſponds in kind and degree with that of Mr. Dugald Stewart, as it may be found occaſionally, in chapters 4th, 5th and 6th, of his Elements of Philoſophy.

Reſpect for the Old, page 15, *line* 15.

While I was writing theſe notes, a ſubject of no ordinary importance ſtruck me unexpectedly; and if I drop ſome remarks upon it, the reader, who looks attentively and ſeriouſly on theſe eventful times, will, I hope, pardon the digreſſion. With a ſmall expenditure of ingenuity in the vulgar and miſchievous arts of exaggeration and perverſion, ſeveral of M. Turgot's arguments may be applied to the prejudice of our *Engliſh Univerſities*. This, I am aware, is not preciſely the fitteſt opportunity for me to enter into a formal defence of them, or to expatiate upon their peculiar and indiſputable advantages—upon thoſe powerful correctives of ſingularity and frowardneſs, which are found in the attrition of mind againſt mind on a ſpot, where different claſſes live together under a ſyſtem of general diſcipline—upon the force of eſtabliſhed rules in producing early habits of regularity and decorum—upon the ſtrong, though eaſy, yoke, that is thrown over the impetuoſity of youth—upon the ſalutary influence among well-informed and well-diſpoſed young men, of that ὁμηλικία which is ſo beautifully deſcribed, and ſo frequently extolled by the writers of antiquity—upon the propenſity of the heart unaſſailed by care, and untainted by ſelfiſhneſs, to form the beſt friendſhips from the beſt motives—upon the generous ſenſe of ſhame that muſt prevail among enlightened equals obſerving the conduct of equals, and cultivating honour, not as a ſhowy and artificial faſhion, but as a natural ſentiment, and even as an indiſpenſable duty—upon the goodly effects that are

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wrought on the temper as well as taſte, by the daily and hourly view of edifices, agreeable from convenience, or ſtriking from magnificence, or venerable from antiquity—upon the deſire which pictures, ſtatues, inſcriptions, public harangues, and other local circumſtances, may excite in men of vivid conceptions and glowing ambition, not merely to admire, but to perpetuate and to *ſhare* in the celebrity of places adorned through many ſucceſſive ages, by many bright luminaries of the ſchools, the pulpit, the bar, and the ſenate—upon the tendency of well-regulated amuſements, and well-directed ſtudies, to plant within our boſoms thoſe attachments to the ſeat of our education, which may afterwards expand into the love of our country—upon the facility of acceſs to well-ſtored libraries—upon the efficacy of oral inſtruction, judiciouſly and diligently communicated—upon the competitions that will ariſe among numbers, whoſe judgments on the qualifications of each other are too frequent to be eluded, too impartial to be reſiſted, and too weighty to be ſlighted—upon the inſtitution of prizes for compoſitions to be recited in the Halls of Colleges, or the Theatres of the Univerſities—upon the diſtribution of literary diſtinctions in ſeaſons of general examination—or, upon the connection of other academical rewards, lucrative or honorary, with moral and intellectual excellence. Waving, therefore, all ſuch pertinent and intereſting topics, I would only requeſt that the uſefulneſs of theſe ſeminaries, like that of every human inſtitution, may be judged by their fruits.

If any intelligent admirer of M. Turgot had met, as on a tour to Cambridge it was my good fortune laſt year to meet, with ſo many perſons of various erudition, of poliſhed taſte, of profound ſcience, of maſculine ſenſe, of unaffected manners, and of ſpirits elevated without haughtineſs, independent without turbulence, and liberal without latitudinarianiſm, he might have felt, as I did, a momentary relief from that inquietude which the preſent condition of the civilized world muſt inflict upon every man of reflection, and perhaps he would have joined with me in exclaiming,—

> Dii patrii, quorum ſemper ſub numine Troja eſt,
> Non tamen omnino Teucros delere paratis,
> Cum tales animos juvenum, et tam certa tuliſtis
> Pectora. ÆNEID 9th.

Let me add, that I have often experienced a ſimilar effect in converſation with many wiſe and worthy members of the Siſter Univerſity.

But why ſhould a point of ſuch magnitude as the credit of Oxford and Cambridge ſtand only on the teſtimony of an individual to the facts which he has ſeen within the circle of his own immediate acquaintance? As to the merits of men

men, ingenious, learned, eminently great, or exemplarily good, who in paſt ages have gone forth from theſe retreats into the boſom of ſociety, "pleni ſunt omnes libri, plena exemplorum vetuſtas." But even in later times the torpor of old age has not crept upon them—the ſorceries of indolence have not enfeebled them—the poiſon of luxury has not corrupted them—the foul miſts of barbariſm have not gathered over them—the dim and baleful light of ſuperſtition has not glimmered around them—the portentous meteors of infidelity have not glared upon them—the mercileſs tempeſt of deſolation has not yet ſwept them away. No. For among the academies who, during my own life, have been diſtinguiſhed by claſſical, oriental, theological, or mathematical knowledge, by profeſſional ſkill, or by parliamentary abilities, I with triumph recollect the names of

Archbiſhops Herring, Seeker, Newcome and Markham; of Biſhops Hoadley, Sherlock, Lowth, Hurd, Pearce, Newton, Edmund Law, Philip Yonge, Ross, Squire, Ellys, Shipley, Horne, Bagot, Moss, Douglas, Watson, Halifax, Porteus, Horſley, Cleaver, Randolph, Prettyman, Beadon, Pococke, John Law, Bennett and Percy. Of Dr. S. Johnſon, τῷ τῇ ῥώμῃ, καὶ ἰσχυι, καὶ τόνῳ "ἀιὲν ἀριστέυειν." Of the late Dr. Warton, Mr. Thomas Warton, Mr. Spence, Dr. Farmer, Mr. G. Steevens, Mr. Upton, Mr. Uvedale Price, Dr. Zachary Gray, Mr. Jackson of Leiceſter, Dr. Clarke of Chicheſter, Mr. Bowyer the printer, Dr. Charles Aſhton, of Jeſus College, Cambridge; Dr. Taylor, editor of Demoſthenes; Dr. Jortin, Mr. Mudge, Dr. Galley, Dr. Adam Askew, Dr. Jurin, Dr. Salter and Mr. Mann of the Charter-houſe, Dr. Hartley, Dr. Conyers Middleton, Orator Tunſtall—Of Sir William Jones, a man who was raised far above his contemporaries et natura admirabili, et exquiſita doctrina, et ſingulari induſtria. Vide Cic. in Brut. page 138. Mr. Bryant, Mr. Halhed, Mr. Coſtard, Mr. Swinton, Mr. Richardson the oriental Lexicographer, Dr. Joseph White, Dr. Hunt, late of Chriſt Church; Mr. Carſlyle, Dr. Kennicott, Dr. Sandford, of Baliol; Dr. Thomas Shaw; of Richard Dawes, Richard Porson, τῷ πάνυ Σαυμασίῳ—of Dr. Musgrave, Mr. Tyrwhit, Mr. Toup, Mr. Merrick, Dr. N. Forſter, editor of Plato's Dialogues; Dr. Charles Burney, τῷ κριτικωτάτῳ καὶ πολυμαθεστάτῳ. Dr. Rowth τῷ ἑταίρῳ ἅμα φρονιμωτάτῳ καὶ δικαιοτάτῳ.* Dr. Winſtanley, Dr. Huntingford, Mr. Wakefield τῷ φιλοπόνῳ, φιλολόγῳ, καὶ φιλελευθέρῳ. Mr. Burgess, Mr. George Glaſſe, Mr. Whiter, Mr. Harris of Salisbury, Mr. Horne Tooke, Mr. Weſton, author of Hermesianax, Mr. R. P. Joddrell, Mr. E. Poore, Mr. W. Seward, Dr. Edwards late of Coventry, Dr. Edwards, jun. of Jesus college, Cambridge; Mr. Parkhurſt, Dr. Sharpe, late of the Temple; Dr. Rennell, Dr. Blaney, Dr. Holmes, Dr. Wheeler, late of Chriſt Church; Dr. Oyril Jackson, Dr. William Jackson, Mr. Sawkins, Mr. Lowth and Mr. Rennell of Winchester; Mr. Howes, of Norwich, τοῦ Δηλίου κολυμβητοῦ—of Mr. Rowth of Beeles, Mr. Twining of Colchester τοῦ Ἀττικωτάτου—of Dr. Philip Barton, Mr. Fawkener, Mr. Abraham Tucker of Merton, Archdeacon Chapman, Mr. Robert Parr, my revered uncle, Dr. Morell, Dr. Battie, Dr. Barford, Dr. John Burton of Eton, Dr. Aſhton and Dr. Lyne of ditto, Dr.

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* I hope to be excused for the inconsistency of sometimes using accents, and sometimes omitting them. I have often instructed others in the rules of accentuation; and I know that a school-boy of ordinary talents, and ordinary application, may learn them in five or six days. But I wished, now and then, to save trouble to the Printer, I found a little want of expertness in my friendly scribes, and I was unwilling to obscure the manuscript unnecessarily with my chaotic scrawl.

Hallam,

Hallam, the late Mr. E. Chamberlayne, Sir J. Macdonald and Mr. G. Balley, of Mr. Daniel Gaches, the late Mess. David and G. Graham ; of Mr. Hare, the late Drs. Barnard and Roberts of Eton, Dr. Davies, Dr. Benjamin and Dr. George Heath, Mr. Goodall of Eton, the late Dr. John Sumner and Dr. Cooke, Provoſts of King's, Mr. William Cooke of ditto ; the late Dr. Sumner of Harrow, my beloved inſtructor, guide, and friend ; the late Dr. Burton of Winchester, Mr. Woodison of Kingston, Dr. Bateman of Sedborough, Mr. Templeman of Richmond, Mr. P. Whalley of Chriſt's Hospital, London —of Dr. Vincent of Westminster ; the late Dr. Crusius, Drs. Beardmore and Raine of the Charterhouse, Mr. Butler of Shrewsbury, Dr. V. Knox of Tunbridge, Dr. James, late Master of Rugby, Dr. Valpey of Reading—of Mr. Bennett Langton, Dr. Shaw of the Museum, Drs. Chandler and Shaw of Magdalen* College, Oxford ; Mr. Orator Crowe of Oxford, Dr. Parsons of Baliol, Mr. Hollwel and Mr. Pet of Christ Church ; Mr. Mitford, the elegant and learned Historian of the History of Greece, Professor Martyn, Dr. Symonds, Professor of Modern History, Cambridge : Dr. Seale, the late Dr. Zouch, Mr. Robert Smith of King's τῇ ἀκριβείᾳ, καὶ δεινότητι, καὶ μεγαλοπρεπείᾳ εὐδοκιμοῦντος—of Mr. Freer and the late Mr. Brundiſh of Caius College ; the late Messrs. Cowper and Tyson of Bennett College, the late Henry Horner of Emanuel, the late John Tweddel of Trinity College, Cambridge :

" Multis ille bonis flebilis occidit,
" Nulli flebilior quam mihi."

Of Messrs. Losche, Lambert, Ramsden, Matthias, and the late John Baynes, of ditto, Mr. Malthus of Jesus College, Cambridge ; Mr. Green of Ipswich, Mr. Guard and Dr. Williams of Corpus, Mr. Fellowes of Oriel, Messrs. Hooley, Phillip Smith and Hamley of New College, the late Mr. Benwell, of Trinity College, Oxford, Mr. Nares of the Museum—of Messrs. William Beloe, Thomas Maurice, Henry Headly, Edward Maltby, Thomas Monroe, Dr. Martin Davy, and Sir Thomas Rivers, my worthy and accompliſhed pupils—of Mr. Wise, Mr. Swinton, Mr. Watson, Dr. Pettingale, Mr. Whitaker, Mr. Gough, Mr. Gale, Mr. Cole, Mr. J. Brand, Dr. G. King, Dr. Lort, Mr. Borlace, Mr. Edward King, Dean Milles, Dr. Pegge, Mr. Watson, Dr. Stukeley, Mr. E. Lye, Mr. D. Barringeon, Bishop Lyttelcon, the learned Antiquaries ;—of the late Dr. Stephen Hales, Mr. G. Harvest, Dr. G. Fothergill, Mr. Seed, Archdeacons Sharpe and Ibbetson, Dr. Balguy, Dr. Brown of Newcastle, Dr. Owen, Dr. Randolph of Corpus College, Dr. Richard Grey, Dr. Townson, Archdeacon Totty, Dr. Gloster Ridley, Dr. Hall, Chaplain to Archbiſhop Secker, Dr. Adams and Mr. Griffiths of Pembroke College, Oxford ; Dean Tucker, Mr. Town, Mr. Jones of Nayland, Samuel and John Wesley, Mr. Harvey, Drs. Powell, Ogden and Rutherforth, of St. John's, Cambridge, Mr. Hubbard of Emanuel, my venerable tutor, Archdeacon Blackburne, Dr. John Jebb ; of Dr. Sturges of Winchester, Mr. Wintle of Pembroke College, Oxford ; Dr. Manwaring, Margaret Professor, Cambridge ; Dr. Bell, of Westminster, Dr. Hay of Sidney College, Dr. Craven and Mr. Gisburne of St. John's, Cambridge ; Dr. Paley, τοῦ καθαροῦ τοῖς ὀνόμασι, καὶ σαφῆς, καὶ συνετῆ ; Mr. Marsh, the very learned Editor of Michaelis, Messrs. Hall, Kett, Grey and Richards, Bampton Lecturers ; of the late Mr. Gray, Mr. West, Mr. Neville, Mr. Mason, Mr. Shenstone, Dr. Edward Young, Lord G. Lyttleton, Messrs. Churchill, Lloyd, Anstie, Bowles, Coleridge, Sotherby, Potter, Woodhull, Pye, Duncombe, Francis, Franklin, Fawkes, Hole, Dunster, Christopher Pitt, William Whitehead, and Giffard ; of the late Dr. Smith and Mr. Jones, of Trinity College, Cambridge ; Professors Waring, Vince, and Mr. Manning, of Cambridge ; Dr. Milner, of Queen's Coll. Cambridge ; Mr. Robinson, Savilian

* I have not intentionally omitted any name, which appeared to me worthy of being inserted ; but I am aware, that the better memory, or the fuller information of other men, may enable them to enlarge the list.

Professor

Professor of Geometry, at Oxford; of Sir George Baker, Dr. Heberden, the late Sir Clifton Wintringham, Dr. Warren, Dr. Beddoes, Dr. Plumptree, Dr. Lawrence, the learned Friend of Dr. Samuel Johnson; of the late Lord Mansfield, Lord Thurlow, Judge Blackstone; the late Mr. Charles Yorke, the late Judge Wilson, Lord Eldon, Sir William Scott τοῦ ζαθέρρονος καὶ σώφρονος, Sir William Wynne, Dr. Lawrence, of the Commons, Mr. Bentham, Professor Woodeson, Mr. Erskine, τοῦ ἀφύκτου ἐναγωνίου, καὶ ἡδέος, καὶ ἀνεπτικοῦ, καὶ πιστικοῦ; of Mr. Mansfield, Mr. Gibbs, Serjeant Lens, the late Felix Vaughan; of the late Lords Chesterfield, Chatham, Guildford, and Orford; the Duke of Grafton, Lord Holland, the Marquis of Wellesley, Lord Castlereagh, the late Charles Townsend, Mr. Windham, Mr. Canning, Mr. Addington, the Speaker of the House of Commons, Mr. Tierney, Mr. Grey, Mr. Pitt, and my illustrious and amiable friend Mr. Fox.

Surely, in *such* men we have "a cloud of witneſſes," when we are pleading for "the excellency of our ſtrength, and the joy of our glory." Their purſuits, indeed, are not ſimilar, nor their talents equal. Some inſtruct, and others pleaſe. Some excel in ſolidity of judgment, and others in ſplendour of imagination. Some are known by their eloquence, others, by their writings, and a few, perhaps, have been content to exerciſe their powers only in academical conteſts, or literary converſation. But they have all obtained diſtinction among their contemporaries, and many of them will attract the admiration of poſterity.

I have thrown together the foregoing names of academical worthies as they occurred to me, per lancem ſaturam, and yet they have enough of the εὐσύνοπτον to warrant me in applying with a ſmall alteration, to the places where they were educated, much of that diſtinct and appropriate praiſe, which Cicero beſtowed upon Athens, as "omnium fere doctrinarum inventrices, ubi dicendi vis ſcri-"bendique, vel reperta eſt, vel perfecta."

From the ſincere, the ardent, the anxious regard which I bear to both Univerſities, I have ſometimes wiſhed to ſee a few alterations admitted into our academical ſtudies, and perhaps in both of them might be pointed out academical men, who are capable of planning thoſe alterations with wiſdom, and of conducting them with full and viſible effect. Such men will not be wholly inattentive to the profound and comprehenſive obſervations which Lord Bacon has made in his ſecond book upon the Advancement of Learning, (Vide vol. ii. of his Works, p. 452), and probably they will have the ſatisfaction to find in *many* inſtances, that the objections of this great man have been removed, either by the improvements which have been happily adopted ſince his time in our Univerſities, or by the ſtudies which are ſucceſsfully proſecuted in the Capital, in Mancheſter, and ſeveral other large towns of this kingdom. They will pardon me, however, for ſaying with Bacon, that "Learning would be much advanced if there were "more intelligence mutual between the Univerſities of Europe than there now "is." Upon other points, as Bacon ſays, from Cæſar's letter to Oppius, "non-"nulla mihi in mentem veniunt, et multa reperiri poſſunt, de quibus rogo eos,

"ut

" ut cogitationem ſuſcipiant." I diſdain to countenance the trite and frivolous objections of ſuperficial obſervers. But I think myſelf authorized, and even bound to ſtate my meaning a little more particularly, and for this purpoſe I will employ the words of Morhoff—" Studium philoſophiæ moralis non poſſumus, " quin ſerio commendemus. Jejuna eſt hujus ſtudii in noſtris academiis tracta- " tio, cum hæc tamen faciat ad viros bonos formandos. Scilicet ſunt, quæ in- " flant, ſcientiæ, ut quæ circa notiones intemperantius verſantur; quædam etiam " pectus ſaturant, ut rerum naturalium cognitio. Ut boni vere ſimus, uni huic " diſciplinæ, et poſt illam, Theologiæ, debemus." (Vid. Polyhiſt. vol. ii. p. 483. edit. Lubec, 1732).

Be the imperfections of theſe ſeminaries what they may, I am acquainted with no other ſituations, where young men can have ſo many opportunities for contemplating either religion under an aſpect, which is ſolemn without gloomineſs, or morality, with features which have exactneſs without auſterity—where they can be ſo ſucceſsfully trained up to habits, which may for a while detain, and afterwards preſerve them, from the contagious example of crowded and diſſipated cities—where they can be ſo largely ſtored with principles, that may enable them to detect the fallacy, and to eſcape the contamination of thoſe metaphyſical novelties, which are ſaid to have gained a wide and dangerous aſcendancy in ſome places of education upon the Continent.* Even in a comparative point of view, our Univerſities hold a very high rank among ἀπάσης τῆς Ἐυρώπης ὀφθαλμές. But in the opinion of Engliſh ſcholars, who, it ſhould ſeem, are not wholly unqualified to decide upon a queſtion of Engliſh experience, they are entitled to more direct and ample commendation.

After the recent downfall, and amidſt the rapid decay of ſimilar inſtitutions in foreign countries, our Univerſities are the main pillars, not only of the learning, and perhaps the ſcience, but of the virtue and piety, *whether ſeen or unſeen*, which yet remain among us, and therefore, woe be to every frantic viſionary, and every ruffian vandal, who would raze them from their old and ſacred foundations.

* In this charge I do not include the University of Gottingen, which has long and deservedly flourished under the auspices of Mr. Heyne, a man, whose taste, judgement, erudition, and candour, are almost unparalleled. Decidedly as I should prefer an Engliſh University for the youth of England, I ſhould be aſhamed of throwing out the slightest insinuation to the discredit of the Universities in Scotland. I have derived from Scotch writers great information upon some of the greatest subjects that can interest human curiosity, or exercise the human understanding. I feel a most sincere respect for Dr. Beattie, Dr. Campbell, Dr. Dunbar, Mr. Dalziel, Mr. Millar, and other Scotch Professors; and so far as the improvement of a young man's head or heart may depend upon the exertions and example of an individual, I ſhould gladly entrust a child of my own to the sagacious, the enlightened, and the virtuous Dugald Stewart. In the writings of this excellent man, I find the perspicuity of Dr. Reid, the acuteness of Adam Smith, and the precision of David Hume.

I have

I have been led into the foregoing reflections by the unuſual circumſtances which characterize our own times; and with a deep and fearful ſenſe of the danger that accompanies them, I have endeavoured to ſpeak of them without adopting the uncouth language of party, and without alluding very pointedly to the more tranſient politicks of the day. But the cauſe of morality, which has a right to be protected from the caprices of paradox, and the artifices of ſophiſtry—the cauſe of religion, which I revere as the moſt faithful guide, and the moſt powerful guardian of morality—the cauſe of both, while both are adapted to the nature, and both are conducive to the happineſs, of mortal and immortal man—*Theſe* cauſes, I truſt, will never ceaſe to employ my underſtanding, and to intereſt my heart. Muſt I not look, then, with anguiſh upon the ſituation of ingenious and well-diſpoſed young men, whoſe reverence for the Deity has been extinguiſhed by a miſguided and extravagant concern for the intereſts of mankind—whoſe love of mankind, conſidered as a *ſpecies*, is made ineffectual to every good purpoſe, by the opinions they are taught to hold of *individuals*, as inevitably and almoſt irremediably depraved by their *connection with ſociety*—whoſe ardour in the purſuit of ſome uſeful or honourable employment, having been once chilled by hyperbolical repreſentation of its abuſes, can never be rekindled to the performance of its duties—whoſe pride, having been wounded by their own detection of their own errours, infuſes a diſtruſt of every principle, ſpeculative or practical, maintained by other men—whoſe benevolence, having been diſſipated upon the exaggerated or ſuppoſed miſeries of life, retains no ſympathy with its joys—whoſe underſtandings, having been early and imperceptibly warped from the directions of common ſenſe, do not always *recover* their proper tone for ſtudy, or action—whoſe conſcience, having loſt the reſtraints of fear and the encouragements of hope from a judgment to come, is *ſecretly* annoyed by ſtrange and irregular paroxyſms of inquietude, which ſcepticiſm can neither *account for*, nor *aſſuage*; and finally, to whoſe imagination the paſt exhibits a wild and hideous ſcenery of woe, the preſent is a cheerleſs void, and the future ſeems a dark and dreary maze?—Amidſt the poſſibility of ſuch effects from ſuch cauſes, ἀιτχρὸν σιωπᾷν.

If, therefore, among the readers of this diſcourſe, there be any academic, who, in the giddineſs of youth, or the raſhneſs of conceit, ſhould have endeavoured to "compoſe himſelf* into a Heteroclite who is not to be tried by ordi-"nary meaſures;" if decoyed by the authoritative air, or the ſingular phraſeology of any favourite writers, he ſhould have given them an undue ſhare of credit for originality, and correctneſs of thinking: if he ſhould ſuppoſe that any

* See Hooker's Sermon upon Pride.

one man, by any ſeries of reaſoning, can lay open the laws of the moral world, with the clearneſs and the fulneſs of Newton, when he unfolded thoſe of the natural: if, from the uniformity which is aſcribed to the active and paſſive properties of matter, he ſhould have transferred any precarious or fantaſtic analogies to the complex operations of mind: if he ſhould have drawn his notions of duty, not from general rules, but from particular, improbable, extreme caſes, which, if they ever occur, muſt be treated as *exceptions* to thoſe rules: if he ſhould have founded his opinions of human nature, not upon facts, nor deductions from facts, but upon arbitrary aſſumptions and chimerical ſuppoſitions: if, upon queſtions the moſt abſtruſe and important, he ſhould have ventured to decide in direct oppoſition to the principles, or modifications of principle, admitted by men of the moſt enlarged and cultivated underſtandings: if he ſhould have been induced to meaſure truth, by its *want* of conformity to general opinion, and juſtice, by the *contrariety* of its dictates to the notices of our experience, and the impulſes of our affections, let me appeal to that docility which is ſo uſeful—to that ingenuouſneſs which is ſo becoming and ſo amiable, in the character of a young man. Let me intreat him, not, indeed, to *repreſs* his curioſity, but to gratify it, by *extending* and *diverſifying* his enquiries. From dazzling coruſcations of paradox which will only lead him into errour, into ſingularity, or into artificial ſenſibility, let me turn his attention to that pure and ſteady light which has been thrown upon moral truth in the pages of Abraham Tucker, Dr. Hartley, Paley, Locke, Reid, Dugald Stewart, Hutcheſon, Archbiſhop King, Biſhop Cumberland, Hooker, Taylor, Cudworth, Barrow,* and Butler. In order to avert the imputation of unmanly prejudice, let me ſend him, when previouſly *diſciplined* by reading and reflection, to the writings of Shaftſbury, Adam Smith, and Hume, who, upon the nice and intricate texture, the reſemblances, and ſympathies of our ſocial affections, upon the virtues of juſtice and benevolence, and upon many other intereſting parts of ethics, are inſtructive and profound. Let me beſeech him now and then to *ſuſpend* his judgment, till he has an opportunity for peruſing a work which ere long will be publiſhed by Mr. Macintoſh—a man, whom I am proud to call my friend, becauſe he has explored the deepeſt receſſes, the moſt complex qualities, and the remoteſt tendencies of human action—becauſe to the reſearches of philoſophy he adds the graces of taſte—becauſe, with powers commenſurate to the amplitude and dignity of his ſubject, he *can*, and he, alſo, *will*, ſtate without obſcurity, reaſon without perplexity, aſſert without dogmatiſm, inſtruct without pedantry, counſel without auſterity, and even refute without acrimony. Let me aſſure

* Πάντες μὲν σοφοί· ἐγὼ δε Ὤκηρον μὲν σέβω. Θαυμάζω δὲ Βάββιον, καὶ φιλῶ Ταίλεφον. See Lucian in Vita Dæmonact. vol. ii. page 394.

him,

him, that, though the batteries of oppoſition have been hitherto opened only againſt parental affection and gratitude, the mine is laid for all the other affections by which we are endeared to each other as friends, as neighbours, or as countrymen; and that, unleſs the wiſe conſtitution of nature were ſuch as to exclude the poſſibility of an exploſion, all the boaſted ſyſtems of perfectibility and of univerſal philanthropy would be ſhivered in the common wreck. Let me, further, inform him, that ſuperſtition is not the *only* venom, which pollutes and cankers the natural ſentiments of the heart; that philoſophy, no leſs than religion, may be diſgraced by phariſaical votaries; and that, in the drudgeries which may be neceſſary to uphold the cauſe of metaphyſical, as well as of theological myſticiſm, ſelf-deluſion is often the vaſſal of zeal, hypocriſy, and pride. Above all, let me remind him, that as a ſocial being he has an arduous part to ſuſtain in the view, and for the ſake, of ſociety itſelf; that, by his tenets and his habits he muſt become the object of praiſe or blame, of eſteem or hatred, to the wiſe and good; and that a ſentence far more awful awaits him hereafter, when he is ſummoned before the tribunal of his omniſcient Maker.

IN the foregoing parts of this note, I have ſtudiouſly avoided the inſertion of Mr. Gibbon's name in the liſt of learned Academics, and my reaſons for this caution will be obvious to every one, who has read the account of his life and writings contained in his poſtumous works.

Singular it is, that in our days, both Cambridge and Oxford ſhould have been treated diſreſpectfully by two eminent perſons who belonged to them; Cambridge, by Mr. Gray, and Oxford, by Mr. Gibbon. Long, therefore, have I wiſhed to make a public avowal of my diſſent upon this ſubject, even from men whoſe claims upon my reſpect are large from the uncommon powers of their underſtandings, the ſplendid variety of their attainments, and the acknowledged merit of their writings. Hitherto I have entered my proteſt againſt a ſet of writers who are ſeldom indebted to our Schools for literature, or to our Univerſities for ſcience—againſt ſelf-appointed and ſelf-deluded reformers, who, with little knowledge of character or fact, wreſt, to the diſcredit of their countrymen, the ſtrictures of foreign writers upon foreign inſtitutions—and againſt a reſtleſs crew of innovators, who would have diſguſted Mr. Gray by the wildneſs of their fancies, and diſmayed Mr. Gibbon by the loudneſs of their clamours. In the ſame ſpirit of juſtice I now proceed to notice other animadverſions, which are ſupported by the authority of two great names; and therefore may be ſuppoſed to have let looſe upon our academical ſocieties, the prattle of the ignorant, and the taunts of the ſuperficial.

With a licence for exaggeration, which has always been granted to the enthuſiaſm of poetry, Pindar, I remember, compliments Demophilus and Arceſilæus, for excellencies far ſurpaſſing their time of life. See Pyth. Ode iv. Strophe 13, and Ode v. Antiſtrophe 4.

When Lord Orford, however, ſaid of Mr. Gray, that "he never was a boy," it may be doubted whether this obſervation had one property, which Cicero wiſhed to find in the praiſe Cæſar had beſtowed on him "Modo ſit hoc judicii, non benevolentiæ teſtimonium." Cicero in Brnto. p. 150. vol. I. edit. Gruter. But, upon comparing the materials which have been collected about Mr. Gray by his friends, with the repreſentation which Mr. Gibbon has given of himſelf, I am inclined to think that the lad of Cambridge had a ſtronger claim than the lad of Oxford, to be ranked among thoſe who, ante annos mentemque gerunt, animumque virilem.

Be it remembered, at the ſame time, to the honour of both, that they ſurpaſſed, rather than diſappointed the expectations of their moſt partial friends--that their powers and their attainments encreaſed with their years, and that, with a felicity very uncommon, they may defy the ſevereſt criticiſm to diſcover in them illud ingeniorum velut præcox genus, which, as Quinctilian ſays, non temere unquam pervenit ad frugem. Lib. 1. ch. 3. But let us attend to other circumſtances in which the difference between theſe Cenſors of their reſpective univerſities is more ſtriking.

Mr. Gray reſided at Cambridge nearly four years before he began to travel, and Mr. Gibbon was at Oxford only fourteen months. Mr. Gray went to Cambridge with all the advantages which a boy of ardent curioſity and intenſe application might be expected to derive from the noble ſeminary of Eton. Mr. Gibbon, after leaving Weſtminſter ſchool for the recovery of his health, and ſpending three years, partly with one maſter, who was not very learned, and partly with another, who was not very induſtrious, entered at Oxford.

Mr. Gray was out of humour with Cambridge, becauſe the *moſt favoured* ſtudies of the place were diſſimilar to his own. Mr. Gibbon was diſpleaſed with Oxford, becauſe in his opinion *no* ſtudies at all were generally encouraged, or ſyſtematically purſued.

Mr. Gray was the petulant ſatiriſt of Cambridge in confidential letters, which at firſt he did not intend, and which afterwards he might not wiſh, to ſee the light. Mr. Gibbon comes forth the grave accuſer of Oxford, when preparing for the view of *diſtant* ages, the various events of his life, and the final reſult of his obſervation; and when beſtowing upon his narrative all the accuracy, which could be obtained from the exerciſe of a tenacious memory, of a comprehenſive underſtanding, and of talents for compoſition, diſciplined by long practice, and invigorated by repeated ſucceſs.

Without enquiring how far the delicacy of friendſhip was preſerved at the expence of its diſcretion or its freedom, when the editor of Mr. Gray publiſhed ſome offenſive paſſages in his letters, which "throw the blame on the mode of education rather than on the mode "of the times,"—Vid. Page 12, how far ſuch a meaſure is juſtified by the plea of "neceſſity not to omit this picture of Mr. Gray's mind, when employed in drawing a general likeneſs of it, and to let his own forcible colours expreſs its true light and ſhadow" —how far Biſhop Sprat is to be cenſured for ſtifling ſome letters of Mr. Cowley, in which he had "expreſſed the native tenderneſs and innocent gaiety of his heart," (page 4) or Mr. Maſon is to be commended for not keeping back ſome epiſtolary effuſions of Mr. Gray, who, "though a virtuous, a friendly, and an amiable man," was leſs diſtinguiſhed by ſuch tenderneſs and ſuch gaiety than Mr. Cowley, I cannot paſs over ſome other particulars in which Mr. Maſon is entitled to high commendation. Mingling the feelings of a friend with the duty of a biographer, he endeavoured only to *extenuate* the ſingularities of which

which he manifeſtly did not quite approve. From the diſlike which Mr. Gray had conceived againſt mathematics, from his confidence in the proficiency that he had made in claſſical knowledge, from the diſguſt which he had felt at the baneful influence of "jacobitiſm "upon good manners as well as good letters," Mr. Maſon would account for ſarcaſms, *ſome* of which, I readily allow, it might have been unfair for him to ſuppreſs. With equal judgement and liberality Mr. Maſon takes care to inform his readers, that "whatever "truth there might be in Mr. Gray's ſatire, at the time it was written, it can by no "means affect the *preſent ſtate* of the univerſity."

This aſſertion he wiſely ſupports by a juſt and general principle. "There is uſually, "ſays he, a much greater fluctuation of taſte and manners in an academical than a national "body; occaſioned, (to uſe a ſcholaſtic metaphor) by that very quick ſucceſſion of its "component parts, which often goes near to deſtroy its perſonal identity. Whatever, "therefore, may be true of ſuch a ſociety at one time, may be and generally is ten years "after abſolutely falſe." p. 12. Mr. Maſon properly compares the changes which happen in an univerſity, to thoſe which ſometimes ariſe in a nation, and doubtleſs each of thoſe bodies may at different periods, and in different degrees, be affected by temporary cauſes, beneficial or injurious.—But he does not mean to deny, that independently of thoſe cauſes, they will be more or leſs marked by a permanent peculiarity of character, which diſtinguiſhes them from other communities. The conſtitution of a country gives a certain character to the people, and the diſcipline of an univerſity gives a certain character to its members. Though the conſtitution be radically good, a government may for a while, be leſs wiſe or juſt, and a people may be leſs free or happy, than the conſtitution is formed to make them reſpectively; and though the diſcipline of an univerſity be good, the manners of academics may at one ſeaſon be more relaxed than at another. But good principles in a conſtitution, and a good ſyſtem of diſcipline in an Univerſity, will always produce *ſome* proportion of good effects, and muſt *tend* conſtantly, though gradually, to counteract the influence of cauſes leſs favourable to the welfare of a people, or to the virtue and learning of an academical body. This, ſurely, is true of the Engliſh nation, and it is no leſs true of the Engliſh univerſities.

The frolicks of fancy, and even the ebullitions of ſpleen muſt not be treated with the rigour which we uſually employ againſt the oblique inſinuations of envy, or the virulent calumnies of malevolence. But, truth ought to be vindicated alike, from *every* kind and every degree of miſrepreſentation. At *that very* time, then, in which Mr. Gray ſpoke ſo contemptuouſly of Cambridge, that very univerſity abounded in men of erudition and ſcience, with whom the firſt ſcholars in Europe would not have diſdained to converſe; and who ſhall convict me of exaggeration when I bring forward the names of Bentley, Dawes, Aſhton of Jeſus, Provoſt Snape, Middleton, Tunſtal the public orator, Baker of St. John's, Edmund Law, John Taylor, Thomas Johnſon, Waterland, Whaley, afterwards Regius Profeſſor of Divinity; Smith the nephew of Cotes, afterwards Maſter of Trinity; Roger Long, Coulſon, the correſpondent of Sir Iſaac Newton; and Profeſſor Saunderſon?

After the opportunities which Mr. Gray enjoyed, and of which he, doubtleſs, had availed himſelf, for obſerving the ſtate of literature, and the characters of literary men upon the Continent, he did not merely *viſit* the univerſity, but fixed his chief *reſidence* there; and of a choice, to which he adhered ſo ſteadily and ſo long, the ſcantineſs of his fortune, the

love

love of books, and the eaſy acceſs he had to them in many libraries, will hardly be conſidered as the ſole motives.

At a later period, when experience had enabled him to correct the precipitation of youth, and the faſtidiouſneſs of pedantry: when prejudice had yielded to reflection, and flippant conceit had ſubſided into a calm and manly ſenſe of dignity; "when the abbre-"viation of time," as Mr. Gibbon ſays in his Memoirs, "and the failure of hope had be-"gun to tinge with a browner ſhade the evening of life," the courteſy, the reſpect, the admiration, and the public honours of that univerſity, were all employed to ſoothe the dejected ſpirits, and to gratify the honeſt pride, of this illuſtrious academic. The men of Cambridge gazed only upon the tranſcendental merits of Mr. Gray; and Mr. Gray had ceaſed to look with Lyncean eyes upon real or imaginary weakneſſes in the men of Cambridge.

In regard to the noble Editor of Mr. Gibbon's poſtumous works, he, I believe, was not a member of either univerſity; and therefore, it might not have been quite diſcreet in him to controvert the opinions of his friend upon the ſtrength only of his own obſervation. He ſeems, indeed, to have gone out a little in queſt of information; and of the little information with which he was fortunate enough to meet, he has permitted his readers to partake. See note p. 52, vol. I.

Readily do I aſſent to the favourable account he has given of Brazen-noſe and Oriel Colleges, and as to another Society, which he believed deſerving of fuller praiſes, and in which Mr. Gibbon juſtly ſuppoſes learning to have been made "a duty, a pleaſure, and even "a faſhion," long have I thought, and often have I ſaid, that the higheſt ſtation in our eccleſiaſtical eſtabliſhment would not be more than an adequate recompenſe for the perſon who now preſides over it. Upon petty and dubious queſtions of criticiſm, I may not always have the happineſs to agree with that celebrated man. But I know that, with magnanimity enough to refuſe two biſhopricks, he has qualifications enow of head and heart to adorn the primacy of all England, and to protect all the ſubſtantial intereſts of the Engliſh Church. I will enumerate thoſe qualifications in ſuch terms as are moſt familiar to ſuch a man. ἡ πολυμαθία, ἡ ἐμπειρία, ἡ εὐβουλία, ἡ ἀγχίνοια, ἡ ἐλευθερίοτης, ἡ φιλοπονία, τὸ σεμνὸν, τὸ ἐπιεικὲς, τὸ φιλόφιλον, τὸ φιλόξενον, καὶ φιλόκαλον.

They who complain of what is omitted in this catalogue, are not likely to approve of what is inſerted in it. Let me, however, endeavour to propitiate them by ſtating, that I ſhall thank other men for ſupplying what I may have overlooked, and by obſerving, that the moral excellencies for which heathen philoſophy has found a name, may, by a chriſtian ſpirit, be eaſily exalted into chriſtian graces.

For communicating to the public all he had diſcovered about the preſent ſtate of Oxford, Lord Sheffield is to be commended. Yet I could wiſh, that upon a ſubject ſo delicate to the feelings of academical men, and ſo important to the credit of our national learning and national virtue, his lordſhip had been pleaſed to *enlarge* his enquiries, to ſuſpend for a while his judgment upon generalities, to imitate the example of Socrates in what he ſaid about the writings of Heraclitus, and to diſplay his wiſdom, his modeſty, and his candour, by *inferring* that what he did *not know* of Oxford might not be bad, becauſe that which he *did* know, was very good. If his Lordſhip had converſed with his accompliſhed and amiable friend, the late Chancellor of Oxford, he might have obtained in that quarter more copious and accurate information, than from young gentlemen, who, with the very beſt intentions, ſeldom

dom have much of that knowledge which was ſuited to the occaſion, or from Mr. Gibbon, who, with the very worſt prejudices, had little or no communication with the place, when he wrote his Memoirs. If he had been anxious to diſcover whether the College of St. Mary Magdalen were a *monaſtery* for drones, or a ſeminary for ſcholars, he might have been informed that the examination for Demyſhips is quite as ſtrict and quite as judicious, as the examination for almoſt any place of emolument or honour in any other ſociety; that the candidates do not depend now, as they once did, upon the recommendation of friends, but upon their own literary attainments and moral characters; that their exerciſes during term are examined by a Preſident whoſe knowledge of the Greek philoſophers, and Greek fathers, and of the Greek and Latin languages, is at leaſt *equal* to that of Mr. Gibbon, and that among the young men who have been elected within theſe few years, there are many endowed with ſuch a ſhare of claſſical learning, as would be highly eſteemed by our beſt inſtructors in our beſt public ſchools. If he had further conſulted ſuch impartial and intelligent men as ſurely may be met with in every other college, he would have found the *exceptions* to Mr. Gibbon's opinion ſo numerous, and ſo meritorious, as to conſtitute the *general rule*. But as matters now ſtand, the noble Editor has ſaid too *much*, if he meant to compliment parts of the academical body without regard to the whole, and too *little*, if he meant to do juſtice to the whole, as well as to parts. Academiæ alumnus ipſe cum non eſſet, hanc doctorum et virorum hominum turbam effingere debuit, nequis ſe præteritum, aut non ſatis laudatum, queri poſſet. Cicer. Brut. p. 151.

It can hardly have eſcaped the notice of an intelligent reader, that while the mind of Mr. Gibbon was turned towards the want of regularity and activity in the *ſtudies* of Oxford, the attention of his Editor has been very much bent on the want of reſtraint over its *expences*. The manner too, in which this ſubject is treated, forms a very ſtriking contraſt with the diffidence and good-ſenſe of Iſaac Cauſaubon in one of his letters to Daniel Heinſius.

Cupio in Græcis Latinis et Hebraicis literis filium menm ſerio exerceri. Hoc in Anglia poſſe fieri ſperare non poſſum; nam hic locupletiſſima ſunt collegia; ſed quorum ratio toto genere diverſa eſt ab inſtitutis omniûm aliorum collegiorum. Quo ſumptu filium poſſim iſtic alere honeſte, ſcire velim. Quod ſi res meæ ferunt ut par ſim futurus illi impenſæ, expecta me iſtic non multo poſt tuas acceptas. Vid. No. 132, p. 111, in the 4to ed. publiſhed at the Hague, 1638, by S. T. Gronovius; and No. 962, p. 563 in the fol. ed. of Caſaubon's Epiſtolæ et præfationes, publiſhed at Rotterdam, 1709, by Theodore Janſon, ab Almeloveen.

The prudence and parental affection of Iſaac Caſaubon impelled him to make enquiries upon the ſpot; from enquiries he proceeded to experiment, and by experiment he found that the ſtatelineſs of the buildings, the largeneſs of the public revenues, the hoſpitable living of the heads of houſes, and the expences of the more opulent academies, were not incompatible with the economical plan which he had formed for his ſecond ſon Meric—The eldeſt, as it appears from other letters, had, like Mr. Gibbon, gone over from proteſtantiſm to the Church of Rome.

For the credit of Oxford, and with a view to the removal of vulgar prejudices, I will purſue this topic a little farther. Inſtead of being ſent, as the father intended to ſend him, (if Oxford had been too expenſive) to the care of that great ſcholar Daniel Heinſius, Meric entered at Chriſt Church; he ſoon became a ſtudent there; he took both his degrees in arts: he publiſhed ſeveral uſeful works in literature and theology: he was preferred

ferred by Archbiſhop Laud: he was created Doctor of Divinity by the order of Charles I. though deprived of his livings, he refuſed to accept any employment under Cromwell, when an immediate preſent of nearly four hundred pounds, an annual penſion of three hundred pounds, and the valuable books of his father, which had been purchaſed by James I. and then depoſited in the royal library, were proffered to him at different times. He recovered his eccleſiaſtical preferment after the Reſtoration: he lived proſperouſly and ſtudied diligently, till he had reached his ſeventy-ſecond year; and by his learning, affability, charity and piety, he proved himſelf worthy of all the attentions which had been ſhewn to him, by the parent who loved him, the univerſity which had educated him, and the princes who had ſuccoured him. As to Iſaac, the father, he had firmneſs enough not to be deterred by appearances from examining realities; he had ſagacity enough to eſtimate all the aids and all the encouragements which Oxford then afforded to men of letters; and they who wiſh to know the reſpect and gratitude with which he ſpeaks of the place, would do well to conſult the following letters. No. 893, p. 535. No. 899, p. 537, in the fol. edit. and No. 198, p. 247, and No. 98, p. 825 in the quarto.

But to return to Mr. Gibbon and his noble Editor. Moſt undoubtedly I concur with Lord S. that "the general expences, or rather extravagances of our young men might be "more effectually reſtrained." But I do not allow the expences "in which they are per-"mitted to indulge to be *quite* inconſiſtent with a neceſſary degree of ſtudy, or with thoſe "habits of morality which ſhould be promoted by all means poſſible at ſo early a period of "life." Of Scotch univerſities I have already ſpoken: but I have ſeen ſcarcely any one inſtance, in which they who, "from the apprehenſion of expence, diſſipation, and other evil "conſequences, ariſing from the want of reſtraint in our univerſities," thought themſelves "forced to ſend their ſons" to other ſeminaries, have ultimately had reaſon to rejoice in the experiment, on account of more reſtraints on the prodigality of their children, leſs diſſipation in their habits, or fewer evil conſequences to their fortunes—their morals, or their religion. And what right has a parent to be ſurpriſed at the diſappointment of his hopes, or the irregularity of his ſon, when, if we may believe Mr. Gibbon, "In the moſt celebrated uni-"verſities of Holland, Germany and Italy, the ſtudents, who ſwarm from different countries "are looſely diſperſed in the private lodgings at the houſes of the Burghers, when they dreſs "according to their fancy and fortune, and their ſwords, though leſs frequently than of "old, are ſometimes ſtained with each others blood?" P. 32, Vol. I. of G. Poſt. Works. I do not acquieſce, then, in the repreſentation which the noble Lord has given of the unavoidable and unparalleled expences which he imputes to our univerſities. Much leſs ſhall I admit the charge which his Lordſhip has *heard* inſiſted on, "that the heads of our Col-"leges at Oxford and Cambridge, are vain of having under their care chiefly men of "opulence, who may be ſuppoſed exempt from the neceſſity of œconomical controul." Readily ſhould I grant all the miſchievous conſequences which his Lordſhip deſcribes ſo fully and ſo earneſtly, if he had eſtabliſhed the ſeveral facts. But to the ἐμμαρτυρία, of his Lordſhip, founded, as he confeſſes, upon *hear-ſay*, let me oppoſe a more direct teſtimony. For thirty years it has been my lot to viſit both univerſities, to converſe with very well informed members of them, and to ſee many changes in governors, inſtructors, and cuſtoms. But with *very* few exceptions, indeed, I muſt pronounce this *hear-ſay* ſtatement inaccurate, and, I would beg leave to add, that the tutors of Colleges, who, if it were accurate, would be

more

more concerned in it than heads of houſes, are for the moſt part as guiltleſs, as I believe thoſe heads to be

" Pluris eſt oculatus teſtis unus, quam auriti decem."

Plautus in Truculent.

" To the Univerſity of Oxford," ſays Mr. Gibbon, p. 34, v. i, " I acknowledge no obli-" gation, and ſhe will as chearfully renounce me for a ſon as I am willing to diſclaim her " for a mother." Be it ſo. Let me further grant, that Mr. Gibbon in his ſixteenth year, was not " devoid of capacity and application:" that even " his childiſh reading had diſ-" played an early though blind propenſity for books: that in the diſcipline of a well conſti-" tuted academy, and under the guidance of ſkilful and vigilant profeſſors, he would gradu-" ally have ariſen from tranſlations, to originals, from the Latin to the Greek claſſics, from " dead languages to living ſcience." But muſt the whole ſyſtem of Oxford be reprobated, and the conduct of other tutors in other Colleges arraigned, becauſe in one College, and at one time, they to whom the office of inſtruction had been conſigned, were defective in ſkill or vigilance?

Academical ſocieties partake of thoſe inequalities, and thoſe viciſſitudes, to which other human affairs are inevitably expoſed. All Colleges have not the ſame advantages with each other at the ſame period, and the ſame College may be more fortunate in the talents and diligence of tutors at one time, than at another. Of this general, this obvious, and very momentous truth, Mr. Gibbon himſelf was not inſenſible, when he told us, in page 51 of his Memoirs, that " many ſtudents had been attracted, at a more recent period, by the merit " and the reputation of Sir William Scott, then tutor of Univerſity College."

But inſtead of condemning the Univerſity promiſcuouſly and contemptuouſly, a man of good ſenſe would adopt the diſtinction which Quinctilian lays down upon a ſubject not wholly diſſimilar—" Ut fugiendæ ſint magnæ ſcholæ, (cui ne ipſe quidem rei aſſentior, ſi ad ali-" quem merito concurritur) non tamen hoc eo valet ut fugiendæ ſint *omnino* ſcholæ. Aliud " eſt *vitare* eas, aliud *eligere*." Lib. i. cap. ii. page 19, edit. Capperon.

Often has it fallen in my way to lament the inconveniencies which young men have ſuffered from a wrong choice of Colleges; and for a wrong choice I have often been able to account by the partialities of parents, who have been at the Univerſities, by the obſtinacy of thoſe who have not been there, by the prevalence of political or perſonal, over literary or moral conſiderations, by the deſire of immediate, though temporary, emoluments, by the recommendations of thoughtleſs, though well-meaning acquaintance, by popular opinions, which had little foundation, and by vagrant reports, which had none at all. The credulity of fathers may be pitied, but their inattention, or their rapacity cannot be juſtified, in a point of ſuch high importance to the intellectual or moral improvement—to the temporal and eternal welfare of their children.

When Mr. Gibbon entered at Magdalen other Colleges were open to him, and in other Colleges he might have found no room for thoſe complaints, which he has urged ſo ſtrenuouſly, and which he has taught other men to apply ſo indiſcriminately and ſo unjuſtly.

In 1779, Mr. Gibbon, in the vindication of ſome paſſages, (vol. ii. p. 602), in the fifteenth and ſixteenth chapters of his Hiſtory, was pleaſed to ſay, " Far be it from me, or " from any faithful hiſtorian, to impute to reſpectable ſocieties the faults of ſome indivi-" dual members."

Is the office, then, of him, who writes Memoirs, leſs connected with fidelity, than the office of him who writes Hiſtory? "The general perſuaſion of mankind," as Mr. Gibbon "elſewhere obſerves, upon another ſubject, (ſee p. 555), "that when much has been poſi-"tively aſſerted, *ſomething* muſt be true, may contribute to encourage a ſecret ſuſpicion "which would naturally diffuſe itſelf over the whole body" of the Univerſity. Is it poſſible, then, for any man of common ſenſe to read the Memoirs of Mr. Gibbon, without ſuſpecting that ſomething *more* is meant, than immediately meets the ear; without feeling, that inſinuation in one place is to be interpreted by ſtatement in another, without carrying on his diſtruſt from St. Mary Magdalen College to other Colleges, or without ſuppoſing, that in Mr. Gibbon's eſtimation, what Oxford *was*, when he wrote his Memoirs, bore no very faint or diſtant reſemblance to what Oxford *had been*, in his ſight, when he firſt became an academic? Does not the conduct of his noble Editor, in looking out for particular ſocieties that might be excepted, ſtrongly ſhew the general impreſſion that had been made upon *his* mind?

Had Mr. Gibbon ſo little diſcernment as not to foreſee the concluſions that would be drawn from his narrative? Has he ſhewn any diſpoſition, or made any effort, to prevent his readers from drawing them? Has he not attempted to counteract the effects of any important diſtinction that might be ſet up between actual defects, as he conceived them to be, when he was a boy, and *poſſible* improvements, which had taken place when he was a man? Do not Mr. Gibbon's own thoughts, as expreſſed in his own words, point directly to the Univerſity at large? I will repel contradiction and baffle evaſion, by planting thoſe words in the view of cavillers, who, however they may murmur at me, cannot miſunderſtand Mr. Gibbon.

"In all the Univerſities of Europe, excepting our own, the languages and ſciences are "diſtributed among a numerous liſt of effective profeſſors. The ſtudents, according to their "taſte, calling, and their diligence, apply themſelves to their proper maſters, and, in the "annual repetition of public and private lectures, theſe maſters are aſſiduouſly employed. "Our curioſity may enquire, what number of profeſſors has been inſtituted at Oxford; for "I ſhall now confine myſelf to my own Univerſity, by whom are they appointed, and what "may be the probable chances of merit or incapacity; how many are ſtationed to the three "faculties, and how many are left for the liberal arts; what is the form, and what the ſub-"ſtance of their leſſons? But all theſe queſtions are ſilenced by one ſhort and ſingular anſwer. "The greater part of the public profeſſors have, for theſe many years given up even the "pretence of teaching." P. 36.

To this anſwer, which is founded upon the evidence of Dr. Adam Smith, the members of the Univerſity may give a more detailed reply than I can do. But what I know, I will relate. Dr. Trapp, Mr. Hawkins, and Dr. Lowth, have publiſhed their lectures as Poetry profeſſors. Mr. Warton has inſerted one lecture in his edition of Theocritus. The gentleman who is now profeſſor reads lectures, and has publiſhed a part of them, I believe, in Engliſh. That the lectures of Sir William Scott upon "Hiſtory, if given to the world, "would form a moſt valuable treatiſe," Mr. Gibbon himſelf had been aſſured.

In addition to this reſpectable teſtimony I would beg leave to ſay, that many years ago Sir William read to me a part of one lecture, which contained ſome curious matter on the revenues of the Grecian States, and which ſeemed to me perfectly worthy of the writer, from variety of learning, acuteneſs of obſervation, and elegance of ſtyle. The Commentaries of Dr. Blackſtone,

Blackſtone, and a very excellent work of Profeſſor Woodiſon, are proofs that the inſtitution of the Vinerian Profeſſorſhip is not wholly uſeleſs. Dr. Bentham formerly read lectures in the Divinity School, and the ſame office is now performed with great ability by Dr. Randolph, whoſe cares as a prelate have not made him inattentive to his duties as a Profeſſor. In Chymiſtry and in Anatomy, lectures, I know, were for ſome years regularly given; and, I believe, they were largely attended. The lectures of the late Saxon Profeſſor are much applauded, and his ſucceſſor, I am perſuaded, will juſtify the choice of the Univerſity by his knowledge, his activity, and his judgement. I have not heard whether Dr. Hunt or Dr. White read lectures in the Oriental languages, nor am I ſure that ſuch lectures would have been of great uſe, according to the method in which thoſe languages are now learned. But I know that both the Profeſſors juſt now mentioned, hold a very high rank in the eſtimation of foreign ſcholars. Dr. Hunt ſupplied many valuable notes to the Prælectiones Hebraicæ of Dr. Lowth; he read in the Schools, and then printed, one Oration de Antiquitate elegantiâ et utilitate, linguæ Arabicæ, 1738; and another, De uſu Dialectorum Orientalium et Præcipue Arabicæ, in Hebraico Codice interpretando, in 1748. He, in 1744, addreſſed to Oxford Students "A Diſſertation on Proverbs vii. 22, 23;" and this Diſſertation in 1775, was re-publiſhed by Dr. Kennicott, who added to it critical obſervations of Dr. Hunt on other paſſages in Proverbs, and two very learned Sermons on two very difficult ſubjects.

Dr. White was always ready to aſſiſt young men who applied to him for inſtruction: He is author of a very judicious Sermon upon the Septuagint: He publiſhed an inaugural ſpeech, which, in point of compoſition, far excels that which is uſually found in the Clavis Pentateuch of Dr. Robertſon: He tranſlated and edited, in two vols. 4to. the Syriac Verſion of part of the New Teſtament, which belonged to Dr. Glouceſter Ridley: He is ſaid to be now engaged in preparing the Epiſtles: He long ago completed, and might with very little exertion publiſh, what Pocock junior left unfiniſhed, in the tranſlation of Adollatiph's Egyptian Hiſtory: He has lately done ſignal ſervice to young clergymen, by an edition of the received Text of the New Teſtament, with the moſt important variations in Grieſbach, and by a Diateſſaron,* drawn up in conformity to the Chronology approved by Archbiſhop Newcome; and to his profeſſional ſtudies, he, in his Bampton Lectures, was much indebted for the happy choice of a ſubject, and for the very maſterly manner in which it has been treated.

The foregoing ſtatement is ſufficient to ſhew the ſlenderneſs of Mr. Gibbon's information, and the raſhneſs of his concluſions. I therefore leave it with the men of Oxford to adduce the particulars which I may have omitted, and to expatiate upon thoſe which I have merely enumerated.

In regard to Cambridge, the perſons there appointed to Profeſſorſhips, have in few inſtances diſgraced them by notorious incapacity, or criminal negligence. A late work of Dr. Hay furniſhes us with a deciſive proof of *his* abilities and his activity. Dr. Waring and Mr. Vince, in their writings, have done honour to the ſcience, not only of their Uni-

* I do not take upon myſelf to offer advice to Engliſh Biſhops; but I ſhould be very happy to hear that the candidates for orders were inſtructed to read the Greek Teſtament in Dr. White's Diateſſaron, and to make uſe of Novum Lexicon Græco Latinum in Novum Teſtamentum, firſt prepared by Chriſtian Schoettgenius, afterwards enlarged by Krebsius, and edited at Leipſic, 179[illegible], by M. Gottlieb Lebereol Spohn.

verſity, but of their age. The profound reſearches of Dr. Waring, I ſuppoſe, were not adapted to any form of communication by lectures. But Mr. Vince has, by private inſtructions, been very uſeful both to thoſe who were novitiates, and to thoſe who were proficients, in Mathematics. Dr. Haliſax, Dr. Rutherforth, and Dr. Watſon, very abundantly conveyed the information which belonged to their departments, ſometimes in the diſputes of the ſchools, and ſometimes by the publication of their writings. Chemiſtry has been adorned, not by the labour only, but by the ſagacity of Dr. Watſon, and Dr. Milner. Mr. Porſon, the Greek Profeſſor, has not read more than one Lecture, but that one was παίδακος ἐξ ἱερῆς ὀλίγη λιβάς. He has written, however, *books*, of utility far more extenſive than lectures could be; and I ſpeak from my own actual obſervation, when I ſtate, that the Greek Plays edited by this wonderful man, have turned the attention of ſeveral academics towards philological learning, which, it muſt be confeſſed, has few and feeble attractions to the eagerneſs of curioſity, or the ſprightlineſs of youth.

Whatſoever lectures may, or may not, have been given by other Profeſſors, I am convinced that Mr. Gibbon, if he had viſited Cambridge, would have been "almoſt," if not "altogether" a convert. Surpriſed he might have been to find, and ready, I truſt, he would have been to embrace, many opportunities for congratulating other men upon the enjoyment of thoſe advantages, which, during his own time, may not have been, in his own College, acceſſible to himſelf. He would have ſeen many elegant ſcholars, and many deep Mathematicians among the tutors. He would have ſeen the moſt generous emulation, and the moſt indefatigable diligence in the younger members of the Univerſity. He would have ſeen plans of ſtudy recommended for their uſe—exerciſes preſcribed for the diſplay of their ingenuity, or the exertions of their induſtry—rewards propoſed for their merit in Mathematics, in Poetry, in Proſe, in Greek Compoſitions, in Latin, and in Engliſh. In almoſt every College he would have ſeen young men, who were able to underſtand "origi-"nals" without the dim and deluſive light of "tranſlation"—who were well acquainted with "Greek, as well as Latin Claſſics;" and who had improved their taſte, while they enlarged their knowledge by the aid of the "dead languages." He would have ſeen days, and weeks, and years, employed in the moſt intenſe labour upon "living ſcience." He would have ſeen amuſements, exerciſe, ſociety, health, and ſometimes even life cheerfully ſacrificed to the acquiſition of that knowledge, which no learned man ever deſpiſed, who poſſeſſed it, and no candid man would depreciate, who poſſeſſes it not. Such was the ſtate of Cambridge, when Mr. Gibbon wrote his Memoirs, and ſuch it now is, perhaps to a greater extent, when Mr. Gibbon is numbered among the dead. Some of the foregoing facts, I allow, Mr. Gibbon could not know; but far the greater part of them were within his reach, and to ſearch for them would have been creditable to his accuracy as a reporter, his delicacy as a gentleman, and his liberality as a ſcholar. That ſearch, indeed, was a duty equally obvious and indiſpenſable; and that *duty* ought to have been diſcharged deliberately and compleatly, before Mr. Gibbon, rouſing all his antipathy, and collecting all his might, had ventured to exaggerate real defects, to diſregard real excellencies, or to throw before readers of all ages and in all nations, one glittering deſcription, one vague ſuggeſtion, one invidious compariſon, one contemptuous ſcoff, or one ſerious charge. *If* Mr. Gibbon, as was ſaid of Dante, "intended Reformation, his cenſures were not wiſe: if he did not intend Re-"formation, his cenſures were not good." Vide Adventure, No. 87.

Ill would it become me, tamely and ſilently to acquieſce in the ſtrictures of this formidable accuſer, upon a ſeminary to which I owe many obligations, though I left it, as muſt not be diſſembled, before the uſual time, and, in truth, had been almoſt compelled to leave it, *not* by the want of a proper education, for I had arrived at the firſt place in the firſt form of Harrow School, when I was not quite fourteen—not by the want of uſeful tutors, for mine were eminently able, and to me had been uniformly kind—not by the want of ambition, for I had begun to look up ardently and anxiouſly to academical diſtinctions—not by the want of attachment to the place, for I regarded it then, as I continue to regard it now, with the fondeſt and moſt unfeigned affection—but by another want, which it were unneceſſary to name, and for the ſupply of which, after ſome heſitation, I determined to provide by patient toil and reſolute ſelf-denial, when I had not completed my twentieth year. I ceaſed, therefore, to reſide, with an aching heart: I looked back with mingled feelings of regret and humiliation to advantages of which I could no longer partake, and honours to which I could no longer aſpire: I viſited my companions, my rivals, and my inſtructors, when either my leiſure or my circumſtances permitted: I was aſſiſted in a moſt gracious manner by the Chancellor and ſeveral Heads of Houſes, when the degree of a Maſter had become requiſite for me, in the purſuit of a moſt precious object, which I was not fortunate enough to attain; and upon the acceſs, with which I was honoured at a very early period, to the preſence of men, high in academical rank, and conſpicuous for literary excellence, often have I reflected with the pleaſure and with the pride of an ancient writer,* who has more than once recorded his own intimacy with the poets and the ſtateſmen of the Auguſtan age. The unreſerved converſation of ſcholars, the diſintereſted offices of friendſhip, the uſe of valuable books, and the example of good men, are endearments, by which Cambridge will keep a ſtrong hold upon my eſteem, my reſpect, and my gratitude, to the lateſt moment of my life. Never ſhall I have the preſumption to "diſclaim her as a mother," and never may ſhe have juſt occaſion to "renounce me as a ſon—ἔστι δὲ ἐχ ἕτος ἀχάριστος μόνον, ὅστις οὐ δρᾷ κακῶς ἢ λέγει, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅστις σιωπᾷ καὶ ἀποκρύπτει, λήθῃ παραδίδους καὶ ἀφανίζων τὰς χάριτας." Julian, Orat. II. page 172, edit. D. Petavius, 1614.†

Such are the ſeductions of Mr. Gibbon's ſtyle, and the contagion of his ſenſe; ſuch is the ſkilfulneſs with which his obſervations are engrafted upon his narrative; ſuch is the air of plauſibility, and even authority, which his acknowledged veneration for learning diffuſes over his ſevere animadverſions upon two learned ſocieties, that the uſe of *generalities* is not to be ſlighted, where they can be pertinently oppoſed to generalities, and may fortify the evidence from detail. There is a very numerous, and a very officious claſs of cenſors, who find it much eaſier to aſſume the importance of pronouncing deciſions, than to endure the drudgery of examining facts. Among ſuch perſons, one very fruitful ſource of errour is their voluntary or accidental inattention to the peculiar conſtitution of foreign Univerſities, and that of our own. Cambridge and Oxford, unlike the former, are compoſed of Colleges,

* See Horace, Sat. X. lib. i. Sat. I. lib. ii. Epiſt. xx. lib. i.

† When Julian wrote this Oration, he had received ſome important favours from Conſtantine and Euſebia. Whatever motives might afterwards induce him to apoſtatize from Chriſtianity, he probably would not have been a proſelyte to ſome modern notions about gratitude. For in the ſentence immediately preceding he writes—"Οὐδενὸς γαρ, οἶμαι, τῶν ἄλλων ἀδικημάτων ἥττων κατάμεμψις ἀχριβὴς, κ' ἐνεδίζομεν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ὅταν εἰ παθόντες πρὸς τοὺς ἐυεργέτας ὧσιν ἀχάριστοι."

founded

founded in different ages, endowed with diſtinct revenues, ſubject to different ſtatutes, governed by different heads, independent of each other in many points of internal regulation, yet united under a general code of laws, which have not only appointed reſtraints upon foppery, lazineſs, and vice, but provided encouragements for various degrees of effort and talent, in various branches of ſcience and erudition.

Other miſtakes ariſe from the want of due conſideration that Engliſh Univerſities, being filled with the ſons of Engliſh parents, muſt, in ſome meaſure, ſympathize with the general ſtate of England itſelf, and ſhare, more or leſs, in the gradual and ſucceſſive changes of manners, cuſtoms, opinions, and intellectual purſuits. Hence their ſtreets are no longer crouded with ſtriplings of twelve or fourteen. Their diſcipline no longer requires thoſe puniſhments which are retained in ſchools. Their undergraduates, upon admiſſion, are uſually preſumed to have made a greater proficiency than Mr. Gibbon claims to himſelf. The elements of the learned languages are no longer taught, as they uſed to be in the days of Cheke and Smith, by Profeſſors; nor does there ſeem to be much propriety in *thus* teaching them, when ſtudents are to be employed in the works of Ariſtotle, of Plato, of Longinus, of Quintilian, and other writings of antiquity, for the peruſal of which it is expected that they have been ſufficiently prepared by their ſchool-maſters. Rhetoric, with all its tawdry appendages and tedious incumbrances of tropes and figures, is no longer made an eſſential part of education, becauſe compoſition, and criticiſm upon compoſition, are regulated by laws more favourable to perſpicuity and elegance, to eaſe and vigour, to uniformity without fameneſs, and variety without incongruity, to the emancipation of good ſenſe from pedantry, and the dominion of genius over art. The uncouth jargon and the frivolous diſtinctions of Logic are no longer conſidered as inſtruments indiſpenſibly *neceſſary* for the detection of errours, or the expreſſion and arrangement of truths, becauſe the underſtandings of men have happily eſcaped from the fetters of forms and words, and are accuſtomed to explore, through a clearer medium, and over a wider range, the properties and relations of things. The noiſy jarrings of Thomiſts and Scotiſts, of Nominaliſts and Realiſts, have long been huſhed. The labours of individuals reſiding upon the ſame ſpot, and proſecuting the ſame enquiries, are invigorated by competition, rather than relaxed by co-operation. Their opinions, inſtead of being cramped by ſyſtems, are enlarged by principles; and in their pretenſions to literary fame, their appeals muſt be made, not to the ſuffrages of the wrangling partiſan, or the ſolitary recluſe, but before the tribunal of an unprejudiced and enlightened public.

The multiplication of books, the facility of procuring them, and the cuſtom of reading them, may be conſidered as additional reaſons for the diminiſhed uſefulneſs of lectures, upon the abſtruſer parts of ſcience, and upon various ſubjects of claſſical, and even oriental literature.

Under theſe circumſtances, which Mr. Gibbon was well qualified to appreciate, if he had been *diſpoſed to examine* them, the inſtruction, which, formerly was conveyed by Profeſſors to a promiſcuous multitude of the young, the old, the trifling loiterer, and the attentive ſtudent, aſſembled in the ſchools, is now conſigned with happier effect to private and public tutors within the walls of colleges. The plans for ſuch inſtruction admit ſufficient comprehenſion and ſufficient regularity for uſe. The diviſions are eaſily adapted to the capacities of thoſe, who underſtand what they have heard, and retain what they have underſtood. The tutor can interrogate, where the lecturer, perhaps, would only dictate, and therefore, in his intercourſe with learners, he has more opportunities for aſcertaining their proficiency, correcting their miſappre-

miſapprehenſions, and relieving their embarraſſments. Doubtleſs, when the preſent condition of academical affairs is compared with that of which we read in the laſt century, and thoſe which preceded it, *appearances* are much changed, but the *ſubſtance* remains unimpaired. A conceited and ſuperficial ſpectator may eaſily deceive himſelf; but a diſpaſſionate and judicious obſerver will underſtand, and often approve. A witling may glean materials for raillery, but a ſcholar will find ample room for reflection and commendation. Reports may ſometimes miſguide thoſe who are content to *hear* only; but facts will intereſt, and upon the whole, ſatisfy thoſe who frequently and carefully inſpect.

" The Schools of Oxford and Cambridge, (ſays Mr. Gibbon), were founded in the dark " age of falſe and barbarous ſcience, and they are ſtill tainted with the vices of their origin. " The legal incorporation of theſe ſocieties, by the charters of Popes and Kings, had given " them a monopoly of the public inſtruction, and the ſpirit of monopoliſts is narrow, lazy, " and oppreſſive: their work is more coſtly and leſs productive than that of independant " artiſts; and the new improvements, ſo eagerly graſped by the competition of freedom, are " admitted with ſlow and ſullen reluctance in thoſe proud corporations, above the fear of a " rival, and below the confeſſion of an error." P. 35. After reading the foregoing paſſages, ſhall I be told that Mr. Gibbon had not in view other Colleges beſides his own, another Univerſity beſides his own, and other times beſides his own? In ſpeaking of his own College, page 37, he enumerates particulars; and, if particulars of other Colleges were known, why were they not produced, to illuſtrate general hints, or to eſtabliſh general poſitions? Real improvements in ſcience *are* admitted, cautiouſly, but *not* reluctantly; and ſuch caution upon ſuch ſubjects is more becoming in a learned body than *eagerneſs*.

" Our Colleges, (ſays Mr. Gibbon, page 37), are ſuppoſed to be ſchools of ſcience, as " well as of education:* nor is it unreaſonable to expect, that a body of literary men, devoted " to a life of celibacy, exempt from the care of their own ſubſiſtence, and amply provided " with books, ſhould devote their leiſure to the proſecution of ſtudy, and that ſome effects of " their ſtudies ſhould be manifeſted to the world." I admit the premiſes, but deny the inference, which, by implication, is to be drawn from them. The Univerſity Preſſes of Oxford and Cambridge, in Mr. Gibbon's life-time, and ſince his death, have produced *numerous* effects of thoſe ſtudies, which are equally honourable to the writers, and to the Univerſities. Mr. Gibbon thus proceeds: " The ſhelves of their library, groan under the weight " of Benedictine folios; of the editions of the Fathers, and the collections of the middle ages, " which have iſſued from the ſingle Abbey of St. Germain des près at Paris." Are there no books, then, in ſcience, criticiſm, natural philoſophy, hiſtory, and polite literature? Are there no manuſcripts in Greek, Latin, and the Oriental languages? Has Mr. Gibbon never viſited the libraries of Corpus, All Souls, Queen's, New College, Worceſter, and Chriſt-Church? Did he never deign to caſt a glance on the Bodleian Catalogue, in two volumes folio? Did he never hear of additional books, ſufficient perhaps to fill another folio? " A " compoſition of genius," Mr. Gibbon ſays, " muſt be the *offspring* of one mind. But ſuch " works of induſtry, as may be divided among many hands, and muſt be continued during

* In the catalogue I have given of diſtinguiſhed academics, may be found the names of perſons who publiſhed while they reſided in the University, as well as of others who became authors after leaving them. To that catalogue I would add the names of the late Archdeacon Ibbetſon, of Mr. Collins the poet, of Mr. Cumberland, Dr. Ford, Dr. Tatcham, Mr. Scarlet, Mr. Jekyl, Dr. R. Shepherd, Sir G. Shuckburgh, Dr. Maſkelyne, and, if I have not been miſinformed, Baron Maſeres.

" many

" many years, are the peculiar province of a laborious community." True. Nacti ſunt hanc Spartam Oxonienſes, et præclariſſimé ornaverunt. *So* ſay I. But Mr. Gibbon ſays, page 38, " If I enquire into the manufactures of the Monks of Magdalen, if I extend " the enquiry to the other Colleges of Oxford and Cambridge, a ſilent bluſh, or a ſcornful " frown will be the only reply."

Were I to ſpeak of the foregoing paſſage as it deſerves, I ſhould employ " thoſe harſh " epithets which might be interpreted as the expreſſions of reſentment, though I ſhould be " conſtrained to uſe them as the only words in the Engliſh language, which could accurately " repreſent my cool and unprejudiced ſentiments." Thus wrote Mr. Gibbon (vol. ii. page 579,) about Mr. Davis, and thus I ſhould have written about Mr. Gibbon.

Dr. Horne was a *Monk of Magdalen*. But he compoſed ſeveral volumes of Sermons, to which Mr. Gibbon will not refuſe the praiſe of ingenuity; and he, alſo, drew up a Commentary on the Pſalms, for *nobler* purpoſes than the amuſement of ſcholars, or the confutation of critics. Dr. Chandler is a Monk of Magdalen. But, he has publiſhed Travels into Greece and Aſia Minor, which have been well received in the learned world, and with great credit to himſelf, he has republiſhed the Marmora Oxonienſia. Dr. Routh is a Monk of Magdalen. But, he is now engaged in a work of great difficulty, and of great uſe, for which he is peculiarly qualified by his profound knowledge of the tenets and the language of the earlier fathers in the Chriſtian Church; and, long before the death of Mr. Gibbon, this very Monk had ſent forth an edition of two dialogues in Plato; an edition, which, in common with many of my countrymen, I have myſelf read with inſtruction and with delight; an edition, which, the firſt ſcholars on the Continent have praiſed, which Charles Burney " loves," and which even Richard Porſon " endures."

" It is the peculiar felicity of youth," ſays Mr. Gibbon, vol. i. page 55, " that the moſt " unpleaſing objects and events, ſeldom make a deep or laſting impreſſion. It forgets the " paſt, enjoys the preſent, and anticipates the future." The obſervation is well founded, and well expreſſed. But he from whom it proceeds, has exhibited a freſh inſtance of human infirmity in the variance which ſubſiſts between his opinion and his practice. May we not ſuſpect, that the tranquillity which Mr. Gibbon derived from his thoughtleſſneſs as a boy, was not granted to his hours of reflection, when he became a full-grown man? While Mr. Gibbon was preparing the Memoirs of his own life and writings, he certainly had *not* ' forgotten the paſt." The motives which enabled him to " enjoy the preſent," will not excite the envy of a wiſe or a good man, and " in the future," he had only to anticipate the pain he was about to inflict, and the reproaches he was about to call down, upon a race of academics, by whoſe faults he had never been injured, and into whoſe virtues and ſtudies he had very ſlightly enquired.

If Mr. Gibbon had intended only to convince the public, that all the literary exploits, for which he was ſo juſtly celebrated, had been atchieved *ſuo marte*, he might have been content ſhortly and poignantly to notice the injudicious regulations of the Palæſtra when he frequented it, and the ignorance or negligence of the Gymnaſiarchs, who were appointed to inſtruct him. But, why are eight or nine pages employed in doing that, which might have been done as effectually and more decorouſly, in four or five ſentences?

I have ſometimes been inclined to think that Mr. Gibbon had received, or fancied himſelf to have received, provocations more *recent* than any which he has ſtated in his Memoirs. What they *were* muſt be left to conjecture, and for conjecture there are ſome grounds.

That

That Mr. Gibbon was not inattentive to the reports at Oxford relating to himſelf, is apparent from the forty-ſeventh page of his Memoirs. "The good ſenſe of my father was "aſtoniſhed at my ſtrange departure from the religion of my country. In the firſt ſally of "paſſion he divulged the ſecret which prudence might have ſuppreſſed, and the gates of "Magdalen College were for ever ſhut againſt my return. Many years afterward, when "the name of Gibbon was become as notorious as that of Middleton, it was induſtriouſly "whiſpered at Oxford that the Hiſtorian had formerly turned Papiſt. My character ſtood "expoſed to the reproach of inconſtancy, and this invidious topic would have been handled "without mercy by my opponents, could they have ſeparated my cauſe from that of the "Univerſity."

As to the ſecret, if it had been *kept*, did Mr. Gibbon, the convert, mingle ſo little ſincerity with his zeal, as to be capable of returning to Magdalen, even if he had not been forbidden to return? When the ſecret had been *told*, what other inconvenience, or, I ſhould rather ſay, effect, can we ſuppoſe Mr. Gibbon to have experienced, *according to Mr. Gibbon's own account*, except that of being removed from a ſociety, in which he had never been inſtructed, and from a religion, of which he no longer approved. The men of Magdalen were faithful to their oaths, when they did not permit a Papiſt to reſide in a Proteſtant Society. The men of Oxford ſpoke truth, when they ſaid that "the Hiſtorian had formerly turned "Papiſt." In regard to the opponents of Mr. Gibbon, who were *not* men of Magdalen—their compaſſion, their candour, their inability to determine whether his converſion to the Church of Rome was an act of inconſtancy, or "an honeſt ſacrifice of intereſt to conſci-"ence;" their good ſenſe in diſcerning, that ſuch converſion, under either ſuppoſition, was wholly unconnected with the points in diſpute between themſelves and Mr. Gibbon—all, or any of theſe reaſons *may* have produced their ſilence. But as to the *one* reaſon, which *alone* Mr. Gibbon *has* aſſigned for what they *did* do, and from which he has inferred, what under other circumſtances they *would have done*, it is utterly inadmiſſible. The cauſe of Mr. Gibbon, as a convert to Papacy, is ſeparate in all its principles, and all its circumſtances, from the cauſe of the Univerſity, to which his opponents belonged. If the men of Magdalen were right in preventing Mr. Gibbon's return, the Univerſity would have claimed no praiſe. If the men of Magdalen were wrong, the Univerſity would have deſerved no blame.

It muſt be owned that Mr. Gibbon's opponents did not beſtow any commendation upon his *poſſible* integrity. But, did they take any advantage of his *actual* deluſion? Did they expatiate in any general harangues upon the proneneſs of the human mind to wander from one extreme to another, "to try all things" with equal eagerneſs, and ultimately "to hold faſt" that which may *not* be good? Did they attempt any analyſis of thoſe mental idioſyncraſies, which ſeek for gratification in variety, and find it in ſingularity? Did they draw up any ſcale of gradation according to which we may paſs on from the exerciſe of ſubtilety to the love of ſophiſtry, from impatience under doubt to captiouſneſs amidſt proofs, or from indiſcriminate inquiſitiveneſs with conſcious ignorance, to exceſſive refinement with conſcious knowledge? Did they produce any arguments or any examples to ſhew, that from the offenſive and perilous obſtinacy of dogmatiſm, there is a ſurer refuge in the warineſs and moderation of the academic philoſophy, than in the verſatility and indifference of the ſceptical? *They did not*; and therefore, after noticing the ungracious terms in which this forbearance is

 mentioned,

mentioned, and the unſatisfactory manner in which it is explained, we muſt look for ſome other cauſe of Mr. Gibbon's diſlike to the Univerſity.

Had, then, the oral traditions of Oxford preſerved and diſſeminated any of thoſe childiſh foibles and trifling infirmities, which mean and malicious adverſaries often bring forward to inſult the learned, or to degrade the virtuous? Was it the cuſtom of Oxford to ſay, that the erudition of Mr. Gibbon was ſuperficial, that his judgment was weak, that his taſte was incorrect, and that his compoſitions were unworthy of that fame, which he had acquired, and which, in his reply to Mr. Davis, he repreſents "as the motive and the rewards of his "labours?" Did the members of Oxford, in their *corporate* capacity, paſs any direct vote of cenſure upon a work, which, from its matter, in ſome places, could not be *expected to pleaſe*, and from its manner, in other places, *may* have been intended to provoke? Shrinking from the danger of aſſailing Mr. Gibbon with the weapons of argument, did they endeavour to ſtrike him down with the iron mace of law? Did they raiſe againſt this mighty champion of infidelity the paſſions of a blind and infuriate rabble, juſt, as upon another occaſion, but without their concurrence, and, I truſt, approbation, thoſe paſſions have been ſince ſtirred up againſt a well-known Hereſiarch? Did they hold him up to public abhorrence as a fly and malevolent enemy, who, inſtead of deſtroying the outworks of Chriſtianity by the batteries of oppoſition, was attempting to ſap the very citadel by the mines of inſinuation? Nil horum. What, then, was the wrong? Two confederate Doctors, it ſeems, of this Univerſity, men, "whoſe zeal, (vol. ii. p. 603), was indeed enlightened by ſome rays of knowledge," but "whoſe habits of ſtudy and converſation appeared to have left them in total ignorance of the "principles which univerſally regulate the opinions and practice of mankind," (page 615), had ventured to write againſt Mr. Gibbon. The ſame offence had been committed by Mr. Davis, who was a Batchelor of Arts in Oxford, and who had undertaken, as Mr. Gibbon informs us, "to write before he had read." They who have peruſed Mr. Gibbon's Vindication, can have no doubt of his talents to convert defenſive war into that which is offenſive; and they may be ſuppoſed to believe, that the correction which had been formerly inflicted on the two Doctors and the Batchelor of Arts, was quite equal to the crimes of which they had been guilty. How far, then, is the Univerſity reſponſible for thoſe crimes? I have never been told that a vote of thanks was paſſed in favour of the two Doctors; though I have ſomewhere heard that the Batchelor of Arts was honoured with the degree of a Maſter.

But if *this* was the enormity which rouſed Mr. Gibbon's indignation, and inflicted ſo deep, ſo laſting, ſo venomous a wound upon his feelings, we may ſurely apply to him, what he had obſerved of Mr. Davis, "that in *his Philoſophy*, all ſins are of equal magnitude."—Vol. ii. page 542.

It were unneceſſary for me to vindicate, either the propriety of the general uſage, or the conduct of Oxford, in beſtowing a mark of diſtinction upon Mr. Davis, whoſe purpoſe it was to elucidate queſtions which Oxford could not ſlight; and whoſe exertions, though not completely ſucceſsful, do credit to the education which Oxford furniſhed. Academical degrees, I am aware, may ſometimes be laviſhed with intemperate zeal, and ſometimes refuſed by churliſh bigotry. The cabals of intereſted or prejudiced individuals, may over-rule the good ſenſe, and defeat the good-nature of a learned body. Great, however, is the *aggregate* of wiſdom and liberality, for which our Univerſities are indebted to the influence of Literature, Philoſophy, and Religion; and where, let me aſk, are we to look for a community,

munity, numerous in its members and fluctuating in its component parts, ſo exempt from human frailty, as never to be blinded by prepoſſeſſion, never beguiled by ſuſpicion, never warped by party, never, even with right *intention* led aſtray into meaſures, which a calm and ſagacious bye-ſtander would pronounce wrong? Suffice it, then, to ſay, that the practice of conferring degrees upon authors, has from time immemorial, been adopted in foreign, as well as in our own Univerſities; and that, on many important occaſions, it has been employed in favour of many celebrated men, who, being engaged in the beſt cauſes, and actuated by the beſt motives, have put forth the greateſt abilities with the greateſt effect.

When a writer has ſpoken ſo frequently, and in truth, ſo handſomely of himſelf, as Mr. Gibbon, and ſo acrimoniouſly of almoſt all his antagoniſts, it is no violation either of charity or decorum, to examine the ſoundneſs of his pretenſions, not to veracity, indeed, but to impartiality and candour. Willing I am to make all due allowances for the foreneſs of a controverſialiſt, for the irritability of a valetudinarian, for indolence impatient of being diſturbed in that ſweet repoſe which ſucceeds exertion, and for conſcious merit, indignant at rude interruption in the career of its triumphs. I muſt, however, take the liberty of ſaying, that Mr. Gibbon retained his reſentments more ſtedfaſtly, and felt them more painfully, than his diſcretion or his pride would ſuffer him to acknowledge. The ſoftneſs of his expreſſions often gave a ſharper edge to the ſeverity of his invectives, and the gaiety of ridicule is often employed by him, not as a check, but as a diſguiſe, to the fierceneſs of anger. The haughtineſs of defiance itſelf had few charms for his mind, unleſs it were accompanied by the poignancy of ſarcaſm; and, inſtead of cruſhing his opponents with confutation only, he choſe rather to pierce them again and again with ſneers, exulting, it ſhould ſeem, in the abilities which he poſſeſſed, ita ferire, ut, ii quos viciſſet, crebris et minutis ictibus ſe mori ſentirent. Suetonius in Vit. Calig. Par. 30.

A man of his various, extenſive, and recondite learning, muſt have known morem fuiſſe Graiis, cum inter ſe bellum geſſiſſent, ut ii qui viciſſent, tropæum aliquod in finibus ſtatuerent, victoriæ modo in præſentia declarandæ causâ, non ut in perpetuum* belli memoria maneret. Cicero de Inventione, lib. ii. p. 79. Vid. Grut. edit.

But the literary hoſtilities in which Mr. Gibbon was engaged were, it ſeems, not to be conducted on the equitable and humane conditions Graiorum cum Graiis concertantium. His adverſaries were for the moſt part βάρβαροι, ἢ ὅτι ἂν εἴποι τις. Vid. Dem. Olynph. iii. page 33. edit Reiſke. In the war upon their part ἄτακτα, ἀόριστα, ἀδιόρθωτα ἅπαντα. Vid. Demoſth. Phil. i. vol. i. page 50. And on the part of Mr. Gibbon πόλεμος ἦν ἄσπονδος, ἀκήρυκτος, ἄπαυστος. Orat. de Cor. vol. i. page 314. Thucyd. lib. ii. paſſag. 1, Plutarch, vol. ii. page 1095. Julian, Orat. iii. p. 368.

Where he profeſſed to deſpiſe only, he attacked, or repelled attacks, like one who hated odio Vatiniano. Not content with diſarming and vanquiſhing his antagoniſts, he trampled them under foot. As if diſſatisfied with the proud eminence of his own fame, unleſs it reſted on the baſe of other men's infamy, he has endeavoured to perpetuate the remembrance of his enmity, when the cauſes of hoſtility had ceaſed, and when, according to his *own* belief (not mine), and his own wiſhes, his foes were ſinking apace into that gulph, where bigots, ſciolиſts, and dunces are forgotten. Æternum inimicitiarum monumentum, æneum ſtatuit tropæum. Cic. de Inv. lib. ii.

* Οὐδὲ παρ' Ἕλλησιν οἱ τροῶτοι λίθινον ἢ χαλκοῦν στήσαντες τρόπαιον ἐδοκιμοῦσι Plutarch, Quæst. Romanæ, vol. ii. p. 273.

This charge is not adduced raſhly, and it ſhall be ſupported ſtrongly.

Mr. Gibbon, in the opening of his anſwer to Mr. Davis and other opponents, ſays—"That he might have acted in ſtrict conformity to the rule of prudence, if he had perſe-"vered in patient ſilence; but that the defence of his own honour urged him to repel with "vigour an unjuſt and unprovoked attack. His adverſary, indeed, (Mr. D.) does not ap-"pear to have recollected, that modeſty is an amiable and uſeful qualification, till he had "arrived at the laſt page of his work;" nor did he find, till Mr. Gibbon politely informed him of it, that a "mature judgment was indiſpenſably requiſite for the ſucceſsful execution "of any work of literature, and more eſpecially of criticiſm." Mr. Gibbon, however, "could not" remain cold and indifferent with regard to the attempts which were made "to "deprive him of the moſt valuable object of his poſſeſſions, or at leaſt of his hopes." With ſtrong marks, therefore, or I ſhould rather ſay, with ſtrong *profeſſions*, of reluctance, "he proceeded upon his hoſtile march over a dreary deſert, where thirſt, hunger, and in-"tolerable wearineſs, were much more to be dreaded than the arrows of the enemy," and in my opinion, as well as his own, he was lucky enough "to pick up ſomething curious "and uſeful, even in the barren waſte of controverſy." Now, let us attend to the *concluding* paragraph. "It is not without ſome mixture of mortification and regret, that I "now look back upon the number of hours which I have conſumed, and the number of "pages which I have filled in vindicating my literary and moral character from the charge "of wilful miſrepreſentations, groſs errors, and ſervile prejudices. I cannot derive any "triumph or conſolation from the occaſional advantages which I have gained over three ad-"verſaries, whom it is impoſſible for me to conſider as objects either of terror or eſteem. *The* "*ſpirit of reſentment and every other lively ſenſation have long been extinguiſhed*, and the pen would "long ſince have dropped from my weary hand, had I not been ſupported in the execution of "this ungrateful taſk by the conſciouſneſs, or at leaſt the opinion, that I was diſcharging a "debt of honour to the public and to myſelf. I am impatient to diſmiſs, and to diſmiſs *for* "*ever*, this odious controverſy, with the ſucceſs of which I cannot ſurely be elated, and I "have only to requeſt, that, as ſoon as my readers are convinced of my innocence, they will "*forget* my vindication." Vol. ii. page 628.

Why then, let me aſk, was that vindication republiſhed by the noble Editor? Why was any diſcretionary power of republiſhing it granted to a gentleman, who was ſurrounded by ſo many incentives to republiſh it, whoſe judgement, ſo far as the contents of it were unfavourable to our Univerſities, was under no guidance from his perſonal experience, whoſe habitual reverence for Mr. Gibbon might have produced habitual and implicit confidence, and whoſe attachment to him, ſincere and rooted as it was, might have expoſed him to the keeneſt ſympathy, even in the *ſuppoſed* wrongs of a friend ſo beloved and ſo admired? Why was not the republication of it, explicitly, peremptorily, and ſolemnly forbidden by the learned author? Did he mean a ſecond time to vindicate himſelf? No, ſurely; for, his vindication was, in his own view at leaſt, complete, *before*. As to his adverſaries, they "were "no objects of terror or eſteem:" and after having ſaid concerning one of them, "that his "book is haſtening to oblivion, and will ceaſe to be read," he apprehends "that grammari-"ans may already reproach him for the uſe of an improper tenſe." Was it his purpoſe, then, to protect the characters of *other* men, from adverſaries, who were lurking in ambuſcade, and lying on the watch for a favourable opportunity to ruſh upon their prey, whether among

among the living or among the dead. This, doubtleſs, were an important, and honourable purpoſe; but it was *not*, nor could it be, the purpoſe of Mr. Gibbon. So far then as I can explain the fact from circumſtances, the vindication was *republiſhed*, becauſe it had been written with effort; becauſe it had been *publiſhed with ſucceſs*; becauſe from the dexterity of the reaſoning, the nicety of the diſtinctions, the clearneſs of the explanations, the occaſional felicity of the retorts, and the general ſplendour of the ſtyle, it might increaſe the fame of Mr. Gibbon for ability as a writer, even at the expence of his reputation for conſiſtency as a moraliſt; becauſe, having been inſerted in a work which muſt attract the attention of poſterity, it will ſtand as a lofty and laſting memorial of Mr. Gibbon's opinion, that "the "champions who are enliſted in the ſervice of authority commonly wear the uniform of the "regiment; that, oppreſſed by the ſame yoke, and covered by the ſame trappings, they "heavily move along, perhaps not with an equal pace in the ſame beaten tract of prejudice "and preferments;" and that "our two Univerſities moſt undoubtedly contain the ſame "mixture, and moſt probably the ſame proportion of zeal and moderation, of reaſon and "ſuperſtition." Vid. the Vindication, vol. ii. page 602, 603. If the laſt obſervation be juſt, the fate both of the perſons to whom it is applied, and of the writer by whom it was made, ſeems remarkable. Cambridge, upon this one occaſion, diſplayed all her excellencies, and Oxford, in a luckleſs hour, expoſed all her faults. In the Cambridge Profeſſor Mr. Gibbon found only reaſon and moderation; *ſo much* reaſon, that he "would not have "bluſhed (vol. ii. p. 599, and 600,) to call Dr. Watſon his antagoniſt;" and ſo much moderation that, "ſuppoſing the only queſtion which remained between them, to relate to the "degree of the weight and effect of thoſe ſecondary cauſes which eſtabliſhed Chriſtianity," and "being perſuaded that the Doctor's philoſophy, like his own, was not of the dogmatic "kind, he would have been happy to call him his friend." But, in the Oxford Doctors, and the Oxford B. A. he had found only the impetuoſity of zeal, and the blindneſs of ſuperſtition. He therefore "enjoyed the preſent and anticipated the future," when he confuted and inſulted them; and he "did *not* forget the paſt," when he ſpoke of the place in which they were educated.

Hinc, or as ſome will chooſe to read with Bentley, Hæc illæ lacrymæ.

When Ariſtotle had occaſion to expreſs his diſſent from the opinions of his maſter Plato, about ideas, he thought it incumbent upon him to make one apology—Ἀμφοῖν γὰρ ὄντων φιλεῖν, ὅσιον προτιμᾶν τὴν ἀλήθειαν. But Mr. Gibbon was tied by no bonds of friendſhip to the Univerſity of Oxford, and therefore he was incumbered with no obligations to contend, or even to ſearch for the *whole* truth, when he ſpoke of its defects. Ariſtotle, however, in ſpite of his ſmooth profeſſions, has been charged by others, as well as by Plato, with jealouſy and ingratitude; and my own charity, I confeſs, reſtrained as it is by my conviction, will not permit me to laviſh on Mr. Gibbon *unqualified* praiſe, for delicacy, juſtice, or placability.

Let me, however, commend him where commendation is due. Mr. Gibbon, in his Memoirs, acknowledges "Mr. Viner's benefaction to the Univerſity of Oxford, not to have "been unprofitable, ſince it had produced the excellent Commentaries of Sir W. Black-"ſtone." Vol. i. p. 63.

He obſerves too, "with pleaſure, that in the Univerſity of Oxford, Dr. Lowth, with "equal eloquence and erudition, had executed his taſk, as a Profeſſor, in his incomparable

"Prælections

" Prælections on the Poetry of the Hebrews." Vol. i. p. 37. In reality, when the merits of Dr. Lowth occurred to the mind of Mr. Gibbon, he cannot be ſaid laudare maligné ; for in the heat of his controverſy, or in the pride of his triumph over his Oxford antagoniſts, he pauſes for a moment, to quote with approbation a paſſage in Iſaiah which had " been elegantly tranſlated by Dr. Lowth, and to mention with pleaſure the labours of the " reſpectable prelate, who, in that tranſlation, as well as in a former work, had very happily united the moſt critical judgement with the taſte and ſpirit of poetry." Vol. ii. page 561.

In one part of his Memoirs, he ſuppoſes other men likely " to aſſert, that, in the " courſe of forty years, many improvements had taken place in Magdalen College and in " the Univerſity, and he acknowledges himſelf *not unwilling* to believe that *ſome* tutors might " have been found, more active than one, and leſs contemptible than another, of his own " inſtructors." Page 51. After admitting, however, what was poſſible, he does not claim the merit of having enquired what was *true* ; and in many inſtances he has ſpoken of Oxford with a ſeverity which could be juſtified only by his conviction, that the improvements which *might* have taken place in *ſome* degree, had *not* taken place in *any* degree whatſoever.

In the ſame page, he mentions Dr. John Burton, as a man of whom it is recorded, " that " he knew ſome Latin, ſome Greek, ſome Ethics and Metaphyſics ; that he taught his " pupils what he knew ; that he referred them to proper maſters for the languages and ſci- " ences of which he was ignorant, and that another man like Burton, (for another man there " was) might, according to the meaſure of his capacity, be diligent and uſeful."

Theſe conceſſions are quite as remarkable for their *warineſs*, as for their courteſy. The commendation of Burton, reſts, not upon Mr. Gibbon's own knowledge, but upon the vague and general teſtimony of other perſons. The commendation of that other man, Bentham, does not riſe into *panegyric*, becauſe, we are told, " that he preferred the ſchool-knowledge to the " new philoſophy, Bergurſdicius to Locke." Nay, the commendation granted to Dr. Burton, as a tutor, is ſullied a little by the account that is given of his imperfections in another character ; for, " this hero (Dr. Burton) appears," ſays Mr. Gibbon, " in his own writings " a ſtiff and conceited pedant." In this cautious and frugal ſpirit, has Mr. Gibbon been pleaſed τῇ χειρὶ σπείρειν his civilities upon Dr. Burton.

But upon Sir William Scott and Archbiſhop Markham, he bravely pours them forth ὅλῳ τῷ θυλάκῳ, and with all which he ſays of theſe very excellent men I was delighted, becauſe it is ſaid elegantly and deſervedly. Indeed, if it had been Mr. Gibbon's fortune to be placed under the tuition of Dr. Burton, he would in all probability have been a much better Greek ſcholar ; and under the auſpices of ſuch teachers as a Scott and a Markham, he certainly would not have been a worſe writer, a worſe hiſtorian, a worſe philoſopher, or a worſe man.

" The expreſſion of gratitude," ſays Mr. Gibbon, " is a virtue and a pleaſure : a liberal " mind will delight to cheriſh and celebrate the memory of its parents, and the teachers of " ſcience are the parents of the mind."

" Applauding the filial piety which it was impoſſible for him to imitate," but, for the purpoſe, as it afterwards appears, of giving fuller effect to that filial impiety which it was both *poſſible* and proper for him to reſtrain, Mr. Gibbon produces the celebrated words of a celebrated prelate, in which he had told an antagoniſt, who was equally celebrated, that " he

" he (Dr. Lowth) had been educated in the Univerſity of Oxford; that he had enjoyed all " the advanges, both public and private, which that famous ſeat of learning ſo largely " affords; that he had ſpent many years in that illuſtrious ſociety, in a well-regulated courſe " of diſcipline and ſtudies; and in the agreeable and improving commerce of gentlemen and " ſcholars; in a ſociety where emulation without envy, ambition without jealouſy, con- " tention without animoſity, incited induſtry and awakened genius; where a liberal pur- " ſuit of knowledge, and a genuine freedom of thought; was raiſed, encouraged, and " puſhed forward, by example, by commendation, and by authority: that he had breathed " there the ſame atmoſphere which the Hooker's, the Chillingworth's, and the Locke's had " breathed before," &c. &c. This " eloquent paſſage," I have read again and again with the ſame glow of enthuſiaſm, which Mr. Gibbon, or any other human being ever felt upon reading it. I tranſcribe it now, as Mr. Gibbon profeſſed to tranſcribe it before, " with " pleaſure;" and, after peruſing it, after ſympathiſing with it, after reflecting upon it, after conſidering the authority of the writer, his ſagacity, his learning, his opportunities for obtaining information, his ability to uſe information when obtained, his reſpect for thoſe who had inſtructed him, and his gratitude to thoſe who had encouraged him, after contraſting his opinion, his ſituation, and his words, with the opinion, ſituation, and words of Mr. Gibbon, I cannot help exclaiming with confidence, Utri credere debetis, Academici?

I will " forbear to enquire," as Mr. Gibbon has forborne, " what benefits or what re- " wards were derived by Hooker, or Chillingworth, or Locke, from their academical inſti- " tution."

Yet, theſe three men, be it remembered, were ſagacious without refinement, and delicate without faſtidiouſneſs. They were calm, but not cold—They had ſenſibility with ſelf-command, rather than querulouſneſs with ſelf-conceit. One of them was orthodox, but not credulous; another was in ſome reſpects ſceptical, but not licentious: and a third was moderate, but not irreverent, or indifferent. Their views were extenſive, their ſituation was intereſting, and their writings are not barren of alluſion to the events and characters of their own days. But, in what part of their large and uſeful works do theſe venerable men ſpeak of Oxford, in that inſidious, that affrontive, I had almoſt ſaid, that vindictive ſpirit, which Mr. Gibbon has indulged?

What would they have ſaid of Mr. Gibbon's philoſophy, if they had found him not only retaining and even cherihing his reſentments for the ſpace of forty years, but endeavouring to perpetuate in his laſt, perhaps, his moſt deliberate, and moſt elaborate work, all the raſh concluſions of his youth, all the haſty aſſumptions of his very boy-hood, all the unkind ſuggeſtions of his prejudice, and all the unmanly complaints of his wrath?

What would they have ſaid of his logic, when, from his own caſe, with a weakly frame of body; with a coldneſs of temperament which made him ſtand aloof from the gaiety of companions, and from the generous ſympathy of friends; with peculiarities not very pliant, it ſhould ſeem, to perſuaſion, nor obedient to authority; with an education, which can hardly be allowed to have prepared him for the lectures of a very learned tutor, upon books generally eſteemed to be above the ordinary reach of ſchool boys; with *impatience to learn*, which is ſometimes miſtaken for *willingneſs to be taught*; with a waywardneſs of curioſity which might have impelled him to *diſpute*, where he ſhould have been contented to *obſerve*, and to diſcuſs *principles*, before he had collected *facts*; with a paſſion for " deſultory reading," which,

which, having been pampered by indulgence, might have reſiſted every attempt, to direct its courſe, or to contract its range; he thought himſelf authorized to argue to the caſe of *other* young men, whoſe educations, habits, and diſpoſitions, were not ſimilar to his own? When from his own College, with which, I confeſs, he was reaſonably enough diſguſted, he argued to *other* Colleges with which he was very imperfectly acquainted—when, from his own want of proficiency, during a ſhort and interrupted reſidence of fourteen months, he argued to the proficiency made by other young men, who reſided there regularly for the ſpace of four years—when from the general ſtate of the Univerſity, (if ſuch it were,) about his own time, he argued to the general ſtate of it, at a very diſtant period, and under inſtructors who might be very different in their attainments, their ſkill, and their diligence?

Non ſat commodé
Diviſa ſunt *temporibus* tibi, Dave, hæc.

Mr. Gibbon, in ſome of the foregoing ſtrictures, includes Cambridge as well as Oxford; and this circumſtance enables me to reſume more directly the vindication of both Univerſities from other objectors as well as Mr. Gibbon.

Mr. Gibbon, it ſhould ſeem, conſidered the colourings in Dr. Lowth's deſcription of Oxford, as overcharged, and the outline too bold. Would he have aſſented, then, to the meaſured language of another great author, who reſided more than fourteen months, or even four years, in the ſiſter Univerſity; and who, as Mr. Gibbon himſelf tells us, upon another occaſion, "to a great degree of well-digeſted reading, adds a clearneſs of judgement and "a niceneſs of penetration, capable of taking things from their firſt principles, and obſerving their moſt minute differences?" Vol. ii. page 27, Poſt. Works.

"Ingenious men," ſays Biſhop Hurd, "delight in dreams of reformation. In comparing this propoſition of Cowley (for the advancement of experimental philoſophy,) with "that of Milton addreſſed to Mr. Hartlib, we find that theſe great Poets had amuſed themſelves with ſome exalted, and in the main, congenial fancies, on the ſubject of education. "That of the two plans propoſed, this of Mr. Cowley was better digeſted, and is the leſs "fanciful, if a preference in this reſpect can be given to either, when both are manifeſtly "Utopian; and that our Univerſities, in their preſent form, are well enough calculated to "anſwer all the reaſonable ends of ſuch inſtitutions, provided we allow for the unavoidable "defects of them when drawn out into practice." Vol. i. page 219, Hurd's edit. of Cowley's Works.

If the queſtion had hung, as it were in ſcales, between the zeal of Biſhop Lowth, and the ſobriety of Biſhop Hurd, the evidence of Sir William Jones might have turned the balance. "There is no branch of literature," ſays this great ſcholar, of whom we ſhall all exclaim in his own words immediately preceding, *it is happy for us that this man was born*—"there is no liberal art, no ſublime or uſeful ſcience, which may not here be learned to "perfection, without having recourſe to any foreign inſtructor. All nature lies open to "our inſpection. The ſurprizing fabric of this viſible world has been explained to us, not "by conjectures or opinions, but by demonſtration: the works of poets, critics, rhetoricians, hiſtorians, philoſophers, the accumulated wiſdom of all nations and all ages, are here "made acceſſible and familiar to the ſtudents of every claſs, in whoſe minds they are preſerved as in a curious repoſitory, whence they may at any time be extracted for the honour

"and

" and benefit of the human ſpecies." Page 8, of an Oration, Intended to have been ſpoken in the Theatre of the Univerſity of Oxford, 9th of July, 1773.

Mr. Gibbon probably ſpoke the truth, when he ſaid, " that his three antagoniſts from " Oxford inſpired him with no *terror*." But Biſhop Lowth, Biſhop Hurd, and Sir W. Jones, are three men who might have excited his *eſteem*; and the opinions of theſe three men, upon the merits of the Engliſh Univerſities differ, toto cœlo, from the opinion of Mr. Gibbon.

There are men (I know not whether Mr. Gibbon was of the number,) to whom ſuch an opponent as Dr. Johnſon, upon ſuch a topic, as the honour of Cambridge and Oxford, might have been an object *both* of " terror and of eſteem." Now, in a paper of the Idler, Johnſon has employed quite as good ſenſe, in quite as good Engliſh, for the credit of our Univerſities, as Mr. Gibbon has ſince miſemployed for their diſcredit.

" If literature," ſays he, " is not the eſſential requiſite of the modern academic, I am " yet perſuaded that Cambridge and Oxford, however degenerated, ſurpaſs the faſhionable " acedemies of our metropolis, and the gymnaſia of foreign countries. The number of " learned perſons in theſe celebrated ſeats, is ſtill conſiderable; and more conveniencies and " opportunities for ſtudy ſtill ſubſiſt in them than in any other place.

" There is at leaſt one very powerful incentive to learning—I mean the *genius of the place*. " This is a ſort of inſpiring deity, which every youth of quick ſenſibility and ingenuous diſ- " poſition creates to himſelf, by reflecting that he is placed under thoſe venerable walls " where a Hooker and a Hammond, a Bacon and a Newton, once purſued the ſame courſe " of ſcience, and from whence they ſoared to the moſt elevated heights of literary fame. " This is that incitement, which Tully, according to his own teſtimony, experienced at " Athens, when he contemplated the portico where Socrates ſat, and the laurel-groves where " Plato diſputed. But there are other circumſtances, and of the higheſt importance, which " make our colleges ſuperior to all places of education. Theſe inſtitutions, though ſomewhat " fallen from their primary ſimplicity, are ſuch as influence in a particular manner the mo- " ral conduct of their youths: and, in this general depravity of manners and laxity of " principles, pure religion is no where more ſtrongly inculcated. * * * *

" Engliſh Univerſities render their ſtudents virtuous, at leaſt by excluding all opportuni- " ties of vice; and by teaching them the principles of the Church of England, confirm " them in thoſe of true Chriſtianity."

I had finiſhed the firſt diviſion of this note, before I began the ſecond about Mr. Gibbon; and I had reached nearly the end of that ſecond diviſion, before the ſentiments of Dr. Johnſon, as they may be found in the Idler, occurred to my mind. I am too diſcreet, too honeſt, and perhaps too proud, to be *intentionally* guilty of plagiariſm from any writer whatſoever. But, I am too ingenuous to diſſemble the ſincere, and exquiſite ſatisfaction that I feel, upon finding that my own opinions, and even my own words, on the encouragement of learning, the preſervation of morals, and the influence of religion, correſpond ſo nearly with the opinions and the words of ſuch an obſerver as Dr. Johnſon, upon ſuch a queſtion as the merits of the Engliſh Univerſities.

" For the time I have ſpent," and the efforts I have made, in this note, I with great ſincerity, and great confidence, urge the plea of Mr. Gibbon, that " I am conſcious of " having diſcharged a momentous duty to the intereſts of the public," and to my own feelings." I do *not*, however, like Mr. Gibbon, deſire the reader to *forget* the contents of that

note, when he is "convinced of their truth." On the contrary, I would exhort him to *remember* them when he is ſenſible of their importance, as well as truth; and, for the freedom of ſome parts, the ſerioufneſs of others, and the length of the whole, no vindication will be required by the conſiderate, as no apology would be accepted by the froward. Poſſible it is, however, that ſome readers may be a little wearied with the agoniſtical manner in which I have been now and then *compelled* to write about the ſtrictures of Mr. Gibbon, and, therefore, I will endeavour to refreſh, to entertain, and even to inſtruct them, by adverting to his ſtyle.

The moſt accurate and maſterly obſervations which I have ever ſeen from the pen of my contemporaries, either upon the beauties or the faults of Mr. Gibbon's language, appeared in the Engliſh Review, and were written, I believe, by Mr. Whitaker, a man, whoſe variety of knowledge, keenneſs of diſcernment, brilliancy of imagination, and vigour of diction, qualified him moſt eminently for the taſk which he has executed moſt ſucceſsfully. But this very powerful writer, and very honeſt man, will I hope excuſe me for obſerving, that in the Bibliotheca of Photius, p. 354, there is a critique upon the declamations of Himerius the Sophiſt, which, with one or two exceptions that I have ventured to omit, may be applied with the ſtricteſt juſtice to the hiſtorical writings of Mr. Gibbon.—

Ἐν ὅις ἐςὶ πᾶσι τὸν μὲν τῆς λέξεως τύπον καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ σχῆμα φυλάτ̃ων, τῇ τε περιεολῇ καὶ τῇ τροπῇ χρώμενος· * * * * * *

Παραδείγμασι δὲ ἐξ ἱςορίας τε καὶ ἐκ μύθων παντοδαπῶν μεῖξὰ αὐτᾶ τυγχάνει τα γράμματα, ἢ πρὸς ἀπόδειξιν, ἢ πρὸς ὁμοιότητα, ἢ πρὸς ἡδονὴν καὶ κάλλος ὧν λέγει, τέτοις ἀπευθύνων τὸν λόγον καὶ ποικιλλόμενος· καὶ τὰ προοίμια δὲ καὶ οἱ ἐπίλογοι, ἔςι δὲ ἃ καὶ οἱ ὅλον ἀγῶνες ἀπὸ τέτων αὐτῷ διασκευάζονται· πολλῇ δε κεχρήται καὶ τῇ προδιατυπώσει· ἀλλα τοιᾶτος ὢν ἐν τοις λόγοις, ἀσεβὴς (ὡς ἦ̃λον ἐςὶ) τὴν θρησκείαν, εἰ καὶ τὲς λαθραίως μιμεῖται τῶν κυνῶν, καθ' ἡμῶν ὑλακτῶν. Photius, edit. Hoeſchelius, page 354.

Butler, page 16, *line* 8.

See Butler's Analogy, in Part I. chap. v. of a ſtate of moral diſcipline, page 152, 5th edition.

Experimental Knowledge, page 17, *line* 14.

See page 18 of Biſhop Lowth's excellent Sermon, preached at Oxford for the Infirmary in 1771.

Phyſician of your Hoſpital, page 17, *line* 25.

I mean Dr. Thomas Monro, who was my ſcholar when I lived at Stanmore, in Middleſex.

Teachers, page 17, *line* 35.

Mr. Peter Whalley, the learned editor of Ben Jonſon's Works, was maſter of the ſchool of Chriſtchurch Hoſpital. Among the ſcholars educated there, I will juſt mention the name of Joſhua Barnes, the well-known editor of Homer; of Mr. Jeremiah Markland, whoſe works are enumerated in the 191h page of Nichols's Anecdotes of Bowyer, and Mr. Richards of Oriel College, Oxford, now living, who gained a prize or two in the Univerſity, who has lately publiſhed ſome very elegant Sermons for the Bampton Lecture ſhip, and is author of ſeveral poems, in which the nervouſneſs of Dryden is united with the eaſe of Goldſmith.

I reſpect

I reſpect Mr. Richards as a truly good man, yet more than as a good writer. Mr. Coledridge the Poet was of the ſame ſchool.*

Northern Potentate, page 17, *line* 39.

I mean the late Empreſs of Ruſſia. For an account of Ruſſian ſchools. ſee the Life of Catharine, vol. ii, page 73, 434, and elſewhere.

Moral Regeneration, page 18, *line* 1.

I have ſeen two or three inſtances of awkward and mutilated experiments to realize the plan of education propoſed by M. Rouſſeau; and with ſorrow, but not ſurprize, I have been a witneſs of their unhappy conſequences. My conſolation, however, was, that if the trial had been more correct and more complete, conſiſtency muſt have been purchaſed at the expence of common diſcretion, and ſucceſs itſelf would have been more pernicious than failure—

" Quæ res
" Nec modum habet neque conſilium, ratione modoque
" Tractari non vult."

By the incubation of modern philoſophy upon modern philanthropy, other ſchemes have ſince been hatched by other experimentaliſts. I will not deprive them of the praiſe which may be due to indefatigable perſeverance and occaſional ingenuity. But their opinions, when compared with thoſe of Rouſſeau, have fewer charms to the fancy, from the embroidery of deſcription, and a feebler hold upon the judgment, from the regularity of ſyſtem. On the firſt view, indeed, they produce the wildneſs of amazement, rather than the vivacity of admiration. They afterwards perplex the underſtanding in a dark and barren wilderneſs of metaphyſics, and they cramp the affections by confuſed repreſentations of their contrariety to the dictates of reaſon, perfected by a long ſeries of triumphs over education and cuſtom—They beguile young and ſuperficial readers by the witchery of new terms, and againſt their lapſe from a ſtate of illumination, they ſupply them with no other ſecurity than the habit of deſpiſing, and a dexterity in controverting the familiar language of fellow-creatures, with whom it is *their* privilege, to converſe, without being underſtood, and to act, without being imitated—They inſtruct their diſciples to try all things by the teſt of their theory alone—and they direct them. after trial, to hold faſt that which is good, becauſe it is ſingular: for ſingularity, it ſhould ſeem from their exoterics, is a preſumptive evidence of reaſon in what they think, truth in what they ſpeak, and juſtice in what they do.

The projects of theſe reformers, even where they reſemble that of Rouſſeau, are not wiſe; and where they differ from it, they are not good. As to religion, not content with thruſting to a diſtance every prejudice in its favour, they anxiouſly ſtore the mind with every prejudice againſt the utility and the truth of it. The milder virtues they puſh aſide, to make way for the ſterner; and, in ſpeculation, at leaſt, they carry the ſterner to an extent, which no efforts of frail humanity can, in practice, ever reach. After inculcating the moſt enlarged love of mankind, they teach individuals to ſtrip themſelves of all the qualities for which alone they are now beloved, by the viſible and unalterable conſtitution of our nature. After vague and magnificent promiſes of effecting progreſſive and indefinite improvement in

* I just now recollect the names of Provost George, of Mr. Crachrode and Mr. Sawkins of Christ Church, of Dr. Langhorne, Mr. L. Sterne, Mr. Russel of Corpus, Oxford; of Mr. Maty and Dr. Scott, of Trinity, Cambridge; of Dr. Hay, of Magd. Cambridge; of Dr. Apthorpe, and (I believe) Mr. Dutens, as worthy of being inserted in the list of distinguished academics.

ſocial life, they would proceed to overturn every known inſtitution, and to ſuperſede almoſt every known principle to which ſociety ſeems to be indebted for its preſervation and exiſtence.

Undoubtedly, the reforms projected by our new ſchool, *reverſe* the order in which civilization has been hitherto ſuppoſed to proceed; and the ſubſtance of its tenets has been thrown together, not unſucceſsfully, I think, into a Cento, which lately was ſent to a friend of mine, and in which the ſelection of the topics fully compenſates for the diverſity of the alluſions, the inequality of the ſtyle, and the uncouthneſs of the verſification. For reaſons of delicacy, "celabitur auctor." But the Canto itſelf (for ſo it was properly called by the writer) ſhall be produced, and it runs thus—

Noſtorum quæ ſit ſententia Dia Catonum:
Quid velit, et poſſit, nova quæ ſapientia fertur,
Quantaque ſit virtus, alienâ vivere quadrâ,
Expediam: memori tu ſigna in mente teneto.

Qui genus humanum ingenio exſuperare videntur,
Et ſeſe *rationis* inire elementa, viaſque
Nullius ante ſolo tritas accedere jactant,
Res ſibi conantur, non ſe ſubmittere rebus:
Publica privatis miſcent, et ſacra profanis:
Concubitu dant fræna vago: nata eſſe maritis
Jura negant. Sua cuique Deus ſit dira Cupido.

En, quæ tot peperit, ſceleroſa atque impia facta,
Relligio paſſim obteritur, pietaſque fideſque
Funditus everſæ ingentem traxere ruinam,
Contemptæque jacent. Non ſancti judicis ora
Triſtia formidant, nec verba minacia legum,
Felices ſine re, et tuti ſine vindice, cives.

Quamvis limite humum multo ſignavit arator
Communem priùs, et multo ſudore ſubegit,
Magnus ab integro rerum jam naſcitur ordo:
Terra iterum communis erit, ne in commoda peccet
Publica, neu priſcæ ſubeant veſtigia *fraudis*.

Aude igitur contemnere opes, et te quoque dignum
Finge novis rebus, placido cum viderit orbem
Lumine Libertas, et Juſtitia omnibus omnia
Annuerit, fauſtèque æquaverit omnibus omnes.

Hæc tibi ſi quando ſurgit felicior ætas,
Et nova ſigna novis præceptis ponere fas eſt,
Obſcurata diu, et *ſpecioſa* vocabula rerum
E tenebris retrahes, ſtudio expromeſque fideli
Plurima, quæ *nunquam* genitor produxerat uſus.

Neglectis propriis, aliena negotia ſolum
Curabis, ſumeſque animum cenſoris amici:
Ignoſces vitiis: *morum* ambitioſa recides
Ornamenta: *parum claris* dabis undique lucem.
Nam ſi cultor eris veri, ſecurus amoris
Atque odii, pariter narranda tacendaque dices,

Vulgabis

Vulgabis commiſſa fide, poſitoque pudore,
Vivere nec voto metues, nec crimine aperto.

Has inter curas, tibi ne labor improbus artus
Membraque conficiat paulatim, inhianſque lucello
Mentem affigat humo non hæc in munera natam.

Non uxor ſalvum te vult, non filia. Qui te
Paſcit ager, tuus *eſt*, et, deficiente crumenâ,
Hinc nummos atque hinc tibi convectare licebit,
Arreptiſque frui. *Facit* hæc meliora probatque
Utilitas,* juſti quæ *ſola* eſt mater et æqui.

Quid mores ſenſuſque velint, quid proſit amicis,
Ne tibi ſit curæ. Toti te credere mundo,
Non patriæ, genitum fingas. Scelera ipſa nefaſque
Hac mercede placent, famamque merentur honeſtam.

Lenire armatos, paciſque imponere morem
Ante tubæ ſonitum : Naturæ jura *volentes*
Per populos ferere, et natorum ſœda patrumque
Sanguine purpureis ſceptra extorquere Tyrannis,
Hæ tibi erunt artes. Sine regibus et ſine bellis
Vivendi ſimul hæc fuerint fundamina jacta,
Materiem ſuperabit opus, *Ratione* Magiſtrâ.

Quid quod ab humanis rebus ſemotus, et extra
Sejunctus longe flammantia mœnia mundi,
Nec bene promeritis capitur, nec tangitur irâ,
Quem perhibent regnare, Deus. Natura beatis
Omnibus eſſe dedit, ſua ſi bona, numine freti
Non ullo, norint ; ipſi ſibi fortiter æquam
Si mentem, precibus ſpretis et thure, parârint.
Scilicet in cœlo vita haud peritura piorum,
Culparumque graves poenæ quas neſcia veri
Religio quondam intonuit, ſunt fabula vulgi.
Nox manet una omnes, et in omnia ſæcula ſomnus.

Amidſt the caſe, the freedom, and the vigour of converſation, as it is conducted in this country, few are the minds which can be long ſeduced from their allegiance to the authority of common ſenſe ; and if I am not deceived as to the preſent ſtate of public opinion, we may apply to ſome modern theories, what Chryſippus ſaid about the boaſted Μεγαρικὰ ἐρωτήματα of Stilpo and Manedemus, σφοδρὰ ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ γενομένων αὐλῶν ἐνδόξων, νῦν ἴις ὄνειδος αὐτῶν ὁ λόγος περιτέτραπται, ὡς τῶν μὲν παχύτερον, τῶν δὲ ἐκφανῶς σοφιζομένων ἔργα. Plutarch de Stoicorum Repugnantiis, vol. ii. page 1036.

Whatſoever diſapprobation I may have expreſſed of certain opinions, and whatſoever conſequences I may apprehend from them to the innocence of individuals, and the welfare of

* What Ariſtotle ſays of old age in the preſent courſe of human affairs, might be applied to youth formed according to the new ſchool—μᾶλλον ζῶσι κατὰ λόγισμοι, ἢ κατὰ τὸ ἦθος· ὁ μὲν γὰρ λόγισμος τῆ συμφέροντος, τὸ δὲ ἦθος τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐστὶ—and again, αἰσχύνονται μᾶλλον ἢ αἰσχύνηλοί, διὰ γὰρ τὸ μὴ φρονπτίζειν ὡμοίως τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ τῆ συμφέροντος, ὠλιγωροῦσι τῆ δοκεῖν. Arist. Rhetoric. lib. ii. cap. 14. edit. Cantab. 1728.

ſociety,

ſociety, I ſincerely and anxiouſly diſclaim all contempt for the abilities, and all hatred to the perſons of the writers by whom thoſe opinions are maintained. On the contrary, I think with a very judicious author, " that profeſſing to neglect their opinions," we may encourage them to over-rate " the ſize of their own underſtandings, and the comprehenſiveneſs " of their views, and to impute our neglect to poverty and narrowneſs of intellect: but that " a candid examination of the ſubjects which they diſcuſs may tend to convince them, that " in favouring improbable and unfounded hypotheſes, ſo far from enlarging the bounds of " lunar ſcience, they are contracting it; that ſo far from promoting the improvement of the " human mind, they are contracting it, and throwing us back again into the infancy of " knowledge." See page 154, of an Eſſay on Population,* with remarks on the ſpeculation of Mr. Condorcet, Mr. Godwin, and other Writers, publiſhed in 1798.

Gladly do I beſtow the tribute of my commendation on the general merits of this work, in ſoundneſs of matter, accuracy of reaſoning, elegance of diction, and uſefulneſs of effect. I admit unequivocally the fundamental principle of the writer, that by thoſe general laws of nature, which conſtitute all our experience, and therefore ſhould regulate all our enquiries, " population, under certain circumſtances, will encreaſe in a geometrical proportion, and " the produce of the earth, in an arithmetical, only." I admit the juſtneſs of his remark upon the reſolute and extraordinary " adherence of Mr. Condorcet to his favourite princi- " ples," while he was " ſurrounded by ſo many facts," which glaringly " contradicted them" and lived among an " enlightened people, debaſed by ſuch a fermentation of diſguſting paſ- " ſions, fear, cruelty, revenge, ambition, madneſs, and folly, as would have diſgraced the " moſt barbarous nation in the moſt barbarous age, and muſt have given a tremendous ſhock " to his ideas about the neceſſary and irreſiſtible progreſs of the human mind." See page 144 of the abovementioned Eſſay.

I aſſent, in a very great degree, to his praiſe " on the ſpirit and energy of Mr. Godwin's " ſtile, the force and preciſion of ſome of his reaſonings, and the ardent tone of his thoughts." Page 173.

I allow, not the truth only, but the importance of his obſervation, that " man is a ra- " tional, and, yet at the ſame time, a *compound* being, in whom the paſſions will act, as diſ- " turbing forces to the deciſions of his underſtanding."

* The reader may compare the last chapter of this work with Ariſtotle's repreſentation of νοῦς and θεωρία, in cap. vii. and viii. lib. x. edit. Oxon. of the Ethics, and with the hypotheſis of Dr. Hutton: " That this life, inſtead of being conſidered as a ſtate of probation for moral agents, ſhould rather be " conſidered as a ſtate of infotmation for beings capable of intellectual knowledge." Vid. Inveſtigation of the Principles of Knowledge, vol. iii. page 172.

To me it ſeems more probable from Analogy and from Revelation, that intellect, under whatſoever modifications it may hereafter exiſt, upon whatſoever objects it may be employed, and to whatſoever degree it may be improved, will be connected with virtuous action; and that happineſs indefinitely increaſing, will be the reſult of indefinite progreſſion in both. Of what high importance, then, muſt be the moral habits which we acquire, and even the moral principles which we adopt, in this preparatory ſtate? " In my Father's houſe," ſaid Chriſt, " there are many manſions," and who ſhall aſſign limits to the wiſdom of the Deity in appointing means of improvement, and through improvement, of happineſs, not only to the Philoſopher and the Chriſtian, but to the wild Barbarian and the " ignorant Savage?" Whether, or no, the term " probationary" be applicable to the ſituation of man conſidered as an intellectual, as well as a moral being in this life, the " *evidence* for a future ſtate of felicity," appears to me quite as concluſive from his preſent condition under the one character, as under the other.

More

More particularly I am pleaſed with the concluſion of cap. vii. where he preſents his readers with a moſt luminous deſcription " of the vices of mankind, as the great precurſors " in the army of deſtruction—of ſickly ſeaſons, epidemics, peſtilence and plague, advancing " in dreadful array, and ſweeping off their thouſands and tens of thouſands; and gigantic " famine ſtalking in the rear, and levelling with one mighty blow the population, with the " food of mankind;" with chapter viii. where he examines Mr. Condorcet's " ſketch of the " hiſtory of the human mind;" with chapter ix. where he refutes the " conjectures of the " ſame philoſopher on the organic perfectibility of man, and the indefinite prolongation of " human life;" and with chapter x. where he *demonſtrates*, that " Mr. Godwin's ſcheme of " equality never can be realized, and that were it realized, it ſoon would ceaſe, and drive us " back from the tranſient bleſſings of an ill-directed and overſtrained benevolence to all the " terrible evils of the moſt corrupt and ferocious ſelfiſhneſs."

Viewed on the fairer ſide of his character, Mr. Condorcet ſeems to have been worthy of happier times than thoſe in which he lived, of better colleagues than thoſe with whom he acted, and of enemies, far nobler than thoſe by whom he was deſtroyed. His knowledge was various and recondite, his genius was vigorous and comprehenſive, and upon *one* atrocious deed, to which he was impelled by the frenzy of political reſentment, and the waywardneſs of philoſophical fanaticiſm, who does not wiſh that " the accuſing angel may drop a " tear?" Κύριε, μὴ στήσῃς αὐτῷ τὴν ἁμαρτίαν ταύτην· ἡμᾶς δὲ τοὺς κατακρίνοντας αὐτὸν ῥῦσαι ἀπὸ τοῦ πονηροῦ.

Narrow Ruler, page 19, *line* 14.

In the Ductor Dubitantium, page 1706, where Taylor is ſpeaking of the parental authority, when it may appear to claſh with that of God, he mentions an excellent maxim of the lawyers:—" In comparatione perſonarum, ineſt læſio et injuria." This very ſenſible maxim may be applied to many caſes of morality: to the diſtinctions, for inſtance, that might be ſet up between one diſtreſſed perſon and another, upon account of their religious tenets: to the claims of a native and a foreigner upon our compaſſion: to the comparative rights of a good man and a benefactor to our aſſiſtance, &c. &c.

The deciſions which a man of fertile imagination or polemical acuteneſs, might make upon ſuch caſes, are plauſible rather than inſtructive in theory; and the general rules drawn from them, would, in practice, be often fallacious. In the mere ſtatement of ſuch diſtinctions, for the purpoſe of *wholly* excluding the pleas of one claimant, and eſtabliſhing thoſe of the other, " ineſt læſio et injuria."

The humble Suit, page 19, *line* 24.

For my knowledge of the ſuit preſented to the King and his Council, by the Citizens of London, in 1552, and of the preamble to the Ordinances and Rules drawn out for the good government of the houſe of Bridewell, as it is ſuppoſed by Sir Martin Bowes, and addreſſed to the Governors, or rather Almoners of Bridewell, in 1557; I am indebted to the Poſtſcript to ſome Conſiderations on the original and proper Objects of the Royal Hoſpital of Bridewell, printed at London in 1798. The pamphlet is well written, and ſeems to have been well intended. But upon making ſome enquiries about the actual ſtate of that Hoſpital, I had lately the ſatisfaction to hear that it is very judiciouſly governed. A ſhort account of the Royal Hoſpitals may be found in pages 34 and 35 of Mr. Entick's Survey of London, Weſtminſter

Weſtminſter and Southwark, vol. ii. Henry VIII. in the laſt year of his reign, gave the Priory of St. Bartholomew to the City, for the relief of the poor. He founded two religious houſes, Chriſt Church out of the Grey Friars, and little St. Bartholomew's out of St. Bartholomew's Hoſpital. But King Edward VI. by the advice of Biſhop Ridley, the Lord Mayor, Aldermen and Common Council, founded Chriſt's Hoſpital in the Grey Friars' Convent, for the relief and education of young and helpleſs children. By the advice of Biſhop Ridley, he gave the old Palace of Bridewell to the City, for the lodging of poor wayfaring perſons, the correction of vagabonds, ſtrumpets, and idle perſons, and for finding them work; and as the City had appointed Chriſt's Hoſpital for the education of poor children, and St. Bartholomew's, and St. Thomas's in Southwark, for the maimed and diſeaſed, Edward, in the ſeventh year of his reign, by a charter, dated June 6th, formed the Governors of theſe Foundations into a Corporation. The Priory of Bethlehem was ſuppreſſed by King Henry VIII. and in the year 1546, the Mayor and Commonalty purchaſed the ſaid Priory from the Crown; and it was by them converted into an Hoſpital for the uſe of lunatics, at a certain expence to be paid weekly by the relations or pariſh of the patient admitted. Entick, iii. 406.

By lewd and evil Services and other Cauſes, page 19, *line* 32.

Theſe words convince me that thievery, actually committed, though not proved by legal proceſs, and preſumed only from the temptations to which vagrants are expoſed, was within the view of the Founders and Governors of Bridewell. When they ſpeak directly of priſoners, they deſcribe them as perſons who were "quit at the Seſſions;" but it appears to me that they meant to afford protection to other unhappy beings who had loſt their credit in conſequence of the ſuſpicions to which they lay open for want of honeſty: And even of the priſoners acquitted, it may be ſuppoſed that their moral innocence was often doubtful, whatever circumſtances might produce their legal exemption from puniſhment.

Exclaim, page 20, *line* 7.

I found this ſpeech of the King in a note to page 11 of the above-mentioned Conſiderations on Bridewell Hoſpital.

That Euthanaſiæ, page 20, *line* 16.

"Quoties audiſſet, cito ac nullo cruciatu defunctum quempiam, ſibi et ſuis εὐθανασίαν "ſimilem (hoc enim verbo uti ſolebat) precabatur." Suet. in vita Aug. par. 99, p. 285, edit. Grævii.

Agonies of Remorſe, page 20, *line* 20.

"I have underſtood concerning divers vicious perſons, that none have been ſo free in their "donatives and offerings to religion and the prieſt, as they; and the hoſpitals that have been "built, and the highways mended at the price of ſouls, are too many for Chriſtendom to "boaſt of in behalf of charity." Jeremy Taylor's 12th Sermon, page 117.

[The contents of the printed Sermon, from page 20, line 27, to page 23, line 20, were not preached.]

Twinkling of an Eye, page 20, *line* 40.

I quote from the old tranſlation retained in our Prayer-book. The latter tranſlation, printed in our Bibles, ſays, "but a moment."

A Time

A Time for Hatred, page 21, *line* 2.

See Eccleſiaſtes, chap. iii. ver. 8.

Bread of Adverſity, page 21, *line* 3.

See Iſaiah, chap. xxx. ver. 20.

Mourn like a Dove, page 21, *line* 4.

See Iſaiah, chap. xxxviii. ver. 14.

Intolerable Wants, page 21, *line* 17.

"Robbery," ſays Beccaria, "is commonly the effect of miſery and deſpair, the crime of "that unhappy part of mankind to whom the right of excluſive property has left but a bare "exiſtence." Eſſay on Crimes and Puniſhments, chap. xxii. p. 83. I agree with Beccaria about the mitigation of puniſhment for robbery, unaccompanied by violence, and about the increaſed ſeverity of puniſhment when violence *does* accompany it. But I totally diſſent from him where, in the ſentence juſt now quoted, he calls excluſive property a "terrible, and perhaps unneceſſary right;" and I have ſeparated his words from the context, for the purpoſe of oppoſing to them the wiſer opinion of Plutarch—"Ἀλλ' ὅπα τὸ ἴδιόν ἐστιν, ἀπόλ- "λυται τὸ κοινὸν, ὅπα μὲν ἓν μὴ ἴσον ἐστίν. Οὐ γὰρ οἰκεία κτῆσις, ἀλλ' ἀφαίρεσις ἀλλοτρίᾳ, "καὶ πλεονεξία περὶ τὸ κοινὸν, ἀδικίας ἦρξε καὶ διαφορᾶς· ἦν ὅρῳ καὶ μέτρῳ τῷ ἰδίᾳ κατα- "παύοντες οἱ νόμοι τῆς ἴσα νεμέσης εἰς τὸ κοινὸν ἀρχῆς καὶ δυνάμεως ἐπάνυμοι γεγόνασιν." Plutarch, vol ii. page 644. The learned reader, without any warning from me, will attend to the legal and moral ſenſe of ἴσον as uſed by the Greek writers.

Accumulation of Evil, page 21, *line* 25.

When I apply the word evil here to puniſhment as well as to crime, I ſpeak only of phyſical evil. For the application of the word to puniſhment I have very high authority in Mr. Bentham. "The general object which all laws have, or ought to have, in common, is to "augment the total happineſs of the community; and, therefore, in the firſt place, to ex- "clude, as far as may be, every thing that tends to ſubtract from that happineſs: in other "words, to exclude miſchief. But all puniſhment is miſchief: all puniſhment in itſelf is "evil. Upon the principle of utility, if it ought at all to be admitted, it ought only to be "admitted in as far as it promiſes to exclude ſome greater evil." Introduction to the Principles of Morals, chap. xiii. p. 166.

Dreadful Severities of Law, page 21, *line* 28.

"If the paſſions, or the neceſſity of war, have taught men to ſhed the blood of their "fellow-creatures, the laws, which are intended to moderate the ferocity of mankind, "ſhould not increaſe it by examples of barbarity, the more horrible, as this puniſhment is "uſually attended with formal pageantry—What are the true and moſt uſeful laws? Thoſe "compacts and conditions which all would propoſe and obſerve, in thoſe moments when "private intereſt is ſilent, or combined with that of the public. What are the natural ſen- "timents of every perſon concerning the puniſhment of death? We may read them in the "contempt and indignation with which every one looks on the executioner, who is never-

theleſs

" thelefs an innocent executor of the public will ; a good citizen, who contributes to the ad-
" vantage of fociety ; the inftrument of the general fecurity within. as good foldiers are
" without. What then is the origin of this contradiction ? Why is this fentiment of man-
" kind indelible, to the fcandal of reafon ? It is, that in a fecret corner of the mind, in
" which the original impreffions of nature are ftill preferved, men difcover a fentiment which
" tells them, that their lives are not lawfully in the power of any one ; but of that neceffity
" only, which with its iron fceptre rules the univerfe." Beccaria on Crimes and Punifh-
ments, edit. 4, chap. xxviii. p. 112. See Sir William Temple on Popular Difcontents,
vol. iii. page 55.

Cravings of Hunger, page 21, *line* 31.

In Julian's firft Oration, there is a paffage which no benevolent man can read without
heaving a figh, and imploring the pity of Legiflators, Judges, and Magiftrates, upon the
Poor, in this melancholy and awful feafon of fcarcity—Πέφυκε γὰρ ὁ τρυφὴ μόνον ἦθος
διαφθείρειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐνδεὴς δίαιτα, ἐφ' ὧν ἅπω τὸ κρίνειν ὁ λογος προσλαβὼν
ἕπεται ταῖς χρείαις ὑπὸ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας ἀναπειθόμενος. Page 46.

Unfit to Decide, page 22, *line* 13.

" Τὸ δὲ τῶν σοφιστῶν γένος ἄν, πολλῶν μὲν λόγων καὶ καλῶν μάλα ἔμπειρον ἥγημαι· φοβοῦμαι
" δὲ μήπως ἄσχολον ἅμα καὶ φιλοσόφων ἀνδρῶν ἢ καὶ πολιτικῶν." Plat. Timæus, vol. iii.
page 19.

Difcipline of Shame, page 22, *line* 16.

I think that in our moral, and perhaps our legal treatment of offenders, fufficient atten-
tion is not fhown to the feeling of fhame. The reader, if he pleafes, my confult Beccaria
in the 23d chapter, where he treats of infamy confidered as a punifhment, and fays that
" it fhould not be too frequent, becaufe the power of opinion grows weaker by repetition,
" nor inflicted on a number of perfons at the fame time, becaufe the infamy of many re-
" folves itfelf into the infamy of none." Mr. Howard,* in his admirable book upon prifons,
ftates, in feveral inftances, the wifdom and the humanity of the laws in fome foreign coun-
tries, where punifhments are infamous rather than painful. The moft remarkable inftance
of which I have ever read occurs in Stobæus. I would not gravely recommend it as an ex-
ample worthy of imitation ; but I will produce it as a fact which is very fingular, and
which fhows the great ftrefs laid by the laws upon the efficacy of fhame." Παρ' Ἰνδοῖς ἐάν
" τις ἀποξερηθῇ ὀνείδ, ἢ ψρακαταθήκης, ἐκ ἔξι κρίσις· ἀλλ' αὐτον αἰτιᾶται ὁ πιστεύσας. ὁ
" δὲ τεχνίτα ψηρώσας χεῖρα ἢ ὀφθαλμὸν θανάτῳ ζημιῶται. τὸν δὲ μέγιςα ἀδικήσαντα, ὁ βασι-
" λεὺς κελεύει κείρθαι, ὡς ἐσχάτης ὕσης ταύτης ἀτιμίας." Stob. p. 293.

Remorfe, page 22, *line* 16.

The effects of remorfe, as it relates to the opinion of mankind, are moft luminoufly de-
fcribed by Adam Smith. " The violator of the more facred laws of juftice can never reflect
" on the fentiments which mankind muft entertain with regard to him, without feeling all
" the agonies of fhame, and horror, and conftternation. When his paffion is gratified, and
" he begins coolly to reflect on his paft conduct, he can enter into none of the motives
" which influenced it. They appear now as deteftable to him as they did always to other
people.

* See his Account of the " Spanish Mantle," page 76.

" people. By ſympathizing with the hatred and abhorrence which other men muſt enter-
" tain for him, he becomes in ſome meaſure the object of his own hatred and abhorrence."
" The remembrance of his crimes has ſhut out all fellow-feeling with him from the hearts
" of his fellow-creatures. The ſentiments which they entertain with regard to him, are
" the very thing which he is moſt afraid of. Every thing ſeems hoſtile, and he would be
" glad to fly to ſome inhoſpitable deſert, where he might never more behold the face of a
" human creature, nor read in the countenance of mankind the condemnation of his crimes.
" But ſolitude is ſtill more dreadful than ſociety. His own thoughts can preſent him with
" nothing but what is black, unfortunate, and diſaſtrous, the melancholy forebodings of
" incomprehenſible miſery and ruin. The horror of ſolitude drives him back into ſociety,
" and he comes again into the preſence of mankind, aſtoniſhed to appear before them load-
" ed with ſhame and diſtracted with fear, in order to ſupplicate ſome little protection from
" the countenance of thoſe very judges, who he knows have already unanimouſly condemned
" him. Such is the nature of that ſentiment, which is properly called remorſe; of all the
" ſentiments which can enter the human breaſt the moſt dreadful. It is made up of ſhame
" from the ſenſe of the impropriety of paſt conduct; of grief for the effects of it; and of
" the dread and terror of puniſhment from the conſciouſneſs of the juſtly provoked reſent-
" ment of all rational creatures." Theory of Moral Sentiments, vol. i. p. 209—211, 7th edition.

Repreſents his own, page 22, *line* 18.

" The all-wiſe Author of nature has made man, if I may ſay ſo, the immediate judge
" of mankind; and has in this reſpect, as in many others, created him after his own image,
" and appointed him his *vice-gerent* upon earth, to ſuperintend the behaviour of his brethren.
" They are taught by nature to acknowledge that power and juriſdiction which has thus
" been conferred upon him, to be more or leſs humbled or mortified when they have
" incurred his cenſure, and to be more or leſs elated when they have obtained his applauſe."
Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments, vol. 1 page 320-1.

Prevent, page 23, *line* 12.

" I do not pretend to leſſen that juſt abhorrence which crimes deſerve, but to diſcover
" the ſources from whence they ſpring, and I think I may draw the following concluſion:
" That the puniſhment of a crime cannot be juſt (that is neceſſary) if the laws have not
" endeavoured to prevent that crime by the beſt means which times and circumſtances
" would allow." Beccaria on Crimes and Puniſhments, page, 131.

Recompenſed, page 24, *line* 8.

I have often had occaſion to obſerve both the juſtneſs and the importance of a remark in Moſheim's notes upon Cudworth: " Qui Theologorum ſcita & dogmata vituperare volunt,
" eos ante omnia decet, & ſententiam eorum inveſtigare, & ſermonis, quo utuntur illi,
" generi adſueſcere. Sed, ut hodie vivitur, nulli ſunt audaciores & vehementiores in com-
" munibus ſententiis & opinionibus vellicandis & reprehendendis, quam illi, qui ne voca-
" bulorum quidem, quibus utimur, veras poteſtates & notiones perſpectas habent." Vol. ii. page 589.

" In later times, fays Mr. Hume, Philofophy of all kinds, efpecially Ethics, have been " more clofely united with Theology than ever they were obferved among the Heathens; " and as this latter fcience admits of no terms of compofition, but bends every branch " of knowledge to its own purpofe, without much regard to the phænomena of nature, " or to the unbiaffed fentiments of the mind, hence reafoning, and even language, have " been warped from their natural courfe, and diftinctions have been endeavoured to be " eftablifhed, where the difference of the objects was, in a manner, imperceptible. Philo- " fophers, or rather divines under that difguife, treating all morals as on a like footing " with civil laws, guarded by the fanctions of reward and punifhment, were neceffarily " led to render this circumftance of voluntary or involuntary, the foundation of their whole " theory." Effays, p. 391, vol. ii. Edit. 1767.

Whatfoever may have been the errours of philofophers under the difguife of theologians, Adam Smith feems to have thought that between the belief of futurity and the moral fentiments of mankind, there is not any neceffary or invincible contrariety; and I fuppofe that he would not have refufed to the doctrines of revelation among thofe who acknowledged its authority, that efficacy which he granted to the dictates of natural religion. " Our " reverence for general rules of conduct, fays he, is ftill further enhanced by an opinion, " which is firft impreffed by nature, and afterwards confirmed by reafon and philofophy, that " thefe important rules of morality are the commands and laws of the Deity, who will finally " reward the obedient, and punifh the tranfgreffors of their duty." Theory, vol. i. p. 407.

But though a philofopher would regard the operations of our moral faculties, and the influence of future rewards *conjointly*, it may yet be true that theologians flight the former and attend to the latter only. Let us then examine the fact, keeping in view Mr. Hume's obfervation upon the difference between the antient and the modern way of treating Ethics.

Mr. Hume, it is apparent, fpeaks of writers who have fome claim to philofophical acutenefs, and therefore the point in difpute will not be at all affected by the extravagant decrees of councils, the gloomy vifions of fanatics, or the frantic ravings of evangelical itinerants.

That among Chriftians Ethics fhould be more frequently connected with Theology than they were among Heathens, is a fact for which we may eafily account, when we confider, not only that the evidences by which chriftianity is accompanied, are far brighter and more numerous than thofe which belong to the religions of antiquity; but that the doctrines of it have a clofer and more direct connection with the principles of virtue; and as one peculiar and profeffed defign of the Gofpel was to eftablifh the belief of a future life, it were ftrange if the teachers of it overlooked a confideration upon which the Author of it fo much infifted. They would fhow, indeed, a very imperfect knowledge of human nature itfelf, if, in reftraining men from vice, or encouraging them to virtue, they were not to avail themfelves of the influence which the profpect of futurity muft have upon the generality of mankind. But they are not inattentive to other conficerations, which may excite their hearers or their readers to a virtuous conduct from other motives. They dwell upon the reafonablenefs, as well as the authority of their Lord's commands. They fhew the tendency of thofe commands to promote our prefent, as well as our future welfare. In recommending virtue from a regard to temporal concerns, they infift upon the benefits of health, of

reputation,

reputation, ſerenity of mind, and the public as well as the private good of their fellow-creatures.

Mr. Hume in the ſame eſſay tells us that "every man may employ terms as he pleaſes." But whatever innovations may have been made by theologians in language, they certainly are not greater than thoſe which he has himſelf employed, when, in conformity to the genius of the Latin rather than the Engliſh tongue, he transfers the word virtue to endowments of the mind, merely intellectual, and when he extends the word approbation and diſapprobation, to blemiſhes, defects, and their contraries, which, in the common judgment of the world, are looſely connected with the idea of morality. Though Chriſtian divines unqueſtionably *have* treated morals as guarded by the ſanctions of rewards and puniſhments, they have not ceaſed to "regard the phænomena of nature and the unbiaſſed ſentiments of "the mind," nor have "they warped reaſoning and language from their natural courſe." *Conſiſtent* they certainly were in aſſuming the diſtinction of voluntary and involuntary, when they ſpeak of laws: "for, as Taylor ſays, we cannot be under a law, and promiſes "and threatenings, if we cannot chuſe, and, whether we affirm or deny the liberty of "the will, there muſt be in every action, good or bad, the action of the will." Ductor Dubitantium, p. 794.

"The goodneſs or badneſs of actions, ſays Butler, does not ariſe from hence, that the "epithets intereſted or diſintereſted may be applied to them, any more than that any other "indifferent epithet, ſuppoſe inquiſitive or jealous, may or may not be applied to them; "not from their being attended with preſent or future pleaſure or pain, but from their "being what they *are*; namely, *what becomes ſuch creatures as we are*, what the ſtate of "the caſe requires, or the contrary." Pref to Sermons, p. 27.

Here then morality is founded upon human nature, conſidered as a *ſyſtem or conſtitution*, and not *immediately* or ſolely upon a law, with the ſanction of rewards and puniſhments.

Again, having ſhown that this "human nature conſiſts in reaſon, appetites, paſſions, and "affections, conſidered as having a natural reſpect to each other, and being naturally ſubor-"dinate to the one ſuperior principle of reflection or conſcience," and thus ſhewing that "man hath the rule of right within himſelf, Butler puts this queſtion—"What obligations "are we under to attend to and follow it? I anſwer, ſays he, It has been proved that man "by his nature is a law to himſelf, without the particular diſtinct conſideration of the "poſitive ſanctions of that law, the rewards and puniſhments which we feel, and thoſe "which from the light of reaſon we have ground to believe are annexed to it. The "queſtion then carries its *own anſwer along with it*. Your obligation to obey this law "is *its being the law of your nature*. That your conſcience approves of and atteſts to ſuch "a courſe of action, is itſelf *alone* an obligation. Conſcience does not only offer itſelf to "ſhow us the way we ſhould walk in, but it likewiſe carries its own authority with it, that "it is our natural guide; the guide aſſigned us by the Author of our nature." Sermons, p. 49. The will then acts in obedience to the dictates of conſcience. It chuſes what conſcience pronounces right; but the choice is often made without reference to the *ſanctions* of an external law.

Jeremy Taylor, ſeems to have caught a glimpſe of the principle, which is ſo largely and ſo perſpicuouſly unfolded by Butler, when he ſays, "Since the order and "perfection of every creature is to do actions agreeable to the end and perfection of his "nature, it is a purſuance of the end of God and of his own felicity. Although to do

"ſo

" ſo is not virtue in beaſts, becauſe they are directed by an external principle, and them-
" ſelves chuſe it not; yet in *men* it is *virtue*, and it is obedience: and although it is natural
" to do ſo, and it is unnatural to do otherwiſe; yet becauſe it is alſo choſen in many
" inſtances, in them it is a virtue or a vice reſpectively: and though it be no emi-
" nent virtue to do ſo, yet it is a prodigious ſin to do otherwiſe; for ſins againſt nature
" are ordinarily and in moſt inſtances the worſt; which does demonſtrate that even things
" of nature and the actions of our prime appetites, when they can be conſidered and choſen,
" never can be indifferent." Doctor Dubitantium, p. 759.

The firſt and great commandment is the love of God: but to love God is right, and from the very conſtitution of the mind it is natural, independently of the command, and of the rewards annexed to it. " In reſpect to the love of God, ſays Butler, in the ſtricteſt
" and moſt confined ſenſe, we only offer and repreſent the happieſt object of an affection,
" ſuppoſed already in our mind. Some degree of goodneſs muſt be *previouſly* ſuppoſed:
" This always implies the love of itſelf, an affection to goodneſs: The higheſt, the ade-
" quate object of this affection is perfect goodneſs; which therefore we are to *love with all*
" *our heart, with all our ſoul, and with all our ſtrength.* Muſt we then, forgetting our own
" intereſt, as it were go out of ourſelves, and love God for his own ſake? No more
" forget your own intereſt, no more go out of yourſelves, than when you prefer one place,
" one proſpect, the converſation of one man to that of another. Does not every affection
" neceſſarily imply that the object of it be itſelf loved? If it be not, 'tis not the object of
" the affection. You may and ought if you can, but it is a great miſtake to think you can,
" love or fear or hate any thing, from conſideration that ſuch love or fear or hatred may be
" a means of obtaining good or avoiding evil. But the queſtion, whether we ought to love
" God for his ſake or for our own, *being a mere miſtake in language*; the real queſtion which
" this is *miſtaken* for, will, I ſuppoſe, be anſwered by obſerving that the goodneſs of God
" already exerciſed towards us, our preſent dependence upon him, and our expectation of
" future benefits, ought and have a natural tendency to beget in us the affection of gratitude
" and greater love towards Him, than the ſame goodneſs exerciſed towards others, were it
" only for this reaſon, that every affection is moved in proportion to the ſenſe we have of
" the object of it: and we cannot but have a more lively ſenſe of goodneſs when exer-
" ciſed towards ourſelves, than when exerciſed towards others. I added expectation of
" future benefits, becauſe the ground of that expectation is preſent goodneſs." Sermons, p. 277.

Upon this important ſubject, the ſentiments of ſo great a writer as Butler are of the higheſt moment, and therefore I ſhall point out another inſtance in which his mode of reaſoning does *not* lie open to the objection of Mr. Hume. " If, ſays he, we are conſtituted ſuch
" ſort of creatures, as from our very nature, to feel certain affections or movements of
" mind, upon the ſight or contemplation of the meaneſt inanimate part of the creation, for
" the flowers of the field have their beauty; certainly there muſt be ſomewhat due to Him
" himſelf, who is the author and cauſe of all things; who is more intimately preſent to
" us than any thing elſe can be, and with whom we have a nearer and more conſtant inter-
" courſe than we can have with any creature; there muſt be ſome movements of mind and
" heart which correſpond to His perfections, or of which thoſe perfections are the natural
" object. And thus, when we are commanded to *love the Lord our God with all our heart,*
" *and with all our mind, and with all our ſoul*; ſomewhat more muſt be meant, than merely
that

" that we live in the hope of rewards, or fear of punifhments from Him; fomewhat more " than this muft be intended: though thefe regards themfelves are moft juft and reafonable, " and abfolutely neceffary to be recollected, in fuch a world as this." Pref. to Sermons p. 31.

Similar, though not intirely the fame, is the language of Jeremy Taylor: " No man " can be loved for himfelf; our perfections in this world cannot reach fo high; it is well " if we would love God at that rate, and I very much fear, that if God did us no good, we " might admire His beauties, but we fhould have but a fmall proportion of love towards " Him; and therefore it is, that God, to endear the obedience, that is, the love of his " fervants, fignifies what benefits he gives us, what great good things he does for us. *I am* " *the Lord God that brought thee out of the land of Egypt:* and *does Job ferve God for nought?* " And *he that comes to God muft believe that He is, and that He is a rewarder*; all his other " greatneffes are objects of fear and wonder, it is his goodnefs that makes him lovely." Sermons, p. 646.

In the view of both thefe writers, not *only* the *abfolute* and *general*, but the *relative* and *particular* goodnefs of God, and the effects of the latter too, in that which we receive from him here, as well as that which we expect from him hereafter, in that which we know, as well as believe, in that which we experience in his works, as well as learn from his word, are repreſented as being in part the foundation of our love to him. Here then it may be objected " fo far as a courfe of behaviour, materially virtuous, proceeds from hope and fear, fo far " it is only a difcipline and ftrengthening of felf-love." The anfwer which Butler makes to this queftion, deferves to be weighed moft ſeriouſly, for it is not at variance either with the language, or the fentiments, or the experience of mankind, and has no leſs tendency to make them good, virtuous and happy, than any principles inculcated in any fyſtem of philoſophy, which has fallen within my notice. " Doing what God commands, becauſe " he commands it, is obedience, though it proceeds from hope or fear. And a courſe of " ſuch obedience will form habits of it. And a conſtant regard to veracity, juſtice, and " charity may form diſtinct habits of theſe particular virtues; and will certainly form habits " of ſelf-government and of denying our inclinations, whenever veracity, juſtice, or charity " requires it. Nor is there any foundation for this great nicety, with which ſome affect to " diſtinguiſh in this caſe, in order to depreciate all religion, proceeding from hope or fear. " For, veracity, juſtice, and charity, regard to God's authority and to our own chief " intereſt, are not only all three coincident, but each of them is, in itſelf, a juſt and natural " motive or principle of action. And he who begins a good life from any one of them, " and perſeveres in it, as he is already in ſome degree, ſo he cannot fail of becoming more " and more of that character, which is correſpondent to the conſtitution of nature as moral; " and to the relation which God ſtands in to us as moral governor of it, nor conſequently can " he fail of obtaining that happineſs which this conſtitution and relation neceſſarily ſup- " poſe connected with that character." Analogy, p. 147.

Mr. Hume, as I infer from ſeveral ſtriking marks of coincidence between his opinion and Butler's, in the Eſſay upon Benevolence, was not unacquainted with the writings of our Prelate. If he had adverted to the paſſages juſt now quoted, he would either have qualified his propoſitions upon the excluſive regard which theologians are ſaid to pay to the ſanctions of reward and puniſhment, or he would have ſpoken of Butler as a ſplendid exception to their

their practice. If his reading had been extended to Barrow, Taylor, and many other Engliſh divines, he would have found more exceptions; and even without feeling any conviction from their arguments upon queſtions of faith, he would not have ſpoken ſo unhandſomely of their knowledge in the ſcience of Ethics.

Many of my readers will be glad to contraſt the temperate and ſerious opinions of Dr. Fergusſon, with the harſh and exaggerated ſtatement of Mr. Hume.

" Power employed to determine the will of a free agent muſt operate in preſenting motives " of choice; in preſenting happineſs as the *reward* of fidelity, and miſery as the *puniſhment* " of neglect; and, whether this be done by ſo ordering the nature of things, that virtue ſhall " be its own reward, and vice its own puniſhment; or whether it be done by a ſubſequent " act of will and diſcretion, in rewarding the good and puniſhing the wicked, in a way not " previouſly connected with the part they have acted, the *reality* of the obligation and the " ſanction is the ſame: for if, in the nature of things moral good be conſtituent of happi- " neſs, and moral evil of miſery, what can Almighty power do more to determine the choice " of the one, and the rejection of the other? If we conceive any ſanction of moral law as " different from this, it muſt however terminate in the *ſame effect*. * * *

" If it ſhould be thought neceſſary to conſider moral law as the command of a Superior, " this may be done without departing from that original doctrine of nature we have ſtated— " that *moral good is the ſpecific excellence and felicity of human nature, and moral depravity its* " *ſpecific defect and wretchedneſs*. * * *

" The Sovereign of the univerſe, by having made things as they are, has given his *com-* " *mand*, and promulgated his *law* in behalf of morality; and in every inſtance of confor- " mity to his law, and in every infraction of it, continues to apply the ſanction of happi- " neſs and miſery." * * * * *

" In chuſing what is morally good, it is happy to know that we obey our Creator; and " in obeying our Creator, it is happy to know that what he commands is the ſpecific good, " and felicity of our nature. To *ſeparate* theſe conſiderations were doubtleſs of *ill effect*, " and the ſanctions of morality would be *leſs* powerful upon either principle *apart*, than they " are upon the foundation of *both united*. Merely to obey without a ſenſe of goodneſs and " rectitude in the command, would be greatly ſhort of that duty which we owe to our bene- " ficent Maker; and the love of virtue is no doubt greatly encouraged by the conſideration, " that Almighty power, in the eſtabliſhed order of things, is exerted in its favour." Fergusſon's Principles of Moral and Political Science, page 170—1.

" Man is formed for religion, as well as ſociety. He is capable of perceiving univerſal " intelligence in the fabric of the univerſe. He perceives in the predilection for juſtice and " innocence, in the horrours at guilt which are impreſſed on his own mind, the *will* of that " ſovereign authority which reigns in the ſyſtem of nature. To him the conſciouſneſs of in- " tegrity and goodneſs is peace and amity with God: The conſciouſneſs of depravity and " wickedneſs is rebellion and enmity; the one rendering exiſtence itſelf a bleſſing in the " confidence of preſent and future protection; the other rendering life itſelf a curſe under " the horrours of preſent remorſe, and the fear or apprehenſion of future and impending " evils. Such is religion in the form of mere reflection as it operates in the mind; in the " form of a public eſtabliſhment it operates in the manner of compulſory law, with the de- " nunciations of future puniſhment, and the hopes of future reward." Page 176.

Numerous and weighty indeed are the reaſons, which induce far the greater part of enlightened

lightened Chriſtians to believe that the ſcriptural paſſages in which ἡ τῆς κρίσεως ἡμέρα, or, what is ſometimes* equivalent, ἡ ἡμέρα is mentioned, ſhould be interpreted literally, and that the rewards and puniſhments of another life will be diſpenſed judicially. There are, however, ſome perſons, who, with equal ſolicitude for the intereſts of virtue, and equal reverence for the authority of Scripture, contend, that the well known principle of ἀνθρωποπάθεια may be applied to ſuch paſſages, and that the juſtice of the Deity will be adminiſtered by a regular ſeries of cauſes and effects, producing happineſs to the righteous, and miſery to the wicked.

But, knowing the force of imagination upon opinion, and of cuſtom upon practice, I ſhould myſelf deprecate any *change*† in the language of public inſtruction; and leaving men of

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* 2 Cor. i. 14. Phil. i. 6, 10. 1 Theſſ. v. 2. Vid. Schleuſner and Schwarz in voce.

† A ſimilar caution upon another ſubject is ſhewn by the learned Author of the Treatiſe upon Obligation, prefixed to the Abridgement of Dr. Taylor's Elements of Civil law. In p. 6, he describes "Reaſon "as the faculty which enables us to perceive the various relations which ideas bear to each other." This doubtleſs is the moſt preciſe ſenſe of the word, and in this ſenſe it is uſed by Mr. Hume, as appears in a former note. But the author, of whom I am now ſpeaking, further allows, what Mr. Hume omits, and Dr. Reid properly maintains, that, "by reaſon many perſons mean not only that faculty of the mind "which enables us to perceive the relations between ideas, but alſo thoſe rules of prudence which guide "us to happineſs, or that voice of conſcience which points out our duty." Page 22. In page 55, alſo, he mentions the proper ſenſe "according to which Reaſon enables us to perceive relations between ideas," and the improper but popular ſenſe in which it "often ſtands for a ſentiment of obligation, an approbation of virtue, or a deſire of happineſs." But, in page 28 he tells us, that "Divines and moraliſts "who are to adapt their diſcourſes to popular language, *do well* in aſcribing a life of virtue to reaſon, "and laying the blame of all the faults we commit on our paſſions; becauſe thoſe to whom they chiefly "addreſs themſelves, as he had already obſerved, mean, by reaſon, a deſire of happineſs, or a ſenſe of "duty, and by paſſions, thoſe appetites which cannot be gratified but at the expence of one of theſe. "Nor does there ariſe any *inconvenience* from this miſuſe of theſe words; nay, as they can plead long "*preſcription* for having been *received* in theſe ſenſes in common life, one would not chooſe in ſome "caſes to *hazard* the *innovation* of confining them to their ſtrict philoſophical meaning."

The diſtinction which this writer makes between Reaſon and Senſation, as the latter word is explained in page 7, appears to me more exact in the terms, than Mr. Hume's diſtinction between reaſon and ſentiment. I further grant, that obligation when traced to its firſt principles, muſt be reſolved into ſenſation, as the word is employed by this Author. I accede likewiſe to his diſtinction between the *primary* ſenſe of the word Obligation, according to which we as ſocial creatures are influenced by benevolence, and as religious creatures, by gratitude, and the *ſecondary* ſenſe, according to which we in both characters are actuated by a regard to our own welfare. The concluſion of the Treatiſe is ſo connected with the ſubject of this note, and the *purpoſe* for which I have written it, that I ſhall produce the whole: "There "is ſuch an entire conformity between the laws of God, the happineſs of each individual, and the com-"mon good, and ſo difficult is it for us to *ſeparate* theſe ſentiments of love and gratitude, which ariſe "from contemplating the goodneſs of God, from that fear which his power occaſions, that we cannot "reflect upon the divine commands without being forcibly influenced by both theſe motives, and feel "ourſelves under an obligation in both ſenſes of that word to practiſe them. But ſtill, whether the "Supreme Being, or a future ſtate, is the object of our conſideration, the province of reaſon is ex-"actly the ſame as it is in any other matter; ſhe only preſents the different relations which ideas bear "to each other, and connects together different propoſitions, how many ſteps ſoever there may be be-

"tween

of ſolid learning and profound reflection to their own views on the ſubject, I would recommend to their ſerious attention the concluſion of Hutcheſon's chapter De Intellectu Divino.

" Quum tanta pietate curaque religioſa, ne quid Dei virtutibus derogetur, moveri videantur, contrariarum in hac ardua quæſtione ſententiarum patroni; a maledictis, contumeliis, iracundis contentionibus, et odiis, abſtineant, neque inter ſe convicia, philoſophia indigna, jactent." Synopſ. Metaphyſic. page 106.

Gaſſendi was not a divine. But upon the beauty and utility of virtue and piety he has delivered ſome opinions, to which the enlightened divines of the church of England will not, I am ſure, refuſe their aſſent. And as thoſe opinions are ſo cloſely connected with the ſubject which I am now conſidering, I will produce them at full. " Ne ſpecialia plura conſecter, id attingo ſolum, quòd reputant multi virtuti nimium detrahi, dum eſſe dicitur propter aliud. Inferunt enim exinde ſequi, ut virtus ſit in genere utilium, quod ab honeſtorum genere eſt diverſum; ſicque fore, ut propriè ipsâ dicamur uti, non frui, quòd fruitio non ſit, niſi earum rerum, quæ & propter ſe, & honeſtæ ſunt, quo modo ait Cicero *non parandam ſolum, ſed etiam fruendam ſapientiam eſſe*; dicente aliunde B. Auguſtino, *iniquum fieri hominem, cùm fruitur utendis, aut utitur fruendis.* Veruntamen, ut concedatur quicquid eſt propter aliud, poſſe quodammodo dici utile; negatur tamen quicquid eſt utile, ad illiberale illud genus ſpectare in quo pecunia primas tenet, et honeſto opponitur; quatenus ipſum quoque honeſtum ſuam utilitatem, verùm liberalem ſortitur; cùm Cicero etiam aliique demonſtrent nihil verè utile eſſe, niſi id, quod honeſtum eſt. Quare et cùm ex hoc genere habebitur virtus, nihil ipſi propterea decedet, neque aut dicemur eâ uti, eo modo, quo uti dicimur pecuniâ; neque non frui, eo modo quo quavis re honeſta frui dicimur, dum ex ea capimus voluptatem. Favet certè idem S. Doctor, cùm verba ipſius alio loco hæc ſunt: *Frui dicimur ea re, de qua capimus voluptatem*;

" tween them; for after having shewn, by a long deduction from our own existence, that there is a " God, and what his will is, there she must give over, and leave it to the sensations of gratitude, or " fear, to induce every one to practise it, and the sermons of all our divines fully prove what I advance; " for after they have shewn, either by the Christian revelation, or the structure of man, and this mate- " rial system, what are the divine commands; do they suppose they have done all that is incumbent on " them? or, that by having convinced the understanding they have influenced the practice? No, they " apply at least to these two sensations, and endeavour to make you virtuous, either by exciting your " gratitude, by displaying the goodness of God, or your fears, by shewing you what you will suffer " in consequence of being vicious."

All I have to observe on the foregoing paſſage is, that the goodness of the Deity, as it becomes the object of our gratitude, is manifested, not only in the bleſſings which he has bestowed upon us in this life, but in the prospect which he has opened to us of a future state, whether by reason, or by revelation. Hence, in the mind of a religionist, the motives to action are *complex*; for, with piety, with benevolence, with a general sense of duty, and a general love of rectitude, are mingled the suggestions of calm self-love in the desire of attaining, and the apprehenſion of losing, that happiness, which is reserved for the righteous. A Christian teacher ought, therefore, to avail himself from *every* quarter, of man as he *is*, and of things relative to man, as they *are*—to employ *every* cause which is adapted to every moral faculty of our nature—to make every *primary*, and every *secondary* obligation, instrumental in promoting our moral improvement—to engage the judgment, the affections, and the imagination, upon the side of virtue—to draw forth topics of conviction and persuasion from the past, the present, and the future—to warm his hearers with gratitude, to animate them with hope, and to restrain them by fear.

" *voluptatem*; *utimur ea, quam referimus ad id, unde voluptas capiendu est. Omnis itaque* " *humana perverſio est, quod etiam vitium vocatur, fruendis uti velle, atque utendis frui.* Et " rursùs: *omnis ordinatio, quæ virtus etiam nominatur, fruendis frui & utendis uti*; *fruendum* " *est autem honestis, utendum vero utilibus, &c.*

" At inquies, id, quod universè de virtute dicitur, dici-ne etiam poteſt de ipſa pietate in " divinum numen? ſi quidem non videtur poſſe ſincera eſſe pietas, niſi Deus purè ac " præciſe propter ſeipſum & ametur, quia infinitè bonus ſit, & colatur, quia infinitè excel- " lat; nullatenus verò qui amat, & colit, ad ſe ſuumve commodum ſuamque voluptatem " reſpiciat. Ego verò, abſit pietati cujuſquam detractum contendam. Cum ſint, qui " non modò id faciendum ſuadeant, (fierique adeò poſſe ſupponant) ſed etiam, ut fidem " quærant dogmati, objectionemque præoccupent, *ſe* id facere confidant, & jactent: ipſe " ſanè neque invideo, neque contradico; quin etiam & probo, & exoſculor eam beati- " tatem, quâ ſeu ipſi, ſeu alii tantam cœlitus gratiam conſequuntur. Scilicet hoc divinum " donum, ac *ſupra* naturam reputandum eſt, ut quis ſe ad Deum hac ratione amandum, " colendumque accingere poſſit. Aſt *hic* agitur de pietate, ſeu universè de virtute, quæ " *ſecundum naturam eſt, juxta quam quicquid homo agit, quodam cum reſpectu ad ſeipſum agit.* " An liceat verò addere *Deum* ita ſeſe huic naturæ infirmitati *accommodaſſe*, ut cum in " *ſacris literis* vix ullum exſtet monumentum, quo illud iſtorum dogma exprimatur, " creberrima tamen occurrant quibus commendantur, qui *Deum ideo* multum amant, quia " multa peccata dimiſit, multumve gratiæ contulit; qui & diligunt propter *ſpem*, quæ " ipſis repoſita in cœlis eſt; & officia varia charitatis exercent, & perſequutionem pati- " untur, fidem ſervant, &c. ob *regnum ſibi præparatum* ab ipſa mundi conſtitutione, ob " *mercedem* copioſam, quæ in cœlis manet; ob coronam juſtitiæ, quam Deus diligentibus " ſe repromiſit, &c. Ex quibus, aliiſque effici videtur, non improbari, ſi quis reſpiciat " ad æternas illas delicias, quibus eſt futurum, ut olim, ſi Deum amârit, coloeritque, " fruatur.

" Nam et quod filium, potiuſque ſervum in divina familia deceat agere; non obſtat, " quin dicere liceat, ideo filium amplius amare parentem, quam ſervus amet Dominum; " quia et amplius ab eo accepit, et inſuper hæreditatem accepturum ſe ob eo ſperat. " Alioquin certe ſi ab eo exhæredatum iri pernoſſet, et ſervus ſe hæredem iri inſtitutum " conſideret: quæſo utrius amor futurus eſſet vehementior? Ac non teſtor quidem " iſtorum conſcientiam quid acturi eſſent, ſi Deus amari, et coli, contentus nihil prorſus " ipſos amatores, cultoreſque ſui curaret; nihil beneficii, illis conferret; nullum tota " æternitate ſperandum bonum faceret? Nimirum quaſi agnituri, reſponſurique bona " fide ſint, nihilo-ne minus amantes, veneranteſque Dei forent. Velim ſolum grave non " ſit, ſi rogentur, id-ne ſaltem non faciant, quia Deum ea ratione amare, ipſique " ſervire *ſuaviſſimum* ſit; ſuaviſſimumque adeo ducant mentem ſic habere in Deum " comparatam; ut ob ipſum plane, nullo vero modo ſui causâ faciant. *Suavitas hæc* certe " ab EO non excluditur, qui ſuave eſſe clamat jugum ſuum, hoc eſt, legem ſuam, cujus " caput eſt, ut ex toto corde, ex tota anima, ex tota mente, ex totis viribus diligamus " Deum." (Tom. ii. page, 710) It were an abuſe of language to ſay, that the influence of Religion, as ſtated by Gaſſendi, that gratitude for favours perſonally received, and the hope of bleſſedneſs to be perſonally enjoyed hereafter, are proofs of ſelfiſhneſs. Unqueſtionably they point to objects related to ſelf—to the gratifications of ſelf—to calm

ſelf love, or the general deſire of happineſs—to the particular affections of gratitude and hope excited by particular objects. But they are not inſtances of ſelfiſhneſs, or that vicious regard to our own good, which makes us neglect or oppoſe the good of others. For ſuch a creature as man, not to feel that gratitude, would be an imperfection, and even a crime. Not to feel that hope would alſo be an imperfection, and in various circumſtances would weaken thoſe motives, which, by the very conſtitution of our nature incite us to right acts. Hope and gratitude are real *parts* of our nature, and they concur with other parts in moving us to fill up the meaſure of our duty, and to obtain the happineſs of which we are capable by that nature.

Hitherto we have been ſpeaking of the connection which the love of God has, or has not, with the conſideration of rewards. In reſpect to the love of our neighbour, I ſhall endeavour to guide the reader to that which he ought to know, and though the words are not taken from a profeſſed theologian, they were written by a man of diſtinguiſhed piety, and they are founded upon principles of which the moſt learned and orthodox Chriſtian will hardly diſapprove. " That deſire of the good of others which we approve as virtuous, " cannot be alledged to be voluntarily raiſed from the proſpect of any pleaſure accompanying " the affection itſelf, nay, it is often attended with pain when the object is in diſtreſs." Hutcheſon's Inquiry concerning moral Good and Evil, p. 139, ſee alſo p. 141, 2, and 149, 50.

" We do not by an act of our will, raiſe in ourſelves that benevolence which we " approve as virtuous, with a view to obtain future pleaſures of *ſelf-approbation* by our moral " ſenſe." What will moſt effectually convince us of the truth of this point, is reflection " upon our own hearts, whether we have not a *deſire* of the good of others, generally " without any conſideration or intention of obtaining theſe *pleaſant reflections* on our own " virtue: nay, often this deſire is ſtrongeſt where we leaſt imagine virtue, in *natural* " *affection* toward offspring, and in gratitude to a great benefactor; the *abſence* of which " is indeed, the greateſt *vice*, but the affections themſelves are not eſteemed in any con- " ſiderable degree virtuous. The ſame reflection will alſo convince us, that theſe deſires " or affections are not produced by *choice*, with a view to obtain this private good. In like " manner, if no *volition* of ours can directly raiſe affections from the former proſpects " of intereſt, no more can any *volition* raiſe them from proſpects of *eternal rewards*, or to " avoid *eternal puniſhments*. The former motives differ from theſe only as ſmaller from " greater, ſhorter from more durable. If affections could be directly raiſed by *volition*, the " ſame conſideration would make us *angry* at the moſt innocent or virtuous character, and " *jealous* of the moſt faithful and affectionate, or *ſorrowful* for the proſperity of a friend; " which we all find to be impoſſible. *The proſpect of a future ſtate may, no doubt, have a* " *greater indirect influence, by turning our affection to the qualities in the objects naturally apt to* " *raiſe the acquired affection, than any other conſideration.*" Ib. p. 140—42 Again—" If " any one ſhould aſk, ſince none of theſe motives of ſelf-intereſt excite our benevolence, " but we are in virtuous actions intending ſolely the good of others, to what purpoſe ſerves " our *moral ſenſe*, our *ſenſe of pleaſures from the happineſs of others?* to what purpoſe ſerves " the *wiſe order of nature*, by which virtue is even made generally advantageous in this " life? To what end are *eternal rewards* appointed and revealed? The anſwer to theſe " queſtions was given partly already: all theſe motives may make up deſire to have *benevolent* " *affections*, and conſequently turn our *attention* to thoſe qualities in objects which excite " them;

" them; they may overbalance all apparently *contrary motives*, and all temptations to vice. " But farther, I hope it will be ſtill thought an end worthy of the DEITY, to make the " virtuous happy by a wiſe conſtitution of nature, whether the virtues were in every " action intending to obtain this happineſs or not. Beneficent actions tend to the public " good, it is therefore good and kind to give all poſſible *additional motives* to them; and to " excite men who have ſome weak degrees of good *affection*, to promote the public good " more vigorouſly by motives of *ſelf-interest*; or even to excite thoſe who have no virtue " at all to external *acts of beneficence*, and to reſtrain them from vice." Ib. 149, 150.

I have made theſe quotations very ample, becauſe I wiſhed to do juſtice to the opinions of the ingenious and amiable writer; and with great ſatisfaction I ſhall add from him the following note. " Let it be alſo remembered, that every conſideration ſuggeſted in the " Goſpel, as an *additional motive* to beneficent actions, is not immediately to be looked upon " as the *proper motive* to virtue, or what would engage our approbation of actions flowing " from it alone. Whoever would appeal to the general ſtrain of Chriſtian exhortations will " find *diſinterested love* more inculcated, and *motives of gratitude* more frequently ſuggeſted " than any others." Ib. p. 150, 51

It were ſufficient to evince by *one* illuſtrious inſtance, the truth of Mr. Hutcheſon's obſervation.

" Finally, brethren, ſays the Apoſtle, whatſoever things are true, whatſoever things are " honeſt, whatſoever things are juſt, whatſoever things are pure, whatſoever things are " lovely, whatſoever things are of good report: if there be any virtue, and if there be any " praiſe, think on theſe things." Ep. to the Philippians, iv, 8.

My intention through this long note, is to vindicate from miſrepreſentation the doctrine of rewards and puniſhments, as it is *really* laid down in the Scriptures, and as it has been *really* explained by wiſe and learned Theologians. The reſult upon the whole is this. It is a part of our preſent condition to be the ſubjects of future rewards and puniſhments. It is a part of our preſent nature to be influenced, and very ſtrongly too, by the hope of the one and the fear of the other: but that hope and that fear, however neceſſary they may be to regulate, do not obſtruct the proper energies of other parts of the ſame nature. They leave us to be actuated by the love of God and the love of our neighbour, in conſequence of regards quite diſtinct from the peculiar objects which they may themſelves preſent to our minds—They leave us to the complex feeling of admiration and love which we experience from the abſtract conſideration of the divine power, wiſdom, and goodneſs manifeſted in His general works—They leave us to an indirect feeling of gratitude, where we ſympathiſe with our fellow-creatures whom we conſider, together with ourſelves, as the objects of that divine goodneſs—They leave us to the exerciſe of all thoſe theopathetic affections, which are excited by our meditations upon the goodneſs of God, whereſoever, and howſoever it may have communicated happineſs to other beings—They leave us to return acts of beneficence merely from gratitude, and to perform acts of kindneſs merely from compaſſion. To the original and direct force of theſe affections, they bring an additional and diſtinct force of their own. But, becauſe man is deſigned for another life, his attention to the intereſt he has in that life is adapted to his actual ſituation here; and becauſe the intereſt itſelf is ſo very precious, the attention he pays to it cannot be too frequent or too earneſt.

In

In conformity to the principles, which this note is intended to illuſtrate, I have, in the earlier parts of my Diſcourſe, not merely explained the commands of Chriſtianity, but examined the tendencies both of our general and more limited affections, as they can be diſcovered in the conſtitution of our minds; and I have ſcarcely touched upon future rewards till the concluſion of my Diſcourſe. The thought of them, at this moment, makes a deep impreſſion upon my ſoul—May every reader ſympathize with me in that impreſſion, and receive in the laſt day the recompence of the juſt!

Glory of your God, page 24, line 9.

The duty of glorifying God has been miſrepreſented no leſs than the duty, which we conſidered in a former note, of acting from the expectation of reward. I will therefore lay before my readers what I think a very judicious ſtatement of it, in the words of Le Clerc, tranſlated by Moſheim in his notes upon Cudworth:—"Sacræ literæ nonnunquam Deum "dicunt ob gloriam ſuam agere et egiſſe aliquid: quod non ita capi debet, ac ſi finis ejus "primarius eſſet, rerum conditarum admirationem et laudes ſibi acquirere: nam hoc illud "eſt, quod inter homines gloriam Dei vocant: ſed hoc ſibi volunt ſacri ſcriptores, Deum, "quum finem ſuum ob oculos habet poſitum, ſeu, quod idem eſt, accommodate ad perfec-"tiones ſuas agit, neceſſario admirationem et laudes omnium naturarum intelligentium, "quæ quidem recte utuntur ratione ſua, ſibi comparare. Quin etiam Deus hominibus "laudes et gloriam ſuam, tanquam neceſſarium officium, imperat: non ideo, ac ſi laudibus "eorum egeret, aut felicitas ejus alienis laudibus augeri poſſet, ſed quo homines id agant, "quod ratio, qua inſtruxit eos, poſtulat, et iſta ratione ipſimet beati ac felices evadant. "Nullus enim homo, nulla gens veram conſequi poteſt felicitatem, niſi Deum illis, qui de-"bentur ipſi, honoribus afficiat: quod quidem, ſi res ita poſceret, facile oſtendi poſſet. "Igitur ob gloriam agere, et ideo agere, ut bonitatis divinæ alii participes fiant, duo fines "ſunt, qui nullo modo ſibi refragantur." Vol. ii. p. 589.

After many interruptions from many cauſes, and with the obliging, but precarious and irregular aid of five or ſix friends, when they were at leiſure to write what I dictated to them, or what I ſet before them, I am now arrived at the end of a labour, which I muſt confeſs, has been more irkſome to me than any effort I ever made in original compoſition. My activity, however, and I may add, my patience, were ſupported through every ſtage of it, by the deſire which I felt to place before my readers the deciſions of the moſt approved authors on the moſt uſeful queſtions; and by the hope which I entertained, that the curioſity of ſome, and the induſtry of others, might be excited to a fuller peruſal of the works to which I have referred them. Moſt of thoſe authors have, indeed, been long familiar to me, and the coincidence of their ſentiments with thoſe of each other and with my own, was ſo frequent, that I ſometimes found it more difficult to determine what I ſhould omit, than what I ſhould produce.

From the celebrity of Mr. Hume's name, the depth of his reſearches, the acuteneſs of his reaſonings, the felicity of his illuſtrations, the captivating beauties of his ſtile, and the amiable

amiable qualities of his heart, a ſuſpicion has ariſen, that his opinions about religion are very widely diffuſed among the more enlightened inhabitants of North Britain. With peculiar ſatisfaction, therefore, I have endeavoured to ſhew incidentally, from the writings of *Adam Smith and Dugald Stewart, that on the queſtion concerning the Being of a God, thoſe two great men, are neither advocates for ſcepticiſm with their illuſtrious countryman, nor zealots for infidelity with the later philoſophers of France. On the contrary, they diſtinguiſh, as Mr. Hume rarely does, between the ſober advances of Theologians in the broad and beaten road of common ſenſe; and their haſt yſtrides in the obſcure and winding bye-paths of Metaphyſics. They ſeparate, as the French Philoſophers ſeldom do, ſuperſtition, which muſt enfeeble and debaſe the mind, from religion, which ought to invigorate and exalt it. They ſeem to conſider the belief of a Deity, not only as warranted in its proofs, by the phenomena of nature, but as favourable in its effects to the happineſs and moral improvement of mankind. They aſſign to Theiſm, not only the truth of a doctrine, but the energy of a ſentiment, and the comprehenſiveneſs of a principle. They admit, not only the capacity of the human underſtanding to infer the exiſtence of a God from his works, but the propenſity of the human heart to view him as the Governour and Judge, as well as the Creator of the world, to do him homage by acts of reverential and grateful adoration, to look upon his will as a rule of action, to feel in his diſpleaſure, an object of moſt alarming, but ſalutary fear, and to rejoice in the hope of his favour, as animating our ſtrongeſt affections, and nobleſt faculties in the purſuit of virtue. As to the Works of Dr. Reid, they, I ſuppoſe, like thoſe of Dr. Beattie, are more generally known in this country, than Smith's "Theory of Moral Sentiments," or Stewart's "Elements of the Philoſophy of the Human "Mind;" and I am ſure, that the greater part of my readers have long anticipated me in

* Having frequently quoted Dr. Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments, I am glad to ſtate that Dr. Hutton allows Sympathy "*to be* a principle, and to have been ſucceſsfully employed as ſuch in "the formation of Moral Sentiments, though he doubts whether it be a *firſt* principle, endeavours to "trace it up to thoſe inſtinctive paſſions and actions which cannot be farther underſtood, and de-"ſcribes it as a rational progreſs of the human mind, proceeding upon conſcious principles." Vol. iii. page 252.

For the fuller confirmation of my opinion about the philoſophers of Scotland, I would refer the reader to Dr. Hutton's Inveſtigation of the Principles of Knowledge, in Part III. Section I. chap. ii. iii. Section IV. chap. i. Section VII. chap. i. ii. iii. iv; and to Dr. Ferguſon's Principles of Moral and Political Science, Part II. chap. ii; and Section VIII. and chap. v. Section IV. "Where piety "to Almighty God is repreſented as a modification of benevolence juſtly entitled to the firſt and the "higheſt place." The writings of Dr. Gregory, ſenior, are extenſively read in England, and do credit to the ingenuity, the ſenſibility, and the piety of the author. Though my mind was vigouroufly exerciſed, rather than ultimately convinced, by the elaborate work of Dr. Gregory, junior, upon Liberty and Neceſſity, I feel great reſpect for him as a very acute reaſoner, and a very inſtructive moraliſt. Let me add, ὁ πᾶς ἀνὴρ, that the ſtyle in his Conſpectus Medicinæ Theoreticæ is perſpicuous and elegant.

Among the Latin compoſitions which have come forth from the Univerſities of Scotland, ſince the time of Dr. Hutcheſon, I have ſeen none ſo diſtinguiſhed by the beſt effects of early practice and well-formed taſte, ſo accurate in the choice of phraſeology, ſo eaſy in the ſtructure of the ſentences, and ſo harmonious in the cadence of the periods, as the writings of Dr. Gregory, junior, and Profeſſor Dalziel.

any

any teſtimony which I might be diſpoſed to pay, to their ingenuity, or their liberality, or their piety.

For the uſe which I have made of ſome authors, who are generally and perhaps juſtly believed not to look with a very favourable eye on the evidences of revelation, no apology can be neceſſary to the diſpaſſionate, and to the uncandid none would be ſatisfactory. They who ſpeak truth, howſoever diſcovered, have a right to be heard—they who aſſiſt others in diſcovering it, have the yet higher claim to be applauded; and ſurely, upon the propriety of any practice recommended by reaſon, as well as inculcated in the Scriptures, the teſtimony of ſuppoſed Deiſts is not leſs weighty among the impartial, nor leſs acceptable to the ſerious, than that of profeſſed Chriſtians. Paſſion, I am afraid, influences ſpeculation, as well as conduct, and the conſequence is, that prejudices are transferred from perſons to things; that diſcuſſion aſſumes the fierceneſs and the obſtinacy of altercation; and that victory is purſued as more precious than truth. Such muſt ever be the caſe, while the infirmity or the malignity of men is permitted to turn their thoughts ſo eagerly, and to fix them ſo ſtiffly, on the points in which they *differ*—I rejoice, therefore, that the object I had in view was ſuch as naturally led my attention towards a variety of topics, upon which the wiſer and the greater part of the authors to whom I had recourſe were fortunate enough to *agree*.

I diſdain to avert any imputation of pedantry, which the illiterate or the petulant may throw upon the paſſages which I have occaſionally introduced from the writers of antiquity. Conſcious I am not of any unbecoming arrogance, in acknowledging that much of my time has been employed in the peruſal of their works; and for the application of their opinions to a ſubject which is eminently intereſting, I will aſſign a reaſon, the validity of which will hardly be diſputed by the wiſe and good—"Τὰ τῶν πρεσβυτέρων ἐπιχειρήματα, τὲς μὲν ἀργοὺς καὶ ἀφυεῖς ὅιον ἀναπάυει καὶ ἀναπίμπλησι, τοὶς δὲ φιλοπόνοις καὶ φιλολόγοις, ἀρχὴν ἐνδίδωσιν οἰκείαν καὶ τόλμαν ἐπὶ τὸ ζητεῖν καὶ ἀνιχνεύειν τὴν ἀληθείαν." Plut. Sympoſ. vol. ii. lib. vi. page 694. edit. Xylan

So far as the merit of mere *expreſſion* is concerned in the numerous and ample quotations which occur in theſe Notes, ſenſible as I am of the excellence of other writers, and of my own defects, I rejoice to ſay in the words of Callimachus—"μῦθος δ' οὐκ ἐμὸς ἀλλ' ἑτέρων."

But

While this ſheet was in the preſs, I heard that the learned Dr. White had publiſhed Abdollatiph, of which I ſpoke in page 123; and it occurred to me, that my friend, Mr. George Dyer, was educated at Chriſt's Hoſpital, and that the names of Biſhop Butler, the late Mr. H. Brown, Dr. Bever, the Civilian, Dr. Nowel of St. Mary Hall, the late Dr. Hutchins of Lincoln, Dr. Bandinel of Oxford, Mr. Cox of King's College, Mr. Wiſhart of Trinity, Cambridge, Dr. Peckard of Magdalen, and Mr. Frend of Jeſus, ditto; Mr. Burdon and the late Meſſrs. Blackall and H. Homer of Emanuel; and Sir E. Law (now Attorney General), ſhould have been inſerted in the liſt of thoſe perſons, who in my life-time have done honour to our Univerſities. After all my efforts to do juſtice to my contemporaries, I muſt ſay of my catalogue of our academical worthies, what Fabricius ſaid upon another occaſion—"Plures aliorum induſtria facile adjiciet." B. G. R. vol. i. page 502. Edit. Harles.

I ought to apologiſe to the learned reader, for not having ſtated in page 84, that the military ſervices of Socrates, for which I have quoted the teſtimony of D. Laertius, are controverted by Athenæus, in chapters 4 and 15, of book v. But the futility and injuſtice of Athenæus's objections, will be obvious to any one who reads the notes of Menagius and Caſaubon, upon ſections 22 and 23, liber ii, of D. Laert. and Caſaubon's animadverſions upon Athenæus, liber v. chap. 15, where the ſubject is profeſſedly and largely diſcuſſed.

But I do not wiſh to be ſheltered from reſponſibility for the *matter* contained in them, becauſe I have not ventured, explicitly, or by implication, to approve of any paſſage which did not appear to me likely, either to elucidate ſome important doctrine, or to enforce ſome neceſſary duty. Be it obſerved, however, that both in my own Diſcourſe, and in the Notes to it, I diſclaim all intention of amuſing the reader with unſubſtantial refinements, and unprofitable novelties. Yet, if my own opinions, or the arguments I have employed to juſtify them from other writers, ſhould anſwer any of the purpoſes to which they are directed—If they ſhould throw any light upon the connection which ſubſiſts between ſound morality and pure religion—If they ſhould facilitate the progreſs of any one human being in wiſdom without cauſtiſtry, benevolence without ſingularity, and piety without ſuperſtition, I ſhall confidently affirm with Jeremy Taylor, that "no man ought to be offend-"ed, becauſe a Sermon," or even Notes upon a Sermon, "are not like curious enquiries "after new nothings, but purſuances of old truths." See Epiſtle dedicatory to Taylor's Diſcourſes.

For the paſſages, which occaſionally allude to general Politics, as *connected* with Morality and Religion, my apology ſhall be offered in the words of Sir William Temple—

"Under favour of thoſe who would paſs for wits in our age, *by ſaying things, which Da-*
"*vid tells us, the fool ſaid in his*; and ſet up with bringing thoſe wares to market, which, God
"knows, have been always in the world, though kept up in corners, becauſe they uſed to
"mark their owners, in former ages, with the names of buffoons, profane or impudent
"men, who deride all form and order, as well as piety and truth, and under the notion of
"fopperies, endeavour to diſſolve the very bonds of all civil ſociety, though by the favour
"and protection thereof, they themſelves enjoy ſo much greater proportions of wealth and
"of pleaſures, than would fall to their ſhare, if all lay in common, as they ſeem to deſign,
"(for then ſuch poſſeſſions would belong of right to the ſtrongeſt and braveſt among us);
"Under favour of ſuch men, I believe it will be found, at one time or other, by all who
"ſhall try, that, whilſt human nature *continues what it is*, the ſame orders in State, the ſame
"diſcipline in armies, *the ſame reverence for things ſacred*, and reſpect of civil inſtitutions,
"the ſame virtues and diſpoſitions of Princes, or Magiſtrates, derived by intereſt, or imita-
"tion, into the cuſtoms and humours of the people, will ever have the ſame effects upon
"the ſtrength and greatneſs of all governments, and upon the honour and authority of thoſe
"that rule, as well as the happineſs and ſafety of thoſe that obey." Preface to Obſervations upon the United Provinces.

FINIS.

T. Gillet, Printer, Salisbury-ſquare.

ERRATA.

Page 4, *for* inſtitution *lege* inſtitutions. Page 6, *for* economy *lege* œconomy. Page 7, *for* harldy *lege* hardly. P. 11, *for* ſlaken *lege* ſlacken ; in line laſt, *lege* was, after, text. Page 15, *for* numerous *lege* various. Page 18, *for* bind *lege* binds ; *for* members *lege* numbers. Page 36, *for* Εργαζισθαι *lege* Εργαζεσθαι. Page 37, *for* τη *lege* τῇ ; *for* ἠκιστα *lege* ἥκιστα. Page 38, put a comma at διαφροντιζειν. Page 39, *for* U *lege* V. Pape 43, *for* ἐικοτως *lege* ἐικοτως ; *for* alius *lege* aliis. Page 45, *for* Helicarn *lege* Halicarn. Page 47, line 31, *for* δι before οὐ *lege* δἰ. Page 48, add more, before properly. Page 50, *for* ἀδιναται *lege* ἀδυνατων. Page 53, *for* τοχοντας *lege* τυχοντας ; *for* effect *lege* effects. Page 57, *for* σπεδαιος *lege* σπεδαιος. Page 57, *for* φιλωυτος *lege* φιλαυτος. Page 64, *for* difficilio *lege* difficilis ; put a comma at γυνικων. Page 65, *for* νοττιος *lege* νοτιος. Page 66, *for* ἀλλοτρους *lege* ἀλλοτριους ; *for* θεοφρωστος *lege* Θεόφραστος ; *for* φυοις *lege* φυσις. Page 72, *for* from, before want, *lege* by. Page 74, *for* principal *lege* principle. P. 76, *for* retirements *lege* refinements. P. 79, *for* penettans *lege* penetrans. Page 80, *for* χαυνὶς *lege* χαυνῆς. P. 81, *for* Conlertium *lege* Cornhertium ; *for* page 665 *lege* 655. Page 82, *for* recited *lege* cited ; add *a* before neceſſary. P. 83, *for* σ᾽φη *lege* ἔφη. P. 86, *for* Ehe *lege* The ; *for* διανίοιαν *lege* διάνοιαν. P. 87, *for* ὁμοεθνών *lege* ὁμοεθνῶν ; *for* ἐριδαντέων *lege* ἐριδαντέων ; *for* εἰμαντελικτέων *lege* ἱμαντιλικτέων ; *for* διδώσκοντες *lege* διδάσκοντες. P. 88, *for* ἀλλ᾽ ἢ *lege* ἀλλ᾽ ἤ ; *for* ἀρετὴ *lege* ἀρετή. P. 89, Dele marks of quotation at, The preceding. P. 94, *for* involuntary *lege* involuntarily ; *for* ἄμἐλει *lege* ἀμέλει. P. 96, *for* ὅτε *lege* ὅτι ; *for* numinis *lege* nominis. P. 99, *for* φῶν *lege* φῶν ; *for* μυρίάκις *lege* μυριάκις ; *for* excceſſive *lege* exceſſive ; *for* ἀρχὴν *lege* ἀρχήν. P. 100, *for* exſercus *lege* exſerens. P. 103, *for* unnatural *lege* connatural twice. P. 104, *for* recking *lege* reeking. P. 106, *for* Ἑλλὴν *lege* Ἕλλην. P. 109, *for* ἐμω *lege* ἐμῷ ; *for* Fawkener *lege* Falconer. P. 119, *for* ipſe cum *lege* cum ipſe. P. 131, *for* ὅτι *lege* ὅτι. P. 138, *for* τῆ τε περιβολῆ *lege* τῇ τε περιζολῇ. P. 140, *for* Canto *lege* Cento ; *for* contemnere *lege* contemnere. P. 141, *for* ἐστι *lege* ἐστί ; *for* cap. xiv. *lege* xv. Page 144, *for* Euthanaſiæ *lege* Euthanaſia ; *for* latter *lege* later. Page 146, *for* λογος *lege* λόγος. Page 148, *for* acknowledged *lege* acknowledge. Page 151, dele good, before virtuous. Page 160, *for* G. R. *lege* Græc. ; *for* 4, after chapters, *lege* 14.

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